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                                                        Abstract 
 
The time charter plays a very significant role in the practical shipping field. However, 
the time charterparty itself has attracted little consideration by researchers working in 
the field. In addition, there are still many legal issues that require resolution as it is 
possible to easily confuse merchants, leading to further practical disputes. 
 
This thesis explores the core characteristics of the time charter. It discusses crucial 
legal issues and aims to resolve potential legal disputes. It also considers key 
improvements to the relevant significant clauses in the current essential standard 
forms of the time charterparty by way of recommending revisions to clauses within 
various charterparties such as the BALTIME form, the NYPE 46 form, the NYPE 93 
form and the GENTIME form. The original contribution of this thesis is not only the 
modification of vital clauses in these essential forms for merchants, but also the 
provision of constructive ways of reforming the remaining clauses in these forms 
thereby providing a potential guiding framework for the revision of other standard 
charterparty forms in the future. 
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CHAPTER 1:  
INTRODUCTION 
------------------------------ 
 
1.1   Research Background 
 
The development of the time charter took place in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century.1 This was triggered when the duration of shipping 
became precisely predictable due to the dependable improvement of the 
triple enlargement of the engine resulting in an economical and reliable 
steamship.2 These attributes made paying for the service of the vessel for a 
period of time rather than on the basis of a voyage more desirable to the time 
charterer.3 In addition, when the time charter was established, demise 
(bareboat) charters4 became less popular within the shipping and finance 
industries than in the past.5  
 
The time-chartered vessel still plays an important role in modern commercial  
 
                                                          
1 The Albazero [1977] AC 774 [808] (Roskill, L.J.); Triad Shipping Co. v Stellar Chartering & 
Brokerage Inc. (The Island Archon) [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 227 [232] (Evans L.J.); Martin 
Stopford, Maritime Economics (3th edn, Routledge 2009) 50; See also Paul Todd, Maritime 
Fraud (Informa Professional 2003) 117-18.  
2 ibid. 
3 ibid. 
4 John F Wilson, Carriage of Goods by Sea (7th edn, Pearson Education Limited 2010) 7; 
Christopher Smith, ‘Time Charterparties’ in Bernard Eder and others (eds), Scrutton on 
Charterparties and Bills of Lading (22nd edn, Sweet and Maxwell Limited 2011) para 4-004. 
5 Todd (n 1) 118-19. 
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shipping practice and it can function as a sub-charter,6 a liner,7 or tramp 
vessel.8 The various types of time chartered vessels are designed for 
carrying different commodities.9 For example, a container is usually carried 
under the liner, and bulk carriers are able to transport dry cargo, such as 
coal, grains or iron ores.10 In addition, tankers are specially designed for 
carrying oil, gas and chemicals.11   
 
The time charterparty is one kind of charterparty.12 The general concepts 
relating to the time charterparty are described and explained in the following 
sections in order to initially build a general foundation and provide a clear 
and easy basis for the subsequent discussion of significant legal issues in 
the following chapters and guide the direction of this thesis.  
 
 
1.1.1 The governing law of the time charterparty 
 
The regulation 593/2008 (Rome I) replaces the Rome Convention13 and it 
applies to contractual obligation in commercial and civil issues in the 
                                                          
6 Charles Debattista, ‘Cargo Claims and Bills of Lading’ in Yvonne Baatz (ed), Maritime Law  
(2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2011); See the explanation in Section 6.7.1 in Chapter 6. 
7 The liner service might run between major ports. Wilson (n 4) 5; See Section 6.7.1 in 
Chapter 6. 
8  Wilson (n 4) 5. The time charted vessel might commercially operate the services of tramp 
vessels to sail from port to port in order to seek cargo. 
9 Dry Cargo Chartering (2011/2012 edn, Witherby Publishing Group Ltd 2011) 2, 82; Tanker 
Chartering (2011/2012 edn, Witherby Publishing Group Ltd 2011) 1-8. 
10 Dry Cargo Chartering (n 9) 2, 82.  Alan E. Branch, Elements of Shipping (8th edn, 
Routledge 2007) 5.  
11 Tanker Chartering (n 9) 1-8, 14-16, 111-112. 
12 Wilson (n 4) 3-4. 
13 This is “The Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations”. The Contract 
(Applicable Law) Act 1990 gives Rome Convention the force of law in England. Terence 
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occurrence of a conflict of laws.14 Therefore, with the exception of some 
issues15 currently the issue of applicable law regarding contractual claims is 
decided by Rome I.16 
 
It is provided in Article 3.1 of Rome I17 that the law is chosen by the 
contractual parties governing the contract.18 In addition, this choice must be 
‘expressly or clearly demonstrated by the terms of the contract or the 
circumstances of the case.’19 Therefore, for example, under Article 3.1 of the 
Rome I,20 if contractual parties under the time charter expressly choose 
English law as the governing law of their time charterparty, then their choice 
of law is valid.21 It can be seen that an expression of governing law chosen 
by the contractual parties under the time charter is usually provided either in 
the essential standard form of the time charterparty—such as Clause 22 of 
the BALTIME form,22 Clause 45 of the NYPE 93 form23 or Clause 22 of the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Coghlin and others, Time Charters (6th edn, Informa 2008) para 1.19; 
<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1990/36> accessed 27 September 2013. 
14 This refers to Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I). 
<http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/judicial_cooperation_in_ci
vil_matters/jl0006_en.htm> accessed 15 December 2013. 
15 ‘It does not apply to revenue, customs or administrative matters.’ See Jason Chuah, Law 
of International Trade: Cross-Border Commercial Transactions (5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 
2013) 723; See also Article 1 (2) of Rome I. 
16 Chuah (n 15) 723. 
17<http://eurlex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/ALL/;jsessionid=QkGST5jNtDV5hKJQ6qF5gxRql
2Z7bV2y7jVxyh2sn1NvdcjkvKC1!1948192893?uri=CELEX:32008R0593> accessed 15 
December 2013. 
18 Ibid; It is provided in Article 28 of Rome I that ‘The Regulation shall apply to contracts 
concluded after 17 December 2009’.  
19 Ibid; Under Article 3.1 of Rome I, the parties also can choose the law governing the whole 
or merely part of the contract. . 
20 ibid. 
21 ibid. 
22 The BALTIME form 1939 (as revised 2001). Unless otherwise specified, all reference to 
the BALTIEM form refer to the BALTIME form 1939 (as revised 2001). D. Rhidian Thomas 
(ed), Legal Issues Relating to Time Charterparties (Informa 2008) 288. 
23 Peter Brodie, Commercial Shipping Handbook (2nd edn, Informa 2006) 45. 
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GENTIME form24—or in the clause which is added under the agreement by 
the contractual parties.25 However, if any expression of governing law 
provision cannot be found in the time charterparty, the demand for arbitration 
of disputes in a specific place, such as London, is normally stipulated within 
an arbitration provision in the time charterparty.26 If London arbitration is 
chosen, English law is implied as the choice of governing law of the time 
charterparty.27 
 
For the purposes of clarity, the chapters of this thesis are primarily based on 
English law when discussing the issues relating to the time charterparty. 
 
 
1.1.2   Paramount clause 
 
A consideration of both Article I (b) and Article V of the Hague28 and Hague-
Visby Rules,29 shows that the Rules are not used in the charterparty.30 This 
is because  parties who have similar commercial bargaining power to 
                                                          
24<https://www.bimco.org/~/media/Documents/Document_Samples/Time_Charter_Parties/S
ample_Copy_GENTIME.ashx> accessed 29 March 2011. 
25 Coghlin and others (n 13) para 1.21. 
26 ibid. 
27 Dicey, Morris & Collins, The Conflict Laws (14th edn) paras 32.094-32.097; Coghlin and 
others (n 13) para 1.21; C.M.V. Clarkson and Jonathan Hill, The Conflict of Laws (4th edn, 
OUP 2011) 212. 
28 The full name of the Hague Rules is ‘International Convention of the Unification of the 
Certain Rules of Law relating to Bills of Lading’. 
<http://www.admiraltylawguide.com/conven/haguerules1924.html> accessed 8 April 2011. 
29 The whole name of the Hague-Visby Rules is ‘Protocol to Amend the International 
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading’ 
<http://www.admiraltylaw.com/statutes/hague.html> accessed 5 February 2011; The 
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971 had added the Hague-Visby Rules as a schedule and 
the Act was made effective in the U.K. on 23 June 1977. Wilson (n 4) 174. 
<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1971/19/contents> accessed 18 April 2011. 
30 Stephen Girvin, Carriage of Goods by Sea (2nd edn, OUP 2011) 268, 279. 
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negotiate the terms of the charterparty do not need to be protected by the 
Hague31 and the Hague-Visby Rules32 as the holder of a transferable bill of 
lading and the consignee of  a straight bill of lading are already protected by 
these Rules.33 However, aiming to keep the obligations the same within both 
the charterparty and the bill of lading,34 it is normal that the Hague35 or 
Hague-Visby Rules,36 or other similar national legislation enacting any of 
these Rules,37 is incorporated into the charterparty and the bill of lading.38 
This is known as a clause paramount or a paramount clause.39 
 
Through being governed by English law, the incorporation of the Rules40 into 
a charterparty via the paramount clause will be deemed as the terms of a 
contract.41 In addition, it is likely that the paramount clause is regarded by 
the English court as an intention by contractual parties to be superior to the 
conflicting terms of the charterparty when any conflict is shown between the 
provisions of the Rules and the charterparty.42 The impact of the 
incorporation of the Rules into the time charterparty by way of a paramount 
                                                          
31 (n 28). 
32 (n 29). 
33 Yvonne Baatz, ‘Clause Paramount in Time Charters’ in Thomas (n 22). 
34 ibid. 
35 (n 28). 
36 (n 29). 
37 For example, the US Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1936 adopts the Hague Rules 1924. 
<http://www.forwarderlaw.com/library/view.php?article_id=285> accessed 18 July 2013; it 
has been found that the US Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1936 is incorporated into Clause 
24 of the NYPE 46 form and Clause 31 of the NYPE 93 form.  
38 Girvin (n 30) 279, 283; Baatz (n 33); Jan Ramberg, ’Freedom of Contract in Maritime Law’ 
(1993) LMCLQ 178. 
39 ibid. 
40 (n 28); (n 29). 
41 Coghlin and others (n 13) para 34.1. 
42 For example, Marifortuna Naviera S.A v Government of Ceylon [1970] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 247 
[255] (Mocatta J); Nea Agrex S.A v Baltic Shipping Co. Ltd. (The Agios Lazaros) [1976] QB 
933 (CA) [943]-[944] (Lord Denning MR); Girvin (n 30) 279-80. 
6 
 
clause43 might appear in the seaworthiness obligation,44 carrying dangerous 
goods,45 the time bar46 and the exemptions.47 The related details of the 
impact of incorporating the Rules into the time charterparty through a 
paramount clause will be discussed in the relevant chapters of this thesis.48 
 
 
1.1.3   Clarifying the general concept of the time charter 
 
It is important to clarify the general concept of the time charterparty and the 
time charter in order to reach a deep discussion of the significant legal issues 
and to find a way to solve any related problems in the time charterparty. 
However, the time charterparty and the time charter are often easily 
misunderstood and confused with the other two kinds of charterparties and 
charters.49 For the purposes of distinguishing the essential concept of the 
time charterparty and the time charter from the concept of the demise 
(bareboat)50 charterparty and the demise charter; and the voyage 
charterparty and the voyage charter, the general and basic principles of 
                                                          
43 Baatz (n 33).  
44 See Chapter 2.  
45 See Chapter 3. 
46 It is held by Colman J in The Marinor that, in order to apply the time bar in Art III, rule 6 of 
the Hague/ Visby Rules, it is necessary to sufficiently connect the claim with the goods 
shipped. Noranda Inc. v Barton (Time Charter) Ltd. (The Marinor) [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 301 
[312] (Colman J) Therefore, when the Hague-Visby Rule is incorporated into the time 
charterparty, the one-year time bar in Art III, Rule 6 of the Hague-Visby Rules will be applied 
within the time charterparty if the loss or damage claim is linked to the carried cargo. See 
Grant Hunter, ‘Standard Forms-the BIMCO experience in Thomas (n 22). In addition, 
according to English law, the time bar in Article III, Rule 6 of the Hague-Visby Rules usually 
starts from arbitration proceedings. See The Merak [1964] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 527; Coghlin and 
others (n 13) para 34.34. 
47 See Chapter 7.  
48 See Chapter 2, 3 and 7. 
49 This refers to the demise (bareboat) charterparty and the demise charter; and the voyage 
charterparty and the voyage charter. 
50 See (n 4). 
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these latter kinds will also be also introduced in this section. 
 
Being governed by the rule of supply and demand and being negotiated 
under a currently free charter market, a charterparty is formed on the basis of 
the freedom of contract,51 the terms of which are negotiated by the 
shipowner and the charterer, who have relative commercial bargaining 
powers.52  
 
The demise (bareboat)53 charterparty, the voyage charterparty and the time 
charterparty are three elementary54 types of charterparty.55 For each kind of 
charterparty, the contract is established between the shipowner and the 
charterer (the demise charterer under the demise charter;56 the voyage 
charterer under the voyage charter;57 and the time charterer under the time 
charter58). 
 
Under the nature of the lease, a demise charterer is granted whole 
possession and control of the vessel by the shipowner for the duration of the 
charter.59  Therefore a demise charterer practically acts as a shipowner, 
                                                          
51 Yvonne Baatz, ‘Charterparties’ in Baatz (n 6).  
52 Wilson (n 4) 3. 
53 See (n 4). 
54 The variety of hybrids might be seen under the charter on the basis of the freedom of 
contract. For example, a charter may be formed for a particular voyage which operates 
under a time charter; or a time charter may be formed as with consecutive voyage charters, 
which perform a sequence of voyages between planned ports. Wilson (n 4) 4; Simon 
Baughen, Shipping Law (5th edn, Routledge 2012) 185-86. 
55 Indira Carr, International Trade Law (4th edn, Routledge-Cavendish 2010) 162. 
56 Wilson (n 4) 7. 
57 Baughen (n 54) 184. 
58 ibid. 
59 Shipping Law (2011/2012 edn, Witherby Publishing Group Ltd 2011) 155. 
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equips and employs the crew of the vessel60 and takes all responsibilities for 
the management and navigation of the vessel as well as the expenses of 
running the vessel.61  
 
In terms of the voyage charter, as a typical example, a seller who sells goods 
under a CIF contract62 supplies the voyage charter to carry goods to the 
buyer, the seller then acts as the voyage charterer taking responsibility for 
transporting particular cargo between particular ports and for arranging the 
reception of the cargo at the destination and the port of discharge.63 In 
addition, the voyage charterer is liable for the cost associated with the time of 
loading and discharging the cargo beyond the contractual lay days.64  The 
shipowner still controls and operates the vessel and supplies the carrying 
services.65 The freight paid to the shipowner by the voyage charterer is either 
calculated in proportion to the quantity of carried cargo, such as a fixed rate 
per ton of cargo for the voyage, or as a lump sum for the voyage.66   
 
In terms of the time charter, this has its own special characteristics and these 
                                                          
60 Wilson (n 4) 7.   
61 Shipping Law (n 59); Wilson (n 4) 7. 
62 CIF stands for “cost, insurance and freight”. Under the CIF contract, the freight and 
insurance are covered in the price. Therefore, the seller takes responsibility for arranging the 
entirety of transporting goods by sea, which covers those relevant to insurance. The buyer 
would state the port of arrival or nominate one of a number of ports at some period after the 
contract is established. In addition, it is necessary for the buyer to get hold of the shipping 
documents, such as the bill of lading, commercial invoice and insurance policy, in order to 
take the goods which are delivered. See Michael Furmston and Jason Chuah (eds), 
Commercial and Consumer Law (Pearson Education Limited 2010) 269; Ewan Mckendrick 
(ed), Goode on Commercial Law (4th edn, Penguin Books Ltd 2010) 951, 1042.  
63 Wilson (n 4) 4-5. 
64 This is known as demurrage. Baatz (n 51); Wilson (n 4) 5, 76; Shipping Law (n 59) 148. 
65 ibid; Wilson (n 4) 4-5. 
66 Wilson (n 4) 5. 
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are indeed radically distinct from the demise charter67 and the voyage 
charter.68 Under the time charter, the shipowner still possesses and controls 
the vessel through the Master and crew who are hired by the shipowner.69 
On the other hand, the time charterer needs to pay the shipowner for the 
time charter service70 in exchange for ordering the Master and using the 
vessel to run his/her business and reach his/her commercial aim71 during an 
agreed period of time72 within the contractual permission.73  
 
The following chapters in this thesis shape the key picture of the important 
legal liability of the shipowner and the time charterer under the time charter.  
Based on these core characteristics of the time charter,74 crucial legal issues 
are discussed and this thesis aims to resolve the possible disputes by way of 
proposing reforms to the essential standard forms of the time charterparty.75 
 
 
1.1.4   The important standard forms of the time charterparty 
 
                                                          
67 John Hare, Shipping Law & Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa (2nd edn, JUTA & Co, 
LTD 2009) 747. 
68 Wilson (n 4) 85. 
69 The ship owner takes responsibilities for the navigation. The discussion of the ship 
owner’s responsibility will be shown in Chapter 2, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7.  
70 This will be dealt with in Chapter 5.  
71 This will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
72 This will be dealt with in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. 
73 Chapter 3 will deal with this. 
74The Berge Tasta [1975] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 442 [424] (per Donaldson, J.); Coghlin and others (n 
13) para 1.13; Christopher Hill, Maritime Law (6th edn, Informa Professional 2003) 171. Sea 
& Land Securities v Dickinson [1942] 72 Ll.L Rep 159 [163] (MacKinnon, L.J.); The Hill 
Harmony [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 147 [156] (Lord Hobhouse); Coghlin and others (n 13) para 
1.10. 
75 Such as the BALTIME form, the NYPE 46 and NYPE 93 forms, and the GENTIME form. 
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The BALTIME 1939 (as revised in 2001),76 the NYPE 46 form (the 1946 
version of the New York Produce Exchange form)77 and the NYPE 93 form 
(the 1993 version of the New York Produce Exchange form),78 and the 
GENTIME form79 will be considered as the currently significant standard 
forms of the time charterparty. 
 
The BALTIME 1939 form,80 which is a specifically owner-friendly form, 
remains broadly used in short-sea trade and is still one of BIMCO’s81 most 
well-known documents.82 The part I Box Layout of this form was presented in 
1974.83 The only minor technical change was the substitution of outdated 
clauses in the latest published version of the form by BIMCO84 in 2001; 
however, there is actually no material change in the version of the form.85 It 
is known as BALTIME 1939 (as revised in 2001).86 
 
The New York Produce Exchange form (1913) was updated in 1921, 1931, 
1946, 1981 and 1993.87 The ASBATIME (1981)88 has received a 
                                                          
76 Thomas (n 22) 286-89. 
77 Harvey Williams, Chartering Documents (4th edn, LLP Reference Publishing 1999) 228-
31. 
78 Brodie (n 23) 32-46. 
79 (n 24). 
80 Thomas (n 22) 286-89. 
81 BIMCO is the major world shipping organization which takes responsibility for the progress 
of free-standing clauses and standard forms of contract for shipping fields as well as offering 
advice, education and valuable information in order to assist the commercial operation of its 
membership. <https://www.bimco.org/en/About/About_BIMCO.aspx> accessed 28 
September 2013; Hunter (n 46). 
82 Hunter (n 46). 
83 ibid. 
84 <https://www.bimco.org/> accessed 28 September 2013. 
85 Hunter (n 46). 
86 ibid. 
87 ibid. 
88<http://www.shipinspection.eu/index.php/home/k2-item-view/item/73-asbatime> accessed 
28 September 2013.      
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considerably restricted acceptance in the charter market.89 The NYPE 46 
form90 continues to exist as the most significant and commonly used 
standard form of the time charterparty for dry cargo91 charters.92 When 
shipbrokers refer to the NYPE form, they commonly refer to the NYPE 46 
form.93 The NYPE 93 form94 is the current version of the New York Produce 
Exchange form95 and it is one of the contemporary leading standard forms of 
time charterparty.96 The NYPE 93 form97 was completed as a consequence 
of cooperation between BIMCO,98 ASBA99 and FONASBA.100 Subsequently, 
it has been added to the approved list of BIMCO.101 The up-to-date and more 
modern version of the form is listed because it is concerned with the change 
in the practicality of the charter market and the development of types of 
vessel.102  
 
                                                          
89 Hunter (n 46). 
90 Williams (n 77) 228-31. 
91 Such as coal, grains or iron ores. See (n 10). 
92 Hunter (n 46); Coghlin and others (n 13) para 1.2. 
93 Hunter (n 46). 
94 Brodie (n 23) 32-46. 
95 Hunter (n 46).  
96 Girvin (n 30) 600. 
97 Brodie (n 23) 32-46. 
98 See (n 81). 
99 Association of Ship Brokers and Agents Inc. <www.asba.org> accessed 28 September 
2013. ‘ASBA is an independent membership trade association, established in 1934 that 
brings together member Shipbrokers, Agents and Affiliates with offices in the United States 
and Canada. ASBA advances and fosters the ideas and standards of professional conduct 
and practices and is a medium through which members with common interests can 
communicate.’ 
<http://www.maritime-executive.com/maritime-directory/Assoc-of-Shipbrokers-and-Agents-
(ASBA)/> accessed 28 September 2013.      
100 The Federation of National Association of Shipbrokers & Agents. This organization 
endorses fair and equitable practice and makes sure that the requests of its members are 
recognized at the maritime field and governmental level. 
<https://www.fonasba.com/fonasba-member> accessed 28 September 2013.      
101 Hunter (n 46). 
102 ibid. 
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It is worth mentioning that, even though there is a new draft of NYPE 2014103 
which proposed to include the provisions of some new development of 
issues in the time charter, such as providing the specific duty on the matter 
of electronic bills of lading and other dematerialised documentation,104  
providing the shipowner should comply with the requirements of the ISM105 
and ISPS Codes106 into the NYPE 2014 form,107 until the completion of this 
phd thesis, the draft of NYPE 2014 form108 is still in an uncertain, immature 
and changeable stage by showing that it is open to industries to give 
comments and feedback as well as to be reviewed the industries’ comments 
by the draft team.109 Therefore, no further formal explanatory notes of NYPE 
2014 form110 had been supplied by BIMCO111 and no authority, such as court 
decision, had mentioned a relevant point of view of these new issues. In 
order not to confuse  the academic and practical field, this phd thesis tries to 
narrow down the discussion to certain important issues of pre-existing 
clauses in NYPE 46 and NYPE 93 forms. When the NYPE 2014 form112 
further evolves in the final and certain stage and there are enough 
authorities, the following researchers, if they are interested in the new 
development of issues in the NYPE 2014 form,113 can also continue to 
deeply explore this area. 
                                                          
103<https://www.bimco.org/~/media/News/2014/NYPE_93_v_NYPE_2014_comparison.ashx
?RenderSearch=true> accessed 10 September 2014. 
104 ibid. See Clause 32 of new draft of NYPE 2014 form.  
105 See Clause 46 of new draft of NYPE 2014 form. 
106 See Clause 47 of new draft of NYPE 2014 form. 
107 See (n 103). 
108 ibid. 
109<https://www.bimco.org/news/2014/06/30_industry_invited_to_comment_on_updated_nyp
e_charter.aspx> accessed 10 September 2014; 
<https://www.bimco.org/news/2014/08/11_industry_engages_with_new_nype.aspx> 
accessed 10 September 2014. 
110 See (n 103). 
111 See (n 84). 
112 See (n 103). 
113 ibid. 
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The GENTIME form114 is designed on the basis of BOXTIME,115 which was 
the existing standard form of the time charter party for container116 vessels 
published by BIMCO in 1999.117 It is designed to reflect the modern time 
chartering industry and to improve the standard form of the time charterparty 
to provide a balanced and contemporarily well-drafted form under the time 
charter by BIMCO.118 The form is intended for use in the dry cargo119 area 
and in the container industry.120 The GENTIME form121 might also be 
regarded as one of the currently important standard forms of the time 
charterparty.122 
 
The discussion of reforming the standard forms of the time charterparty in 
the following chapters within this thesis intends to focus on the improvement 
of the dry cargo standard forms of time charterparty and therefore it is based 
on the aforementioned important current standard forms of the time 
charterparty which include the BALTIME form,123 the NYPE 46124 and NYPE 
93125 forms, and the GENTIME form.126 
 
 
                                                          
114 (n 24). 
115<https://www.bimco.org/en/Chartering/Documents/Time_Charter_Parties/Withdrawn_form
s/~/media/Chartering/Document_Samples/Withdrawn/Sample_Copy_BOXTIME.ashx> 
accessed 28 September 2013. 
116  A container is a large box which is designed for the transport of goods by sea. 
<http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/container> accessed 27 September 2013. 
117 Hunter (n 46). 
118 ibid. 
119 See (n 91). 
120 Hunter (n 46). 
121 (n 24). 
122 Girvin (n 30) 600. 
123 Thomas (n 22) 286-89. 
124 Williams(n 77) 228-31. 
125 Brodie (n 23) 32-46. 
126 (n 24). 
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1.2    Research motivation and method 
 
Finding ways to improve the crucial clauses within the essential standard 
forms of the time charterparty127 is an area worthy of dedicated study and 
interest. However, it has not yet been systematically researched in the field. 
Therefore, this thesis aims to explore and discuss the significant legal issues 
of the important clauses within the time charterparty and searches for an 
approach to solving their related legal problems by making a constructive 
contribution toward improving these imperfect standard contractual forms.  
 
Even though the interview is one type of methodology, this thesis does not 
use interviewing of relevant users of those forms as a methodology. Instead 
a text-based approach has been adopted in this thesis. This is because the 
text-based methodology allows various materials to be compared, contrasted 
and analysed such as books, journals, websites, different essential standard 
forms of the time charterparty,128 case law and comments, industry practice 
and arbitration awards. By way of the text-based methodology, it assisted in 
finding strengths and weaknesses in the important clauses within the 
different essential standard forms of the time charterparty129 whose contents 
had possibly been interpreted by judgments or discussed through various 
other materials. This further achieves the aim of this thesis which is to reform 
the important clauses of the essential standard forms of the time 
charterparty. 
                                                          
127 (n 75). 
128 ibid. 
129 ibid. 
15 
 
1.3    The aim and normative foundation of the thesis 
 
The thesis is concerned with the reform of these important clauses within the 
current essential standard forms of the time charterparty. By what criteria 
should the reform of these clauses be guided?   
 
There is a vast literature which examines the principles which should be 
followed in drafting rules which are to function as “standard” or “default” 
terms for private parties’ bargains.130 For the purpose of this thesis, the 
assumption of this thesis is that the terms should aim to promote “economic 
efficiency”131 This familiar prescription has come to dominate much of the 
discussion around the drafting of such rules.132    
 
Efficiency is a notoriously controversial goal, however. There has been much 
debate about whether or not it is desirable for lawmakers, or judges, to 
pursue efficiency, especially where doing so may conflict with other values, 
such as “fairness”. It is not the aim of this thesis to defend the choice of this 
value in comparison to alternatives, such as fairness, when designing default 
rules for time charterparties.  Providing such a defence would surely deserve 
a thesis in its own right.  Rather, the aim of this thesis is to work out what 
                                                          
130  For a good introduction, see for example D. Charny, ‘Hypothetical Bargains: The 
Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation’ [1991] 89 Michigan Law Review 1815.   
131 In simple terms, we may follow Cooter and Ulen and say that ‘economic efficiency is a 
comprehensive measure of public benefits that include the profits of firms, the well-being of 
consumers, and wages of workers’. Robert B. Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and 
Economics  (6th edn, Pearson Education Limited 2014) 4. 
132 ibid; C. A. Riley, ‘Designing Default Rules in Contract Law: Consent, Conventionalism 
and Efficiency’ [2000] 20 OJLS 367.   
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efficiency actually requires, in the context of time charterparty terms. It is 
worth noting, nevertheless, as other writers have observed, that although 
efficiency has admittedly proved controversial as a guide to the reform of, 
say, tort law,133 reliance on this value when drafting terms that serve only as 
default rules, within consensual contractual relationships, seems much more 
defensible.134 And this applies even more so to the extent that the rules in 
question are being promulgated, as they are here, “in advance”, so that 
contractors are, or should be, aware of the rules even before they enter into 
a contractual relationship in the first place (as opposed to the default rule 
being designed by an adjudicator, in the course of settling a pre-existing 
dispute).135    
 
Even if, however, we accept that reforms to time charterparty terms should 
be driven by the value of efficiency, how are we to know what makes any 
particular, proposed, term more, or less, efficient, than alternative 
formulations of that term? Again, there is a considerable literature exploring 
what considerations should guide the draftsperson who wishes to produce 
contractual default terms that are efficient.136 The starting point is usually 
taken to be that the choice of term should aim to reduce the parties’ 
“transaction costs”, for by reducing such costs the drafter of the standard 
                                                          
133 See for example the criticisms in R. Dworkin, ‘Why Efficiency?’ [1980] 8 Hofstra L.Rev 
563. 
134  See Riley (n 132) 384-87.   
135  ibid. 
136  See e.g. Charny (n 130); I. Ayres and R. Gertner, ‘Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: 
An Economic Theory of Default Rules’ [1989] 99 Yale LJ.87; R. Craswell, ‘Efficiency and 
Rational Bargaining in Contractual Settings’ [1992] 15 Harvard.J.of Law and Public Policy 
805.   
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terms can help to maximise the parties’ wealth.137 The literature on 
transaction costs then seeks to identify what the content of a standard 
contract term should be if it is to fulfil this transaction cost-saving goal.138  
 
Three factors seem especially important here, and these factors will inform 
much of the analysis in the remainder of this thesis. First, clarity and 
comprehensibility of any chosen term are crucial if it is to function well in 
reducing parties’ transaction costs. If terms are unclear, then parties will 
waste time and money in the process of seeking to understand the term’s 
content, either ex ante, or ex post. Unclear terms will also fail to guide the 
parties’ behaviour in the desired way during the currency of the contract.  
Unclear terms will also increase disputes about the meaning of the 
chartperparty, undermining enforcement. Finally, a lack of clarity is also likely 
to lead to increased litigation, which links to the second factor that is stressed 
as being important here.  
 
This second factor is that, in attempting to reduce transaction costs, rules 
must be designed so as to limit adjudication costs.139 The costs of 
adjudication are part of the costs of enforcement. This thesis, therefore, will 
explore in depth the relationship between charterparty terms and past judicial 
                                                          
137 ‘Transaction costs are the costs of exchange.’ (1) search costs, (2) bargaining costs and 
(3) enforcement costs are the three types of transaction costs corresponding to these three 
steps of an exchange. Cooter and Thomas Ulen (n 131) 74. 
138 For a clear explanation of the issue here, see I.Ayres, ‘Preliminary Thoughts on the 
Optimal Tailoring of Contractual Rules’ [1993] 3 S.Cal.Interdisciplinary Law J 1.    
139 It is recommended that the costs are more economically efficient to have fixed rules of 
law rather than solve by disputes by judges. Richard Stone, The Modern Law of Contract 
(10th edn, Routledge 2011) 20. 
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interpretations and practices. The aim is to ensure that the terms which are 
suggested “fit” appropriately with previous case law, and minimise the 
likelihood of interpretive conflicts.   
 
The third factor that is relevant in seeking to reduce transaction costs is to 
ensure that the terms proposed fit with existing commercial practice. Why is 
this important? For one thing, it should ensure that the terms are more likely 
to reflect the actual expectations of contracting parties, which is often taken 
as itself being “fairer”.140 But moreover, in terms of “transaction cost 
analysis”, it is generally accepted that transaction costs are more likely to be 
saved if a standard contract term mimics the term which the majority of 
contractors would have chosen anyway – what is sometimes referred to as 
the parties’ “hypothetical bargain”.141 In this way, the standard term avoids 
most transaction costs, by saving most parties the need to think out, and 
write out, their own bespoke rule.   
 
It must of course be admitted that reducing transaction costs (and thereby 
adjudication costs too) cannot be the only consideration if one’s goal is 
“efficiency”. It is conceivable that sometimes a term that reduces transaction 
costs (say because it is perfectly clear, and reflects what most contractors 
would choose anyway) may still be economically inefficient. It is for this 
reason that “efficiency analysis” of standard contract terms aims not merely 
                                                          
140 See eg Lord Steyn, ‘Contract Law: Fulfilling the Reasonable Expectations of Honest Men’ 
[1997] 113 Law Q.Rev 433. 
141 See Charny (n 130) 1840-1848.   
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to mimic prevalent commercial practice, but also sometimes to improve on 
that practice. It is sometimes said, therefore, that the efficient term must be 
an “idealised” one – the term which ideally economically rational parties 
would choose.142  Two comments might be made in response to this point.   
 
First, it is easy to exaggerate this conflict between actual commercial 
practice and ideally rational economic choices. The practices of thousands of 
real world parties entering into time charterparties is likely to contain a great 
deal of accumulated wisdom about just what terms best promote the 
economic health and well-being of those parties. Accordingly, anyone 
seeking to draft new charterparty terms must surely accord a great deal of 
presumptive “efficiency” to terms and commercial practices which real 
parties, gambling with their own money, have worked out over many 
years.143   
 
Second, whilst the foregoing point is surely correct, it is nevertheless 
important to consider whether proposed terms do indeed produce sound 
economic results. Crucial here is to ensure that such terms provide a sound 
and defensible allocation of the economic risks that are an inevitable feature 
of the activities which the time charterparty governs.  Accordingly, within the 
thesis, analysis of relevant commercial practice will be supplemented, where 
appropriate, with direct analysis of the efficient allocation of such risks.  
                                                          
142 See generally Craswell (n 136).   
143 See R. D. Cooter, ‘Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach 
to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant’ [1996] 144 Uni.of Penn. L Rev 1643.  
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1.4   Thesis structure 
 
Chapter 2 begins with a discussion and analysis of the important legal issues 
relevant to the beginning of the time charter service, such as the cancelling 
clause, misdescription of the vessel, the seaworthiness of the vessel, and 
maintaining the vessel. In addition, the arguable issue which, ‘substantially 
deprives the time charter of the whole benefit of the contract’144 will be 
discussed. Possible recommendations to manage the legal risk and solve 
practical disputes will be made.   
 
Chapter 3 analyses the interaction scenario between the shipowner and the 
time charterer when the latter breaches trading limits and safe port 
undertakings within the time charterparty while using the time charter 
service. To resolve this dilemma, the legal consequences of the time 
charterer’s breach will be clearly presented in the proposed reform. In 
Chapter 4, the extent of the margin, the early and late ending of the time 
charter service, will be discussed. The chapter will also consider how to 
reasonably allocate risk in ensuring differing legal consequences for the late 
ending of the time charter service for legitimate and illegitimate final voyages.  
 
In Chapter 5, by way of discussing safeguarding both the shipowner and the 
time charterer’s legal rights with respect to their commercial targets, the 
                                                          
144 This is indicated in Hongkong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd. v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha [1962] I All 
ER 474 (CA). 
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drawbacks of the relevant clauses in the time charterparties145 will be 
explored and suggestions will be made for better designing these clauses. 
Chapter 6 will clarify the scope of the time charterer’s orders for the Master 
and discuss the connection between the shipowner’s indemnity and the time 
charterer’s ordering for the Master. The chapter will consider the practical 
difficulties of distinguishing who the contractual carrier is and make some 
recommendations for improving this. Chapter 7 examines the exemptions 
clause within these time charterparties.146 The imperfection of Clause 12 of 
the BALTIME form147 will be discussed and possible improvements will be 
proposed. Finally, Chapter 8 will provide a concluding analysis by presenting 
the original contribution of this thesis. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
145 (n 75). 
146 ibid. 
147 Thomas (n 22) 287. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
BEGINNING OF THE TIME CHARTER SERVICE 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
2.1    Introduction  
 
The legal issues regarding the “delivery of the vessel” 1  between the shipowner 
and the time charterer are materially important in the time charterparty, because 
they will greatly affect the time charterer's use of the vessel and his/her rights to 
perform his/her specific commercial purpose.2 This chapter will analyse and 
evaluate the legal liabilities regarding the “delivery of the vessel”3 for both the 
shipowner and the time charterer under the time charterparty by discussing 
significantly relevant legal issues and possible improvements to the disputable 
clauses in respect of “delivery of the vessel”4 in the essential standard forms of 
the time charterparty.5 This chapter will start by clarifying the concept of 
“delivery of the vessel”.6  Then, the cancelling clause and misdescription of the 
vessel will be analysed. Following the seaworthiness of the vessel, maintaining 
                                                          
1 It is suggested in Section 2.2 of this Chapter to use the wording “beginning of the time charter 
service” instead of “delivery of the vessel”. 
2 John D.Kimball, ‘Termination of Right under Time Charters’ in D. Rhidian Thomas (ed), Legal 
Issues Relating to Time Charterparties (Informa 2008).  
3 See (n 1). 
4 ibid. 
5 Such as the BALTIME form 1939 (as revised 2001), the NYPE 46 and NYPE 93 forms, and the 
GENTIME form. 
6 See (n 1). 
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the vessel will be discussed. The possible reform of these under the time 
charterparty will be shown in the relevant sections of this chapter. 
 
 
2.2   Clarifying the concept of “delivery of the vessel” 
 
It is incorrect to interpret the legal characteristics of the time charterparty only on 
the basis of the principle noscitur a sociis.7 Concepts including that the owners 
“let”, the charterers “hire” , and that the vessel is “delivered” in the clause 
regarding “delivery of the vessel”8 under a time charterparty, and even within 
clauses such as clause 1 of the latest BALTIME form 2001 revision9 and clause 
1 and 2 of the NYPE 93 form,10 are still used and easily confused with the legal 
characteristics of a demise charterparty. This is because the vessel is delivered 
to the demise charterer who hires the whole vessel for a period and the demise 
charterer fully controls the vessel under the demise charterparty.11 Even though 
the vessel is controlled by the shipowner reaching the time charterer and it is 
the shipowner who places the vessel in the available berth at the time 
                                                          
7 This means that a word is to be interpreted on the basis of its context. 
<http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/N/Nosciturasociis.aspx> accessed 16 May 2011. 
8 See (n 1). 
9 Thomas (n 2) 286; There is no substantial difference between the 2001 revision of the 
BALTIME form and the earlier versions of the BALTIME form, except War Risks (revised Clause 
20) and Dispute Resolution (revised Clause 22). In addition, the merchants could edit the 
standard form to create their time charterparties in practice. Grant Hunter, ‘Standard Form-the 
BIMCO experience’ in Thomas (n 2). 
10 Peter Brodie, Commercial Shipping Handbook (2nd edn, Informa 2006) 32-33. 
11 Sea & Land Securities v Dickinson [1942] 72 LlL Rep159 [163] (MacKinnon, L.J.); Terence 
Coghlin and others, Time Charters (6th edn, Informa 2008) para 1.10; Christopher Smith, 
‘Charterparties’ in Bernard Eder and others (eds), Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of Lading 
(22th edn, Sweet and Maxwell Limited 2011). 
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charterer’s disposal, the vessel is legally put at the charterer’s service.12 The 
time charterer merely exercises his/her right to the service of the vessel, starting 
from the beginning of the period of the time charter until the end of the 
contractually allowed period of the time charter, and pays for the services13 
since the vessel is still controlled and possessed by the crews hired by the 
shipowner.14 Thus, it is necessary to declare in advance, due to the special legal 
characteristics of the time charterparty, that “delivery of the vessel” or “the 
vessel is delivered”15 as used under the time charterparty, should refer to the 
“beginning of the time charter service”;16 in other words, they also refer to the 
start of the time charterer’s “using the vessel” through his/her ordering the 
Master and the crew, who are owned by the shipowner.17 Therefore, it is 
suggested that this conventional but confusing wording in the modern time 
charterparty form should be changed. It will be proposed that the “beginning of 
the time charter service” should be used, instead of the term, “the vessel is 
delivered” under the time charterparty.18 These changes are recommended in 
order to clarify the specific characteristics of the time charterparty and to avoid 
potential misunderstandings as well as to directly reflect previous views 
expressed in the courts about these traditional issues in the time charterparty. 
                                                          
12 ibid para 1.35. 
13 The Berge Tasta [1975] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 442 [424] (per Donaldson, J.); Coghlin and others (n 
11) para 1.13; Christopher Hill, Maritime Law (6th edn, Informa Professional 2003) 171. 
14 Sea & Land Securities v Dickinson (n 11) [163] (MacKinnon, L.J.); The Hill Harmony [2001] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep 147 [156] (Lord Hobhouse); Coghlin and others (n 11) para 1.10.  
15 For example, ‘…the vessel is “delivered” and placed at the disposal of the Charterers between 
9a.m. and 6 p.m., or between 9 a.m. and 2 p.m….’ in Line 20 and 21 of clause 1 of the BALTIME 
form 2001 revision; ‘The Owners agree to let and the Charterers agree to hire the Vessel from 
the time of “delivery” for a period of…’ in Line 24 and 25 of clause 1 of the NYPE 93 form   
16 The Berge Tasta (n 13) [424] (per Donaldson, J.); Coghlin and others (n 11) para 1.13. 
17 Scandinavian Trading Tanker Co. A.B. v Flota Petrolera Ecuatoriana (The Scaptrade) [1983] 
2 Lloyd’s Rep 253 [256]-[257] (Lord Diplock); Coghlin and others (n 11) para 1.4. 
18 Smith (n 11). 
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Taking this action would clarify the issue for merchants, aid comprehension and 
avoid future disputes in practice.   
 
 
2.3    The cancelling clause 
 
Under a time charterparty, an implied obligation is normally imposed on the 
shipowner to show due diligence in supplying the vessel, whose condition is 
readiness for beginning the time charter service by the particular cancelling 
day.19 In The Democritos, Kerr J. pointed out that the charterer could cancel the 
charter only on the cancelling day if the vessel is not sent to the charterer in 
readiness by the cancelling day.20 Before that, all the charterer can do is to 
continue to wait and he/she is under no obligation to do anything.21 It was also 
shown in Moel Tryvan22 that the shipowner cannot demand a charterer’s 
declaration in advance, whether or not this optional charterer’s right to cancel 
will be exercised.23  
 
                                                          
19 The Democritos[1976] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 149 (CA) [152] (Lord Denning); Coghlin and others (n 11) 
para 7.51, 24.1, 24.4, 24.8; To make sure the condition of the vessel is ready, for example, it 
needs to comply with all the essentials set out in Line 21 to 24 of the NYPE 46 form. Coghlin 
and others (n 11) para 8.34. In addition,’ The position under English Law is generally that if an 
owner renders a vessel to perform a charterparty in an unseaworthy condition, the charterers 
can refuse to take delivery of the vessel until the defects have been remedied. Furthermore, the 
charterers will generally have the protection of a contractual right to cancel if the defects are not 
remedied by a specific cancelling date.’ See Mark Hamsher, ‘Seaworthiness and the Hongkong 
Fir decision’ in Thomas (n 2). 
20 The Democritos [1975] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 386; Coghlin and others (n 11) para 24.12.   
21 ibid [397] (Kerr, J.). 
22 Moel Tryvan v Weir [1910] 2 KB.844; Coghlin and others (n 11) para 24.12. 
23 Coghlin and others (n 11) para 24.12. 
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If the vessel cannot be sent to the time charterer by the shipowner to allow the 
time charter service to begin by a particular time, there is likely no legal liability 
for the shipowner.24 On the other hand, in this circumstance, the time charterer 
can exercise the right to cancel25 and therefore terminate the time 
charterparty.26 Whether or not the shipowner is at fault carries no weight with 
regard to the time charterer’s right to cancel the time charter.27 The protections 
to both the shipowner and the time charterer are indicated by a cancelling 
clause under the time charterparty when the vessel is delayed in reaching the 
time charterer.28 Clause 21 of the BALTIME form29 and Clause 14 of the NYPE 
46 form30 exemplify the time charterer's option of cancelling the time 
charterparty.  
 
However, weather and sea conditions are controlled by nature and it is always 
difficult to accurately predict when risks taken at sea will impact upon the sailing 
of the vessel. Clause 16 of the NYPE 93 form31 and Clause 1 (d) of the 
                                                          
24 The Democritos (n 20) (Bridge, L.J.); Coghlin and others (n 11) para 24.2. 
25 This is by way of written or oral notice to notify the shipowner. Coghlin and others (n 11) para 
24.15. 
26 Coghlin and others (n 11) para 24.2. 
27 ibid para 24.5; Yvonne Baatz, ‘Charterparties’ in Yvonne Baatz (ed), Maritime Law (2nd edn, 
Sweet & Maxwell 2011). 
28 Coghlin and others (n 11) para 24.2. 
29 The BALTIME form 1939 (as revised 2001). Unless otherwise specified, all reference to the 
BALTIEM form refer to the BALTIME form 1939 (as revised 2001). Clause 21 of the BALTIME 
form provided that ‘Should the Vessel not be delivered by the date indicated in Box 22, the 
Charterers shall have the option of cancelling. If the Vessel cannot be delivered by the 
cancelling date, the Charterers, if required, shall declare within 48 hours after receiving notice 
thereof whether they cancel or will take delivery of the vessel’. Thomas (n 2) 288. 
30 ‘That if required by Charterers, time not to commence before… and should vessel not have 
given written notice of readiness on or before…but not later than 4 p.m. Charterers or their 
Agents to have the option of cancelling this Charter at any time not later than the day of vessel’s 
readiness.’ 
31 ‘If the Owners warrant that, despite the exercise of due diligence by them, the vessel will not 
be ready for delivery by the cancelling date, and provided the Owners are able to state with 
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GENTIME form32 take this situation into account and clearly give the shipowner 
extra flexibility for the extension of the sending time if this is required by the 
particular situation under the time charterparty.33 These clauses also provide 
instruction for both parties to deal with these special circumstances. The 
expression regarding the extension of cancelling is not only fair, giving the 
shipowner more time and space to deal with accidents, but also gives the time 
charterer the option to choose whether or not to cancel a time charter, thus 
balancing both parties’ rights. In addition, particularly under Clause 1 (d) of the 
GENTIME form, it also has the merit of providing a time restriction which 
indicates that if the time charterer fails to reply within “two working days” of 
receiving notification of an extension, then the new cancelling date will replace 
                                                                                                                                                                          
reasonable certainty the date on which the vessel will be ready, they may, at the earliest seven 
days before the vessel is expected to sail for the port or place of delivery, require the Charterers 
to declare whether or not they will cancel the Charter Party. Should the Charterers elect not to 
cancel, or should they fail to reply within two days or by the cancelling date, whichever shall first 
occur, then the seven day after the expected date of readiness for delivery as notified by the 
Owners shall replace the original cancelling date. Should the vessel be further delayed, the 
owners shall be entitled to require further declarations of the Charterers in accordance with this 
Clause.’ Brodie (n 10) 37. 
32  ‘Should the Vessel not be delivered by the date/time stated in Box 10 the Charterers shall 
have the option to cancel the Charter Party without prejudice to any claims the Charterers may 
otherwise have on the Owners under the Charter Party. If the Owners anticipate that, despite 
their exercise of due diligence, the Vessel will not be ready for delivery by the date/time stated in 
Box 10, they may notify the Charterers in writing, stating the anticipated new date of readiness 
for delivery, proposing a new cancelling date/ time and requiring the Charterers to declare 
whether they will cancel or will take delivery of the Vessel. Should the Charterers elect not to 
cancel or should they fail to reply within two (2) working days (as applying at the Charterers’ 
place of business) of receipt of such notification then unless otherwise agreed, the proposed 
new cancelling date/ time will replace the date/time stated in Box 10. This provision shall 
operate only once and should the vessel not be ready for delivery at the new cancelling 
date/time the Charterers shall have the option of cancelling the Charter Party.’ 
<https://www.bimco.org/~/media/Documents/Document_Samples/Time_Charter_Parties/Sample
_Copy_GENTIME.ashx> accessed 29 March 2011. 
33 (n 31); (n 32). 
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the original cancelling date, thereby resolving this legal issue within a 
reasonable number of days.34 
 
 
2.3.1    The reform of the cancelling clause under the  time charterparty 
 
There are some aforementioned advantages of the extension of cancellation 
time which provides a reasonable time limitation in which to ascertain the legal 
position of both parties under Clause 16 of the NYPE 93 form35 and Clause 1 (d) 
of the GENTIME form, it is therefore suggested to use those and to modify 
Clause 21 of the BALTIME form36 and Clause 14 of the NYPE 46 form37 in order 
to make them more complete and flexible.  
 
However, the interpellation mechanism38 which is limited to operating “once” 
within Clause 1 (d) of the GENTIME form permits the shipowner at an early 
period to inform the time charterer that he/she cannot meet the cancellation day 
while stating the anticipated new day of readiness for the beginning of the time 
charter service.39 It is proposed that this restriction to operating “once” at the 
end of Clause 1 (d) of the GENTIME form40 be removed. Since the charterer 
already has protection by exercising the option of cancelling the time charter 
                                                          
34 (n 32). 
35 Brodie (n 10) 37.  
36 Thomas (n 2) 288. 
37 Harvey Williams, Chartering Documents (4th edn, LLP Reference Publishing 1999) 230. 
38 Hunter (n 9).  
39 (n 32). 
40 ibid. 
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upon receiving notification from the shipowner, to strictly limit this interpellation 
mechanism to “once” under the Clause 1 (d) of the GENTIME form41 is 
unnecessary. This clause concerns the uncontrollable peril of the sea and gives 
flexibility to the shipowner, but there is likely no reason for prohibiting him/her to 
operate this clause again if the vessel is again not ready for sending to the time 
charterer based on uncontrollable perils of the sea at the time of the new 
cancelling date.  
 
As mentioned above, in terms of the cancelling clause, even though there are  
strengths in both Clause 16 of the NYPE 93 form42 and Clause 1 (d) of the 
GENTIME form,43 drawbacks still exist in both. Therefore, the best way to 
reform the cancelling clause in the time charterparty, whether in the BALTIME 
form,44 the NYPE 46 form,45 the NYPE 93 form46 or the GENTIME form,47 is to 
keep the strengths under the cancelling clause of the GENTIME form,48 to 
modify Clause 21 of the BALTIME form,49 Clause 14 of the NYPE 46 form,50 and 
Clause 16 of the NYPE 93 form,51 as well as deleting the parts of Clause 1 (d) of 
the GENTIME form52 which have been criticised earlier in this section.   
 
                                                          
41 ibid. 
42 Brodie (n 10) 37.  
43 (n 32). 
44 Thomas (n 2) 285-89. 
45 Williams (n 37) 228-31. 
46 Brodie (n 10) 32-46. 
47 (n 32). 
48 ibid. 
49 Thomas (n 2) 288. 
50 Williams (n 37) 230. 
51 Brodie (n 10) 37. 
52 (n 32). 
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2.4    Misdescription of the vessel 
 
Description of the vessel is provided in the preamble of the BALTIME form53 and 
of the NYPE 46 form54 and the NYPE 93 form.55 The vessel should be in 
compliance with the description of the vessel, such as name, flag, gross and net 
tonnage, speed, fuel consumption and cargo capacity, which are agreed by both 
the shipowner and the time charterer.56 Otherwise, the vessel provided could 
conflict with the time charterer’s intention and his/her commercial plan for 
establishing the time charterparty and this would involve the issue of 
misdescription.57 For example, the real speed of the vessel would likely affect 
the efficiency of the vessel.58 The plan and commercial target of the time 
charterer may not be achieved if the speed of the vessel does not accurately 
match its description in the time charterparty and it would also fail to meet the 
actual expectations of the time charterer. Therefore, as indicated by Lord Roskill 
in The TFL Prosperity,59 the shipowner cannot base on the exemption clause of 
the BALTIME form60 to assert immunity from a claim of misdescription of the 
vessel, otherwise this exemption clause would conflict with the expressed true 
                                                          
53 Thomas (n 2) 286. 
54 Williams (n 37) 228. 
55 Williams (n 37) 228; Brodie (n 10) 32. 
56 Coghlin and others (n 11) para 3.17. 
57 ibid para 3.38. 
58 ibid para 3.73. 
59 The TFL Prosperity [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 123 [130]; Coghlin and others (n 11) para 37.69. 
60 Clause 13 of the BALTIME form. Thomas (n 2) 287. 
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common intention regarding the vessel shared by both contractual parties and 
this clause would then be regarded as unfair.61   
 
Moreover, the time charterer may not suffer particularly substantial losses from 
the misdescription of the vessel.62 However, the time charterer is entitled to 
damages when misdescription of the vessel decreases the value of the vessel 
and thus causes the time charterer to suffer particular loss.63 It is indicated in 
Tibermede v Graham64 and Sterns v Salterns 65 that the damages claimed by 
the time charterer can be ‘measured as the difference between the hire agreed 
and the hire that would have been payable for the ship if accurately described.’66 
 
There is a debate in respect of when the vessel should be the same as the 
description under the time charterparty. The view of Mocatta J. in The 
Apollonius67 indicates that the vessel should be in compliance with her 
description at the “delivery” time, except for the class of the vessel.68 Evans J. 
and Parker L.J. in The Al Bida69 also appear to believe that, at least in terms of 
description of a vessel’s consumption and speed, the approach of Mocatta J. in 
The Apollonius is correct.70 However, Bingham L.J. in The Didymi stated that the 
                                                          
61 Coghlin and others (n 11) para 37.69. 
62 ibid para 3.38. 
63 If there is any material misdescription of the vessel, it breaches a contract and the time 
charterer may have legal right to claim damages. ibid para 3.18, 3.38. 
64 Tibermede v Graham [1921] 7 LlL Rep 250; ibid para 3.38. 
65 Sterns v Salterns [1922] 12 LlL Rep 385; ibid para 3.38. 
66  ibid para 3.38. 
67 The Apollonius [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 53 [64]; Coghlin and others (n 11) para 3.27. 
68 Coghlin and others (n 11) para 3.27. 
69 The Al Bida [1986] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 124 (CA) [150], [129]; Coghlin and others (n 11) para 3.28. 
70 The Apollonius (n 67); Coghlin and others (n 11) para 3.27. 
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description of the vessel’s capacity at the time of drawing up the time 
charterparty covering the description of her consumption and speed in the 
preamble of the time charterparty.71 Nonetheless, it is shown in the double 
undertaking by the shipowner in the NYPE 46 form72 that the vessel must be the 
same as the description of the “seaworthy vessel” when the time charterparty is 
made73 and also when the vessel is beginning its time charter service.74 
However, the NYPE 93 form75 modified these and does not include the 
requirement that the vessel is seaworthy, which is promised by the shipowner, 
when the contract is made.76 
 
 
2.4.1    The reform of the description of the vessel under the time 
charterparty 
 
Even though it is essential for the vessel to be the same as its contractual 
description when the time charterer starts to use it, the results of the 
negotiations of both parties regarding various aspects, and whether or not to 
keep the same vessel for the duration between the contractual party making the 
                                                          
71 The Didymi [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 108 [110]; Coghlin and others (n 11) para 3.28. 
72 Williams (n 37) 228-31. 
73 ‘with hull, machinery and equipment in a thoroughly efficient state‘ in Line 5 of NYPE 46. 
Williams (n 37) 228; Coghlin and others (n 11) para 3.41. 
74 By Lines 21 and 22 of NYPE 46. In addition, the seaworthiness of the vessel is provided in 
clause 2 of NYPE 93. It indicates that ‘The vessel on her delivery shall be ready to receive cargo 
with clean-swept holds and tight, staunch, strong and in every way fitted for ordinary cargo 
service’; Coghlin and others (n 11) para 3.44. 
75 Brodie (n 10) 32-46. 
76 Coghlin and others (n 11) para 3.44. 
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contract and their performing the obligation of the contract, must be respected. 
Therefore, it is suggested that extra text should be added to show “when” the 
vessel must comply with the details of the description of the vessel and to allow 
both parties in the time charterparty to add at the end of the preamble of the 
BALTIME form,77 the NYPE 46 form,78 and the NYPE 93 form,79 as well as the 
GENTIME form.80 A specification of that contractual party’s real intention, “when” 
it is necessary for the vessel to fit “which” details of the description of the vessel. 
This is in order, again, to prevent future arguments and a waste of judicial 
resources as well as both parties’ time and financial resources. For example, the 
following could be added: ‘The vessel should be in compliance with the 
description of the vessel, such as… when this time charterparty is concluded. 
The vessel must be the same as the rest of the details of the description of the 
vessel, such as…when the time charter service begins.’  
 
Moreover, it is recommended that a separately highlighted option be added to 
the details of description of the vessel, such as ‘when this time charterparty is 
concluded, the vessel should be in compliance with the description of the 
vessel,’ and ‘when the time charter service begins, the vessel should be in 
compliance with the description of the vessel’ in the Part 1 Box Layout of the 
BALTIME form81 and GENTIME form.82 Both parties could then negotiate and 
                                                          
77 Thomas (n 2) 286. 
78 Williams (n 37) 228.  
79 Brodie (n 10) 32. 
80 (n 32). 
81  Thomas (n 2) 285. 
82 (n 32). 
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tick when it is necessary for the vessel to be the same as the description of the 
vessel. Furthermore, in order to draw special attention to the aforementioned 
options regarding decisions made by both parties and to address other key 
points of their legal obligations and rights within the clauses under the time 
charterparty, it is believed that it is also a good idea to consider adding a clear 
and organised Box Layout (or table) on the front of the NYPE 46 form83 and the 
NYPE 93 form84 so that busy merchants can efficiently note and bear in mind 
such details. 
 
 
2.5   The seaworthiness of the vessel in the time charterparty 
 
The seaworthiness of the vessel will considerably impact upon whether or not 
the vessel can be effectively employed by the time charterer and whether they 
can achieve their commercial target.85 In addition, an unseaworthy vessel may 
further connect to other issues, such as, the liability of the marine insurer,86 oil 
pollution on the sea, rising numbers of marine casualties and the riskiness of the 
                                                          
83 Williams (n 37) 228-31. 
84 Brodie (n 10) 32-46. 
85 Coghlin and others (n 11) paras 8.16-19. 
86 ‘The House of Lords in The Good Luck has pronounced that a promissory warranty in marine 
insurance is in fact a condition precedent, the breach of which automatically discharges the 
insurer from liability as from the date of breach. This rule applies to all promissory warranties 
including the implied warranty of seaworthiness.’ See Susan Hodges, Law of Marine Insurance 
(Cavendish publishing Limited 2005) 129; See also Clause 33 and 39 of Marine Insurance Act 
1906; Howard Bennett, The Law of Marine Insurance (2nd edn, OUP 2006) 848-49.     
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shipping industry.87 The subject of the unseaworthy vessel under the time 
charter has also led to numerous legal disputes in the courts.88 Therefore the 
seaworthiness of the vessel is a vital point which must be discussed when 
examining the legal issues regarding the beginning of the time charter service.      
 
 
2.5.1    General key concept of the undertaking of seaworthiness by a 
shipowner under the time charterparty 
 
“Seaworthiness of a vessel” is classically defined as a level of fitness and this is 
what a normally careful and prudent shipowner would demand his/her vessel to 
have at the commencement of her voyage having considered all the probable 
situations it may face.89 
 
To require a shipowner to supply a seaworthy vessel does not mean the vessel 
has to be perfect90 and this test of unseaworthiness is likely subjective rather 
                                                          
87 Ahmad Hussam Kassem, Carriage of Goods by Sea-The Legal Aspects of Seaworthiness 
Current Law and Development (Lambert Academic Publishing 2010) 2. 
88 Coghlin and others (n 11) paras 8.10-20. 
89 This is stated in Carver on Carriage by sea, which was approved by Scrutton, L.J. in F.C. 
Bradley & sons v Federal Steam Navigation (1926) 24 LlL Rep 446. In addition, in Mobil 
Shipping and Transportation Company v Wonsild Liquid Carriers Ltd. 190 F.3D 64, 1999 AMC 
2705 (2d Cir. 1999), a factor in deciding whether the vessel was seaworthy under modern 
concepts ruled by court is that the potential risk to the environment should be calculated and 
considered. See Coghlin and others (n 11) para 8.16, 3.121.   
90 John Hare, Shipping Law & Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa (2nd edn, JUTA & Co. Ltd. 
2009) 643; ‘…In every contract for the carrier of goods between a person holding himself forth 
as the owner of a lighter or vessel ready to carry goods for hire, and the person putting goods on 
board or employing his vessel or lighter for that purpose, it is a term of the contract on the part of 
the carrier or lighterman, implied by law, that his vessel is tight and fit for the purpose or 
employment for which he offers and holds it forth to the public; it is the very foundation and 
immediate substratum of the contract that it is so: the law presumes a promise to that effect on 
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than objective.91 The shipowner’s obligation of seaworthiness is an implied 
warranty at the beginning of the voyage under common law92 in order to make 
the vessel ‘fit to meet and undergo the perils of the sea and other incidental 
risks to which of necessity she must be exposed in the course of a voyage’ in 
every contract of affreightment93 if it is not expressly within the contract.94 
There are various situations which in fact will be considered as unseaworthiness 
of the vessel and whereby the shipowner may therefore breach their 
undertaking of seaworthiness under a time charterparty.95 Some significant 
cases illustrate the concept of the undertaking of seaworthiness of a shipowner 
under the time charterparty, as follows:96 
 
 
2.5.1.1     Physical condition of the vessel 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the part of the carrier without any actual proof; and every reason of sound policy and public 
convenience requires it should be so.’ See Lyon v Mells (1804) 5 East 428 (Lord Ellenborough 
CJ); See Martin Dockray, Cases & Materials on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (3rd edn, 
Routledge-Cavendish 2004) 45.   
91 ‘i.e. this ship must be fit to encounter the perils of the sea for the contractual voyage and not 
any other voyage.’ See Baatz (n 27).  
92 N J J Gaskell, C Debattista and R J Swatton, Chorley and Giles’s Shipping Law (Pearson 
Education Llimited 1987) 182. 
93 John F Wilson, Carriage of Goods by Sea (7th edn, Pearson Education Limited 2010) 9; In 
addition, Article 39 (4) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 stipulates the general meaning of 
seaworthiness as ‘ A ship is deemed to be seaworthy when she is reasonably fit in all respects 
to encounter the ordinary perils of the seas of the adventure insured’. See Susan Hodges, 
Cases and Materials on Marine Insurance Law (Routledge-Cavendish 2008) 305. 
94 Giertsen v Turnbull,1908 S.C. 1101; The Honglong Fir [1961] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 478 [489] 
(Upjohn, L.J.); Coghlin and others (n 11) para 8.11; ‘In addition to the express clauses agreed 
by the parties, every contract of affreightment is negotiated against a background of custom and 
commercial usage from which a series of obligations are implied which are automatically 
incorporated into the contract in the absence of agreement to the contrary.’ See Wilson (n 93) 9; 
See also Braden Vandeventer, ‘Analusis of Basis Provisions of Voyage and Time Charter 
parties’ <www.heinonline.org> accessed 28 April 2011. 
95 Coghlin and others (n 11) paras 8.44-46, 8.49. 
96 Coghlin and others (n 11) paras 20.4, 8.20, 8.44-45, 8.49-50. 
37 
 
It was held that the vessel was unseaworthy by the Court of Appeal in The Yuri 
Maru97 since the propeller of the vessel was insufficiently strong and the blades 
began to be lost after less than three months of the time charter followed by 
over two months of unsuccessful attempts by the shipowner to remedy the 
vessel’s defect.98 In other words, the shipowner needs to ensure that the 
propeller of the vessel is sufficiently strong and there are no problems at the 
start of the time charter, otherwise the issue of the physical condition of the 
vessel will make it unseaworthy. 
 
 
2.5.1.2    Adequate and competent staff  
  
It was held in The Hongkong Fir that even if the condition of an old ship is 
satisfactory, it is necessary to have sufficient staff who are competent to operate 
the ship from the engine room.99 If the size of the staff is not appropriate to 
operate the vessel, this could render the vessel unseaworthy.100 In addition, 
competence of the staff includes their proclivities and their personal attributes, 
and is not just measured by the extent of the Master’s training.101 Salmon J. at 
first instance in this case, held that the chief engineer was a drunkard when he 
                                                          
97 Snia Societa di Navihazione v Suzuki & Co. [1924] 18 LlL Rep 333; [1924] 17 LlL Rep 78 
(KB); Coghlin and others (n 11) para 8.45. 
98 Coghlin and others (n 11) para 8.45. 
99 Hongkong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd. v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. (The Hongkong Fir) [1962] 2 
QB 26; Jason Chuah, Law of International Trade: Cross-Border Commercial Transactions (5th 
edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2013) 256. 
100 ibid. 
101 ibid. 
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performed his job, thus he was incompetent.102 It was therefore held that the 
lack of sufficient numbers of competent staff to control the vessel was a breach 
of the undertaking of seaworthiness by the shipowner under the time 
charterparty at the start of the time charter.103 
 
In addition, it was also held that the vessel was unseaworthy in The Saxon 
Star,104 in which U.S COSGA 1936105 was intended to be incorporated into the 
charterparty.106 The vessel was unseaworthy in this case and the judge ruled 
that the delays in continuing the voyage charter in this case came from the 
breakdowns in the machinery which arose from the problem of having 
incompetent staff in the engine room.107 The shipowner argued that he had 
exercised due diligence in choosing staff but this argument was rejected by the 
court108 since the vessel had incompetent staff in the engine room at the start of 
each voyage under the continuing voyage charter.109 Thus the shipowner 
breached his undertaking of seaworthiness at the beginning of each voyage 
                                                          
102 Hamsher (n 19).  
103 Coghlin and others (n 11) para 8.44. 
104 Adamastos Shipping Co. Ltd. v Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co. [1958] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 73; Coghlin 
and others (n 11) para 34.5. 
105 ‘This is the United States version of COGSA and it incorporates the Hague Rules 1924, with 
certain differences. In the United States, if there is any difference between the application of the 
Hague Rules and COGSA, the ACT prevails, COGSA applies to shipments under bills of lading 
or similar documents of title, which are evidence of the contract of carriage of goods by sea to 
or, from U.S.ports. It covers transportation in US. Foreign trade.’ 
<http://www.shipinspection.eu/index.php?action=page_display&PageID=242> accessed 12 April 
2011. 
106 Coghlin and others (n 11) para 34.5. 
107 ibid. 
108 ibid. 
109 ibid. 
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under the continuing voyage charter and needed to take responsibility for the 
unseaworthiness of the vessel resulting from a lack of competent staff.110  
 
In short, it is clear that whether the charter is a continuing voyage charter or a 
time charter, a shipowner needs to provide competent staff in order to perform 
his undertaking of seaworthiness under the charterparty. 
 
 
2.5.1.3     Documents or certificate 
 
Whether or not a lack of appropriate documents amounts to unseaworthiness of 
the vessel in common law depends on what sort of documents they are.111  
It has been held that it is necessary to possess a legal certificate from the port 
health authority, a deratisation certificate, in order to meet the requirement to be 
“in every way fitted for ordinary cargo service” and the shipowner’s undertaking 
                                                          
110 ibid. 
111 Coghlin and others (n 11) paras 8.49-50; In addition, ‘in July 2002 the International Safety 
Management Code (ISM Code) of the IMO was made applicable to all vessels. The annex to the 
Code explains that it was brought into effect in order to “provide an international standard for the 
safe management and operation of ships and for pollution prevention”. The Code obliges 
shipping companies to establish a Safety Management System (SMS) and provides that a 
Document of Compliance (DOC) and a Safety Management Certificate (SMC) will be issued to 
verify compliance with the Code. It is likely that a vessel will not be considered seaworthy when 
trading to states which are parties to the Code if she does not possess the DOC and SMC. 
Similarly, a vessel which does not have the documentation (ISSCs) and DOS (declaration of 
security) clearance required by the SOLAS ISPS (International Ship and Port Facilities Security) 
Code after the latter came into effect on 1st July 2004 May well be considered to be an 
unseaworthy ship’. See Shipping Law (2011/2012 edn, Witherby Publishing Group Ltd 2011) 
135-36. 
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of seaworthiness is required in The Madeleine, which is the time chartered case 
under the BALTIME form.112 
 
However, the Court of Appeal found in The Derby that holding the document 
needed for proper performance of the service of the charter is required as a 
warranty of seaworthiness.113 It was held that there was no customary necessity 
for a shipowner to obtain a blue certificate or card issued by the International 
Transport Workers Federation and carrying this blue card was neither required 
by “the law of the vessel’s flag” nor by ‘the laws, regulations or lawful 
administrative practices of governmental or local authorities at the vessel’s ports 
of call’.114 Therefore, the blue card is not a document required to be possessed 
by the vessel and the shipowner also was not in breach of a warranty of 
seaworthiness.115 In addition, it was commented on by Longmore L.J, in The Elli 
and The Frixos116 that documents demanded by an officious outside authorised 
organization could not be treated as a document in respect of the seaworthiness 
of the ship.117 
 
 
2.5.1.4     Cargoworthiness 
                                                          
112 Cheik Boutros v Ceylon Shipping Lines Ltd. (The Madeleine) [1967] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 224 (QB); 
Coghlin and others (n 11) para 8.50. 
113 Alfred C. Toepfer Sehiffahrtsgesellschaft G.m.b.H.v. Tossa Marine Co. Ltd. (The Derby) 
[1985] 2 Lioyd’s Rep 325 (CA); Coghlin and others (n 11) para 8.49, 8.52. 
114 ibid. 
115 ibid. 
116 Golden Fleece Maritime v ST shipping & Transport Inc.(The Elli and The Frixos) [2008] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep 262 [19] (Longmore, L.J.); Coghlin and others (n 11) para 8.52. 
117 Coghlin and others (n 11) para 8.52. 
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It was indicated in Maori King v Hughes that cargoworthiness118 of the vessel is 
required for seaworthiness.119 The Arianna also asserted that a vessel is 
unseaworthy if it might result in serious damage to its cargo or make it 
impossible to load and unload cargo.120 However, it was indicated in M.D.C v 
Zeevaart Masstschappij that it was possible for some routine or minor damage 
to the cargo to occur during the carriage and this does not constitute the vessel 
being unseaworthy.121  
 
 
2.5.1.5     Overloading and bad stowage 
 
The overloading and bad stowage of cargo which causes direct damage to 
cargo or surrounding cargo amounts to a shipowner’s breach of undertaking of 
seaworthiness since the ship’s holds are not “fit and safe” to carry the cargo.122 
In addition, in The Standale, it was held that a cargo of grain was badly stowed 
and this affected the seaworthiness of the vessel because the cargo of grain 
was stowed in the hold without suitable protection to prevent it from shifting.123 
Moreover, it was indicated in Ocean Eagle-Lim.Procs that there was no loading 
manual when a vessel left port with a 650-ton overload which lay her five inches 
                                                          
118 It is stated that ‘…Its cargo spaces must be fit for the reception of cargo and any machinery 
used for preserving the cargo must be fit for that purpose’. Coghlin and others (n 11) para 8.19. 
119 Maori King v Hughes [1895] 2 QB 550; Coghlin and others (n 11) para 8.19. 
120 The Arianna [1987] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 376; Coghlin and others (n 11) para 8.18. 
121 M.D.C.v.Zeevaart Masstschappij [1962] 1 Lloyd’s Rep180 [186]; Coghlin and others (n 11) 
para 8.20. 
122 William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, vol (4th edn, Thomson Carswell 2008) 918. 
123 The Standale [1938] 61 LIL Rep 223; Baris Soyer, Warranties in Marine Insurance (2nd edn, 
Cavendish Publishing Limited 2006) 67. 
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beneath her marks.124 Subsequently the vessel sagged and it caused the vessel 
to break in two.125 The court then held that the vessel had been unseaworthy 
from the time of setting sail.126 
 
However, overloading and bad stowage do not always cause unseaworthiness 
of the vessel.127 It depends on the facts and relies on the decision of the court 
whether or not overload and bad stowage constitute a shipowner supplying an 
unseaworthy vessel.128  
 
For example, in The Aquacharm, a time chartered case under the NYPE form, 
the vessel was down by the head when she arrived on the Panama Canal, due 
to the overloading of too much coal under the supervision of the Master.129 
Consequently The Aquacharm was refused permission to pass through the 
Panama Canal by the Panama Canal Co. authorities.130 Part of the cargo also 
had to be transshipped in another vessel in order for The Aquacharm to pass 
through the canal and there was a delay of nine days.131  
 
                                                          
124 1974 AMC 1629 at pp. 1654-1656 (D.P.R.1974); Tetley (n 122) 919. 
125 ibid. 
126 ibid; ‘Seaworthiness requires that a vessel be safely loaded. If a vessel is loaded so heavy 
that she cannot safely sail on the voyage contracted for, she is unseaworthy. In Foley v Tabor 
[1861] 2 F & F 663, a vessel was held to be unseaworthy as a result of the ship being 
overloaded to such extent as to increase her danger and difficulty in navigation.’ See Soyer (n 
123) 68.  
127 Soyer (n 123) 67. 
128 Tetley (n 122) 918. 
129 Actis Co. Ltd. v The Sanko Steamship Co. Ltd. (The Aquacharm) [1982] 1 All ER 390 (CA); 
Coghlin and others (n 11) para 20.4. 
130 ibid. 
131 ibid. 
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The Court of Appeal decided that the vessel was still seaworthy under Article 3 
(1) (a), (b), (c) of the Hague Rules132 and the time charterer needed to pay for 
the “hire” of the vessel during the extra delay because lightening the cargo did 
not prevent the vessel from working fully. 133 Griffiths L.J. ruled that there was 
‘no suggestion that the vessel’s draught was such as to put her at risk in a 
heavy sea or to render her in any way unsafe to sail in’134 and that she was 
sound, efficient and a suitable vessel to carry a cargo of coal and meet the 
demand of “seaworthiness”135 The delay, in fact, did not result from her 
unseaworthiness since the vessel could have sailed safely in the open seas but 
actually resulted from overload and bad stowage.136  
 
To analyse these aforementioned cases as a whole, in brief, if the propellers of 
the vessel are defective, if there is a lack of adequate and competent crew, if a 
deratisation certificate is not possessed or if the vessel is not cargoworthy at the 
beginning of the time charter service, the shipowner will breach his undertaking 
of seaworthiness of the vessel under the time charterparty.137 Overloading and 
                                                          
132 <http://www.admiraltylawguide.com/conven/haguerules1924.html> accessed 8 April 2011. 
‘The Hague Rules were also given statutory force in the United Kingdom by the Carriage of 
Goods by Sea Act 1924.’ See Ewan Mckendrick (ed), Goode on Commercial law (4th edn, 
Penguin Books Ltd 2010) 1146.  
133 The Aquacharm (n 129); Coghlin and others (n 11) para 25.12. 
134 ibid. (Griffith, L.J.). 
135 <http://pntodd.users.netlink.co.uk/cases/cases_a/aquachm.htm> accessed 25 April 2011. 
136 Kassem (n 87) 51. 
137 Coghlin and others (n 11) paras 20.4, 8.20, 8. 44-45, 8.49-50; Kassem (n 87) 2; Moreover, it 
is also shown in The Aquacharm (n 129) [11] (Griffiths, L.J.), two aspects of seaworthiness are 
identified in this case of a voyage charter as follows: First, it is demanded that the vessel, her 
equipment and her crew must be sound enough and have the capability to overcome as well as 
bear the normal perils of the sea during the intended voyage. Second, it is also demanded that 
the contractual cargo needs to be carried by the vessel. See Coghlin and others (n 11) para 
8.17. 
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bad stowage do not always cause a breach of a shipowner’s seaworthy 
obligation. 
 
 
2.5.2    The reform of the undertaking of seaworthiness of the vessel under 
a time charterparty 
 
It can be said that, even though the Hague Rules138 and Hague-Visby Rules139 
are not applied in the time charterparty,140 the concepts of the shipowner’s 
undertaking of seaworthiness under a time charter in common law have actually 
also been covered by the context of Article 3 (1) (a), (b), (c) of the Hague/Visby 
Rules.141  
 
                                                          
138 Article 5 para. 2 of the Hague Rules provided that ‘The provisions of this Convention shall not 
be applicable to charter parties, but if bills of lading are issued in the case of a ship under a 
charter party they shall comply with the terms of this Convention. Nothing in these rules shall be 
held to prevent the insertion in a bill of lading of any lawful provision regarding general average.’ 
In addition, Article 1 (b) of the Hague Rules provides that ‘ “Contract of carriage” applies only to 
contracts of carriage covered by a bill of lading or any similar document of title, in so far as such 
document relates to the carriage of goods by sea, including any bill of lading or similar 
documents as aforesaid issued under or pursuant to a charter party from the moment at which 
such bill of lading or similar document of title regulates the relations between a carrier and a 
holder of the same.’ <http://www.admiraltylawguide.com/conven/haguerules1924.html> 
accessed 8 April 2011. 
139 Article V of the Hague-Visby Rules is same with Article 5 of the Hague Rules 
<http://www.admiraltylaw.com/statutes/hague.html> accessed 5 February 2011. 
140 Tetley (n 122) 24. 
141 The Carrier shall be bound before and at the beginning of the voyage to exercise due 
diligence to: (a) Make the ship seaworthy. (b) Properly man, equip and supply the ship. (c) Make 
the holds, refrigerating and cool chambers, and all other parts of the ship in which goods are 
carried, fit and safe for their reception, carriage and preservation. In addition, the content of 
Article 3 of the Hague Rules is the same as Article III of the Hague-Visby Rules. 
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The expressed obligations of the shipowner in Clause 1 of the BALTIME form142 
are to provide a vessel which is “delivered” and placed at the disposal of the 
charterers in the nominated available berth143 where she can safely lie always 
afloat, as the charterers may direct, the vessel being in every way fitted for 
ordinary cargo service.144 “Seaworthiness of vessel” is also required in the 
preamble of the NYPE 46 form through ‘with hull, machinery and equipment in a 
thoroughly efficient state’145 and in Clause 1 of NYPE 46 form, which stipulated 
that the vessel must be ‘in a thoroughly efficient state in hull, machinery and 
equipment for and during the service’.146 In addition, Clause 2 of the NYPE 93 
form states that ‘The vessel on her delivery shall be…tight, staunch, strong and 
in every way fitted for ordinary cargo service, having water ballast and with 
sufficient power to operate all cargo-handling gear simultaneously.’147  It is also 
prescribed in Clause 11 of the GENTIME form that the shipowner should deliver 
the vessel “in a thoroughly efficient state of hull and machinery”.148 However, the 
Hague Rules149 are incorporated in Clause 24 of the NYPE 46 form,150 and the 
Hague/Visby Rules151  are incorporated in Clause 31 (a) of the NYPE 93 
form;152 by the Clause Paramount in B of the Appendix A-protective Clauses of 
                                                          
142 Thomas (n 2) 286. 
143 The berth should be immediately available before or on the arrival of the vessel and the 
waiting period is entitled to be “hired” by the shipowner. See The Golfstraum [1976] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep 97; Coghlin and others (n 11) para 37.5. 
144 Coghlin and others (n 11) para 37.5. 
145 Williams (n 37) 228. 
146 ibid 229. 
147 Brodie (n 10) 33. 
148 (n 32).  
149 <http://www.admiraltylawguide.com/conven/haguerules1924.html> accessed 8 April 2011. 
150 Williams (n 37) 231. 
151 (n 149) <http://www.admiraltylaw.com/statutes/hague.html> accessed 5 February 2011. 
152 Brodie (n 10) 40-41. 
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the GENTIME form.153 Meanwhile Article 3 (1) (a), (b), (c) of the Hague/Visby 
Rules154 will be instead of the provision regarding seaworthiness of vessel under 
the NYPE 46 form,155 NYPE 93 form156 and the GENTIME form.157 Therefore, 
the content of the seaworthiness of vessel under the NYPE 46 form,158 the 
NYPE 93 form159 and the GENTIME form160 will be exactly the same as Article 3 
(1) (a), (b), (c) of the Hague/Visby Rules.161 
 
The concept of seaworthiness of vessel under the Hague Rules and the Hague-
Visby Rules was widely discussed by relevant experienced experts when they 
were drafted and have already been successfully applied in the world for a long 
time and are  widely accepted in academia and practice.162 Thus it is suggested 
that the original description regarding shipowners’ undertaking of seaworthiness 
should be deleted and a sub-clause to clearly define the seaworthy vessel 
should be added.  A change to the clear wording as in the contents of Article 3 
                                                          
153 (n 32). 
154 (n 149); (n 151). 
155 Williams (n 37) 228-29. 
156 Brodie (n 10) 33. 
157 It is likely that the clause paramount is treated by the English court as intended to override 
the conflicting terms of the charterparty by the contractual parties when any contradiction is 
indicated between the provisions of the Rules and the charterparty. See Section 1.1.2 of 
Chapter 1, and Section 2.5.4 of this chapter. 
158 Williams (n 37) 228-31. 
159 Brodie (n 10) 32-46. 
160 (n 32). 
161 (n 149); (n 151). 
162 Carriers, shippers, underwriters and bankers were involved in the discussion when the 
Hague Rules was drafted. See S.W. Margetson, ‘The History of the Hague (Visby) Rules’ in 
M.L.Hendrikse, N.H.Margetson and N.J. Margetson (eds), Aspects of Maritime Law Claims 
under Bills of Lading (Kluwer 2008). In addition, the Hague Rules were drafted under the 
auspices of the Maritime Law Committee of the International Law Association. The text of the 
Hague Rules as drafted were discussed by the ICC (International Chamber of Commerce), the 
proposals were also discussed by the CMI (The Comité Maritime International was founded by 
the eminent Belgian lawyer in 1897) and the World Shipping Conference; Stephen Girvin, 
Carriage of Goods by Sea (2nd edn, OUP 2011) 220-22. 
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(1) (a), (b), (c) of the Hague Rules163 or the Hague-Visby Rules164 is proposed, 
to replace the vague, incomplete and abstract wordings of ‘where she can safely 
lie always afloat, as the charterers may direct, the vessel being in every way 
fitted for ordinary cargo service’ in Clause 1 of the BALTIME form165 if the Hague 
Rules166 or Hague-Visby Rules167 are not agreed by the contractual parties to be 
incorporated in the BALTIME form.168 This would make the shipowners’ 
obligation of seaworthiness accurate and clear in the time charterparty. 
Moreover, if both parties under the NYPE 46 form,169 the NYPE 93 form,170 or 
the GENTIME form171 decide “not” to incorporate the Hague Rules172 or Hague-
Visby Rules,173 it is also recommended that a better solution can be found by 
adopting the definition of seaworthiness in Article 3 (1) (a), (b), (c) of the Hague 
Rules174 or Hague-Visby Rules.175 This would make the contents clearer and 
more complete in Clause 1 of the NYPE 46 form,176 Clause 2 of the NYPE 93 
form177 and Clause 11 of the GENTIME form.178 Furthermore, this would 
harmonise the concept of shipowners’ seaworthiness undertaking in the 
                                                          
163 (n 149). 
164 (n 151). 
165 Thomas (n 2) 286. 
166 (n 149). 
167 (n 151). 
168 Thomas (n 2) 285-89. 
169 Williams (n 37) 228-31. 
170 Brodie (n 10) 32-46. 
171 (n 32). 
172 (n 149). 
173 (n 151). 
174 (n 149). 
175 (n 151). 
176 Williams (n 37) 228. 
177 Brodie (n 10) 33. 
178 (n 32). 
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essential standard forms of the time charterparty as well as helping to prevent 
future disputes. 
 
 
2.5.3    The extent of the seaworthy obligation of the shipowner under the 
time charterparty 
 
Seaworthiness of the vessel is the fundamental obligation of the shipowner in 
the carriage of goods by sea.179 Moreover, in common law, the initial seaworthy 
obligation of the shipowner is an essential requirement and an absolute 
obligation under the time charterparty while the Hague Rules180 or the Hague-
Visby Rules181 are not incorporated182 This means that the shipowner cannot 
exclude his/her undertaking of the seaworthiness of the vessel, even though the 
shipowner can prove that he/she and the persons who are employed by him/her 
are not negligent.183   
 
It could be construed that the absolute undertaking of seaworthiness from the 
shipowner’s obligation is demanded at the beginning of the time charter service 
                                                          
179 Girvin (n 162) 383. 
180 (n 149). 
181 (n 151). 
182 Tetley (n 122) 24, 875; Robert B. Fisher, ‘The warranty of Seaworthiness in Charter Parties: 
Legal Methods of Amelioration’ (1975) 1 Mar.Law.1. 
<<http://heinonline.org/HOL/Index?collection=journals&set_as_cursor=clear > accessed 26 April 
2011. 
183 Wilson (n 93) 9. 
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under Clause 1 of the BALTIME form.184 This is distinct from Article 3 (1) of the 
Hague Rules,185 and Hague-Visby Rules186 which provided that the carrier 
should exercise due diligence before and at the beginning of each voyage to 
make the vessel seaworthy.187   
 
However, in terms of failure to make the vessel seaworthy which then causes 
delay, or loss or damage to goods on board, Clause 12 of the BALTIME form188 
also provides that the shipowner alone shall have responsibility problems 
regarding the vessel caused by an incompetent crew selected by the 
shipowner,189 or on the part of his manager who runs the shipping activities for 
the shipowner190 to make the vessel seaworthy.191 The shipowner’s implied 
absolute seaworthy undertaking in every contract of carriage ‘could only be 
                                                          
184 Thomas (n 2) 286. 
185 Coghlin and others (n 11) para 37.57. 
186 (n 151). 
187 Article III (1) of the Hague-Visby Rules. <http://www.admiraltylaw.com/statutes/hague.html> 
accessed 5 February 2011. Also see Francesco Berlingieri, ‘Basis of Liability and Exclusions of 
Liability’ (2002) LMCLQ 336. 
188 Thomas (n 2) 287. 
189 Hongkong Fir (n 99); Coghlin and others (n 11) para 37.65. 
190 ‘The ship’s manager is one of the co-owners appointed to act by and on behalf of fellow co –
owners in the employment/trading of the vessel and the collecting of freight. The ship’s manager 
is often referred to as the ‘Managing Owner’. This is a commercial and not a legal expression’. 
See Shipping Law (n 111) 4-5. See also The Lady Gwendolen [1965] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 335 [345]; 
Coghlin and others (n 11) para 37.59. For example, ‘The shipowner was a brewer company 
whose shipping activities were subsidiary to their main business. The ships were run by a 
manager who was not a member of the board of directors but who was responsible to an 
assistant managing director.’ See Coghlin and others (n 11) para 37.60. 
191 Clause 12 of the BALTIME 1939 form provides that ‘The Owner only shall be responsible for 
delay in delivery of the vessel or for delay during the currency of the Charter and for loss or 
damage to goods onboard, if such delay or loss has been caused by want of due diligence on 
the part of the Owners or their Manager in making the vessel seaworthy and fitted for the 
voyage or any other personal act or omission or default of the Owners or their 
Manager…’.Thomas (n 2) 287. 
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excluded by express and clear terms’ in common law.192 Clause 12 of the 
BALTIME form193 is a clear exemption of the shipowner’s absolute seaworthy 
undertaking in common law.194 Therefore, Clause 12 of the BALTIME form195 will 
decrease any absolute undertaking of seaworthiness from the shipowner’s 
obligation in Clause 1 of the BALTIME form.196 From this perspective, the extent 
of the shipowner’s obligation of seaworthiness seems likely to be the same as in 
the Hague Rules,197 or the Hague-Visby Rules. 198 
 
Nonetheless, this is different from the view of Viscount Simonds in The 
Muncaster Castle,199 who states that “the shipowner” may be liable under Article 
4 (1) of the Hague Rules,200 and Hague-Visby Rules,201 which also covers the 
failure of an independent contractor,202 agents and servants203 Therefore, it can 
be concluded that the range of liability of the shipowner under Clause 12 of the 
BALTIME form204  which provides that the shipowner alone shall have 
responsibility for want of due diligence on their part or on the part of their 
                                                          
192 Atlantic Shipping and Trading Co. Ltd. v Louis Dreyfus & Co. [1922] AC 250 at p.260; [1922] 
10 LlL Rep 707 at p 708 (HL); Tetley (n 125) 875. 
193 Thomas (n 2) 287. 
194 See (n 192). 
195 Thomas (n 2) 287.  
196 Coghlin and others (n 11) para 37.57. 
197 (n 149). 
198 (n 151). 
199 Riverstone Meat Co.  v Lancashire Shipping Co. [1961] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 57; Wilson (n 93) 189. 
200 (n 149).  
201 Article IV (1) of the Hague-Visby Rules; (n 151). 
202 Heyn v Ocean S.S Co. [1927] 137 LT 158; Hourani v Harrison [1927] 32 Com Cas 305 [310]; 
It is shown in Heyn v Ocean S.S Co. that the employed independent contractors are treated as 
the servants or agents of the carrier if they are engaged by the carrier. It is also indicated that 
the stevedore who was engaged by the carrier to discharge the cargo was held to be a servant 
of the carrier, even though he was an independent contractor. Wilson (n 93) 278.  
203 Wilson (n 93) 189. 
204 Under common law, this expressed reduction of the shipowner’s obligation of seaworthiness 
within the time charterparty is unlikely as Article 3 (8) of the Hague/Visby Rules, prevents the 
reduction of carrier’s liability. See (n 192); Shipping Law (n 111) 136. 
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Manager to make the vessel seaworthy at the beginning of the time charter 
service, is narrower than under Article 4 (1) of the Hague Rules,205 and Hague-
Visby Rules.206  
 
 
2.5.4    Incorporating the Hague Rules, or the Hague-Visby Rules into the 
time charterparty 
 
It is important to note that there is not a paramount clause207 under the 
BALTIME form208 and so it is necessary to read Clause 1209 and 12 of the 
BALTIME form210 together. The extent of the shipowner’s seaworthy obligation 
is that the shipowner and his manager should be bound at the beginning of the 
time charter to exercise due diligence to ensure that the vessel is seaworthy.211 
This is different from the provisions under the NYPE 46 form,212 the NYPE 93 
form213 and the GENTIME form.214 There are no additional phrases, such as 
exercising due diligence, to describe the extent of the shipowner’s undertaking 
of seaworthiness under Clause 1 of NYPE 46215 and Clause 2 of the NYPE 
                                                          
205 (n 149). 
206 (n 151). 
207 Paramount clause had been introduced in Section 1.1.2 of Chapter 1. 
208 Thomas (n 2) 285-89.  
209 Thomas (n 2) 286. 
210 Thomas (n 2) 287. 
211 Clause 1 and 12 of the BALTIME form. Thomas (n 2) 286-87. 
212 Williams (n 37) 228-31. 
213 Brodie (n 10) 32-46. 
214 (n 32). 
215 Williams (n 39) 228. 
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93.216 In addition, no extra responsibility provisions are outlined regarding the 
shipowner’s undertaking of seaworthiness under the NYPE 46 form217 and the 
NYPE 93 form.218 In particular, Clause 18 (iii) (1) of the GENTIME form is 
distinct in that, it separately imposes the shipowner’s responsibility having 
already clearly expressed that the shipowner and their servants should exercise 
due diligence before and at the beginning of each voyage to make the vessel 
seaworthy.219 
 
However, Clause 24 of the NYPE 46 form,220 Clause 31 (a) of the NYPE 93 
form221 and B of the Appendix A-protective Clauses of the GENTIME form222 are 
paramount clauses223 and all of them essentially cover the incorporation of 
Article 3 (1) of the Hague Rules224 which requires the shipowner to exert due 
diligence before and at the beginning of each voyage in order to make the 
vessel seaworthy.225  
 
                                                          
216 Brodie (n 10) 33. 
217 Williams (n 37) 228-31. 
218 Brodie (n 10) 32-46. 
219 Clause 18 (iii) (1) of the GENTIME provides that ‘The Owners shall be liable for any Cargo 
Claim arising or resulting from failure of the Owners or their servants to exercise due diligence 
before or at the beginning of each voyage to make the vessel seaworthy’. See (n 32). 
220 Williams (n 37) 231. 
221 Brodie (n 10) 40-41. 
222 The extent of the shipowner’s undertaking of seaworthiness is overlapped under the 
GENTIME form when the Hague Rules or Hague-Visby Rules are incorporated because there is 
not any change to or difference in extent of the shipowner’s seaworthy obligation. See (n 32). 
223 (n 207).   
224 (n 149). 
225 Yvonne Baatz, ‘Clauses Paramount in Time Charters’ in Thomas (n 2).  
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Even though there is no paramount clause226 under the BALTIME form,227 the 
parties to the contract can argue that as a result of the principle of freedom of 
contract namely that they should be free to decide the terms in their contract.228 
If both parties of the time charterparty agree to incorporate the Hague Rules229 
or the Hague-Visby Rules230 into the time charterparty, the shipowner not only 
needs to exercise due diligence before and at the beginning of each voyage to 
make the vessel seaworthy but must continue to exercise due diligence to 
maintain the vessel in a thoroughly efficient condition in the hull and machinery 
during the time charter service.231  
 
It can be therefore concluded that if both parties also specifically agree to 
incorporate the Hague/Visby Rules232 into the BALTIME form,233   the extent of 
the shipowner’s undertaking of seaworthiness under this form will be the same 
                                                          
226 (n 207). 
227 Thomas (n 2) 285-89. 
228 ‘Where contracts between business are concerned, the assumption is that the parties should 
be free to make the deals and on the terms they regard as desirable for their businesses, with 
access to legal advice on both sides and thus with minimal interference from the law later. So 
duty qualified, the classic model remains a good basis on which to approach the rules and ethos 
of the law of contract, at least where commercial contracts are concerned.’ See Janet O’sullivan 
and Jonathan Hilliard, The Law of Contract (4th edn, OUP 2010) para 1.9, 1.4; Associated 
Metals & Minerals Corp. v S/S Jasmine, 983 F.2d 410 at pp.412-413,1993 AMC 957 at p.960 (2 
Cir.1993): ‘Because charter parties are statutorily exempted from automatic coverage under 
COGSA, if the act is to apply, the parties must clearly indicate their intention to incorporate it into 
the charterparty itself’ ; Tetley (n 122) 76, footnote 4.   
229 (n 149). 
230 (n 151). 
231 Baatz (n 27) 53; The extent of the shipowner’s maintenance obligation will be discussed in 
Section 2.6.2. 
232 (n 141); (n 149); (n 151). 
233 Thomas (n 2) 285-89. 
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as under the NYPE 46 form,234 the NYPE 93 form235 and the GENTIME form236 
which already covers the paramount clause.237 
 
 
2.5.5     The legal effect of a breach of the undertaking of seaworthiness 
under the time charterparty 
 
The nature of the shipowner’s undertaking of seaworthiness under the time 
charterparty is regarded as an innominate term (or an intermediate term),238 
which is neither a condition nor a warranty.239 The innominate term was invented 
in one of the most significant cases of contract law in the 20th century,240 The 
Hongkong Fir.241 This case has also had a major impact upon contract law more 
generally.242 
                                                          
234 Williams (n 37) 228-31. 
235 Brodie (n 10) 32-46. 
236 (n 32). 
237 (n 207). 
238 Donald Nolan, ‘Hongkong Fir Shipping Co Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd, The Hongkong 
Fir’.in Charles Mitchell and Paul Mitchell (eds), Landmark Cases in the Law of Contract (Hart 
Publishing 2008); Chen Liang, ‘Seaworthiness in Charter Parties’ (2000) JBL 
<http://login.westlaw.co.uk/> accessed 11 April 2011. 
239 Simone Schnitzer, Understanding International Trade Law (Law Matters Publishing 2006) 47. 
See also William Tetley, ‘Good Faith in Contract Particularly in Contracts of Arbitration and 
Chartering’<http://www.mcgill.ca/files/maritimelaw/goodfaith.pdf> accessed 22 April 2011  
240 Nolan (n 238) See also Koji Takahashi, ‘Right to terminate (avoid) international sales of 
commodities’ (2003) JBL <http://login.westlaw.co.uk/> accessed 27 March 2011. 
241 The Hongkong Fir (n 99). 
242 ‘As a result of the decision in Hongkong Fir, the courts have shown themselves ready to find 
that a term is innominate, even if the parties themselves describe it as a condition.’ For example, 
in Schuler AG v Wickman Machine Tool Sales Ltd [1974] AC 235. ‘the House of Lords held that 
use of the word “condition” was an indication that the parties intended that the innocent party 
should be allowed to terminate if that term was breached, but it was only an indication. It was 
still important to discover their intention by looking at the contract as a whole, and one relevant 
consideration would be whether imposing the strict legal meaning of condition created a very 
unreasonable result: “The more unreasonable the result, the less likely it is that the party 
untended it.” In this case, their Lordships felt the result would be unreasonable, since the term 
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In The Hongkong Fir the time charterer chartered a vessel (The Hongkong Fir) 
from the shipowner for 24 months and the shipowner made an undertaking of 
seaworthiness of this vessel under the BALTIME 1939 form.243 However, the 
vessel suffered a breakdown, caused by insufficient numbers of, and 
incompetent, staff in the engine room. The staff did not pay careful attention 
when operating the old engine of the vessel.244 Due to the consequent repairs, 
the vessel was delayed and around twenty weeks were lost during the time 
charter period.245 The time charterer therefore repudiated the time charterparty, 
but the shipowner sued for wrongful repudiation.246 
 
The decision of Diplock, L.J in the Court of Appeal showed that the time 
charterer cannot repudiate the time charterparty.247 The shipowner had indeed 
breached the undertaking of seaworthiness of the vessel, since the shipowner 
did not exercise due diligence248 to supply sufficient and competent staff with the 
vessel at the start of the time charter.249 However, this judgment held that the 
important factor was the actual consequences of the shipowner’s breach in 
                                                                                                                                                                          
could be breached in very minor ways; the term was held not to be a condition and Schuler were 
not entitle to terminate the contract.’  See Catherine Elliott and Frances Quinn, Contract Law 
(6th edn, Pearson Education Limited 2007) 126; In addition, the High Court of Australia and the 
Court of Appeal of Singapore ‘also approved the tripartite classification of promissory terms to 
which the decision in Hongkong Fir case gave rise.’ See J.W. Carter, ‘ Intermediate Terms 
Arrive in Australia and Singapore’ (2008) journal of Contract Law 226.  
243 Hongkong Fir (n 99). 
244 ibid. 
245 ibid. 
246 ibid. 
247 Coghlin and others (n 11) para 8.44. 
248 Clause 12 of the BALTIME 1939 form provides that ‘the Owner only shall be responsible for 
delay in delivery of the vessel or for delay during the currency of the Charter and for loss or 
damage to goods onboard, if such delay or loss has been caused by want of due diligence on 
the part of the Owners or their Manager in making the vessel seaworthy and fitted for the 
voyage or any other personal act or omission or default of the Owners or their manager…’ 
249 Hamsher (n 19). 
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order to decide whether the time charterer should be entitled to terminate the 
time charterparty. The judge examined whether the breach of the undertaking of 
seaworthiness by the shipowner ‘deprives the time charterer substantially of the 
whole benefit of the contract’.250 That is also to say, if the shipowner’s breach of 
the undertaking of the seaworthiness ‘deprives the time charterer substantially 
of the whole benefit of the contract‘, the time charterer is entitled to terminate 
the time charterparty; in contrasting circumstances, if the shipowner’s breach of 
the undertaking of the seaworthiness is relatively minor, this is insufficient 
grounds for the time charterer to be allowed to terminate the time 
charterparty.251 
 
 
2.5.6     Is the decision of The Hongkong Fir appropriate? 
 
The Hongkong Fir revealed that the innocent party needs to “wait and see”252 
whether he can justify the termination of the contract once the effect of the 
shipowner’s breach of undertaking of seaworthiness is decided.253 This is 
criticised as an uncertain risk and is claimed to cause difficulty for both parties in 
the contract trying to predict the result.254  
 
                                                          
250 Elliott and Quinn (n 242) 125. 
251 Coghlin and others (n 11) para 8.44. 
252 Bunge Corp. v Tradax Export S.A [1981] 1 WLR 711 (HL) 714 (Lord Lowry). 
253 Coghlin and others (n 11) para 8.44. 
254 Ewan Mckendrick, Contract Law Text, Cases, and Materials (4th edn, OUP 2010) 778. 
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However, if there is no agreement regarding the maximum length of the 
shipowner’s period of maintenance of the vessel during the time charter, it is an 
objective matter for a court to examine the facts regarding the effects of the 
occurrence and decide whether the shipowner’s breach of undertaking of 
seaworthiness goes to the root of the contract or has deprived the time charterer 
substantially of the whole benefit of the time charterparty.255 In addition, this 
more flexible approach remedies the rigid classification for conditions and 
warranties and gives the dispute another new solution when both parties are 
silent about the nature of the terms in the contract or when the contract is 
oral.256 There are various and complex ways of interpreting the shipowner’s 
breach of the undertaking of seaworthiness and it is too simplistic to define it by 
classifying the seriousness of the nature of the terms “conditions” and 
“warranties”.257 For example, many degrees of seriousness of breach, from a 
comparatively trivial breach, such as a  rusty nail on the deck, to a significantly 
serious breach, such as the broken down engines, are all covered in the 
outcomes of a shipowner’s breach of undertaking of seaworthiness.258 Thus, to 
examine the effects and consequences of the breach may be a fair way to deal 
with the dispute.259 The Hongkong Fir may also be valued as a milestone which 
                                                          
255 JW Carter, G J Tolhurst and Elisabeth Peden,’Developing the Intermediate Term Concept’ 
(2006) 22 Journal of Contract Law 268. 
256 Chris Turner, Unlocking Contract Law (3rd edn, Hodder Arnold 2010) 114. 
257 P S Atiyah and others, Atiyah’s Sales of Goods (12th edn, Pearson Education Limited 2010) 
88. 
258 Michael Bridge, The Sales of Goods (2nd edn, OUP 2009) 612. 
259 Turner (n 256) 115. 
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successfully contributed to bringing the time charterparty and contract law 
together.260  
 
Nevertheless, there are two sides to the problems of The Hongkong Fir, one is 
the rule itself,261 the other is the way that the decision is applied.  
 
The consequences of the breach approach, will bring difficulties for commercial 
activities because of its uncertainty.262 This uncertainty occurs because the court 
needs to balance the various aspects of the facts, such as the cost of making 
performance adhere to the terms of the contract, the losses resulting from the 
breach, the value of the performance that has been obtained by the innocent 
party, the desire of the party in breach to make good the effect of the breach, 
enough damages as a remedy to the innocent party and the possibility of a 
further breach by the party in breach.263 As Megaw L.J. asserted in The Mihalis 
Angelos,264 commercial predictability is an essential requirement for contractual 
parties in their commercial dealings.265 Lord Bridge in The Chikuma266 also 
emphasised the desirability of commercial certainty.267 Moreover, Lord 
                                                          
260 Nolan (n 238). 
261 Nolan (n 238). 
262 Mckendrick (n 254) 783. 
263 ibid. 
264 Maredelanto Compania Naviera S.A v Bergbau-Handel GmbH (The Mihalis Angelos) [1971] 
1 QB 164. The court of appeal held that the ‘expected readiness’ clause under the charterparty 
was a condition; See also Janet O’sullivan and Jonathan Hilliard (n 228) para 18.22.     
265 ibid. 
266 Awilco of Oslo A/S v Fulvia SpA di Navigazione of Cagliari (The Chikuma) [1981] 1 WLR 314. 
267 Richard Stone, The Modern Law of Contract (9th edn, Routledge 2011) 440.  
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Wilberforce indicated in Bunge Corp268 that the “consequences of the breach” 
approach in Hongkong Fir “would be commercially most undesirable”.269 The 
rule of The Hongkong Fir, conflicts with the “enormous practical advantages in 
certainty” addressed by Lord Lowry270 and the “need for certainty” in commercial 
dealings mentioned by Lord Roskill271 in Bunge Corp.272 
 
In addition, the downside is also shown when the judges in the Court of Appeal 
“apply” the law which they want to set up in the The Hongkong Fir to the facts, 
i.e. mistakes are caused when judges look at the effect of a shipowner’s breach 
of seaworthy undertaking on the facts in order to decide if it deprived the time 
charterer of substantially the whole benefit he should have obtained under the 
time charterparty. In this case, Diplock, L.J. ignored the real intention of both 
parties and did not focus on the true construction of the contract.273 The 
decision of The Hongkong Fir can also be contrasted with the view of Lord 
Steyn who asserted that English contract law should be in compliance with “the 
reasonable expectations of the contracting parties” in the business world.274 
Even though it could be argued that the vessel had been repaired, its problem 
had been fixed and the time charterer in fact still had around four fifths of the 
period of the time charter remaining in which to use the vessel to run his 
                                                          
268 Bunge Corp. v Tradax Export SA [1981] 1 WLR 711 (HL) 714. The court held that ‘the 
obligation to give notice to load in proper time should also be a condition.’ See Turner (n 256) 
116. 
269 ibid. 
270 ibid; Nolan (n 238). 
271 ibid; Nolan (n 238). 
272 (n 268); Nolan (n 238). 
273 Nolan (n 238). 
274 Johan Steyn, ‘Contract Law: Fulfilling the Reasonable Expectations of Honest Men’ (1997) 
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business,275 this vessel’s condition was actually already unfit to fulfil the 
merchant’s will and expectation. This is because the charterer had needed to 
fully utilise the vessel for the entire period of the time charter in order to have 
completed his commercial plan by the time he concluded the time charterparty. 
 
Moreover, from an economical and commercial angle, as in the old saying, time 
is money, thus time is very important in mercantile contracts.276 The shipowner, 
in fact, took around twenty weeks to repair the vessel and this could have 
destroyed the time charterer’s business plan and commercial operations.  
 
Furthermore, undoubtedly,  a general time charterer may lack confidence and 
feel he lacks control of a vessel with an old engine which was repaired in around 
one fifth (1/5) of the period of the time charter, wondering if the vessel might 
break or need to be repaired again in the future. In short, the time charterer was 
under no obligation to tolerate this uncomfortable psychological burden or 
uncertainty regarding the future. 
 
It is thought to be doubtful that the time charterer was a speculator and might 
have wanted to terminate the time charterparty in order to rent another, cheaper 
vessel, in response to a fall in market prices at the time of the dispute between 
                                                          
275  According to the facts, the shipowner took around 20 weeks to repair the vessel and the total 
period of the time charter was 24 months. See Coghlin and others (n 11) para 8.44. 
276  Effectiveness, efficiency and competitiveness in completing maritime tasks are very 
important for the maritime industry. See Kevin Cullinane, ‘Editor’s introduction: the maritime 
industry means business’ in Kevin Cullinane (ed), International Handbook of Maritime Business 
(Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2010). 
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both contractual parties.277 However, for the time charterer to terminate this time 
charterparty would  be a reasonable and effective strategy for a businessman to 
balance his loss of nearly twenty weeks and to rescue his commercial position 
in order to make profits. 
 
Fault and blame actually lies not with the time charterer, but with the shipowner 
who breached his undertaking of seaworthiness. It can thus be questioned why 
the time charterer should bear the final legal disadvantage. The right for one 
contractual party to terminate a contract should be allowed when to grant such a 
remedy is fair for both contractual parties and this is the modern notion of 
intermediate term which has evolved at the discretion of judges.278 However, the 
decision in The Hongkong Fir is deemed unfair to the time charterer who could 
not terminate this time charterparty. It is not balanced, considering both parties’ 
legal interests. It is also doubtful given the facts whether the shipowner’s breach 
of undertaking of seaworthiness had already deprived the time charterer 
substantially of the whole benefit of the time charterparty. Furthermore, from a 
modern viewpoint, it is also asserted that this decision needs to be reviewed, 
since it cannot reflect the legal and commercial reality of the 21st century.279  
 
To sum up, The Hongkong Fir has indeed made a positive contribution to 
changing the older rigid classifications of classical contract law and has added 
another new approach for courts to inspect the seriousness of the effects in 
                                                          
277 Nolan (n 238). 
278 Turner (n 256) 114. 
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reality and to try to achieve fairness for both parties in the case.280 This was why 
the courts in many subsequent cases have also stressed the advantages of the 
ruling in The Hongkong Fir and continued to uphold it.281    
 
However, the disadvantages of the ruling in The Hongkong Fir are that it gives a 
judge too much discretion and renders the law too uncertain.282 In addition, the 
decision in this case seems likely to infringe the real intentions of the time 
charterer when he agreed to establish the time charterparty283 because repair of 
the vessel took too long. This meant that the time charterer could not effectively 
use the vessel and this breached the merchant’s commercial aim to effectively 
and efficiently make maximum profits. Therefore, it is believed that the decision 
in The Hongkong Fir was inappropriate. In order to fairly and justly solve the real 
commercial disputes and in order to be fit for the modern activities of shipping, 
when a judge adopts The Hongkong Fir approach to interpret the time 
charterparty, and applies this approach to the facts to decide a case in the 
future, it is recommended that a judge must carefully consider the basic reason 
for forming a contract: both parties’ real intentions.284   
 
                                                          
280 H.G.Beale and others (eds), Chitty on Contracts,vol 1 (13th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2008) 
para 12-034. 
281 Such as Cehave NV v Bremer Handelsgesselschaft mbH (The Hansa Nord) [1976] QB 44; 
Reardon Smith Line Ltd. v Hansen-Tangen [1976] 1 WLR 989; Turner (n 256) 115-16; (n 242). 
282 Turner (n 256) 115. 
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284 Robert Upex and Geoffrey Bennett, Davies on Contract (10th edn, Sweet & Maxwell limited 
2008) 51; John N. Adams and Roger Brownsword, Understanding Contract Law (5th edn, Sweet 
& Maxwell Ltd 2007) 106-07.  
63 
 
It is worth considering the ways in which parties might avoid the type of 
commercial dispute that arose in the The Hongkong Fir.285 However, as already 
mentioned, the facts of a shipowner’s breach of seaworthy undertaking are 
various, from trivial to significantly serious breaches.286 It is difficult for 
contractual parties to foresee when a rusty nail will be found on the deck or 
when the engine of a vessel will break down.287 This can be seen as the reason 
why the shipowner and time charterer generally wish to negotiate and manage 
their legal risk288 to be reflected in their time charterparty in advance. However, 
the rule of The Hongkong Fir requires the court to examine the seriousness of 
the consequences of a shipowner’s breach of seaworthy undertaking and then 
decide the suitable remedy for the contractual parties.289  
 
In order to effectively solve these difficulties and to assist contractual parties to 
manage this risk of uncertainty regarding the legal effect as seen in the The 
Hongkong Fir,290 a maintenance clause is proposed under the time charterparty 
and this solution will be illustrated in the following section in “The reform of the 
maintenance clause”. 
 
 
                                                          
285 Hongkong Fir  (n 99). 
286 Bridge (n 258) 612. 
287 Stone (n 267) 439. 
288 Legal risk management generally means the management of risks caused by the drafting 
and/or performance of contracts. Aleka Mandaraka-Sheppard, Modern Maritime Law and Risk 
Management (2nd edn, Informa Law 2009) 1018, 1026, 1028; Michel Crouhy, Dan Galai and 
Robert Mark, The Essentials of Risk Management (McGraw-Hill 2006) 1-2, 9, 31. 
289 O’sullivan and Hilliard (n 228) para 18.17. 
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2.6    The shipowner’s maintenance obligation  
 
Special and different from using an owned vessel in the carriage of goods by 
sea, the initial seaworthy obligation of the shipowner under a time charter 
usually attaches the maintenance obligation to the shipowner within a time 
charterparty.291 The shipowner’s maintenance obligation is comprised of two 
parts.292 One is that the shipowner is obliged to keep up and to cautiously 
survey, inspect, renew and replace the hull and machinery of the vessel as 
necessary.293 Another, as in the case of The Yuri Maru,294 indicates that if the 
equipment and machinery of the vessel becomes inefficient during the time 
charter period, the shipowner is required to take reasonable steps to repair the 
vessel to an efficient condition in a reasonable time, under the time 
charterparty.295 Moreover, The Elli and The Frixos also showed that, to decide 
whether maintenance is “reasonable”, it is not necessary to consider whether 
the cost of repairing the defect of the vessel is suitable or proportional.296 It is 
also further indicated in the same case by the Court of Appeal that if law or 
policy is changed and the shipowner has particularly promised297 that the vessel 
                                                          
291 Wilson (n 93) 12; Lars Gorton and others, Shipbroking and Chartering Practice (7th edn, 
Informa Law 2009) 261. 
292 Coghlin and others (n 11) para 11.7. 
293 ibid. 
294 Snia Societa di Navihazione v Suzuki & Co. [1924] 18 LlL Rep 333; [1924] 17 LlL Rep 78 ( 
KB) [88] (Gree, J.); Coghlin and others (n 11) para 11.7. 
295 ibid. 
296 The Elli and The Frixos (n 116) [59] (Cooke, J.). The Elli and The Frixos are two tankers 
which are time chartered under the SHELLTIME 4 form. See Coghlin and others (n 11) para 
11.8, 11.16. 
297 Clause 1 (g) of the SHELLTIME 4 provides that ‘She shall have on board all certificates, 
documents and equipment required from time to time by any applicable law to enable her to 
perform the charter service without delay’. Thomas (n 2) 335; 
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will be maintained in a suitable condition to ship a specific sort of cargo, then the 
shipowner would have an obligation to make physical modifications to ensure 
the vessel continued to be kept legally fit to carry these cargoes.298 It is 
therefore suggested that a time charterer under the BALTIME form,299 the NYPE 
46 form,300 the NYPE 93 form301 and the GENTIME form302 negotiates with a 
shipowner to follow the expression in Clause 1 (g) of the SHELLTIME 4 form303 
and to add a sub-clause under the maintenance clause. This would allow a 
specific promise to keep the vessel legally fit during the time charter as well as 
to be clearly protected by the contractual clause if the time charter believes that 
it is necessary.    
 
 
2.6.1    Maintenance clause under the time charterparty 
 
The shipowner is required to ‘maintain her [the vessel] in a thoroughly efficient 
state in hull and machinery during service’ under Clause 3 of the BALTIME 
form.304 In addition, Clause 11 of the GENTIME form stipulates that the 
shipowner should ‘maintain the vessel in such Class and in every way fit for the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
<http://www.lawandsea.net/1documents/Shelltime4maintenance_obligation.pdf> accessed 29 
April 2011. 
298 The Elli and The Frixos (n 116); [2008] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 119 (CA); Coghlin and others (n 11) 
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service throughout the period of the Charter Party’.305 Moreover, Clause 1 of the 
NYPE 46 form306 indicates that the shipowner has the obligation to ‘maintain her 
class and keep the vessel in a thoroughly efficient state in hull, machinery and 
equipment for and during the service.’ Furthermore, Clause 6 of the NYPE 93 
form307 also adds the following information: ‘and have a full complement of 
officers and crew’308 to make the meaning of “maintenance” more complete.309  
 
However, it is essential to consistently follow the suggestion in Section 2.5.2 and 
use the wordings of Article 3 (1) (a), (b), (c) of the Hague Rules310 or the Hague-
Visby Rules311 in the BALTIME form,312 the NYPE 46313 and NYPE 93314 forms  
and the GENTIME form.315 The content of this contractual clause clearly defines 
the seaworthy vessel in order to oblige the shipowner to offer a seaworthy 
vessel at the beginning of the time charter service.316 Avoidance of repetition is 
recommended and it is suggested that a maintenance clause simply provide 
that the shipowner should be obliged to maintain the vessel’s class if 
contractually required and to keep the vessel seaworthy during the period of the 
                                                          
305 (n 32). 
306 Williams (n 37) 229. 
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have a full complement of officers and crew’. 
309 Brodie (n 10) 34. 
310 (n 149). 
311 (n 151). 
312 Thomas (n 2) 285-89. 
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315 (n 32). 
316 (n 149); (n 151). 
67 
 
time charter under the BALTIME form,317 the NYPE 46 form,318 the NYPE 93 
form,319 and the GENTIME form.320 This would contribute to ensuring the 
content of the shipowner’s maintenance and seaworthy obligation under the 
time charterparty is more consistent, clear, logical and simple across all the 
essential time charterparty forms. 
 
 
2.6.2    The extent of the shipowner’s maintenance obligation 
 
The extent of the shipowner’s maintenance obligation is established on the 
basis of the wording used in the time charterparty.321 For example, it can impose 
absolute obligation upon the shipowner or make him exercise due diligence to 
maintain the vessel.322 In Clause 11 of the GELTIME form it is clearly expressed 
that the shipowner ‘shall exercise due diligence to maintain the vessel in such 
Class and in every way fit for the service throughout the period of the Charter 
Party’.323 In addition, it is believed that the shipowner’s maintenance obligation 
and seaworthy obligation are indeed different concepts and, obviously, the 
express maintenance obligation of the shipowner is wholly and separately 
distinct from the shipowner’s seaworthy obligation provided in the time 
                                                          
317 Thomas (n 2) 285-89. 
318 Williams (n 37) 228-31. 
319 Brodie (n 10) 32-46. 
320 (n 32). 
321 Adamastos Shipping v Anglo-Saxon Petroleum (The Saxon Star) [1958] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 73 
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charterparty.324 Therefore, it will not conflict with the Hague Rules325 and Hague-
Visby Rules326 when they are incorporated in the time charterparty. This is 
because no maintenance clause is stipulated in the Hague Rules327 or the 
Hague-Visby Rules328 and it is thus not necessary to consider the priority of 
legal effects between them.329 That is to say, when the Hague Rules330 or 
Hague-Visby Rules331 are incorporated into the time charterparty, no changes 
should be made to the extent of the shipowner’s maintenance obligation under 
the original time charterparty, regardless of whether they have contractually 
agreed to the shipowner’s absolute obligation or only to the exercising of due 
diligence by the shipowner.332  
 
However, it is argued that the shipowner’s maintenance obligation merely 
extends the shipowner’s initial obligation of seaworthiness under the time 
charterparty.333 This may mean that the shipowner also has an absolute 
obligation to maintain the vessel in common law if the Hague Rules334 or the 
Hague-Visby Rules335 are not incorporated into the time charterparty. 
Nevertheless, the shipowner likewise will certainly need to exercise due 
                                                          
324 Coghlin and others (n 11) para 8.1, 11.5, 11.15; Wilson (n 93) 12. 
325 (n 149). 
326 (n 151). 
327 (n 149). 
328 (n 151). 
329 Coghlin and others (n 11) para 11.15. 
330 (n 149). 
331 (n 151). 
332 Wilson (n 93) 12. 
333 Williams (n 37) 229. Coghlin and others (n 11) para 11.5.   
334 (n 149). 
335 (n 151). 
69 
 
diligence to maintain the vessel when Hague Rules336 or the Hague-Visby 
Rules337 are incorporated in the time charterparty.338 The Elli and The Frixos 
indicate that the shipowner must exercise reasonable care and skill to maintain 
the vessel within a reasonable time when Clause 38 of SHELLTIME 4 form339 is 
incorporated into the Hague Rules and Hague-Visby Rules.340 
 
However, The Elli and The Frixos341 concerned a time charter under the 
SHELLTIME 4 form342 and Clause 3 (a) of the SHELLTIME 4 form343 where the 
exact wording “due diligence” had clearly already been provided in order to 
specify the extent of the shipowner’s maintenance obligation under the time 
charterparty.344 This does not necessarily mean that the extent of the 
shipowner’s maintenance obligation should be imposed by the time charterparty 
in order for the shipowner to exercise due diligence to maintain the vessel in 
order to keep it in efficient condition. It is believed that if the exact wording does 
not specify the extent of the shipowner’s maintenance obligation, the shipowner 
still at least needs to exercise due diligence to maintain the vessel, otherwise it 
is indeed doubtful how the shipowner can keep the vessel working efficiently. 
The expression in Clause 3 (a) of the SHELLTIME 4345 is simply to make sure 
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that the extent of the shipowner’s maintenance obligation is clear in the contract. 
Moreover, as The Eurasian Dream case indicated, to exercise due diligence is 
equivalent to exerting reasonable skill and care.346 Thus, it is no wonder that 
The Elli and The Frixos347 found that the shipowner needed to take reasonable 
steps to exercise reasonable care and skill to maintain the vessel within a 
reasonable time, since “exercise reasonable care and skill” and “exercise due 
diligence” indicate the same coverage of the shipowner’s maintenance 
obligation under the time charterparty in common law and Clause 3 (a) of the 
SHELLTIME 4 form  under which the shipowner needs to exercise due diligence 
to maintain the vessel.348 It is an option for both parties to contractually agree 
the extent of the shipowner’s maintenance obligation under the time 
charterparty, this option allows for a higher standard of maintenance to be 
agreed upon.349 It can be argued though that it is essential for the shipowner “at 
least” to exercise reasonable care and skill or “due diligence” to maintain the 
vessel in an acceptable condition throughout the period of the time charter even 
if the exact wording does not specify the extent of the shipowner’s maintenance 
obligation in order to ensure justice and fairness for both parties, regardless of 
whether or not the Hague Rules350 or Hague-Visby Rules351 are incorporated in 
the time charterparty.352  
                                                          
346 Papera Traders Co. Ltd. and Others v Hyundai Merchant Marine Co. Ltd. (The Eurasian 
Duram) [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 719. 
347The Elli and The Frixos (n 116). 
348 Thomas (n 2) 336. 
349 (n 321). 
350 (n 149). 
351 (n 151). 
352 It is believed that there is no impact on the extent of the shipowner’s maintenance obligation 
when the Hague Rules and Hague-Visby Rules are incorporated into the time charterparty, 
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2.6.3    The legal effect of breach of the maintenance clause 
 
The nature of the shipowner’s maintenance obligation is also an intermediate 
term and this is the same as the shipowner’s initial undertaking of the 
seaworthiness of the vessel in common law.353 Thus the legal effect of 
shipowner’s breach of the maintenance obligation is the same as the legal effect 
of the shipowner’s breach of the seaworthy obligation under the Hongkong Fir 
approach.354 The court examined the effects of this event to judge whether or 
not the shipowner’s breach of maintenance obligation is so serious as to 
substantially deprive the time charterer of the whole benefit of the contract.355 It 
would then decide whether or not the time charterer can terminate the time 
charterparty.356 The decision of the Court of Appeal in The Hermosa case shows 
that the sub-time charterer cannot justify termination of the sub-charter if the 
existing deficiency of the vessel can be repaired to the right condition by the 
head charterer in a comparatively short time, since in The Hermosa case there 
would still have been sixteen to twenty months for the sub-charter to run his 
business.357 This demonstrates that the court will not allow the time charterer to 
terminate the time charterparty if the court believes that the consequences of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
because the shipowner’s maintenance obligation and the shipowner’s seaworthiness obligation 
are different concepts; Wilson (n 93) 12.  
353 Coghlin and others (n 11) para 11,12. 
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the shipowner’s breach of the maintenance obligation are not sufficiently 
serious. 
 
 
2.6.4     Reforming the maintenance clause 
 
As mentioned in Section 2.6.3, it was concluded by the court that the 
maintenance clause is an intermediate term and it is necessary for the court to 
examine the facts in each case to determine whether this breach substantially 
deprives the time charterer of the whole benefit of the time charterparty.358 It 
should then decide whether the time charterer can terminate the contract.359 
However, what is “going to the root of the contract” and what amounts to 
‘substantially deprives the time charter of the whole benefit of the contract’ 
depends upon the judge’s interpretation of the facts. For example, as previously 
mentioned, there are contrasting views with regard to the decision of the The 
Hongkong Fir.360 The decision of The Hongkong Fir may be not appropriate, but 
these different views are all based upon the same fact: the shipowner took 
around 20 weeks to repair the vessel.361 
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Thus it is suggested that the time charterer should take steps to manage his 
risk362 and possible uncertain outcomes in advance. If the time charterer already 
has a clear commercial target and has a sense of his/her pattern or course of 
dealing, it is better for him/her to predict in advance the maximum tolerated 
length of time for the repair of the vessel by the shipowner. Then the time 
charterer can negotiate with the shipowner and clearly express the maximum 
period for repairing the vessel when the time charterparty is made. Moreover, it 
is also recommended that the time charterer should also clearly express the 
consequences of this breach when the contract is formed. These particulars 
would facilitate a judgment as to whether any breach is “going to the root of the 
contract”363 and “deprive[s] substantially the whole benefit of the contract”364 and 
would clarify the legal result for both parties. It could be added as a sub-clause 
of the maintenance clause of the BALTIME form,365 the NYPE 46 form,366 the 
NYPE 93 form,367  and the GENTIME form.368  The wording could be added to 
these forms as follows:  
 
‘It is going to the root of the contract or is depriving the time charterer 
substantially of the whole benefit of the time charterparty when the maximum 
time of (length of time) for repairing the vessel by the shipowner has been 
exceeded. If the vessel has any problems during the time charter and she 
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cannot be completely fixed within the maximum time, the time charterer is 
entitled to his/her right to terminate this time charterparty and has a right for 
damages to be paid.’ 
 
Furthermore, it is also a good idea to follow the GENTIME form369 in adding an 
index to the front of BALTIME form,370 the NYPE 46 form371 and the NTPE 93 
form372 and to add the Box Layout of the NYPE 46 form373 and the NYPE 93 
form.374 An underlined heading emphasizing key words should also be given at 
the front of each section of clauses in the standard forms of the time 
charterparty when these forms are chosen and modified by merchants in order 
for them to more easily and efficiently understand their legal rights and 
obligations. 
 
It is particularly suggested to highlight the maximum period for repair in the time 
charterparty in the Part 1 Box Layout of these essential standard forms of the 
time charterparty. This will ensure that both parties are clearly reminded of the 
maximum period allowed for repair under the time charter. 
 
 
2.7    Highlighting the key reforms in this chapter 
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To sum up, following discussion of this clause of the beginning of the time 
charter service, it is recommended that it is necessary to make the cancelling 
clause in BALTIME form375 more practically flexible to reflect actual situations 
which might occur when the vessel is on the sea. In addition, the real intention 
of both parties should be emphasised by adding “when” it is necessary for the 
vessel to be comply with “which” details of the description of the vessel in the 
BALTIME form,376 the NYPE 46 form377 and the NYPE 93 form,378 as well as the 
GENTIME form.379 Moreover, in order to clearly define and harmonise the 
concept of the shipowner’s seaworthy undertaking in the essential time 
charterparty standard forms and prevent future disputes, it is suggested that the 
original description regarding the shipowner’s seaworthy obligation should be 
deleted and the definition of seaworthiness of vessel in Article 3 (1) (a), (b), (c) 
of the Hague Rules380 or the Hague-Visby Rules381 should be adopted under the 
relevant clause of the BALTIME form,382 the NYPE 46 form383 the NYPE 93 
form384 and the GENTIME form.385 Furthermore, it is also recommended that 
when the time charterparty is made, a clear expression of the maximum period 
for repairing the vessel and the consequences of this breach should be present. 
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2.8     Conclusion 
 
In practice, it is paramount to avoid future disputes and to control uncertainty as 
well as to properly manage risk in advance for both parties under the time 
charterparty. Therefore, it is better to modify the clauses of standard forms in 
view of the courts’ interpretations of common law. In addition, details of the legal 
rights and obligations of both parties should be clarified in the time charterparty. 
It is also necessary to provide the legal effect of their breach in the clauses of 
the time charterparty.386 These changes would provide more protection to 
contractual parties as well as save time and expense in their commercial 
dealings.387  
                                                          
386 Richard Stone, James Devenney and Ralph Cunnington, Text, Cases and Materials on 
Contract Law (2nd edn, Routledge 2011) 228; Legal effect refers to impact on the contractual 
parties and legal effect is determined by precedent. See J.W Carter and Elisabeth Pedent, ‘The 
“Natural Meaning” of Contracts’ (2005) vol 21 Journal of Contract Law 277. 
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resources’. 
<http://www.thefreedictionary.com/economical> accessed 6 August 2013; ‘…a complex 
international dispute can take a great deal of time and money to resolve, even by arbitration’. 
<http://www.iccwbo.org/products-and-services/arbitration-and-adr/arbitration/> accessed 6 
August 2013. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
UTILIZING THE TIME CHARTER SERVICE AND ITS IMPORTANT 
RESTRICTIONS 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
3.1    Introduction 
 
As mentioned in Section 2.2 of Chapter 2, the main purpose of the time 
charterer chartering the vessel is to employ the vessel from the beginning to 
the end of the time charter in order to achieve his/her business target.1 Even 
though the time charterer has the legal right to the use of the time charter 
service on the basis of the time charterparty, some restrictions are usually 
agreed by the contractual parties in practice.2 This chapter intends to make 
the provisions regarding trading limits and safe port undertaking in the time 
charterparty within the essential standard forms of the time charterparty more 
practically operable, complete and thoughtful through the reform of the legal 
effect of the time charterer’s breach of trading limits and safe port 
undertaking within the time charterparty. In order to reach this aim, key 
general concepts regarding utilizing the time charter service and important 
restrictions will be introduced. In addition, trading limits will also be indicated. 
Moreover, important legal issues regarding the time charterer’s safe port 
undertaking and the possible reform of the legal liability and effect of the time 
charterer’s breach of trading limits and safe port undertaking within the time 
charterparty will be discussed. 
                                                          
1 The Berge Tasta [1975] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 442 [424] (per Donaldson, J.); Terence Coghlin and 
others, Time Charters (6th edn, Informa 2008) para 1.13; Christopher Hill, Maritime Law (6th 
edn, Informa Professional 2003) 171. 
2 Howard Bennett, ‘Safe Port Clauses’ in D. Rhidian Thomas (ed), Legal Issues Relating to 
Time Charterparties (Informa 2008). 
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3.2    General key concepts regarding utilizing the time charter service 
and important restrictions 
 
If the time charterer charters the vessel for carrying of cargoes, it will be for 
 either his/her own or others’ cargo.3 The cargo space is provided in Clause 8 
of the BALTIME form4 and it indicates that ‘the whole reach and burden of 
the vessel, including lawful deck-capacity shall be at the Charterers’ disposal, 
reserving proper and sufficient space for the vessel’s Master, officers, crew, 
tackle, apparel, furniture, provisions and stores.’5 In addition, the time 
charterer can, pursuant to Clause 19 of the BALTIME form, also be a head 
charterer and sublet the vessel to a sub-charterer to then make profits by the 
difference between the original charter “hire” and the sub-charter “hire”.6 
Although the time charterer has the liberty to dispose of and utilise the vessel 
to pursue his/her own commercial aims and financial interests, his/her rights 
are still limited by the implication or explication of the time charterparty.7  
 
The time charterer is required to employ the vessel in lawful trades for the 
carriage of lawful merchandise.8 The trades for which a time chartered vessel 
will be employed are those of carriage by sea and import and export of 
goods, and these trades need to be fit for the law of the vessel’s flag and law 
                                                          
3 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 1.41. 
4 The BALTIME form 1939 (as revised 2001). Unless otherwise specified, all reference to the 
BALTIEM form refer to the BALTIME form 1939 (as revised 2001); Thomas (n 2) 286. 
5 ibid. 
6 The Payment of “hire” can be found in Clause 6 of BALTIME form; Thomas (n 2) 286-87.  
7 For example, trading limits are imposed within Clause 2 of the BALTIME form, Line 15, 27 
to 34 of the NYPE 46 form, Clause 5 of the NYPE 93 form, and Clause 2 (a) of the 
GENTIME form; Bennett (n 2).  
8 As provided in Clause 2 of the BALTIME form, Lines 24 to 25 of the NYPE 46 form, Clause 
4 (a), Clause 5 of the NYPE 93 form, and Clause 3 (a) of the GENTIME form. 
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governing the charter.9 In addition, the time charterer’s undertaking of lawful 
merchandise is an absolute warranty.10 If the goods cannot meet the law of 
the vessel’s flag and the governing law of the charter, or the  loading of 
goods breach of the local law, or the goods cannot lawfully be discharged at 
the nominated discharge ports, the goods will not amount to lawful 
merchandise.11  
 
Moreover, it is also prescribed that dangerous goods12 carried by the vessel 
should be excluded under the BALTIME form, the NYPE 93 form and the 
GENTIME form.13 In contrast, the NYPE 46 form14 lacks provisions 
preventing the shipping of dangerous goods but does permit both parties, 
with agreement, to add the exclusion in the space of Line 25 of the form.15  
 
However, Clause 24 of the NYPE 46 form (Clause Paramount)16 
                                                          
9 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 5.5. 
10 The Greek Fighter [2006] EWHC 1729 (Comm) [2006] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 99; Coghlin and 
others (n 1) para 9.1. 
11 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 9.1. 
12 “Dangerous goods” are defined under Section 87 (5) of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 
as ‘goods designated as dangerous goods by safety regulations.’ Regulation 2 (1) (iii) of the 
Merchant Shipping (Dangerous Goods and Marine Pollutants) Regulations 1997 give a 
definition of “dangerous goods” as follows: ‘goods classified in the IMDG (International 
Maritime Dangerous Goods) Code or in any other IMO publication referred to in these 
Regulations as dangerous for carriage by sea, and any other substance or article that the 
shipper has reasonable cause to believe might meet the criteria for such classification…’ 
See <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1997/2367/contents/made> accessed 26 May 2012. 
In addition, a broad meaning is given to “dangerous” under Section 4 (6) of the United States 
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1936 (or Article 4 (6) of the Hague Rules or Hague-Visby 
Rules) and under common law. Even though cargoes of its type are not normally treated as 
dangerous, a particular cargo may be dangerous if its own specific characteristics, including 
issues regarding its packaging, endanger the vessel or other cargoes on board. For 
instance, see The Giannis NK [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 337 (HL); Stephen Girvin, Carriage of 
Goods by Sea (2nd edn, OUP 2011) 310; Coghlin and others (n 1) paras 9.9-10. 
13 See Clause 2 of the BALTIME form, Clause 4 (a) of the NYPE 93 form and Clause 3 (b) of 
the GENTIME form. 
14 Harvey Williams, Chartering Documents (4th edn, LLP Reference Publishing 1999) 228-
31. 
15 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 9.6. 
16 Williams (n 14) 231. 
80 
 
incorporating Section 4 (6)17 of the United States Carriage of Goods by Sea 
Act 193618 and the Hague Rules19 is therefore incorporated in the time 
charterparty.20 Therefore it should be construed that it is the time charterer, 
instead of the shipper,21 and the shipowner, instead of the carrier, within 
Section 4 (6) of the United States Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 193622 
under the context of the NYPE 46 form.23 When the shipowner, Master or 
shipowner’s agent has not consented with knowledge about the nature and 
character of the shipment of dangerous goods, the time charterer is liable for 
all costs and damages which are directly or indirectly caused by any 
dangerous goods being shipped.24 In addition, the shipowner, Master and 
shipowner’s agent are entitled at any time before discharge to land at any 
place or destroy, or render innocuous, dangerous goods without 
compensation.25 
 
                                                          
17 Or Article IV, Rule 6 of the Hague Rules, ‘Goods of an inflammable, explosive or 
dangerous nature to the shipment whereof the carrier, master or agent of the carrier has not 
consented with knowledge of their nature and charterer, may at any time before discharge 
be landed at any place, or destroyed or rendered innocuous by the carrier without 
compensation and the shipper of such goods shall be liable for all damage and expenses 
directly or indirectly arising out of or resulting from such shipment. If any such goods shipped 
with such knowledge and consent shall become a danger to the ship or cargo, they may in 
like manner be landed at any place, or destroyed or rendered innocuous by the carrier 
without liability on the part of the carrier except to general average, if any.’ See 
<http://www.admiraltylawguide.com/conven/haguerules1924.html> accessed 8 April 2011. 
18 <http://www.shipinspection.eu/index.php?action=page_display&PageID=242> accessed 
12 April 2011; 
<http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode46a/usc_sec_46a_00001304----000-.html> 
accessed 26 May 2012; Coghlin and others (n 1) para  34.1, 34.6. 
19 See footnote 105 in Chapter 2; Coghlin and others (n 1) para 9.7, 9.9, 9.16. 
20 Adamastos Shipping Co. v Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co. (The Saxon Star) [1959] AC 133; 
Seven Seas Transportation Ltd. v Pacifico Union Marina Corporation (The Satya Kailash 
and Oceanic Amity) [1982] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 465; [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 588 (AC); Yvonne 
Baatz, ‘Clauses Paramount in Time Charters’ in Thomas (n 2). 
21 ibid; The charterparty is governed by the English law and therefore is construed based on 
English law; Coghlin and others (n 1) para 9.19, 34.1. 
22 (n 17); (n 18). 
23 Baatz (n 20). 
24 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 9.19. 
25 Baatz (n 20). 
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On the other hand, if the shipowner has consented to the shipment with 
knowledge of the nature and character of the dangerous goods, the 
shipowner, Master and shipowner’s agent are also entitled at any time before 
discharge to land at any place or destroy or render innocuous dangerous 
goods without liability except to the general average, if any.26 In these 
circumstances, the time charterer is not liable for all costs and damages 
which are directly or indirectly caused by the dangerous goods he/she 
shipped.27 Similarly, Section 4 (6) of the United States Carriage of Goods by 
Sea Act 1936,28 or Article IV, Rule 6 of the Hague Rules29 or the Hague-Visby 
Rules,30 are incorporated by Clause 31 (a) of the NYPE 93 form31 and Article 
IV, Rule 6 of the Hague-Visby Rules32 are incorporated by the Clause 
Paramount in B of the Appendix A-protective Clauses of the GENTIME 
form.33 Thus it is believed that the construction of Section 4 (6) of the United 
States Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1936,34 Article 4 (6) of the Hague 
Rules35 and the Hague-Visby Rules36 under the NYPE 93 form37 and the 
GENTIME form38 will be the same as the aforementioned under the NYPE 46 
                                                          
26 ibid. 
27 Chandris v Isbrandtsen-Moller [1951] 1 KB 240; John F Wilson, Carriage of goods by Sea 
(7th edn, Pearson Education Limited 2010) 36; Baatz (n 20); Coghlin and others (n 1) para 
9.19. 
28 (n 17); (n 18). 
29 <http://www.admiraltylawguide.com/conven/haguerules1924.html> accessed 28 April 
2012. 
30 <http://www.admiraltylaw.com/statutes/hague.html> accessed 28 April 2012. 
31 Peter Brodie, Commercial Shipping Handbook (2nd edn, Informa 2006) 40-41.  
32 (n 28). 
33<https://www.bimco.org/~/media/Documents/Document_Samples/Time_Charter_Parties/S
ample_Copy_GENTIME.ashx> accessed 28 April 2012. 
34 (n 17); (n 18). 
35 (n 29). 
36 (n 30). 
37 Brodie (n 31) 32-46. 
38 (n 33). 
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form.39 
 
 
3.3     Trading limits 
 
Trading limits are indicated under Lines 15 to 34 of the NYPE 46 form.40 It 
may be necessary to consider two essential aspects under the standard form 
of the time charterparty.41 That is the shipped cargo must be lawful 
merchandise and the voyage should be under the provided scope and 
restrictions.42 However, it is believed that the GENTIME form is clearer, since 
it separately indicates that the shipped cargo must be lawful merchandise in 
another clause, Clause 3.43 In order to benefit the shipping industries’ 
business, and to avoid mixing both aspects of the time charterer’s legal 
liabilities under the time charterparty together and increasing their 
complexity, the approach of the GENTIME form44 is adopted in this section. 
Thus trading limits in this section should only specifically refer to the voyage 
being under the provided scope and restrictions. 
 
The time charterer has the liberty to send the vessel to any port during the 
time charter period if there is a lack of appropriate provision under the time 
charterparty.45 This is different from the voyage charter, which contains one 
                                                          
39 United States Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1936 incorporates the Hague Rules 1924. In 
addition, Article 4 (6) under the Hague Rules is same as the Hague-Visby Rules; (n 19)-(n 
25). 
40 Williams (n 14) 228. 
41 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 5.4. 
42 ibid. 
43 (n 33). 
44 ibid. 
45 Martin Davies and Anthony Dickey, Shipping Law (3rd edn, Lawbook Co 2004) 369. 
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or more designated voyages.46 However, in practice, in order to prevent the 
vessel from a high risk of damage in regions where risks such as reefs, bad 
weather or ice exist,47 the shipowner normally sets out restrictions for the 
geographical scope of the voyages under the time charterparty to require the 
time charterer not to order the vessel outside an agreed geographical range 
of the voyage.48  
 
Therefore, generally, the time charterer only has a legal right to order 
utilization of the vessel under the trading limits within the time charterparty.49 
While the time charterer’s order is outside the contractual trading limits, the 
Master and the shipowner can refuse the order.50 As Mackinnon LJ stated in 
Halcyon Steamship v Continental Grain, if the named discharge port under 
the bill of lading is outside the trading limits, the Master is also not obliged to 
sign a bill of the lading.51  
 
In addition, under the Master or shipowner’s protest, either the time charterer 
withdraws the uncontractual order outside trading limits or the shipowner 
follows the order.52 In the latter situation, as indicated in Rederi Sverre 
Hansen v Van Ommeren, when the charterer’s order from outside trading 
                                                          
46 Julian Cooke and others, Voyage Charters (3rd edn, Informa 2007) para 1.1. 
47 It is usually the shipowner who has insurance for the vessel’s hull and machinery. The 
shipowner agrees with the hull underwriters not to order the vessel outside the specified 
limits in order to keep the vessel away from the high risk of damage resulting from 
dangerous areas, otherwise the shipowner needs to pay an extra premium. Thus the 
shipowner in turn asks the time charterer not to instruct the vessel outside this specified 
limits under the time charterparty. See Davies and Dickey (n 45) 369. 
48 See (n 7); Coghlin and others (n 1) paras 5.1-5.2; Thomas (n 2) 286; Williams (n 14) 228; 
Brodie (n 31) 34; (n 33).  
49 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 5.12. 
50 ibid. 
51 ibid; Halcyon Steamship v Continental Grain [1943] 75 LlL Rep 80 [84]; Coghlin and 
others (n 1) para 5.12. 
52 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 5.18. 
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limits was followed under the shipowner’s well-established objection, the 
shipowner may be entitled to claim the payment of “hire” at the current 
market rate if it is higher than the charter rate.53 The reason was, as 
mentioned in The Batis, that the extra contractual services, which were 
outside trading limits, were worth that value in the market at the time the 
charter service was completed.54 In contrast, if a time charterer’s order is 
outside trading limits and is accepted by the shipowner and followed without 
the shipowner’s objection, it would be possible for the shipowner to claim for 
restitution of the undoubtable benefit granted to the time charterer in the 
current market.55 Therefore, it is likely to be necessary for the time charterer 
to pay the going rate for a service based on the benefit which he/she 
receives from the time charter service outside trading limits under the time 
charterparty.56   
 
Moreover, in practice the time charterer may be willing to pay the extra 
premium demanded by the shipowner’s underwriters in order to get 
agreement under the time charterparty to order the vessel to sail outside 
particular trading limits.57 For example, in The Helen Miller, which was time 
chartered under the New York Produce form, the charterers paid extra 
insurance under an additional clause which gave the time charterers the 
liberty to break limits, and consequently they instructed the vessel to ports 
                                                          
53 Rederi Sverre Hansen v Van Ommeren [1921] 6 LlL Rep 193; Coghlin and others (n 1) 
para 5.21. 
54 The Batis [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 345 [352]-[353] (Hobhouse J.); Coghlin and ohters (n 1) 
para 5.21. 
55 Coghlin and others (n 1) paras 5.22-23. 
56 ibid. 
57 Coghlin and othersl (n 1) para 10.81. 
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outside the trading limits.58 This resulted in ice damage to the vessel and the 
shipowners claimed for damage against the time charterers.59 Mustill J held 
that the time charterers still needed to take responsibility for this damage 
since they were in breach of safe port undertaking.60 The court indicated that 
even though the time charterers may pay the extra premium to get the 
shipowners’ general allowance to sail beyond trading limits, this does not 
mean the time charterer can be released from liability resulting from sending 
the vessel to a dangerous port.61  
 
However, difficulty will arise when the time charterer insists that the Master or 
shipowner should be compliant with an uncontractual order under protest but 
the Master or the shipowner continues not to follow the order.62 In this 
circumstance, the shipowner might claim wrongful repudiation by the time 
charterer to terminate the time charterparty early and claim for damages.63  
 
Furthermore, it is generally asserted that the time charterer will be in breach 
of the time charterparty if he/she instructs the vessel to fulfil the charter 
service outside the agreed trading limits under the time charterparty.64 On the 
other hand, it is argued by Lord Mustill in The Gregos that the shipowner will 
be entitled to indemnity65 against loss resulting from the time charterer’s 
illegitimate order under protest, thus it may be unnecessary to treat the 
                                                          
58 ibid; St Vincent Shipping Co. Ltd. v Bock, Godeffroy & Co. (The Helen Miller) [1980] 2  
Lloyd’s Rep 95 (QB). 
59 ibid. 
60 ibid. 
61 ibid. 
62 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 5.18. 
63 ibid. 
64 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 5.14. 
65 See Section 6.5 in Chapter 6. 
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illegitimate order by the time charterer as a breach of contract.66 
Nonetheless, it is asserted that it would be held by the court that a damages 
claim could be awarded for the shipowner’s suffered loss on the basis of the 
time charterer’s illegal order in breach of the time charterparty if the 
shipowner’s indemnity claim is unable to be won.67 However, it is believed 
that the shipowner can claim suffered loss by claiming for damages based on 
the time charterer’s breach of trading limits or by an indemnity claim, but an 
indemnity claim should be regarded as the shipowner’s last resort for use 
when all prior interests do not succeed.68 Nevertheless, there is an absence 
of detail of the legal effect of the time charterer’s breach of trade limits in the 
BALTIME form,69 the NYPE 46 form70 and the NYPE 93 form71 and the 
GENTIME form.72 Therefore, it is one of the targets of reform for this section. 
 
The legal effect of the time charterer’s breach of trading limits under the time 
charterparty in essential standard forms is unclear, incomplete, easily 
confused and insufficiently organised. The time charterer’s trading limits and 
safe port undertaking are both restrictions of the time charterer’s use of the 
time charter service under the time charterparty and therefore there is some 
connection between them. It is therefore suggested that it may be 
appropriate to reform legal liability and effect of the time charterer’s breach of 
both trading limits and safe port undertaking together in Section 3.4.5. 
 
                                                          
66 The Gregos [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1 [9]; Coghlin and others (n 1) para 5.14. 
67 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 5.14. 
68 David Foxton, ‘Indemnities in time charters’ in Thomas (n 2). 
69 Thomas (n 2) 285-89. 
70 Williams (n 14) 228-31. 
71 Brodie (n 31) 32-46. 
72 (n 33). 
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3.4     The time charterer’s safe port undertaking 
 
Traditionally, if the contractual parties under the voyage charter do not 
expressly incorporate a safe port clause into the voyage charterparty, the 
charterer’s safe port undertaking may not be implied within the standard form 
of the voyage charterparty.73 This is because it is often a draft with a voyage 
between named ports which has been agreed to by the contractual parties 
under the voyage charter.74 However, in this respect, the time charterparty is 
different from the voyage charterparty.75 In practice, there is normally a 
specified limitation to the time charterer merely sending the vessel to a safe 
port under the time charterparty.76 To impose the time charterer’s undertaking 
of nominating a safe port77 can safeguard the individual welfare of the Master 
and crew, and the shipowner ‘s interest in the vessel while the time charterer 
exercises his/her contractual right to make profit under the time charter 
                                                          
73 Bennett (n 2). 
74 Girvin (n 12) 322. 
75 Wilson (n 27) 25. 
76 Davies and Dickey (n 45) 371. 
77 ‘The Ebola outbreak in West Africa is the deadliest occurrence of the disease since its 
discovery in 1976.’ (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-28105531, accessed 23 September 
2014). In the legal respect, the issue regarding whether or not a specific port in an affected 
area is safe will rely on an evaluation of the facts of the possibility of the crew being exposed 
to Ebola. In addition, whether a shipowner or the Master can decline to continue the voyage 
to the port will be based on the charterparty. 
<http://jacquessimon506.wordpress.com/2014/08/27/ebola-and-its-effect-on-shipping-
contracts-calling-or-not-calling-in-africa/> accessed 23 September 2014.   
It is asserted that the impact on the shipping industry could be large. It could be found that, 
when the charter is concluded, the shipowner might pursue extra protection by restraining 
trading limits to exclude named countries which are affected by Ebola. Moreover, if the 
Hague/Visby Rules apply, the shipowner’s legal responsibility to the third parties for late 
“delivery” or for deterioration, as a consequence of the delay, may be exempt by the 
“restraint of princes” (this is indicated in Section 7.2.2 under Chapter 7) in Rule 2 (g) of 
Article IV. Therefore interfering by a government or state by closing a port or quarantining a 
ship can fall within the exemption of “restraint of princes”. Alternatively, it may be dependent 
on  Rule 2 (h) of Article IV  “quarantine restrictions”, regarding which, it is asserted that there 
is less need for the “present threat of executive force”  than with the exemption, “restraint of 
princes”. <http://www.sagarsandesh.com/news/if-ebola-escalates-its-impact-on-the-shipping-
industry-could-be-considerable-reedsmith/> accessed 23 September 2014. 
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service.78 In this section, important aspects regarding the time charterers’ 
safe port undertaking will be examined and a reform of the time charterer’s 
legal liability and the effect of safe port undertaking will be suggested.  
 
 
3.4.1    Defining a safe port 
 
It is claimed that whether a port is safe depends on an issue of fact, but the 
requirements which must be applied in deciding whether a port is a safe 
port79 and whether the time charterer has been in breach in his/her safe port 
undertaking are arguments of law.80 
 
Sellers L.J. in The Eastern City81 described a safe port in the following way: 
‘A port will not be safe unless, in the relevant period of time, the particular 
ship can reach it, use it and return from it without, in the absence of some 
abnormal occurrence, being exposed to danger which cannot be avoided by 
good navigation and seamanship.’82   
 
While identifying whether a port is safe or unsafe, further to the 
aforementioned definition of a safe port, some essential additional criteria of 
                                                          
78 Bennett (n 2). 
79 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 10.49. 
80 Hill (n 1) 180. 
81 Leeds Shipping v Societe Francaise Bunge (The Eastern City) [1958] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 127 
[131]; Coghlin and others (n 1) para 10.3. 
82 ibid. A port is unsafe if the vessel needs to lighten her cargo to move into the port. See 
AIC Ltd. v Marine Pilot Ltd. (The Archimidis) [2008] EWCA Civ 175. A port is also unsafe if 
the structure of the vessel has to be taken apart so as to be able to reach the port. See 
Limerick Steamship Co. Ltd. v WH Stott & Co. Ltd [1920] 5 LlLR 190; Girvin (n 12) 325. 
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a safe port held by the court83 are worth mentioning and are given in the 
following three paragraphs.   
 
It is held by the court that the port does not become an unsafe port only  
because of temporary danger, such as neap tides.84 This is because the 
Master is required to wait for a reasonable time until the temporary risk has 
been removed or has gone.85 The Court of Appeal in The Hermine also 
signified that delays to the voyage resulting from obvious peril or obstruction  
make the port become unsafe only when the delays are of a sufficient 
duration to frustrate the journey.86 
 
Moreover, in The Saga Cob87 and The Chemical Venture,88 it was deemed 
that political risk is usually merely demanding enough to render a port as 
prospectively unsafe whenever the risk is such that a reasonable Master or 
shipowner would refuse to proceed into it with the vessel.89 
 
Furthermore, it is asserted that the prior warning of hazards and avoidance 
of them by a safe system is also necessary for a safe port.90 For example, as 
                                                          
83 John Hare, Shipping Law & Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa (2nd edn, JUTA & Co. 
Ltd. 2009) 763. 
84 Aktieselskabet Eriksen v Foy, Morgan & Co. [1926] 25 LlLR 442; Carlton S.S. Co. v Castle 
Mail Co. [1898] AC 486. 
85 Wilson (n 27) 27. 
86 Unitramp v Garnac Grain (The Hermine) [1979] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 212 (CA); Coghlin and 
others (n 1) para 10.13,10.16. 
87 K/S Penta Shipping A/S v Ethiopian Shipping Lines Corporation (The Saga Cob) [1992] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep 545; Yvonne Baatz, ‘Charterparties’ in Yvonne Baatz (ed), Maritime Law (2nd 
edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2011). 
88 Pearl Carriers Inc. v Japan lines Ltd. (The Chemical Venture) [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 508; 
Howard Bennett, ‘Performance of Contract: Loading’ in Bernard Eder et al (eds), Scrutton on 
Charterparties and Bill of Lading (22nd edn, Sweet and Maxwell Limited 2011). 
89 Bennett (n 88). 
90 Baatz (n 87). 
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The Khian Sea91 illustrated, even if the weather is bad, if there are 
appropriate forecasting systems to monitor the weather, enough sea room to 
manoeuvre and sufficient tugs and pilots to assist the vessel to leave, then 
the port is still a safe port.92 However, as indicated in The Marinicki, while 
there is no suitable system in port to explore, discover and remove 
underwater obstructions, the port is unsafe.93 In The Count, the view by the 
court is that the port of Beria was a prospectively unsafe port at the time of 
the charterer’s nomination because there was no proper system in the port to 
monitor the main navigational channel and this was established as a 
continuing danger to the vessels.94 Thus the court awarded damages for 
detention in this unsafe port to the shipowner.95  
 
 
3.4.2    The key concept of the time charterer undertaking to nominate a 
safe port and berth under the time charterparty  
 
In common law, when a time charterer has a contractual right to nominate a 
safe port, he/she needs to warrant that the port is safe.96 If the safe port 
undertaking is not expressively included within the time charterparty, it is 
implied by the courts under the time charterparty which is operated in a wide 
                                                          
91 The Khian Sea [1979] 545; Baatz (n 87). 
92 Baatz (n 87).  
93 Maintop Shipping Co. Ltd. v Bulkindo Lines Pte Ltd. (The Marinicki) [2003] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 
Rep 655; Girvin (n 12) 325. 
94 Independent Petroleum Group Ltd. v Seacarriers Count Pte Ltd. (The Count) [2008] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep 72; Baatz (n 87). 
95 ibid. 
96 Girvin (n 12) 307, 318; Charles G.C.H.Baker, ‘The Safe Port/Berth Obligation and 
Employment and Indemnity Clauses’ [1988] LMCLQ 43. 
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geographical range.97 In addition, as shown in The Livanita, the time 
charterer’s safe port undertaking will normally also be applied to the named 
port, since the named port had been agreed by the shipowner within the time 
charterparty and this does not conflict with the time charterer’s undertaking in 
order to ensure the safety of the vessel.98 Moreover, it is believed that the 
nature of the time charterer’s safe port undertaking under the time 
charterparty is categorised as a condition under which the innocent 
contractual party is given the right to repudiate all his/her further obligations 
within the charterparty99 and claim for damages100 when the time charterer 
breaches his/her safe port undertaking.101  
 
It is also indicated that when the time charterer assigns the vessel to the 
port, the time charterer’s primary obligation regarding the safe port is 
imposed.102 In addition, the duty of the time charterer to undertake a safe 
berth is generally the same as the time charterer’s safe port undertaking.103 
When the expressed safe port undertaking is imposed on the charterer, this 
undertaking will include a charterer’s safe berth undertaking if the obligation 
as to the safe berth is not expressed in the charterparty.104  
 
Moreover, in practice, the time charterer’s safe port undertaking is 
                                                          
97 Girvin (n 12) 309, 319. 
98 STX Pan Ocean Co. Ltd. v Ugland Bulk Transport AS (The Livanita) [2008] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 
86; Coghlin and others (n 1) para 10.78. 
99 Wilson (n 27) 28. 
100 Jack Beatson, Andrew Burrows and John Cartwright, Anson’s Law of Contract (29th edn, 
OUP 2010) 140. 
101 Wilson (n 27) 28. 
102 Kodors Shipping Corporation v Empress Cubana de Fletes (The Evia (No.2)) [1983] 1 AC 
736, 765 (Lord Roskill); Coghlin and others (n 1) para 10. 50. 
103 Anders Utkilens Rederi A/S v O/Y Lovisa Stevedoring Co. A/B (The Golfstraum) [1976] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep 547; Davies and Dickey (n 45) 374; Coghlin and others (n 1) para 10.85. 
104 Cooke and others (n 46) para 5.42. 
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absolute.105 However, this might be modified and reduced to the time 
charterer exercising due diligence within express terms under the time 
charterparty,106 such as in Clause 4 (c) of the SHELLTIME 4.107 Nonetheless, 
as shown in The Acina, a time charterer’s due diligence obligation is non-
delegable, except that it clearly limits the time charterer’s obligation to one of 
personal want of due diligence under the express term of the time 
charterparty.108 Therefore, in this situation, the time charterer normally 
endures liability for any want of due diligence to nominate a safe port, even if 
he/she delegated this duty of nomination to others.109  
 
In addition, a time charterer’s safe port undertaking denotes the safety of the 
port at the time when the port is used rather than when the port is 
nominated.110 For example, even if a port is icy when the time charterer 
nominates it, it may be safe at the time of using because the ice could have 
melted by the time the vessel arrives there.111 The view of the House of 
Lords in The Evia (No 2)112 indicates that the time charterer’s express 
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undertaking to nominate a safe port does not mean a continuing guarantee 
of the port’s safety but merely means the prospective safety of the port at the 
time of nomination.113 In other words, it means the port will be potentially 
safe when the vessel reaches, uses and leaves it.114 The courts will be 
concerned about a wide range of circumstances, such as high winds, ice, 
wrecks, wars, on the basis of a factual perspective, rather than a subjective 
one, to decide whether or not a port is safe.115   
 
Even though the Lords also affirmed the time charterer would take 
responsibility for the existing features and qualities of the port, regardless of 
whether or not they are explicitly known to the time charterer,116 the time 
charterer’s safe port undertaking does not require that the time charterer be 
liable for unexpected and abnormal events117 and this may also be 
connected with the individual insurance arrangements of contractual 
parties.118 It can be seen that, based on the facts, The Evia (No 2), which 
was time chartered under the BALTIME form, was snared in the Shatt al Arab 
waterway by the onset of the war between Iran and Iraq.119 The arbitrator 
held that the time charterparty was frustrated and the time charterer 
therefore did not need to pay for future “hire”.120 Consequently, the 
shipowner appealed and asserted that any frustration was caused by the 
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time charterer, because the time charterer was in breach of the explicit 
undertaking of nominating a safe port.121 However, ultimately, the House of 
Lords still rejected the appeal and held that the time charterer was not liable 
for unexpected and abnormal events and Lord Roskill believed that the 
shipowner’s insurer should pay for the loss sustained by the shipowner.122  
 
 
3.4.3     The time charterer’s secondary obligation 
 
If a nominated port ceases to become actually and prospectively safe at the 
time after the nomination of a port and before the vessel’s arrival at a port or 
even after the vessel has berthed in the port, a secondary obligation of the 
time charterer arises.123 The time charterer is required to revoke the initial 
order and to give a fresh order,124 i.e. to re-nominate another safe port.125 
However, as Lord Roskill further indicated in The Evia (No 2),126 in which it 
was too late to prevent risk to the vessel by leaving since she was trapped in 
the Shatt al Arab waterway due to the war, the time charterer’s secondary 
obligation to re-nominate another port arises if the vessel is likely to be 
physically left there when the safe port later becomes unsafe after the vessel 
enters it.127 
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This is exemplified by The Lucille.128 Congestion prevented the vessel from 
going into the port until two days before the start of the Iran-Iraq war.129 The 
court held that the charterer was in breach of his safe port undertaking 
because once the port was no longer prospectively safe the charterer had a 
chance to leave the port.130 He failed to give a fresh order to allow the vessel 
to escape the port, consequently causing the vessel to become trapped in 
the port.131  
 
Moreover, a more advanced issue relevant to the time charter, which was not 
resolved in The Evia (No 2), is also worth discussing here.132 That is, after 
nomination of a prospectively safe port, what level of diligence is required to 
find any unexpected risk to the nominated safe port by the time charterer’s 
secondary obligation?133 It is asserted that the time charterer’s secondary 
obligation arises merely when he is aware of the situation of the port 
becoming unsafe.134 Another view suggests that for the time charterer to 
perform his secondary obligation it is necessary for him/her to have 
constructive knowledge of the fact that the nominated port has become 
dangerous.135  
 
Nevertheless, it is believed that if the time for the vessel possibly physically 
to leave there when the safe port later becomes unsafe after the vessel 
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enters it,136 in this circumstance, the secondary obligation of the time 
charterer might still make it necessary to impose the need to exercise due 
diligence on the time charterer to nominate another new “prospectively safe” 
port after the port becomes unsafe in order to ensure that the vessel can 
reach a safe port, use it and leave from it. Therefore, in order to prevent an 
unnecessary dispute, it might be better for the contractual parties to 
negotiate and clearly state in the time charterparty that in the event that the 
vessel may need to leave when the safe port becomes unsafe after it enters 
it, it is necessary under the time charterer’s secondary obligation that the 
time charterer exercise due diligence and re-nominate another new 
“prospectively safe” port after the port becomes unsafe. 
 
 
3.4.4    The legal effect of the time charterer’s breach of safe port 
undertaking under the time charterparty 
 
The time charterer is in breach of his/her undertaking to nominate a safe port 
if the port is prospectively unsafe at the time of nomination of the port,137 and 
causes a promissory obligation.138 
 
It is believed that the time charterer’s safe port undertaking is directly 
enforceable by claiming time charterer’s breach of contract rather than by an 
indirect enforcement relying on an express or implied indemnity of a 
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traditionally named employment clause,139 such as Clause 9 of the BALTIME 
form,140 Clause 8 of the NYPE 46 form,141 Clause 8 of the NYPE 93 form,142 
and Clause 12 of the GENTIME form.143 The shipowner might try to make an 
alternative claim for indemnity under the aforementioned employment clause 
when the time charterer’s safe port undertaking is expressly limited by the 
time charterer or implied to be limited by the courts,144 or when the 
shipowner’s claim that the time charterer is in breach of safe port undertaking 
fails since the situation occurs from a change of situation after the time 
charterer’s instruction to proceed to the nominated port.145   
 
Moreover, even if the nominated port by the time charterer is unsafe, it is 
debatable whether or not the time charterer should be totally liable for the 
shipowner’s damage.146 It is possible for the time charterer to assert that the 
Master should have understood the peril and that he/she should have 
declined to proceed to the unsafe port.147 In addition, it may be argued by the 
time charterer that the unsafe port is not the cause of the damage and the 
damage actually resulted from the negligent operation of the vessel by the 
Master or Crew at the connected time, or “partly by one and partly by the 
other”.148 On the other hand, it may also be debatable as to whether the 
Master is conscious of the extent of risk, when it is not obvious how serious 
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the risk is.149 Under these circumstances, a dilemma may occur.150 If the 
Master refuses an order from the time charterer, he/she may put the 
shipowner, his/her employer,151 at risk of taking responsibility for a breach of 
contract, but if he/she complies with the time charterer’s order to proceed to 
the port, the vessel is exposed to possible loss or damage by his/her 
action.152 
 
Whether or not the negligent act of the Master or Crew, rather than the time 
 charterer’s breach of the safe port undertaking results in damage by the 
shipowner, the effective cause of the damage will be considered by the court 
under English law.153 If the time charterer’s breach of his/her safe port 
undertaking is not the effective cause of the damage, the time charterer has 
no responsibility for the result.154 
 
However, the issue is that it may be arguable because if the Master follows 
the time charterer’s initial order to the unsafe port, the time charterer’s 
breach of the time charterparty actually would be the effective cause of the 
damage.155 In the case of The Houston City, the port of Geraldton was held 
to be unsafe owing to a lack of a hauling off buoy and part of a fender on the 
wharf where the vessel was berthed.156 It is debatable, given the facts, 
whether the Master was presented with a dilemma as to whether to follow 
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the time charterer’s instruction to proceed to the unsafe port.157 The agent, 
who controlled the loading at the port and had the same possibility of 
knowledge as the Master, represented the time charterer.158 In addition, the 
harbour-master pilot, who guided the Master, did not give any guidance to 
the Master to help them choose a safe berth.159 Thus it is possibly 
problematic to treat the damage of the vessel as not being the natural and 
direct result of the time charterer’s nomination to the berth at Geraldton.160 
 
Nevertheless, the Master holds professional judgment as to the proceeding 
 of the vessel.161 In terms of the issue of a safe port, it is asserted by Sellers 
L.J. in The Stork that the Master must act reasonably.162 An unreasonable 
act by the Master can be evidence of his/her negligence when the time 
charterer nominates an unsafe port.163 
 
The Master and shipowner have a legal right to reject an invalid order made 
by the time charterer which directs the vessel to proceed to an unsafe 
port.164 They can then request another valid instruction.165 In addition, if the 
Master or the shipowner is not conscious that the port is unsafe, he/she may 
decline to go into the port when he/she later understands the position of the 
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port.166 However, as Leggatt L.J. indicated in The Product Star (No 2), the 
Master or shipowners can refuse to proceed to the nominated unsafe port, 
but it is necessary that their discretion is not exercised “arbitrarily, 
capriciously or unreasonably.”167  
 
Therefore, even if the time charterer would have been in breach of the time 
charterparty in nominating a safe port, this would not justify damage suffered 
to the vessel by a deliberate act of the Master.168 Moreover, if the Master 
recklessly ignores the obvious dangers of the nominated port, does not 
refuse the time charterer’s order and complies with the charterers’ order to 
proceed to or enter into the unsafe port, a break in the chain of causation will 
be established.169 The Master’s negligence must be sufficiently serious for 
his/her intervening act or fault to be treated as novus actus interveniens.170 
The shipowner cannot then claim for suffered damage from the time 
charterer.171 This is because the Master is the servant of the shipowner and 
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the shipowner’s resulting loss was caused by the choice of the Master.172  
 
It is suggested that the International Safety Management (ISM) Code173 and 
International Ship and Port Facilities Security (ISPS) Code174 can be used as 
risk assessment tools in order for the Master to investigate whether or not 
the circumstances of the port are safe for the vessel to enter175 and minimise 
the risk of the vessel proceeding to an unsafe port176 as well as to prevent 
potential disputes between the charterers and the shipowners.177 It is 
asserted that whether the Master is negligent can be determined by 
examining whether or not the ISM Code178 and ISPS Code are complied with 
by the shipowner’s servant, the Master.179 
 
The ISM Code provides several duties of the Master, with a checklist for 
identifying any dangers or any unforeseeable risks which may cause the port 
to become unsafe whilst preparing to enter.180 Although the risk of the port 
may be unclear, compliance with the ISM Code could aid the Master in 
making an accurate judgement as to whether to reject the time charterer’s 
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order and ask for another one so as to nominate a safe port.181 Thus if the 
Master does not adhere to the ISM Code regarding the aforementioned 
situation, the Master is in breach of his duty and can be deemed negligent.182 
In addition, writing in a logbook or maintaining an electronic record is 
necessary for the Master as evidence in a tribunal.183 The court could use 
this to judge whether the Master properly followed the ISM Code before the 
vessel entered the port or if the Master negligently failed to follow the ISM 
Code and broke the chain of causation between the time charterer’s 
nomination of the unsafe port and the shipowner’s resulting damage.184 
 
Moreover, by means of following the procedure of the ISPS Code, which 
provides the procedure for both operating ports and ships, the ISPS Code 
has established a safeguard to shipping and ports to prevent terrorist 
attacks.185 Therefore, reviewing whether or not the Master or the shipowner 
implemented the procedure provided in the ISPS Code to prevent a terrorist 
attack is also an approach to determine whether the Master or the shipowner 
was negligent when they proceeded with the voyage both before entering 
and within the unsafe port.186   
 
However, it is arguable that examining the Master’s adherence to the ISM 
Code and the ISPS Code is only one possible method for a tribunal or court 
to use to decide whether or not the Master is negligent and breaks the chain 
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of causation.187 Because real life circumstances are varied, it is impossible, 
given the facts, for these Codes to cover every standard for the court to 
determine whether or not the Master is negligent. Therefore, in order to 
properly decide whether or not the Master is negligent in proceeding to sail, 
both before entering and within an unsafe port, it is believed that the tribunal 
or the court may not only need to examine whether or not these Codes, 
along with certain international conventions, such as the International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS),188 Code of Safe Working 
Practice (COSWP),189 and other case laws, are followed by the Master,190 
but may also need to take into account the tailor-made process of the risk 
assessment within the individual shipping company.191 Nevertheless, it is 
also important that the court, in the future, continues to remain up-to-date 
and adapts to current situations when considering and evaluating whether a 
Master has acted reasonably when performing his/her task192 in different 
situations in the current market. 
 
On the other hand, the time charterer would be in repudiatory breach of the 
time charterparty if he/she still insisted on the invalid order.193 The shipowner 
would also be entitled to choose to terminate the time charterparty194 and 
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claim for damages.195 In these circumstances, if the time charterer insisted 
on the invalid order, the shipowner could choose to waive his/her right to 
reject it and proceed to the unsafe port, but the shipowner could still have a 
right for damages on the basis of the charterer’s breach of safe port 
undertaking.196  
 
It can be seen in The Kanchenjunga, from the facts, that the shipowners 
called on the charterers to suggest another safe port and they were aware 
that the port was unsafe.197 However, they finally accepted the charterers’ 
order, declared that the vessel was ready to load, asked the charterers to 
organise priority berthing and stated that the laytime was operating.198 Thus, 
it is important to note that if the shipowner is with knowledge of the unsafe 
port and he/she regards the time charterer’s order as valid, then by following 
that order, the choice of the shipowner will bind him/her and this will lead to 
his/her waiving the right to refuse an invalid order by the time charterer.199 
 
Furthermore, in terms of a remedy, the legal consequence of the time 
charterer’s breach of his/her safe port undertaking is that he/she is liable for 
the damages.200 The shipowner’s legal right to claim for damage, which is 
based on the time charterer’s breach of his/her promissory obligation,201 
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would usually include recovery of physical damage to the vessel.202 The cost 
of investigation caused by the shipowner to ensure the reason for the 
damage of the vessel is also provided to the shipowner.203 In addition, the 
shipowner is also entitled to recover extra expenses incurred at the unsafe 
port.204 For instance, this covers the cost of lightening the vessel because of 
a vessel’s excessive draught resulting in her being unable to enter a port,205  
the cost of preventing peril206 or the time charter “hire” and additional 
insurance premiums caused by delay.207 However, such a resulting loss is 
recoverable but still restricted by the doctrine of remoteness of damages and 
causation.208  
 
To sum up, under English law, the time charterer has an undertaking of 
nominating a safe port within the time charterparty.209 However, it is 
necessary for this port to be prospectively safe at the time of nomination.210 
In addition, if the time charterer’s breach of his/her safe port undertaking is 
the effective cause of the damage, the time charterer must take responsibility 
for the result.211  
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However, in these circumstances, the Master is required to act reasonably.212 
The Master has a legal right to refuse an invalid order from the time charterer 
which nominates the vessel to proceed into an unsafe port, and to request a 
valid instruction.213 Moreover, the shipowner would also be entitled to choose 
to terminate the time charterparty214 and claim for damages215 if the time 
charterer still insisted that an invalid order be followed despite protest.216 In 
addition, if the time charterer continues to insist on the invalid order, the 
shipowner could elect to waive his/her right to reject the initial order and 
accept the order to proceed to the unsafe port, but the shipowner could still 
have the right to claim for his/her suffered damages based on the time 
charterer’s breach of safe port undertaking.217  
 
Furthermore, if the Master deliberately or recklessly ignores any clear risks at 
the nominated port, does not refuse the time charterer’s order and complies 
with the charterers’ instruction to proceed or enter into the unsafe port, the 
chain of causation between the time charterer’s nominated unsafe port and 
the shipowner’s resulting damage will be broken218 and the shipowner cannot 
therefore claim for damage from the time charterer.219 
 
Although the law of the legal effect of the time charterer’s safe port 
undertaking is revealed by the court as mentioned above, none of those are 
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shown in the BALTIME form,220 the NYPE 46 form221 or NYPE 93 form,222 or 
the GELTIME form.223 Therefore, it is doubtful whether such a crucial legal 
effect of the time charterer’s safe port undertaking is sufficiently presented in 
the time charter standard forms so that in the shipping business a lay person 
can clearly understand their legal obligations and rights in the contract so as 
to be aware of and avoid any potential disputes in advance. This is triggered 
by the need for the reform of legal liability and the effect of the time 
charterer’s safe port undertaking. 
 
 
3.4.5   Reforming the legal effect of the time charterer’s breach of 
trading limits and safe port undertaking within the time 
charterparty 
 
The time charterer’s trading limits and safe port undertaking are important 
restrictions when utilizing a time cnarter service.224 These restrictions will 
significantly impact on the interests of bothcontractual parties, the time 
charterer and the shipowner.225 However, it is unlikely that sufficient 
provisions relevant to these parts are included in the essential standard 
forms. 
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It would be beneficial for the NYPE 46226 and 93 forms227 to adopt the Box 
Layout as in the BALTIME form228 and the GENTIME form229 in order to more 
clearly highlight the important agreement and help the busy businessman to 
pay attention to these key settlements of trading limits. Thus the addition of a 
Box Layout to emphasise “trading limits”, “excluded ports” and “excluded 
countries” in the NYPE 46230 and NYPE 93 forms231 are also recommended. 
In addition, it is clearer to divide “at the beginning of the time charter service”, 
“at the ending of the time charter service” and “during the time charter” within 
“excluded ports” and “excluded countries” for the contractual parties to have 
the discretion and flexibility to deal with different circumstances. 
 
Even though a Box Layout is used on the front of the BALTIME form232 and 
the GENTIME form,233 the BALTIME form’s Box Layout234 fails to highlight 
“excluded ports” and “excluded countries” and the GENTIME form’s Box 
Layout235 does not emphasise “excluded ports”. Thus, it would be beneficial 
to add these and also separate “at the beginning of the time charter service”, 
“at the ending of the time charter service” and “during the time charter” within 
“excluded ports” and “excluded countries” for the contractual parties to 
negotiate and fill in. 
 
In addition, from the discussion in Sections 3.3 and 3.4.4, it can be seen that 
                                                          
226 Williams (n 14) 228-31. 
227 Brodie (n 31) 32-46. 
228 Thomas (n 2) 286-89. 
229 (n 33). 
230 Williams (n 14) 228-31. 
231 Brodie (n 31) 32-46. 
232 Thomas (n 2) 286-89. 
233 (n 33). 
234 Thomas (n 2) 285. 
235 (n 33). 
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the legal effects of the time charterer’s breach of trading limits and safe port 
undertaking are very similar, except as noted in Section 3.3 where, while the 
charterer’s order outside trading limits is followed, the shipowner may claim 
payment of “hire”236 at the current market rate if it is higher than the charter 
rate.237 It may help to clarify the shipowner’s potential claim and draw the 
time charterer to the attention of his/her legal obligation if the aforementioned 
legal effect of the time charterer’s breach of trading limits were shown in the 
BALTIME form,238 the NYPE 46239 and NYPE 93 forms,240 and the GENTIME 
form.241 
 
It could be argued that Clause 2 of the BALTIME form,242 Lines 15 to 21,243 
and 27 to 34244 and Clause 6 of the NYPE 46,245 and Clause 5 of the NYPE 
93 form246 are too simple and are incomplete. And despite the fact that the 
GELTIME form247 is more organised, this criticism could also be made of 
Clause 2 (a) of the GENTIME form.248 They all lack clear stipulations about 
the legal effects of the time charterer’s breach of trading limits and safe port 
undertaking. This might cause contractual parties to be unclear about their 
legal rights and obligations. In addition, this might result in unpredictable 
legal consequences for the contractual parties. 
                                                          
236 A suggested change to the wording is as payment for the time charter service. See 
Section 5.2.1. 
237 See (n 53). 
238 Thomas (n 2) 286-89. 
239 Williams (n 14) 228-31. 
240 Brodie (n 31) 32-46. 
241 (n 33). 
242 Thomas (n 2) 286.  
243 Williams (n 14) 228. 
244 ibid. 
245 Williams(n 14) 229.   
246 Brodie (n 31) 34. 
247 Bennett (n 2). 
248 Brodie (n 31) 34. 
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Therefore, in order to make the provision of legal liability and the effect of the 
time charterer’s breach of trading limits and safe port undertaking clear, 
practically operable, complete, thoughtful, reasonable, less confusing, easier 
to follow and better organised through the reform of this provision within the 
essential standard forms of the time charterparty, the following suggested 
provisional guidelines for the time charterparty standard forms not only keep 
the benefits of the wordings in the standard form, Clause 2 (a) of the 
GENTIME,249 but also provide some recommendations.  
 
To avoid future possible disputes and make sure that the reform of the 
provision can be operated in practice, adopting the view of the House of 
Lords in The Evia (No 2)250 to clearly indicate that the time charterer’s 
express undertaking to nominate a safe port means the prospective safety of 
the port at the time of nomination is suggested.251 
 
In addition, excluded ports and countries which are listed as aforementioned 
suggestions in the Box Layout of the essential standard forms of time 
charterparty are also recommended as mirrored as the statement in Box 
Layout to be clearly provided in these forms. The reform would make the 
provision consistent with the recommendation in the Box Layout and improve 
the presentation’s organization and make the provision clearer, less 
confusing and much easier to follow. 
 
Adopting the view in The Hill Harmony is also proposed in order to make the 
                                                          
249 ibid. 
250 The Evia (No.2) (n 112). 
251 Wilson (n 27) 31. 
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provision more practically applicable. Therefore, the Master has a legal right 
to reject an invalid order from the time charterer which would direct the 
vessel to proceed to an unsafe port.252 In reforming the provision, an 
appropriate submission should be made so that the Master can then request 
another valid instruction.253 If the time charterer asserts that the initial order 
should be obeyed under protest,254 the shipowner has the legal right to 
choose to terminate the time charterparty255 and claim for damages.256 This 
legal consequence will be also the same with the time charterer’s breaching 
trading limits under the same circumstances when the time charterer directs 
the vessel outside the trading limits.257 
 
In order to make the provision more complete and consider all possible 
situations, it is suggested that the decision of he Kanchenjunga258 also be 
adopted in the provision in a clear manner to indicate that when the time 
charterer insists on an invalid order, the shipowner also can choose to waive 
his/her right to refuse this order by the time charterer and comply with the 
initial order to proceed to the unsafe port. However, in this situation, the 
shipowner could still have a legal right to claim for suffered damages based 
on the charterer’s breach of the safe port undertaking.259 It is also believed 
this legal consequence will be applied when the time charterers’ breach 
trading limits under the same situations. 
                                                          
252 The Hill Harmony (n 164) [160] (Lord Hobhouse). 
253 Baatz (n 87).  
254 ibid. 
255 ibid. 
256 O’Sullivan and Hilliard (n 195) para 18.38. 
257 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 5.18. 
258 The Kanchenjunga (n 196); Bennett (n 2). 
259 ibid.  
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Moreover, to make payment for the time charter service under the invalid 
order of the time charterer more considerable and reasonable, it is 
recommended that if the time charterer orders the vessel outside the trading 
limits or nominates the vessel to proceed to an unsafe port and the Master or 
the shipowners follow the invalid order under protest, the shipowners are 
entitled to payment for the time charter service at the current market rate if it 
is higher than the charter rate.260 This design of the provision might help to 
decrease the risk of the time charterer’s intention to invalidate ordering the 
vessel outside the trading limits or nominating the vessel to proceed to an 
unsafe port because they might not want to make a higher payment for the 
time charter service if a current market exists.261 This may be especially true 
since the rate of payment would be above the contractual rate during the 
period of the time the vessel was under the time charterer’s invalid order. 
 
Furthermore, the Master’s novus actus interveniens262 cannot be seen in the 
provision regarding the legal effect of the time charterer’s breach of safe port 
undertaking under the essential standard forms of the time charterparty. To 
make the provision more complete, practically applicable and thoughtful 
under the time charter, it is worth adding the point of view of Morris L.J. in 
The Stork263 and the view of a convinced authority264 to reform the provision. 
Thus, it is proposed to provide that the time charterers are not liable for the 
                                                          
260 See (n 53); (n 54). 
261 The market refers to the market for the equivalent vessel for period time charters on 
terms similar to the contractual charter. The Johnny [1977] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 1 (CA); Coghlin 
and others (n 1) paras 4.56. 
262 Girvin (n 12) 334. 
263 Compania Naviera Maropan S/A v Bowaters Lloyd Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd. (The Stork) 
[1955] 2 QB 68 [104] (Morris, L.J.). 
264 Baatz (n 87). 
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shipowners’ suffered damage265 if the Master deliberately266 or recklessly 
ignores267 the vessel outside the trading limits and/or the obvious dangers of 
a nominated port, does not reject the time charterer’s order, and obeys the 
time charterers’ order outside trading limits and/or to proceed to or enter into 
an unsafe port.268 
 
The reform of this provision in the standard form of time charterparty may be 
used as guidance for modern shipping industries as a basic framework of 
legal liability and effect of the time charterer’s breach of the trading limits and 
safe port undertaking. In addition, the contractual parties may also use this 
suggestion to add or modify their own agreement within the time charterparty 
to fit their individual needs.  
 
 
3.5     Highlighting the key reforms in this chapter 
 
The suggestions made in this section can be summarized and shown in the  
standard forms of the time charterparty as follows: 
  
(A) Trading limits and safe port undertaking 
The Vessel shall be employed in lawful trades within the trading limits as 
stated in Box__ between safe ports or safe places where she can safely 
                                                          
265 The Stork (n 263) [104] (Morris, L.J.); Baatz (n 87). 
266 The Stork (n 263) [104] (Morris, L.J.); Bennett (n 2). 
267 Baatz (n 87). 
268 ibid; The Stork (n 263) [104} (Morris, L.J.). 
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enter, lie always afloat and depart.269 The Charterers’ safe port 
undertaking makes it necessary for this port to be prospectively safe at 
the time of nomination.270 
 
(B) Excluded ports and countries 
The Owners warrant that the vessel will not have traded to any of the 
ports and the countries listed in Box__at the time of beginning the time 
charter service. The vessel will also not be allowed to have traded to any 
of the ports or countries listed in Box__ during the time charter and/or at 
the time of ending of the time charter service. 
 
(C) The Master’s rejection and the Owners’ termination of the time 
charterparty 
The Master is entitled to reject an invalid order by the time charterer 
which instructs the vessel to perform a service outside trading limits or 
nominates the vessel to proceed to an unsafe port271 and to request an 
alternative valid order.272 If the Charterers insist that the initial order 
should be followed under protest, the Owners are entitled to choose to 
terminate the time charterparty273 and claim for damages.274 
 
(D) The Owners claim for damage 
The Owners are entitled not to choose to exercise their right under (C) 
                                                          
269 See Clause 2 (a) of the GENTIME form; (n 33). 
270 The Evia (No.2) (n 112). 
271 The Hill Harmony (n 164) [160] (Lord Hobhouse). 
272 Baatz (n 87). 
273 ibid. 
274 O’Sullivan and Hilliard (n 195) para 18.38; Coghlin and others (n 1) para 5.18.  
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but to comply with the Charterers’ order outside the trading limits or to 
proceed to an unsafe port.275 In these circumstances, the Owners are still 
entitled to claim for suffered damages.276 
 
(E) The Owners are entitled to payment for the time charter service at 
the current market rate 
If the Charterers order the vessel outside the trading limits or nominate 
the vessel to proceed to an unsafe port and the Master or the Owners 
comply with the invalid order, the Owners are entitled to payment for the 
time charter service at the current market rate if it is higher than the 
charter rate during the period of time charter under the time charterer’s 
invalid order.277 
 
(F) The Charterers are not liable for damages 
If the Master deliberately278 or recklessly ignores279 the obvious dangers 
of a nominated port, does not refuse the Charterer’s order and complies 
with the Charterers’ order outside trading limits and/or to proceed to or 
enter into the unsafe port, the Charterers are not liable for the Owners’ 
suffered damage.280 
 
 
3.6     Conclusion 
                                                          
275 The Kanchenjunga (n 196). 
276 ibid. 
277 See (n 53); (n 54). 
278 The Stork (n 263) [104] (Morris, L.J.). 
279 Baatz (n 87). 
280 ibid; The Stork (n 263) [104] (Morris, L.J.). 
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In order to ensure the effective use of the vessel by the time charterer and to 
protect the interests of both contractual parties, paying attention to the crucial 
restrictions of employment of the time charter service under the time 
charterparty and law is significant for the time charterer and the shipowner. 
The current provisions regarding legal liabilities and the effect of the time 
charterer’s breach of trading limits and safe port undertaking In the essential 
standard forms of time charterparty have some drawbacks, and therefore, 
hopefully the suggested reforms provided in this chapter can improve the 
guidance provided when these popular standard forms are chosen and 
modified in later editions. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
ENDING OF THE TIME CHARTER SERVICE 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
4.1     Introduction 
 
Examining the duration of a time charter and the rate of payment in a 
particular clause of a time charterparty is important when ending the time 
charter since they are connected to the legal obligation and rights between a 
shipowner and a time charterer under a time charterparty.1 In addition, the 
duration of a time charter will impact on the commercial operation and 
business plan of the shipowner and the time charterer.2 Therefore, in order to 
investigate whether or not the duration of the time charter under the time 
charterparty is clearly shown in the time charter standard forms, and the 
legal effect of early “redelivery of the vessel”3 and late “redelivery of the 
vessel” are thorough and clear in these standard forms, general key 
concepts, significant legal issues surrounding “redelivery of the vessel” under 
the time charter, such as the extent of the margin, early “redelivery of the 
vessel” and late “redelivery of the vessel” will be discussed in this chapter. In 
addition, the reform of duration and “redelivery of the vessel” under the time 
charter standard forms will also be recommended. 
 
 
                                                          
1 John F Wilson, Carriage of Goods by Sea (6th edn, Pearson Education Limited 2010), 90. 
2 Paul Herring, ‘Ascertaining the charter period’ in D. Rhidian Thomas (ed), Legal Issues 
Relating to Time Charterparties (Informa 2008).  
3 Changing “redelivery of the vessel” to “ending of the time charter service” is proposed in 
Section 4.6. 
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4.2    General key concepts surrounding “redelivery of the vessel” 
 
In order to prevent contractual parties from confusing the time charter with 
the bareboat charter and following the aforementioned concepts of the 
specific characteristics of the time charter which are discussed in Section 
1.1.3 of Chapters 1 and Section 2.2 of Chapter 2, it is first necessary to 
clarify the notion of “redelivery of the vessel”. As opposed to “the delivery of 
the vessel” which refers to “the beginning of the time charter”, “redelivery of 
the vessel” actually means “the ending of the time charter service.” i.e. the 
end of the time charterer’s “using the vessel” through instructing the Master 
and Crew who are employed by the shipowner.4 Thus, in this chapter, 
“redelivery of the vessel” means “ending of the time charter service”.  
 
“Redelivery of the vessel”5 is provided in Clause 7 of the BALTIME form 2001 
revision.6 It is required in this clause that the vessel is redelivered in the 
same good order and condition as when it was first delivered.7 In addition, 
Line 54 within Clause 4 of the NYPE 46 form8 and Clause 4 of the GENTIME 
form also stipulate the agreement between the contractual parties regarding 
the “redelivery of the vessel”.9 
 
                                                          
4 The Berge Tasta [1975] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 442 [424] (per Donaldson, J.); Terence Coghlin and 
others, Time Charters (6th edn, Informa 2008) para 1.5, 1.13; Christopher Hill, Maritime Law 
(6th edn, Informa Professional 2003) 171; Christopher Smith, ‘Charterparties’ in Bernard 
Eder and others (eds), Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of Lading (22nd edn, Sweet and 
Maxwell Limited 2011). 
5 It refers to “ending of the time charter service”. 
6 Unless otherwise specified, all reference to the BALTIEM form refer to the BALTIME form 
1939 (as revised 2001); Thomas (n 2) 286.  
7 ibid. 
8 Harvey Williams, Chartering Documents (4th edn, LLP Reference Publishing 1999) 229. 
9<https://www.bimco.org/~/media/Documents/Document_Samples/Time_Charter_Parties/Sa
mple_Copy_GENTIME.ashx> accessed 25 November 2011. 
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For the benefit of the shipowner,10 it is usually provided in the standard form 
of the time charterparty, such as in Line 101 to 102 of Clause 7 of the 
BALTIME form,11 Lines 56 to 57 within Clause 4 of the NYPE 46 form12 and 
Line 94 to 95 of Clause 4 (c) of GENTIME form,13 that the time charterer is 
obliged to give a notice of “redelivery of the vessel.”14 In practice, the 
agreement between the shipowner and time charterer should specify the 
approximate notice of “redelivery of vessel” given within an a certain number 
of days, then definitive notice of “redelivery of the vessel” given within a 
particular number of days.15 Therefore, as indicated in The Liepaya, failure to 
give notice of “redelivery of the vessel” within the agreed number of days by 
the time charterer is in breach of the time charterparty and the shipowner has 
a legal right to claim damages for the resulting loss.16 
 
In addition, even though it may be possible that the shipowner requires the 
vessel be “redelivered” to a specific port, it is more common for a central 
range of specified ports to be named than a specific port under the time 
charterparty.17 For example, in The Sanko Honour, the time charterparty 
provided that the vessel be ‘redelivered to Owners at a port or point at sea 
worldwide within Institute warranty limits but not further in distance than the 
                                                          
10 Yvonne Baatz, ‘Charterparties’ in Yvonne Baatz (ed), Maritime Law (2nd edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2011). 
11 Thomas (n 2) 286. 
12 Williams (n 8) 229. 
13 (n 9). 
14 Christopher Smith, ’Time Charters’ in Eder and others (n 4). 
15 ibid. 
16 ibid; UBC Chartering Ltd. v Liepaya Shipping Co. Ltd. (The Liepaya) [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 
649. 
17 Stephen Girvin, Carriage of Goods by Sea (2nd edn, OUP 2011) 683. 
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Persian Gulf is from Japan at Charterer’s option’.18 
 
Moreover, Clause 7 of the BALTIME form19 also provides the exception of 
good order and “fair wear and tear” when the vessel is redelivered.20 The 
vagueness of the term “fair wear and tear” leads to questions about whether 
or not this includes loading and discharge.21 If it is believed that the 
shipowner should bear the consequences of “fair wear and tear”, this 
conflicts with the view that the time charterer might need to take 
responsibility for “fair wear and tear” caused by loading and discharge on the 
basis of his/her usually being liable for giving instructions for the process of 
loading and discharge, and controlling the process of loading and discharge 
under the time charterparty.22 Nevertheless, it could be argued that the 
shipowner who runs the specific charter services should have the knowledge 
and experience to foresee that “fair wear and tear” is a natural process for 
their particular vessel. Thus it is believed that whether or not the time 
charterer should be liable for the condition of the vessel really depends on 
the facts. It is reasonable to allow the shipowner to prove that the vessel is 
not in the same good condition as when delivered. This results from potential 
negligent use of the vessel by the time charterer and allows for imposition of 
the time charterers’ liability for his/her damage to the vessel. 
 
                                                          
18 Reardon Smith Line Ltd. v Sanko Steamship Co. Ltd. (The Sanko Honour) [1985] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep 418. 
19 Thomas (n 2) 286. 
20 ‘The Vessel shall be re-delivered on the expiration of the Charter in the same good order 
as when delivered to the Charterers (fair wear and tear excepted) at an ice-free port in the 
Charterers; option at the place or within the range stated in Box 21…’ See Thomas (n 2) 
286. 
21 Wilson (n 1) 88. 
22 ibid. 
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4.3    Important legal issues surrounding the duration of the time 
charter under the time charterparty 
 
Extent of margin and relevant reform regarding the duration of the time 
charter under the time charterparty are discussed in this section. 
 
 
4.3.1    Extent of margin 
 
It is often found that legal questions which arise in practice pertain to whether 
or not an extent of margin is allowed when the final voyage ends after 
(overlap)23 or before (underlap) the day of expiration under the time 
charterparty.24 
 
The duration of the time charter may vary depending on the agreement 
between the shipowner and time charterer.25 The time charterparty may 
show that the duration of the time charter is either for a range of time, for 
example, “3 months, 15 days more or less”, “3-6 months” or for a fixed period 
of time, for example, “three months”.26 Due to the difficulties experienced by 
the time charterer when making an accurate plan for how long each voyage 
will take during the time charter, a reasonable time margin is normally 
permitted to allow the time charterer to have some flexibility regarding the 
                                                          
23 Simon Baughen, Shipping Law (4th edn Routledge-Cavendish 2009) 263. 
24 Herring (n 2). 
25 Coghlin and others (n 4) para 4.8. 
26 ibid. 
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duration of the time charter.27  
 
Even though there are various ways to provide the duration for the time 
charter on the basis of the principle of freedom of the contract within the time 
charterparty,28 the key notion regarding the margin of a period time under 
time charter could be briefly illustrated as follows. 
  
Although the word “about”, i.e “approximately”,29 may not actually be shown 
in the time charterparty, the court will treat it as including an implied 
reasonable margin when it provides a fixed duration for a time charter, such 
as six months or two years, because it is very difficult in practice for the time 
charterer to correctly calculate the specific day for the end of the last 
voyage.30 Around plus or minus 5 per cent of the period indicated in the time 
charterparty is normally allowed by the court as an implied margin, except 
where there is an express agreement for an overlap in the time 
charterparty.31 In addition, if the words “without guarantee” are specified 
regarding the duration of the time charter in the time charterparty, the time 
charterer would not be held responsible for exceeding the expected duration 
of the time charter.32 For example, The Lendoudis Evangelos II33 was a case 
about a time charter trip.34 The court indicated in this case that the charterer 
was not in breach of contract for either early or late “redelivery of the vessel” 
                                                          
27 Baatz (n 10). 
28 Neil Andrews, Contract Law (CUP 2011) 6. 
29 Coghlin and others (n 25) para 4.19. 
30 ibid para 4.8; Shipping Law (2011/2012 edn, Witherby Publishing Group Ltd 2011) 141. 
31 Wilson (n 1) 86. 
32 Smith (n 14).  
33 Continental Pacific Shipping Ltd. v Deemand Shipping Co. Ltd. (The Lendoudis Evangelos 
II) [1997] CLC 432. 
34 ibid. 
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if he/she estimated the duration of the period of the time charter in good faith 
under the explicit provision of “without guarantee” of duration of the charter.35  
 
However, when an expressed spread for a variable period of the time charter 
in the time charterparty is set by the contractual parties, this may mean that 
the court does not allow an extra margin for this duration of the time 
charter.36 For example, in The Dione,37 “six months, 20 days more or less” 
for a charter was provided in a charterparty.38 It was thought that the time 
charterer could “redeliver” the vessel at any time within the range of six 
months plus or minus 20 days, and still had the right to use the vessel until 
the end of the spread.39 However, the London arbitrators believed that when 
the vessel was “redelivered”, a reasonable overlap of 8.4 days should have 
been allowed for a period of six months and twenty days.40 Nevertheless, the 
court of appeal held that the additionally implied tolerance could not be 
permitted beyond the agreed margin.41  
   
In addition, if margin of a period under time charter is not set up in the time 
charterparty, extra tolerance is not allowed beyond a handwritten range of 
redelivery dates.42 For example, the view of Atkin J in The Hugin43 showed 
that the extent of the margin would not be allowed beyond 31 October 1912, 
since it was indicated that the “redelivery” day would be “between 15th and 
                                                          
35 ibid; Herring (n 2); Smith (n 14). 
36 Coghlin and others (n 4) para 4.14. 
37 Alma Shipping Corporation v Mantovani (The Dione) [1975] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 115 (CA). 
38 ibid. 
39 ibid. 
40 ibid. 
41 ibid. 
42 Coghlin and others (n 4) para 4.15. 
43 Watson Steamship v Merryweather (The Hugin) [1913] 18 Com Cas 294; Coghlin and 
others (n 4) para 4.15.  
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31st October, 1912”, as handwritten in the time charterparty.44    
 
However, it is indicated that if the spread of redelivery days is narrow, the 
implied tolerance may be justified.45 Nonetheless, it was shown in Bocimar v 
Farenco Navigation46 that if there is a wide spread of days, such as “a period 
of 11 to 14 months” for the charter, it may be impossible to imply a 
reasonable allowance, 5 days, before the expiration of 11 months for 
“redelivery of the vessel.”47  
 
Furthermore, there is also no implied extra margin before the indicated 
minimum and beyond the indicated maximum when the time charter period is 
given an explicit minimum and maximum time under the time charterparty.48 
For example, Kerr, in Mareva A.S,49 which is a case regarding a time charter 
under the NYPE 46 form, held that no margin over a maximum of 3 months 
was tolerated if lengths of two months minimum and three months maximum 
were stated for the time charter.50 It can be found that, if no intention to apply 
any margin is shown by the shipowner or time charterer, the court will also 
respect the agreement by the contractual parties and will not require any 
margin to be applied in the time charterparty.51 
 
                                                          
44 Coghlin and others (n 4) para 4.15. 
45 The Hugin (n 43); Coghlin and others (n 4) para 4.17. 
46 Bocimar v Farenco Navigation [2002] EHWC 1617 (QB); Coghlin and others (n 4) para 
4.17. 
47 ibid. 
48 Coghlin and others (n 4) para 4.18. 
49 The Mareva A.S. [1977] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 368; Coghlin and others (n 4) para 4.18. 
50 ibid. 
51 Shipping Law (n 30) 141. 
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Even if the view in the case of Mareva A.S52 is found in the American case, 
Tweedie Trading Co v Sangstand,53 a contrasting result under American law 
is indicated in Ropner v Inter-American S.S.Co.54 The court decided in this 
case that no different treatment should be made between the maximum 
period and a flat period under the time charter and a reasonable overlap was 
permitted.55 Nonetheless, it is believed that the decision in Ropner v Inter-
American S.S.Co.56 was unreasonable and that it was in contrast with the 
intention of the shipowner and the time charterer when the time charterparty 
was concluded, since the provided maximum period for the duration of the 
time charter under the time charterparty normally signifies no contractual 
intention for an extra margin beyond the maximum period for “redelivery of 
the vessel” by the time charterer.   
 
In brief, it could be concluded that either the provision of an explicit margin or 
a minimum and maximum period for the duration of the time charter in the 
time charterparty would make the duration of the time charter clearer and 
easier for the time charterer to follow. In addition, it would also benefit the 
shipowner and time charterer in clearly outlining their legal rights and 
obligations. 
 
 
4.3.2   Reforming the duration of the time charter under the time 
                                                          
52 The Mareva A.S; (n 49). 
53 Tweedie Trading Co. v Sangstand, 180 F.691 (2d Cir.1910); Coghlin and others (n 4) para 
4.119. 
54 Ropner v Inter-American S.S. Co. 243 F.549 (2d Cir.1917); Coghlin and others (n 4) para 
4.122. 
55 ibid. 
56 ibid. 
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charterparty 
 
In terms of the duration of the time charter under the time charterparty, it is 
found that Clause 1 of the BALTIME form,57 Lines 13 to 14 of the NYPE 46 
form58 and Clause 1 of the NYPE 93 form59 are too simple and unclear. In 
addition, an allowed margin is not expressed at all. Moreover, as mentioned 
in Section 2.6.4 of Chapter 2, lack of organisation of the BALTIME form60 and 
NYPE 46 and NYPE 93 forms61 means there are no index and/or Box Layout 
on the front of them. Therefore, they do not function to help the time 
charterer to be especially efficient or effectively adhere to the duration of the 
time charter. 
 
As noted, even if the word “about” is not present, in the time charterparty the 
court still might use the facts of a case to make a decision about the held 
margin for “redelivery of a vessel”.62 Thus the function of the word “about” is 
questionable. In addition, the use of “About…(how long)” to describe the 
duration of the time charter in Lines 13 to 14 of the NYPE 46 form63 could 
easily cause disputes in practice64 since the words “about how long” are 
subjective and could be interpreted differently by the shipowner and the time 
                                                          
57 ‘The Owners let, and the Charterers hire the Vessel for a period of the number of calendar 
months in Box 24 from the time (not a Sunday or a legal Holiday unless taken over) the 
Vessel is delivered…’ See Thomas (n 2) 286. 
58 ‘…That the said Owners agree to let, and the said Charterers agree to hire the said 
vessel, form the time of delivery, for about…within below mentioned trading limits…’ See 
Williams (n 8) 228. 
59 ‘The Owners agree to let and the Charterers agree to hire the Vessel form the time of 
delivery for a period of…within below mentioned trading limits.’ See Peter Brodie, 
Commercial Shipping Handbook (2nd edn, Informa 2006) 32. 
60 Thomas (n 2) 285-89. 
61 Williams (n 8) 228-31; Brodie (n 59) 32-46. 
62 Smith (n 14).  
63 Williams (n 8) 228. 
64 Coghlin and others (n 4) para 4.20. 
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charterer. Actually “About…(how long)” for the duration of the time charter is 
construed as giving explicit flexibility on the date of “redelivery” and it also 
can be said that the extent of the margin is provided for the duration of the 
time charter. Therefore, for the purpose of significantly commercial certainty 
within shipping industries,65 it is suggested that the word “about” should be 
deleted from Line 14 of the NYPE 46 form66 and changed to an expression in 
the time charterparty specifying either the minimum and maximum duration 
of the time charter or a clearly explicit margin.  
 
Compared to the provisions above, Clause 1 (a) of the GENTIME form67 is 
better organised and worthy of consideration, and could exercise the guiding 
function of a standard form of a time charterparty more effectively than the 
clauses of duration of a time charter in the BALTIME form68 and NYPE 4669 
and NYPE 93 forms70 noted above. 
 
However, Box 6 (a) on the front of the Clauses of the GENTIME form only 
provides the “Margin on the Final Period”.71 This could be divided into 
“margin on early ending of the time charter service” and “margin on late 
                                                          
65 Lord Hoffmann, ‘The Achilleas: Custom and Practice or Foreseeability?’ (2010) 14 (1) 
Edin. LR 47. 
66 Williams (n 8) 228. 
67 ‘Period - In consideration of the hire stated in Box 24 the Owners let not and the 
Charterers hire the Vessel for the period/trip(s) stated in Box 6. 
The Charterers shall have the option to extend the Charter Party by the period(s)/trip(s) 
stated in Box 7 which option shall be exercised by giving written notice to the Owners on or 
before the date(s) stated in Box 7. 
Unless otherwise agreed, the Charterers shall have the option to increase or to reduce the 
final period of the Charter Party by up to the number of days stated in Box 6 (a), which shall 
be applied only to the period finally declared’. (n 9). 
68 Thomas (n 2) 285-89. 
69 Williams (n 8) 229. 
70 Brodie (n 59) 32. 
71 (n 9). 
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ending of the time charter service” to make the GENTIME form72 clearer. An 
alternative suggestion is to show boxes for minimum and maximum durations 
of the time charter on the GENTIME form.73 The contractual parties are free 
to choose what exactly they want. Either of these suggestions would promote 
greater commercial certainty for the duration of the time charter. Moreover, 
they would also have the benefit of allowing the contractual parties to 
effectively pay attention to the negotiated margin and remind the time 
charterer to obey it. In addition, modifying the duration of the time charter in 
the BALTIME form74 and the NYPE 4675 and NYPE 93 forms76 could also 
bring the benefits of Clause 1 (a) of the GENTIME form77 and add the 
aforementioned suggestion for the GENTIME form78 to reduce any 
drawbacks.   
 
 
4.4    Early “redelivery” 
 
The time charterer would be in breach of the time charterparty if he/she 
“redelivered” the vessel earlier than the allowed terminal date given in the 
time charterparty.79 The legal consequence in this circumstance is down to 
the innocent shipowner who can either accept the “return” of the vessel and 
claim damages or keep the time charterer within the time charterparty.80 
                                                          
72 ibid. 
73 ibid. 
74 Thomas (n 2) 286. 
75 Williams (n 8) 229. 
76 Brodie (n 59) 32. 
77 (n 9). 
78 ibid. 
79 Baatz (n 10).   
80 Shipping law (n 30) 142; Girvin (n 17) 631.  
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However, it is indicated that the former result would probably be decided by 
the court in practice.81 This seems appropriate and realistic since the early 
ending of the time charter service may be due to the time charterer having no 
further business plans. If the shipowner chooses to refuse the early ending of 
the time charter service and keep the time charterer under this time 
charterparty, the time charterer, in practice, will probably find it difficult to 
immediately find their next business opportunity which could fit with the rest 
of the charter period after last voyage. 
 
In terms of measuring damages, it is worth noting that “fair” is the basic 
concern of the court when damages are awarded.82 In addition, the principle 
for the court in awarding damages to the shipowner for the time charterer’s 
breach of time charterparty is that the shipowner cannot be compensated for 
more than his/her actual suffering and the award cannot allow the shipowner 
to gain any resulting financial benefits.83 Moreover, the shipowner has an 
obligation to mitigate his/her loss under the assessment of damages.84 
 
If there is an available charter market of a similarly substituted time charter, 
which is of an equivalent length of period to the terminated charter, then by 
re-chartering the vessel for the unexpired period exists at the day of 
                                                          
81 The Puerto Buitrago [1976] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.250; Shipping Law (n 30) 142. 
82 Andrew Taylor, “Damages for Breach of Time Charter: Some Recent Developments” in 
Thomas (n 2). 
83 Coghlin and others (n 4) para 4.37. 
84 ‘The Mitigation rule reduces the claimant’s recovery to the extent that he has failed to act 
reasonably to limit or reduce his loss caused by the defendant’s breach.’; Mindy Chen-
Wishart, Contract Law (3rd edn OUP 2010) 572; British Westinghouse Electric Co. Ltd. & 
Manufacturing Co. v Underground Electric Railways [1912] AC 673 (HL); Janet O’Sullivan, 
‘Case Comment-Damages for Lost Profits for Late Redelivery: How Remote is too Remote?’ 
(2009) CLJ <http://login.westlaw.co.uk> accessed 7 December 2011. 
130 
 
termination of the time charterparty,85 the damages would be likely as 
follows: The time charterer will necessarily continue to pay the contractual 
rate of “hire” from the date of prematurely ending the time charter service 
until the date of the vessel being re-chartered, plus the difference86  between 
the time charter rate of “hire”87 and the charter market rate of “hire” for the 
vessel to be re-chartered from the date of re-chartering until the expiry date 
on the original the time charterparty if the charter market rate of “hire” is 
lower than the original contractual charter rate of “hire”. 88 
 
However, if no such aforementioned available charter market exists, the 
actual loss to the shipowner resulting from the breach of the time charterer is 
a possible way to measure damages awarded by the court.89 In this situation, 
the usual rules of assessing damage, which cover the rule of the claimant’s 
mitigation of loss, will still be applied.90 
  
Nonetheless, the legal consequences of early “redelivery of the vessel” 
discussed here are not shown clearly or in detail in the essential standard 
                                                          
85 Coghlin and others (n 4) paras 4.40-4.41; The Johnny [1977] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 1 (CA). 
86 The market rate for the time charter does not remain stable and can fluctuate before, 
during or after the period of the time charter. Wilson (n 1) 90. 
87 “Payment for the time charter service” will be discussed in Section 5.2.1 of Chapter 5. 
88 For example, the time charterer ends eight days earlier than the expiry date of the time 
charter service, and the shipowner re-charters the vessel on the fourth day before the expiry 
date of time charterparty, the damage might be assessed as follows: (1) the time charterer 
continues to pay the contractual daily rate of “hire” multiplied by four days, plus (2) the 
difference between the contractual daily rate of “hire” and market daily rate of “hire” for the 
re-chartered vessel multiplied by four days if the re-charter market daily rate is lower than 
contractual daily rate. 
89 Glory Wealth Shipping v Korea Line Corporation (The MV Wren) [2011] EWHC 1819 
(Comm). It does not matter whether the charter market is revived at a later period; Zodiac 
Maritime Agencies Limited v Fortescue Metals Group Limited [2010] EWHC 903 (Comm); 
See Jason Chuah, Law of International Trade: Cross-Border Commercial Transactions (5th 
edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2013) 329. 
90 Chuah (n 89) 329. 
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time charterparty forms.91 This prompts the need to improve these forms and 
is discussed in Section 4.6. 
 
 
4.5    Late “redelivery” 
 
It is established as a general rule that a legitimate final voyage is an implicit 
duty of the time charterer92 and there is a reasonable expectation on the time 
charterer that “redelivery of the vessel” will be on time, within any explicit or 
implied margin.93 Being a legitimate final voyage is necessary to satisfy both 
when the order of final voyage is giving and when the performance falls 
due.94 
 
If a final voyage is ordered in advance by the time charterer, judgement of 
whether or not the final voyage is legitimate is made at the time of the 
performance of the final voyage rather than when the order of the final 
voyage was given.95 This is because the initially valid orders may become 
invalid.96 For example, if another vessel blocks the relevant entrance of the 
intended discharge port for several days during the final voyage, the 
originally valid order for the final voyage would become invalid.97 In this 
circumstance, the vessel is committed to the final voyage. If the time 
                                                          
91 Such as the BALTIME form, the NYPE 46 and NYPE 93 forms, and the GENTIME form. 
92 Coghlin and others (n 4) para 4.64. 
93 Baatz (n 10). 
94 Coghlin and others (n 4) paras 4.69-70. 
95 Torvald Klaverness v Arni Maritime (The Gregos) [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1 (HL) (Lord 
Mustill); Coghlin and others (n 4) para 4.70; Baatz (n 10).  
96 ibid. 
97 The Gregos (n 95) (Lord Mustill). 
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charterer does not expect that a final voyage will be completed within the 
period of the time charter necessary to comply with the time charterparty, i.e. 
the time charterer estimates that the final voyage might exceed the ending 
date of the time charter service plus any tolerance under the time 
charterparty,98 this final voyage could be regarded as being illegitimate.99  
 
It was also revealed in The Gregos100 that the time charterer’s contractual 
obligation regarding “redelivery of the vessel” no later than the end of the 
time charter period is likely an intermediate term.101 Therefore, it would not 
allow late “redelivery” for a short time to justify the termination of the time 
charterparty by the shipowner.102 Moreover, if an illegitimate final voyage is 
ordered by the time charterer, the shipowner has the right to refuse this order 
and to request that the time charterer send a new valid order.103 If the time 
charterer declines to follow that request, he/she indicates that he/she has no 
intention of completing his/her obligation with regard to the time 
charterparty.104 This constitutes a repudiatory breach of the time charter105 
and the shipowner has the right to choose to terminate the time 
charterparty.106  
 
There is a question about who will bear the risk when neither contractual 
                                                          
98 Shipping law (n 30) 142. 
99 The Gregos (n 95) (Lord Mustill); Coghlin and others (n 4) para 4.70. 
100 ibid. 
101The Gregos (n 95) (Lord Mustill); Coghlin and others (n 4) para 4.50; “Intermediate term” 
is discussed in Section 2.5.5 in Chapter 2.  
102 ibid; ‘Time Charterparty’. 
<http://www.lawandsea.net/CP_Time/Charterparty_Time_Redelivery.html> accessed 29 
November 2011. 
103 Coghlin and others (n 4) para 4.70. 
104 (n 92). 
105 The Gregos (n 95) (Lord Mustill); Coghlin and others (n 4) para 4.70; Baatz (n 9). 
106 The Gregos (n 95); Coghlin and others (n 4) para 4.70. 
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party is at fault and causes a late “redelivery”. The House of Lords, in The 
London Explorer, which used the NYPE 46 form for a time charter, decided 
that the time charterer needed to pay the contractual charter rate of “hire” 
until the extended “redelivery” date of the vessel.107 After examining the 
facts, late “redelivery of the vessel” was attributed to unforeseen strikes 
during the final voyage, even though the freight market rate during that time 
had fallen.108 In other words, the charter rate was higher than the market rate 
and the time charterer was legally bound to pay the difference between the 
contractual rate of “hire” and the market rate of “hire” for the overlapping 
period. It is unclear why the time charterer needed to pay damages for a late 
“redelivery” under circumstances out of their control. However, under English 
law it is generally believed that the time charterer who uses the time charter 
service during the time charter bears the risk for the overrunning period.109  
 
Under a legitimate final voyage, the shipowner may claim the payment for 
the time charter service for late “redelivery” within an overrunning period.110 
Also, in this situation, the amount which may be claimed by the shipowner for 
damages for late “redelivery” within an overrunning period under a legitimate 
final voyage is the difference between the contractual charter rate of “hire” 
                                                          
107 Timber Shipping Co. S.A v London and Overseas Freighters (The London Explorer) 
[1971] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 523 (HL); Coghlin and others (n 4) para 4.2. 
108 ibid; The market refers to ‘the market for period time charters of a length similar to that 
from which the ship was redelivered late.’ The Johnny (n 85); Coghlin and others (n 4) paras 
4.55-56. 
109 Herring (n 2). 
110 For example, shipowner may claim the amount according to Line 177 to Line 178 of 
clause 8 (a) of the GENTIME form. ‘The Charterers shall pay hire per day or pro rata for any 
part of a day from the time the vessel is delivered to the Charterers until her redelivery to the 
Owners,…’ the hire’. See (n 9). 
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and the market rate of “hire”, if it is higher.111 If the market rate is lower than 
the contractual charter rate, the higher value will be chosen so as to pay 
damages for the overrunning period. Thus if the market rate is lower, the 
shipowner still has the right to claim the difference between the higher 
charter rate of “hire” and the market rate of “hire” for these overrunning 
days.112 However, it also needs to be emphasised that if late “redelivery” is 
caused by a defect in the vessel, something which is a maintenance 
obligation of the shipowner, the time charterer will not take responsibility for 
damages.113 
 
Another argument arises as to whether or not damages incurred for the time 
charterer’s late “redelivery of the vessel” should include additional losses 
such as loss of profit on the shipowner’s next fixture as in The Achilleas.114 
The case of The Achilleas involved a time charter for a minimum of five to a 
maximum seven months under the NYPE 93 form.115 The shipowners 
established a new time charterparty with the next time charterer for four to 
six months on 21st April 2004 with a contractual charter rate of $39,500 a 
day for “hire”116 and an agreed cancelation date of 8th May 2004.117 This 
next fixture was arranged because the original time charterer notified the 
shipowner on 20th April 2004 that the vessel would be “redelivered” to them 
no later than midnight on 2nd May 2004.118 However, the vessel was not 
                                                          
111 Hyundai Merchant Marine v Gesuri Chartering (The Peonia) [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 100 
(Commercial Court and CA); Coghlin and others (n 4) para 4.46; Baatz (n 10). 
112 See (n 108). 
113 Girvin (n 17) 686. 
114 Transfield Shipping v Mercator Shipping (The Achilleas) [2008] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 275. 
115 ibid. 
116 ibid. 
117 ibid. 
118 ibid. 
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“redelivered” until 11th May 2004, passing the shipowners’ next fixture’s 
cancelation date.119 Even though the shipowners successfully negotiated a 
deal with the next time charterer, the next time charterer paid a reduced rate 
of $31,500 a day for “hire” because the market rate fell dramatically during 
those two weeks.120 The shipowner therefore claimed for loss of profit, at the 
cost of the difference between the payment for “hire” the shipowner would 
have received if the vessel had been “returned” on time and the actual 
reduced charter rate of “hire” he received, i.e. $8000 a day, during the 
minimum period from the next fixture.121 
 
Even though the House of Lords ultimately adopted a strict view regarding 
damages in this case and held that damages for the late “redelivery” would 
only amount to the difference between the contractual charter rate of “hire” 
and the market rate of “hire” for the overrunning period, it is worth noting  that 
the majority of arbitrators, the commercial court and the Court of Appeal 
passed judgments in favour of the shipowner and awarded damages which 
included the value of the “hire” which the shipowners lost in the next 
fixture.122 
 
The importance of The Achilleas is that it brings the court’s and lawyers’ 
attention to what types of damages for late “redelivery” under the final 
voyage, with no fault of the time charterer, could possibly be included.123 It 
also gives them the opportunity to think about and debate whether or not 
                                                          
119 ibid. 
120 ibid. 
121 ibid; Hoffmann (n 65). 
122 ibid. 
123 ibid. 
136 
 
damages for late “redelivery” should be limited to the normal measure of 
damages, i.e. the difference between the charter rate of “hire” and the market 
rate of “hire”.124 
 
It is still arguable as to whether or not the time charterer should be liable for 
the shipowners’ loss of profit in this case, because the time charterer 
admitted before the arbitrators that, given the facts, the late “redelivery” was 
likely to have led to the shipowners’ missing the cancelling day of their next 
fixture.125 In addition, as Lord Rodger indicated in this case, given the facts, it 
was also possible that the time charterer had reasonably contemplated that 
the late “redelivery” of this kind of vessel would cause a significant loss of 
profit to the shipowner and that the charterer might be liable for this.126 This 
seems to indirectly show that the time charterer might have had the 
knowledge and experience of the shipowners’ usual course of dealings in the 
time charter service and that the time charterer might have foreseen the 
possible negative impact on the shipowners’ business. Moreover, the 
shipowners had also performed their duty for the mitigation of loss,127 i.e the 
shipowners had tried to negotiate with the next time charterer by reducing 
the payment for “hire”.128 Thus, that the shipowner claimed for loss of profit is 
unlikely to be unreasonable.  
 
However, it is believed that the time charterer may be held responsible for 
                                                          
124 Roger Halson, ‘Time Charters, Damages and Remoteness - The Achilleas’ (2008) 
LMCLQ 119. 
125 Transfield Shipping v Mercator Shipping (The Achilleas) [2007] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 19 [29]. 
(Christopher Clarke); Coghlin and others (n 4) para 4.63. 
126 Coghlin and others (n 4) para 4.61. 
127 See (n 84). 
128 The Achilleas (n 114). 
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the shipowners’ loss of profit if the shipowners informed the time charterer 
about the particular cancelation date of the existing subsequent fixture when 
the original time charterparty was established.129 This situation cannot be 
found on the facts of this case. In addition, Lord Hoffmann was concerned 
about the “background of market expectations”, which is ‘outside the scope 
of liability which the parties would reasonably have considered the value was 
undertaking.’130 It would be appear that the decision of the House of Lords 
was possibly supported by the “assumption of responsibility test” which, 
when applied in this case, is that the contractual parties are assumed liable 
for normal losses under their expectation, whereas unusual losses would not 
be assumed under the circumstances.131 In this specific case, it was 
asserted that, on the facts, the market rate fell sharply during those two 
weeks due to the extraordinary volatility in the charter market during the 
overrunning period.132 This could be treated as an altogether different sort of 
loss which resulted in the shipowners’ loss of profit being unusually greater 
than could be reasonably expected.133 
 
Nevertheless, it is believed that the decision by the House of Lords in this 
case was made on the basis of direct evidence which was provided by the 
shipowners. Therefore, the legal measure of damages held would really 
depend on the diversity of the facts and the evidence which was supplied by 
                                                          
129 ibid (Lord Rodger); Coghlin and others (n 4) para 4.59. 
130 Janet O’Sullivan, ‘Case Comment-Damages for Lost Profits for Late Redelivery: How 
Remote is too Remote?’ (2009) CLJ <http://login.westlaw.co.uk> accessed 7 December 
2011. 
131 Jill Poole, Casebook on Contract Law (10th edn, OUP 2010) 418. 
132 Hoffmann (n 65). 
133 ibid. 
138 
 
the claimant.134 If the loss of profit which the shipowners could claim had 
already been provided in the time charterparty, the shipowners would have 
been protected by this explicit agreement.135 Alternatively, if the shipowners 
had acted differently and could have proved that the damages which they 
had claimed were not remote,136 the decision in this case might have been 
different. This is because if the time charterer had been informed of the 
cancelling day of the shipowners’ next fixture when the time charterer sent 
the last voyage and given evidence to illustrate the foreseeabilities of the 
amount of loss of profit from his next fixture, the court might possibly have 
held that damages for late “redelivery” under the time charterer’s final voyage 
covered the loss of profit of the shipowners’ next business,137 not just the 
difference between the contractual charter rate of “hire” and market rate of 
“hire” for the overrunning period.  
 
A similar result can also be found in The Romandie, an American case in 
which the charterer breached stipulations of “redelivery of vessel” regarding 
the minimum/maximum “redelivery” period.138 Even though the shipowner 
claimed for special damages given the situation, if the vessel had not been 
“redelivered” late (a profitable transatlantic voyage could have been 
completed), the panel of arbitrators decided that there was not enough 
supporting evidence for the shipowner’s claim for special damages given the 
                                                          
134 ibid. 
135 ibid. 
136 ‘The remoteness test is that: Loss is recoverable in contract if the defendant 
contemplated that type of loss as a serious possibility at the time of contracting, or ought 
reasonably to have done so.’ See Mindy Chen-Wishart, Contract Law (3rd edn, OUP 2010) 
582; Edwin Peel, The Law of Contract (13th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2011) para 20-099. 
137 O’Sullivan (n 130); Poole (n 131) 418. 
138 The Romandie, SMA 1092 (Arb.at NY.1977); Coghlin and others (n 4) para 4.146. 
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facts.139 However, it was also stated by the panel that if the shipowner could 
have proved that he had either warned the charterers in advance or that the 
charterer had had other relevant knowledge regarding the financial results of 
late “redelivery” by overrunning the maximum 38 months, the special 
damages in this case would have been awarded to the shipowner.140        
 
The case of The Achilleas  concerns measure of damages under a legitimate 
final voyage, but not measure of damages for an illegitimate final voyage, so 
that is now explored.141 A precedent for this issue does not exist.142 It is 
believed that basic time charterers’ liability for late “redelivery” under his 
sending of an illegitimate final voyage may follow the view indicated by Rex 
L.J. in The Achilleas:143 if the time charterer continued to send the illegitimate 
final voyage with knowledge of the shipowners’ specific next fixture, the time 
charterer should be liable for the loss of profit resulting from the late 
“redelivery”.144 However, it is unfair and unreasonable that the legal 
consequence of late “redelivery” under a legitimate and an illegitimate final 
voyage be the same. Such a situation might indirectly promote more 
illegitimate final voyages to be ordered by the time charterer, because there 
would be no difference in consequences between a legitimate and an 
illegitimate final voyage. Differentiating the legal consequences of late 
“redelivery” under legitimate and illegitimate final voyages is an important 
                                                          
139 ibid. 
140 ibid. 
141 Halson (n 124). 
142 David Foxton, ‘Damages for Late or Early Redelivery under Time Charterparties’ (2008) 
LMCLQ 461. 
143 Transfield Shipping v Mercator Shipping (The Achilleas) [2007] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 555 (CA) 
[577] (Rix, L.J.); Coghlin and others (n 4) para 4.60. 
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possible reform which will be discussed in the next section. 
 
To sum up, whether or not late “redelivery” is caused by the time charterer 
sending the vessel on a legitimate or illegitimate final voyage, the court’s 
usual means of awarding damages amounts to the difference between the 
contractual charter rate of “hire” and the market rate of “hire” if the market 
rate of “hire” is higher than the contractual rate of “hire” for the overrunning 
dates.145 However, lack of practical guidance for contractual parties to predict 
the legal consequences of claiming for additional losses caused by the late 
“redelivery” under an illegitimate final voyage is a potentially controversial 
issue.146 In addition, in terms of loss of profit resulting from late “redelivery” 
under a legitimate final voyage, it is convincing that except for when the 
shipowners’ loss of profit is protected by explicit terms in the time 
charterparty, supplying sufficient evidence to clearly show that the time 
charterer had already been properly informed about the cancelling date of 
the shipowners’ next fixture and proving that the time charterer had 
knowledge or enough experience to know the financial effects of late 
“redelivery” under a legitimate final voyage, is possibly the key to shipowners 
winning their claim for loss of profit caused by time charterers’ late 
“redelivery”.147 Nonetheless, in practice, it is probably not so easy for the 
shipowners to prove this. For the purpose of reducing illegitimate final 
voyages being ordered by the time charterer and avoiding future disputes, 
modifying the standard forms of the time charterparty to make it clearer and 
more thoughtful, in order to functionally guide the shipowner and the time 
                                                          
145 Herring (n 2); Baatz (n 10). 
146 Foxton (n 142). 
147 O’Sullivan (n 130). 
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charterer, may be a possible solution.  
 
 
4.6    Reforming the “redelivery of the vessel” within the time 
charterparty 
 
Commercial certainty is crucial for businessmen in the shipping industries.148 
Reforming the “redelivery of the vessel” within the time charterparty reflects 
this need. Resolving the legal issues and filling in the gaps discussed above 
are two other targets of the modification of the “redelivery” clause under the 
following standard forms of the time charterparty. 
  
Clause 7 of the BALTIME form grants that the time charterer can continue to 
use the vessel to finish his/her voyage when the vessel is under a legitimate 
final voyage sent by the time charterer and she is “redelivered” after the 
termination date of the time charter, but that the charterer should pay more 
for the time charter service if the market149 rate rises at that time.150 This 
clause is criticised for not being clear enough and not covering the legal 
effect of an early “redelivery of the vessel”, the legal effect of the late 
“redelivery of the vessel” under a legitimate final voyage sent by the time 
charterer if the market rate is lower than the contractual rate, or the legal 
effect of late “redelivery of the vessel” under an illegitimate final voyage sent 
by the time charterer. 
 
                                                          
148 Hoffmann (n 65). 
149 See (n 108). 
150 Thomas (n 2) 286. 
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In addition, the insufficiency of Clause 4 of the NYPE 46 form151 and Clause 
1 of NYPE 93 form152 is also questionable, since these forms both lack 
provision for the legal effects of the early “redelivery of the vessel” and late 
“redelivery of the vessel” for a legitimate and illegitimate final voyage sent by 
the time charterer. 
 
Moreover, although Clause 4 (d) of the GENTIME form153 gives more thought 
to an illegitimate final voyage ordered by the time charterer compared to 
Clause 7 of the BALTIME form,154 Clause 4 of the NYPE 46 form155 and 
Clause 1 of the NYPE 93 form,156 it still omits the legal effect of the early 
“redelivery of the vessel” and late “redelivery of the vessel” under a legitimate 
final voyage sent by the time charterer. In addition, it does not provide a legal 
effect of an illegitimate final voyage sent by the time charterer if the market 
rate is lower than the stated contractual rate within the GENTIME form.157 
 
What is more, a “liquidated damages clause”, which means the enforceable 
clause of the contract provides the genuine pre-estimate of the loss arisen 
from the contractual parties’ breach, is suggested.158 It is possible to make 
the contractual parties’ legal position under the time charterparty more 
certain and predictable if the contractual parties negotiate a way in advance 
of measuring the damage159 from the early “redelivery of the vessel” and late 
                                                          
151 Williams (n 8) 229. 
152 Brodie (n 59) 32. 
153 (n 9).   
154 Brodie (n 59) 32. 
155 William (n 8) 229. 
156 Brodie (n 59) 32. 
157 (n 9).   
158 Ewan McKendrick, Contract Law (10th edn, Palgrave Macmillan 2013) 362. 
159 ibid. 
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“redelivery of the vessel” within the time charterparty. This recommendation 
may also make the draft of the provision for the “redelivery of the vessel” 
within the time charterparty more complete and better thought out. 
 
Measuring damage from an early “redelivery of the vessel” could be done by 
creating two possible situations and providing them in the time charterparty. 
One is when an available charter market of a similar substitute time charter, 
which is in equivalent length periods to the terminated charter, by re-
chartering the vessel for the unexpired period, exists at the day of the 
termination of the time charterparty,160 the way of measuring damages will 
follow the rule showed in Section 4.4.161 The other is when no such available 
charter market exists on the day of the termination of the time charterparty.162 
In this case the time charterer would need to pay the agreed charter rate of 
“hire” until the expired date within the time charter period. The reason for this 
suggestion is that, according the normal approaches to contract damage,163 
the shipowner has the legal right to such fixed payments as would put him/ 
her in the same financial position as he/she would have been in if the time 
charterparty had been performed,164 i.e. the shipowner is entitled to the 
payment for the time charter service as if there were no situation of early 
ending of time charter service. Based on this, the contractual obligation and 
rights had been clearly set in the time charterparty, the shipowner did not 
need to further collect evidence on how to prove how much actual loss 
                                                          
160 Coghlin and others (n 4) paras 4.40-4.41; See also The Johnny (n 85). 
161 For instance, see (n 88). In addition, this can be compared with The Achilleas, which is 
occurred in the situation of late ending of the time charter service. See Section 4.5. 
162 (n 89). 
163 Richard Taylor and Damian Taylor, Contract Law (4th edn, OUP 2013) 285. 
164 Coghlin and others (n 4) para 4.44. 
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resulted from the time charterer’s breach of the time charterparty and the 
early ending of the time charter service. 
 
Therefore, this recommendation might also help to reduce the burden of 
proof on the shipowner (the claimant)165 to prove how much actual loss166 he 
/she suffered when there was no such aforementioned available charter 
market. This could also be regarded as a practicable way to prevent disputes 
in advance. 
 
Furthermore to reduce the possibility of an illegitimate final voyage being 
ordered by the charterer and to avoid further disputes as well as making  
Clause 7 of the BALTIME form,167 Clause 4 of the NYPE 46 form,168 Clause 
1 of the NYPE 93 form169 and Clause 4 (d) of the GENTIME form170 more 
complete and thoughtful it is suggested that in addition to changing the 
wording of “redelivery of the vessel” to “ending of the time charter service” 
and keeping the legal effect of illegitimate ordering of the final voyage by the 
time charterer as provided in Clause 4 (d) of the GENTIME form,171 it is 
necessary to make clear the difference between the legal consequences of 
late “redelivery” under a legitimate final voyage and late “redelivery” under an 
illegitimate final voyage. Therefore, in terms of the measured way of 
determining the damage caused by the late “ending of the time charter 
                                                          
165 ‘In common law countries, the plaintiff must prove the case by a preponderance of the 
evidence in civil disputes.’ Robert B.Cooter Jr. and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics (6 th 
edn, Pearson Education Limited 2014) 431. 
166 The MV Wren (n 89). 
167 Thomas (n 2) 286. 
168 Williams (n 8) 229. 
169 Brodie (n 59) 32. 
170 (n 9). 
171 ibid. 
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service”, it is believed that, when there is an available market for period time 
charterers of a length similar to the equivalent vessel which overruns on its  
last voyage,172 the damages awarded under both a legitimate final voyage 
and an illegitimate final voyage could possibly not only include the difference 
between the contractual charter rate of “hire” and market rate of “hire” for the 
overrunning days if the market rate is higher than the contractual rate, but 
the loss of profit could also be negotiated by contractual parties. This could 
make it necessary for the time charterparty to be clearly set up to entitle the 
shipowner to damages.173 Alternatively, the other additional loss, the details 
of which can be negotiated by the contractual parties and which are clearly 
provided for in the time charterparty make the other additional loss 
recoverable by the shipowner for the late ending of the time charter service 
under an illegitimate final voyage. However, if there is no such market as 
mentioned, reasonable compensation for the shipowner would be agreed 
through the establishment of a clear agreement to ensure that the time 
charterer pay the contractual rate of “hire” for the overrunning dates under a 
legitimate final voyage. Also, in order to clearly measure the damage, the 
contractual parties could negotiate the details of additional loss and 
obviously stipulate them in the time charterparty. This might benefit the 
shipowner in that it would probably be easier to recover the additional loss if 
the vessel were “redelivered” late under an illegitimate final voyage. 
 
 
4.7   Highlighting the key reforms in this chapter 
                                                          
172 The Johnny (n 85); Coghlin and others (n 4) paras 4.55-56. 
173 Hoffmann (n 65). 
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Through the aforementioned analysis, the key recommendations which 
therefore need to be followed within these essential standard forms could be 
addressed as follows: 
 
Ending of the Time Charter Service 
(A) Early Ending of the Time Charter Service 
(i) If there exists an available charter market of similar substitute time 
charter, which is of equivalent length of periods to the terminated 
charter, by re-chartering the vessel for the unexpired period which 
exists at the day of termination of the time charterparty, and is 
caused by the Charterer’s early ending of the time charter service, 
the damage that the Charterer will necessarily need to pay will be 
the payment for the time charter service at the contractual rate 
from the date of the early ending of the time charter service until 
the date of the vessel being re-chartered, plus the difference 
between the payment of time charter service under the contractual 
charter rate and the charter market rate for the vessel to be re-
chartered from the date of re-chartering until the expiry date on the 
original the time charterparty if the re-charter market rate is lower 
than the contractual rate.174 
  
     (ii)  If such a charter market as described in (A) (i) does not exist, the 
Charterer should continue to pay for the time charter service at the 
agreed contractual charter rate until the expiry date given in the 
                                                          
174 See (n 88). 
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time charterparty.  
 
     (B) Late Ending of the Time Charter Service by a Legitimate Last 
Voyage 
(i)   If the Charterer orders a final voyage when the order is given and 
when performance falls due,175 with a reasonable expectation that a 
final voyage will complete within the agreed period……plus the 
tolerated extra….. (or between the minimum…and maximum… of 
the duration given in the time charterparty), even if the vessel is 
actually late and beyond the tolerated extra periods (or maximum of 
the duration of the time charter), the final voyage ordered by the 
Charterer is still regarded as a legitimate last voyage. In this 
circumstance, the Charterer shall pay the contractual charter rate of 
payment for the time charter service, stated in the box…for the 
overrunning dates, if the market rate is higher.176  Also, the Owner 
can claim damages for a breach of time charterparty for the time 
beyond the tolerated extra period (or maximum duration given in 
the time charterparty). The damages shall be the difference 
between the contractual charter rate of payment for the time charter 
service and the market rate for the overrunning dates, if the market 
rate is higher.177 If the market rate is lower than the agreed rate 
stated in the box…., the Charterers shall still pay the contractual 
rate for the overrunning dates. In addition, the Owner can also 
                                                          
175 The Gregos (n 95); Coghlin and others (n 4) paras 4.69-70. 
176  See (n 110). 
177 This can be seen in Lines 106 to 111 of Clause 7 of the BALTIME form.  
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claim for the loss of profit178 caused by the overrunning of this last 
voyage.  
 
(ii) If there is no available charter market for an equivalent vessel for a 
similar length of time at the time the Charterer overruns on a 
legitimate last voyage,179 the Charterer shall still pay for the time 
charter service at the contractual rate stated in the box…. for the 
overrunning dates. 
 
(C) Late Ending of the Time Charter Service by an Illegitimate Last 
Voyage 
(i) If the Charterer orders a final voyage when the order is given or 
when the performance falls due,180 the final voyage cannot 
reasonably be expected to be completed within the agreed 
period……plus the tolerated extra….. (or between the 
minimum…and maximum… of the duration given in the time 
charterparty), the final voyage which is ordered by the Charterer is 
regarded as an illegitimate last voyage. In this circumstance, the 
Owner will have the option of (1) refusing the order from the 
Charterer and requesting a substitute order allowing the timely 
ending of the time charter181 or (2) choosing to terminate the time 
charterparty if the Charterer persists in carrying out the invalid 
                                                          
178 Hoffmann (n 65). 
179 The Johnny (n 85); Coghlin and others (n 4) paras 4.55-56. 
180 ibid; The Gregos (n 95) (Lord Mustill). 
181 The Gregos (n 95); Coghlin and others (n 4) para 4.70. 
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order182 or (3) performing the order without prejudice to their rights 
to claim damages for a breach of the charter caused by the 
overrunning of the illegitimate last voyage. The Charterer shall pay 
the contractual charter rate of payment for the time charter service, 
stated in the box…for the overrunning dates, if the market rate is 
higher.  Also, the damages shall be the difference between the 
contractual charter rate of payment for the time charter service, 
stated in the box…., and the market rate for the overrunning dates, 
if the market rate is higher. If the market rate is lower than the 
agreed rate stated in box…., the Charterer shall still pay for the time 
charter service under the contractual rate for the overrunning days. 
In addition, both contractual parties can negotiate that damages 
include the loss of profit; and the other additional losses, such 
as….. 
 
(ii) If there is no available charter market for an equivalent vessel for 
a similar length of time at the time the Charterer overruns on an 
illegitimate last voyage,183 the time charterers shall still pay for 
the time charter service at the contractual rate stated in the 
box…. for the overrunning dates. In addition, both contractual 
parties can negotiate that damages include additional losses, 
such as….. 
 
 
                                                          
182 ibid. 
183 The Johnny (n 85); Coghlin and others (n 4) paras 4.55-56. 
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4.8     Conclusion 
 
It is crucial to clarify the legal obligations and rights of the time charterer and 
the shipowner at the end of a time charter. In this chapter, by way of the 
aforementioned recommendations to improve the duration of the time charter 
within the time charterparty to deal with the legal issues and eliminate the 
shortages of provisions regarding the early ending of the time charter service 
and late ending of the time charter service under the standard forms, it may 
also be beneficial for the merchants in shipping industries to clearly predict 
the legal effect of the ending of the time charter within the time charterparty. 
This chapter will contribute to the reduction of illegitimate final voyages being 
ordered by the time charterer by making the legal effect of the late ending of 
time charter services under legitimate and illegitimate final voyages a 
difference between damages incurred through late ending time charter 
services under legitimate final voyages and late endings time charter 
services under illegitimate final voyages. The recommendations might also 
help to remind shipowners and time charterers that they may take steps to 
avoid future controversy by negotiating whether damages should include the 
loss of profit and other additional losses under an illegitimate last voyage and 
stipulating them within the time charterparty. 
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CHAPTER 5: 
PAYMENT OF THE TIME CHARTER SERVICE, DEDUCTION FROM 
PAYMENT FOR THE TIME CHARTER SERVICE, WITHDRAWAL AND 
SUSPENSION OF THE TIME CHARTER SERVICE, AND OFF-PAYMENT 
FOR THE TIME CHARTER SERVICE 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
5.1    Introduction 
 
From the business perspective, receiving payment for the time charter 
service1 (payment of hire)2 is the most important concern for the shipowner 
when he/she offers the charter service to the time charterer.3 In order to 
control the earnings from the time charter service, the shipowner has the 
right to withdraw the time charter service (withdraw the vessel)4 and the right 
of suspension of the time charter service based on the time charterparty.5 On 
the other hand, the time charterer may possibly also need to be protected by 
the right of deduction of the payment for the time charter service (deduction 
                                                          
1 Terence Coghlin and others, Time Charters (6th edn, Informa 2008) para 1.15. 
2 A change to these wordings is suggested. See reform of payment for time charter service. 
In this thesis, the phrase, “payment for time charter service” is used instead of “payment of 
hire”. 
3 Yvonne Baatz, ‘Charterparties’ in Yvonne Baatz (ed), Maritime Law (2nd edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2011). 
4 This wording change is also recommended. See reform of the withdrawal of the vessel. In 
this thesis, after this mentioned, “withdraw the time charter service”, which includes 
“withdraw the vessel, the Master, Officers and Crew from the time charter service” is used 
instead of “withdraw the vessel”. 
5 Baatz (n 3). 
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of hire)6 and an off-payment for the time charter service (off-hire)7 to permit 
deduction from payment for the time charter service or non-payment for the 
time charter service required if he/she cannot receive the time charter 
service from the shipowner or suffers loss of time.8 Because current 
provisions within the essential standard forms of time charterparties 
regarding payment for the time charter service, deduction from payment for 
the time charter service, withdrawal of the time charter service, suspension 
of the time charter service, and off-payment for the time charter service, are 
not clear, precise or complete enough, the target in this chapter is to reform 
the arguable contents within these forms in order to improve them. These 
topics are all relevant to the payment for the time charter service and will be 
combined and analysed in this chapter. Firstly, the payment for the time 
charter service and the reform of payment for the time charter service will be 
discussed. This will then be followed by an analysis of the deduction of 
payment of the time charter service. Next the reform of the deduction of 
payment of the time charter service will be addressed. Then the general key 
concepts of the withdrawal of the time charter service under the time 
charterparty will be introduced. Then the important issue of the withdrawal 
and suspension of the time charter service will be analysed and a suggestion 
with respect to the withdrawal and suspension provision will be made. 
Subsequently, the general key concepts of the off-payment for the time 
charter service will also be indicated. Then the vital legal issue of the off-
                                                          
6  A wording change is suggested. See reform of deduction of payment for the time charter 
service. In this thesis, the term “deduction of payment for time charter service” is used 
instead of “deduction of payment of hire”. 
7 It is proposed to modify these wordings. See reform of the off-payment for the time charter 
service. In this thesis, the phrase “off-payment for the time charter service” is used instead of 
“off-hire”. 
8 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 25.2. 
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payment for the time charter service will be discussed. Finally possible 
reform as to the clause of the off-payment for the time charter service will be 
recommended.  
 
 
5.2     Payment for the time charter service under the time charterparty 
 
The time charterer usually needs to make a payment for the time charter 
service9 punctually in advance10 and pay on the basis of a daily rate under 
the time charterparty in order to use the vessel and the time charter 
service.11 This can be exemplified by Clause 6 of the BALTIME form, which 
provides that payment of “hire”12 must be paid every 30 days in advance.13  
Another example is Clause 5 of the NYPE 46 form, which also stipulates that 
payment of “hire”14 by the time charterer has to be paid semi-monthly in 
advance.15 In addition, paying in an agreed currency, such as United States 
currency, is also set out in the time charterparty, and is specified in Clause 5 
of the NYPE 46 form.16 If the due date of the payment is on a Sunday or 
another non-banking day, payment no later than the immediately preceding 
banking day is required in order for the time charterer to avoid being in 
                                                          
9 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 1.15. 
10 This is a characteristic of the time charter “hire”. It is the consideration given by the time 
charterer for being permitted to use of the vessel and the time charter service of her Crew, 
Officers and Master. See Shipping Law (2011/2012 edn, Witherby Publishing Group Ltd 
2011) 143. 
11 Baatz (n 3). 
12 (n 2). 
13 Clause 6 of the BALTIMEform 1939 (as revised 2001). Unless otherwise specified, all 
reference to the BALTIEM form refer to the BALTIME form 1939 (as revised 2001); D. 
Rhidian Thomas (ed), Legal Issues Relating to Time Charterparties (Informa 2008) 286.  
14 (n 2). 
15 Harvey Williams, Chartering Documents (4th edn, LLP Reference Publishing) 229. 
16 ibid. 
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default.17 
 
Moreover, under the time charterparty, it is normally required that the time 
charter service should be paid for in cash.18 However, modern commercial 
customs seem to have recognised bankers’ payment slips and drafts as 
amounting to cash19 because the payment is immediately accessible to the 
shipowner through direct bank transfer to his/her account.20 As Brandon J 
indicated in The Brimnes,21 payment for the time charter service in cash 
should have a wider meaning and any commercially accepted way of 
transferring funds should be included.22 It is asserted that the court also 
construed that payment in cash is to ‘give the transferee the unconditional 
right to the immediate use of the funds transferred’.23 This definition by The 
Brimnes as to payment in cash was also approved and clarified by the House 
of Lords in The Chikuma.24 It is believed that payment in cash amounts to 
“unfettered or unrestricted”25 payment. In addition, the House of Lords also 
indicated that if the creditor is given “the equivalent of cash or as good as 
cash”, this is covered in the meaning of payment in cash under Clause 5 of 
the NYPE 46 form.26 Thus it can be said that payment under reserve or 
payment by cheque does not amount to payment in cash since the 
                                                          
17 Mardorf Peach & Co. Ltd. v Attica Sea Carriers Corp. of Liberia (The Laconia) [1977] 1   
Lloyd’s Rep 315; John F Wilson, Carriage of goods by Sea (7th edn, Pearson Education 
Limited 2010) 95. 
18 For example, Line 84 of Clause 6 of the BALTIME form, Line 58 of Clause 5 of the NYPE 
46 form. 
19 The Georgios C [1971] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 7; Wilson (n 17) 94. 
20 Stephen Girvin, Carriage of Goods by Sea (2nd edn, OUP 2011) 641. 
21 Tenax Steamship Co. Ltd. v The Brimnes (Owners) (The Brimnes) [1972] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 
465 [476]; Coghlin and others (n 1) para 16.30. 
22 ibid.  
23 ibid. 
24 A/S Awilco of Oslo v Fulvia SpA di Navigazione of Cagliari (The Chikuma) [1981] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep 371 (HL); Coghlin and others (n 1) para 16.30. 
25 The Chikuma (n 24) [375]; Coghlin and others (n 1) para 16.30. 
26 ibid; Williams (n 15) 229. 
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shipowner cannot access the funds unconditionally and immediately.27 
 
Furthermore, there is also another issue relating to calculating the time for 
payment for the time charter service.28 That is, the ending of the time charter 
service might be in a place which is in a different time zone from the 
beginning of the time charter service.29 The argument is therefore whether or 
not it is necessary for the time charterer to pay for any hours included in this 
time zone discrepancy as part of the time charter service (“elapsed time”).30  
The guideline for this issue can be found in The Arctic Skou31 where “per 
Calendar Month” and “part of a month” within Lines 53 and 54 under the 
NYPE 46 form were removed.32 Instead, “per day” and “part of a day” is used 
under the form.33 Leggatt J considered the primary issue to be how long the 
vessel has been in the charter service and that should constitute the charter 
period any shipowner would expect to be repaid for and any charterer would 
expect it to be necessary to pay for, from a rational commercial point of 
view.34 Clear wording referring to or confirming the intention of the 
contractual parties within the time charterparty is also concerned.35 He 
believed that the time charter service should be suitably computed based on 
the actual period which had elapsed, since the language within Line 54 of the 
NYPE 46 form36 did not indicate the time on the clock at the place of ending 
of the time charter service but specifically referred to the actual time, “day”, 
                                                          
27 Shipping Law (n 10) 143. 
28 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 14.1. 
29 ibid. 
30 ibid. 
31 The Arctic Skou [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 478; Coghlin and others (n 1) para 14.2. 
32 ibid. 
33 ibid. 
34 ibid. 
35 ibid. 
36 It provides that ‘…hire to continue until the hour of the day of her re-delivery…’  
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which substitutes “Calendar Month”.37 Then he held in The Arctic Skou that 
the time charter service should be paid for according to mention of the 
elapsed time rather than local time.38 
 
In short, the practical disputes relevant to payment for the time charter 
service give rise to the need to improve the essential standard forms of the 
time charterparty. The following suggestion for reforming payment for the 
time charter service, hopefully can provide advance preparation for 
contractual parties which will prevent unnecessary arguments in the future. 
 
 
5.2.1   Reforming payment for the time charter service 
 
As already mentioned in Section 1.1.3 of Chapter 1, the time charter has its 
own special characteristics, which are different from the demise charter and 
the voyage charter.39 The shipowner supplies the time charter service, 
including offering the vessel, the Master, Officers and Crew, to the time 
charterer during a specified period.40 The shipowner still possesses the 
                                                          
37 ibid; Coghlin and others (n 1) para 14.3. 
38 ibid; Coghlin and others (n 1) para 14.4; Under the majority of American cases, calculating 
of time within the time charter is to be decided by mention of local dates and times at the 
place of “delivery” and “redelivery” of the vessel rather than by elapsed time. See Coghlin 
and others (n 1) para 14.15. 
39 The Berge Tasta [1975] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 422 [424] (Donaldson, J.); Sea & Land Securities v 
Dickinson [1942] 72 LlL Rep 159 [163] (MacKinnon, L.J.); Coghlin and others (n 1) para 1.4, 
1.5, 1.10, 1.13; Christopher Smith, ‘Charterparties’ in Bernard Eder and others (eds), 
Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of Lading (22nd edn, Sweet and Maxwell Limited 2011).  
40 The Scaptrade [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 253 [256]-[257]; Coghlin and others (n 1) para 1.4.  
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vessel through the Master, Officers and Crew.41 Thus there is no actual “hire” 
of the vessel by the time charterer from the shipowner.42 
 
For the purposes of avoiding misleading the merchant and preventing them 
from mixing the legal concepts of time charter and demise charter (bareboat 
charter)43 together and confusing them, it is believed that appropriate 
wordings should be used to accurately present the unique features of the 
time charter44 and make the concept of the time charter clear within the time 
charterparty. It is therefore proposed that “payment of hire” should be 
modified to “payment for the time charter service”45 within the relevant 
clauses of the BALTIME form,46 the NYPE 46 form,47 the NYPE 93 form,48 
and the GENTIME form.49  
 
In addition, if satisfied by giving the shipowner unconditional rights to the 
immediate use of funds transferred, the wider meaning of “in cash” for the 
time charterer’s payment for the time charter service can be admitted in 
modern commercial practice.50 
 
Thus, in order to follow commercial practice and make the contents of the 
                                                          
41 Timber Shipping Co. S.A v London and Overseas Freighters (The London Explorer) 
[1971] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 523 [526]; Coghlin and others (n 1) para 1.5. 
42 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 1.15. 
43 Wilson (n 17) 7. 
44 The Scaptrade [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 253 [256]-[257]; Sea & Land Securities v Dickinson 
[1942] 72 LlL Rep 159 [163] (MacKinnon, L.J.); Coghlin and others (n 1) para 1.4, 1.5, 1.10, 
1.13.  
45 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 1.15. 
46 See Clause 6 of the BALTIME form. 
47 See Clause 4 and 5. 
48 See Clause 10 and 11. 
49 See Clause 8. 
50The Brimnes (n 21) [476]; Coghlin and others (n 1) para 16.30. 
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clause clearer, it is recommended that the contents regarding payment for 
the time charter service under Clause 6 of the BALTIME form51, Clause 5 of 
the NYPE 46 form52 and Clause 11 (a) of the NYPE 93 form53 be modified 
and provide that payment for the time charter service must be by cash or 
‘other payment method equivalent to payment in cash under commercial 
practice, which can give the shipowner the unconditional right to the 
immediate use of the funds.’54 This might render the wording within these 
standard forms of the time charterparties more precise. 
 
Moreover, there is an issue with the applicable rate of payment for additional 
time for the time charter service.55 Additional time can be found in Clause 9 
(d) of the GENTIME form, which allows the time charterer to declare his/her 
option in writing within a period of limited time, adding the period of off-
payment for the time charter service (off-hire)56 into the charter period within 
the time charterparty.57 Under this circumstance, Clause 8 (a) of the 
GENTIME form provides that the payment for the time charter service of this 
additional period is on the basis of the rate operable at the time that the time 
charter service ends.58  
 
In practice, different rates of time charter service can be found to operate 
                                                          
51 Thomas (n 13) 286. 
52 Williams (n 15) 229. 
53 Peter Brodie, Commercial Shipping Handbook (2nd edn, Informa 2006) 35-36. 
54 See (n 21). 
55<https://www.bimco.org/Members/Chartering/BIMCO_Documents/Time_Charter_Parties/G
ENTIME/Explanatory_Notes_GENTIME.aspx> accessed 28 October 2012. 
56 A wording change is propsed. See Section 5.5.3. 
57<https://www.bimco.org/~/media/Documents/Document_Samples/Time_Charter_Parties/S
ample_Copy_GENTIME.ashx> accessed 18 January 2013. 
58 In Chapter 4 modifying “redelivery“ to “ending of the time charter service” is suggested. 
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over the course of a long-term time charter.59 It is possible that disputes may 
occur as to which rate of time charter service should be used for any 
additions to the time charter period.60 Is it the rate at the actual time of 
ending of the time charter service or the rate at the “original” time of the time 
charter service ending? In order to avoid disputes, the explanatory notes to 
Clause 8 (a) of the GENTIME form indicate that, according to common 
practice, within this clause, the payment of this additional period is on the 
basis of the rate operable at the original time of ending of the time charter 
service.61 However, the “original” time of ending of the time charter service is 
not obviously shown in this clause of the time charterparty.  
 
Even though Clause 8 (a) of the GENTIME form62 provides a more well 
thought out and complete rate of payment for the time charter service for 
additional time than Clause 6 of the BALTIME form,63 Clause 4 of the NYPE 
46 form64 and Clause 10 of the NYPE 93 form,65 all of which are short of 
these provisions, Clause 8 (a) of the GENTIME form66 can still be criticised. 
The contractual parties necessarily take further time to research the accurate 
explanation of this point within the explanatory notes of this clause. If busy 
merchants do not further examine the explanatory notes of this clause, it is 
still possible for them to comprehend the payment for the time charter 
service on the basis of an applicable rate which is not consistent with the 
                                                          
59 (n 55). 
60 ibid. 
61 ibid. 
62 (n 57). 
63 Thomas (n 13) 286. 
64 Williams (n 15) 229. 
65 Brodie (n 53) 35. 
66 (n 55). 
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indication in the explanatory notes of this clause; this makes disputes 
between the contractual parties inevitable. 
 
Therefore, adding “original” to Line 181 of Clause 8 (a) of the GENTIME 
form67 is proposed to render the content in Lines 180 to 181 of this clause: ‘In 
the event that additional time charter service is payable in accordance with 
Clause 9 (d) of the GENTIME form68 such time charter service shall be 
based on the rate applicable at the original time of ending of the time charter 
service.’ In addition, if the option is also given to the time charterer to add the 
period of off-payment for the time charter service to the charter period 
through negotiation when the contractual parties choose the BALTIME 
form,69 the NYPE 46 form70 or the NYPE 93 form,71 the same 
recommendation of such a time charter service having to be on the basis of 
the rate applicable at the original time of ending of the time charter service to 
satisfy common practice is also suggested as being adopted within Clause 6 
of the BALTIME form,72 Clause 4 of the NYPE 46 form73 and Clause 10 of 
the NYPE 93 form.74 
 
Furthermore, in terms of computing a payment for the time charter service, it 
is asserted that unless clear intention to apply the local times is indicated by 
the contractual parties through the language held within the time 
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charterparty, the assumption in support of elapsed time as made in the 
decision of The Arctic Skou75 will rule the issue and this will possibly be 
applied in future cases.76 Therefore, to correctly compute the whole payment 
time for the time charter service under the time charterparty 77 and to avoid 
practical disputes,78 it has been suggested that the contractual parties must 
show their intention by expressing what the governing time is.79  
 
To indicate the governing time in the time charterparty in order to calculate 
the payment for the time charter service, the elapsed time is used as the 
governing time in accordance with the decision of The Arctic Skou.80  For the 
contractual parties, it is necessary to convert the local time of the beginning 
of the time charter service and ending of the time charter service to UTC 
(Universal Time Coordinated) because the beginning of the time charter 
service and ending of the time charter service might be in different time 
zones.81 It has already been found that the elapsed time has been applied in 
statements such as, “shall be adjusted to GMT” in Lines 137 to 138 of 
Clause 10 of the NYPE 93 form,82 and similarly in Lines 181 to 182 of Clause 
8 (a) of the GENTIME form, which provides that, ‘All calculation of hire shall 
be made by reference to UTC (Universal Time Coordinated)’.83  
 
                                                          
75 The Arctic Skou [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 478; Coghlin and others (n 1) para 14.2. 
76 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 14.4. 
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78 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 14.15. 
79.ibid. 
80 The Arctic Skou (n 75); Coghlin and others (n 1) para 14.2. 
81 ibid. 
82 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 14.5. 
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However, Clause 6 of the BALTIME form84 and Clause 5 of the NYPE 4685 
still lack an express provision regarding what the governing time is to 
calculate the whole time for the payment for the time charter service.  
Therefore, it is recommended to follow either Lines 137 to 138 of Clause 10 
of the NYPE 93 form86 or Lines 181 to 182 of Clause 8(a) of the GENTIME 
form87 and to clearly provide the elapsed time as the ruling time, to comply 
with the court decision in The Arctic Skou.88 This might facilitate preventing 
the argument’s reappearance as to whether or not the local time or the 
elapsed time will be applied when computing the whole time for the payment 
for the time charter service89 in the event that the shipowner and the time 
charterer still choose the BALTIME form90 or the NYPE 46 form91 as their 
agreement. 
 
 
5.3   Deduction 
 
A deduction from the time charter service provides a way for the time 
charterer to adjust his/her payment for the time charter service,92 such as 
deducting a claim for performance and speed from the payment of the time 
                                                          
84 Thomas (n 13) 286. 
85 Williams (n 15) 229. 
86 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 14.5; Brodie (n 53) 35. 
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charter service,93 or in the situation of failure to satisfy the other specific 
requirements of the vessel under the time charterparty,94 or for advances for 
disbursements on behalf of the shipowner under the time charter.95   
 
There are two circumstances that enable the time charterer to deduct from 
the time charter service payment if a reasonable assessment in good faith is 
made.96 One is when his/her right for deduction is clearly expressed within 
the time charterparty,97 for example, Lines 65 to 67 of Clause 5 of the NYPE 
46 form explicitly stipulate that the time charterer’s advances for the ordinary 
disbursement of the vessel at any port shall be deducted from the hire.98 
Another is the equitable right for the time charterer to set off under English 
law when there is no explicit stipulation in the time charterparty that allows 
the time charterer to deduct a particular sum from the payment for the time 
charter service.99  
 
The courts were formerly reluctant to permit a self-help remedy if there is no 
express right to deduct for the time charter service.100 It was held by 
Donaldson J. in The Satya Kamal that there is no normal equitable right of 
set-off for the time lost within an off-payment for the time charter service 
                                                          
93 London Arbitration 5/08 LMLN 739; Federal Commerce & Navigation Co. Ltd. v Molena 
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form; Clause 11 (d) of the NYPE 93 form. 
96 Federal Commerce & Navigation Co. Ltd. v Molena Alpha Inc. (The Nanfri, The Benfri, 
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clause under the time charterparty.101 In contrast, Parker J in The Teno 
believed that it would be manifestly unjust if the shipowner could retrieve the 
payment of the time charter service within the charter period but had 
breached the contract and did not supply the payable time charter service.102 
Consequently, the subsistence of the equitable right to set-off was supported 
by Parker J. and he believed that the time charterer had the right based on 
this equitable set-off to deduct from the future payment of the time charter 
service to include disbursements made on behalf of the shipowner during the 
off-payment for the time charter service period which had arisen from the 
breakdown of machinery on the vessel.103   
 
In addition, the majority of the Court of Appeal in The Nanfri104 also approved 
the decision in The Teno105 which applies the principle of equitable set-off to 
a time charterparty.106 It is indicated that there are three elements covered in 
the right of set-off in equity.107 Firstly, the claim and the cross claim must 
result from the same contract.108 Secondly, the cross claim must so directly 
connect with the claim.109 Thirdly, it would be manifestly unjust to allow the 
claim to be declared without concern for the cross claim.110 It is asserted that 
                                                          
101 Seven Seas Transportation v Atlantic Shipping (The Satya Kamal) [1975] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 
188; Wilson (n 17) 100. 
102 Compania Sud Americana de Vapores v Shipmair BV (The Teno) [1977] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 
289; Girvin (n 20) 654. 
103 The Teno (n 102); Wilson (n 43) 100. 
104 Federal Commerce & Navigation Co. Ltd. v Molena Alpha Inc. (The Nanfri) [1978] QB 
927 (CA). 
105 The Teno (n 102). 
106 Robert Gay, ‘How to Apply the Principle of Equitable Set-Off to Time-Charter Hire’ (2006) 
12 JIML 251. 
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under English law there are two conceptions which a time charterer can set 
off his/her cross claim against the payment of the time charter service if the 
cross claim meet the requirements either of the first conception, which is a 
shipowner’s deliberate refusal of providing the service of the vessel, or the 
second conception which is a shipowner’s breach of the time charterparty 
where the time charterer’s damages can be measured by the payment of the 
time charter service for a period.111  
 
The legal basis for The Nanfri112 is that the shipowner’s deliberate refusal to 
allow the time charterer use of the vessel is counted as the shipowner’s 
failing to provide the services of the vessel.113 A time charterer can therefore 
set off his/her cross claim against the payment of the time charter service. 
 
However, Lord Denning in The Nanfri also asserted that when the shipowner 
was in breach of the time charterparty and the consequence of such a 
breach was to wrongly prevent the time charterer from using the vessel, the 
charterer had the legal right to deduct an amount equal to the time so lost 
within the payment of the time charter service.114 Even though this aspect of 
the decision has not yet been re-examined by the House of Lords, it has 
been supported by Century Textiles & Industry Ltd. v Tomoe Shipping 
(Singapore) Pte Ltd. (The Aditya Vaibhav).115     
                                                          
111 Gay (n 106). 
112 The Nanfri (n 104). 
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Moreover, the court held in The Leon for the shipowner.116 The time 
charterer believed the bunker consumption of the ship might not have been 
warranted as they were entitled to and alleged that the shipowner had been 
improperly dealing with the fuel.117 Consequently the time charterers had a 
cross claim regarding their allegations, an entitlement to make an equitable 
set off from the payment of the time charter service.118 However, the court 
believed that the time charterer’s cross claim was not relevant to the use of 
the vessel nor did it prejudice his/her using the vessel and therefore decided 
that the time charterer’s allegation was unsuccessful and the time charterers 
did not have the legal right to an equitable set off.119 It is believed that the 
court’s decision is correct. Based on the principle of equitable set-off, the 
cross claim must be directly connected with the claim.120 However, in The 
Leon, bunkers are not part of the main time charter service regarding 
payment of the time charter service being payable.121 Therefore, the time 
charterers still use the time charter service and it is necessary for them to 
pay for the time charter service. Thus there are no grounds for the time 
charterer to assert an equitable set off from the payment of the time charter 
service.   
 
Similarly, The Li Hai122 dealt with the bunker cancellation fee. However, 
unlike The Leon, the court held for the time charterer.123  
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The fact of this case is that the time charterers concluded a time charterparty 
with the shipowners regarding a bulk carrier.124 The payment of the time 
charter service was due in advance and the shipowners could choose to 
withdraw the time charter service if the time charter was in default and 
subject to a clause in which 72 hours’ notice would be offered to the time 
charterers before exercising the choice.125 The time charterers deducted a 
payment from the time charter service regarding an anticipated seven days 
of dry docking and the time charterers also paid a USD 500 bunker 
cancellation fee.126 A pro-rated payment of USD 600 for cables and victualing 
was also made by the time charterers.127 However, the shipowners gave 
notice of withdrawal of the time charter service on the time charterers. The 
time charterers paid the amount previously refused for dry docking in order to 
not be withdrawn from the time charter service by the shipowners.128 
Notwithstanding, the time charterers did not pay the USD 500 bunker 
cancellation fee to the shipowners because the time charterers asserted that 
a sum was not considered as a precondition of not being withdrawn by the 
time charter service by the shipowner.129 Finally due to a deduction from the 
payment of the time charter service, the shipowners withdrew the time 
charter service.130   
 
The judgment including (1) the time charterers had no legal right to deduct 
for anticipated off-payment of the time charter service, short of a provision in 
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contrast, even if it was certain that the ship would be off-payment of the time 
charter service.131 In addition, there was no evidence to show that the time 
charterer actually suffered any loss or prejudice in their using the ship, the 
loss of the USD 500 bunker cancellation was too remote to the shipowner’s 
right to payment of the time charter service and both of them did not connect 
with each other.132 In terms of the pro-rate payment of USD 600, although 
the time charterparty did not provide the payment of the time charter service 
for the cables and victualing was paid 15 days in advance, this had been a 
long and unchanging practice between the contractual parties.133 If the time 
charterer wanted to disobey this practice they should have given notice to 
the shipowner.134 The time charterer would also not redesignate this payment 
expost facto.135 (2) Due to an off-payment of the time charter service, if the 
payment of the time charter service had been paid in advance and proved to 
have been overpaid, the time charterer had a legal right to recover an over-
payment of the time charter service for the consideration which was totally 
failed.136 However, this was unequal to no whole payment of the time charter 
service on the day of payment.137 Also the time charterer’s right to repayment 
did not begin until after the payment of the time charter service was due and 
payable.138 (3) The shipowners had never said that they would not try to 
withdraw the time charter service for inappropriately small deductions.139 The 
shipowners furthermore had threatened from time to time that they would 
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protect their position even though only a small deduction had been made.140 
(4) The notice had to be formal, in writing and had to clearly give notice to 
the time charterer that unless they corrected their failure to make payment 
for the time charter service within 72 hours, the time charter service would be 
withdrawn.141 It was significant that there was no ambiguity within the notice 
even though shipowners do not often need to put precisely how much the 
payment is in the notice.142 In this case, the notice created confusion and 
defectiveness. The shipowners breached the time charterparty in 
withdrawing the time charter service.143 
   
It was convinced by the judgment in The Li Hai.144 This is because the 
shipowners did not obey the requirements of a formal notice set up in the 
anti-technicality clause.145 The notice by the shipowner in this case did not 
give a clear ultimatum to the time charterer that the vessel would be 
withdrawn unless the payment of the time charter service was paid in full 
within 72 hours. Therefore it is believed that it was inappropriate to give the 
shipowner even more power. 
 
Nevertheless, the deduction from the time charter service should be a 
reasonable evaluation made in good faith, whether the deduction is based on 
an express clause under the time charterparty or equitable set-off.146 As Lord 
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Denning in The Nanfri indicated, although too large an amount came out as a 
result, which was deducted by the time charterer from the claim, a deduction 
for the time charter service which is reasonable and bona fide is still 
allowed.147 In this situation, the shipowner has no right to withdraw the time 
charter service148 but he/she could recover the sum which is over deducted 
by the time charterer.149 It is believed that this might be an applicable way to 
solve the issue because the time charterer’s payment for the time charter 
service should also enable him/her to efficiently use the time charter service 
to achieve his/her commercial aim. If the time charterer honestly deducts the 
payment for the time charter service, even though it is likely to be over, this 
situation is different from the requirement triggering the right of the shipowner 
to withdraw from the time charter service. It is therefore a reasonable and 
effective way to prevent the shipowner from withdrawing from the time 
charter service150 while enabling him/her to recover the sum which is over 
deducted by the time charterer. Subsequently, this approach by Lord 
Denning was adopted by the lower courts.151  
 
Moreover, the deduction for the time charter service is also restricted in other 
circumstances.152 The cross-claims for deducting payment for the time 
charter service have to closely connect with the shipowner’s claim for 
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payment for the time charter service during the time charter period or they 
must be driven by the same transaction.153 Therefore, other claims relevant 
to the time charterer’s unavailability to use the vessel154 or a claim for cargo 
damage resulting from the negligence of the Crew155 are not covered in the 
time charterer’s right for deduction.156 In addition, it is believed that, however 
certain the vessel is to be put in off-payment for the time charter service, the 
prospective period of off-payment for the time charter service cannot be 
allowed to be deducted from the payment for the time charter service in 
advance by the time charterer because the anticipated off-payment for the 
time charter service period has not actually occurred and is uncertain, which 
could result in arguments.157   
 
Furthermore, as held in The Marika M, which was chartered under the NYPE 
46 form, when the off-payment for the time charter service arose from 
running aground, even if the charterer’s time loss was caused by waiting for 
a berth, there was no allowance to deduct from the payment for the time 
charter service under “net time lost” within the off-time charter service 
clause158 after she had been once again refloated, even if the original 
grounding led to this direct result.159 However, it is worth mentioning that, in 
terms of this issue, such a time loss could likely be deducted under American 
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law.160 Net overall time lost as a consequence of any grounds listed within 
the “net time lost” clause under the time charterparty is likely permitted 
through the American courts and arbitrators.161   
 
Nonetheless, it may be reasonable for the view of English courts to be to 
refuse deduction in this situation since net overall time lost as a 
consequence of any of the particular causes listed under the time 
charterparty, such as the vessel waiting for a berth, is not the expressly 
specified situation for the deduction of payment for the time charter service 
under Clause 15 of the NYPE 46 form.162 In addition, this should be strictly 
construed in favour of the shipowner163 when the time charterer deducts a 
payment for the time charter service, which is the time charterer’s 
fundamental obligation164 under the time charter; because the time charterer 
seeks to cut down the shipowner’s right to payment for the time charter 
service.165 If the vessel had already been recovered in a working position 
from the off-payment for the time charter service and the time charterer 
therefore had been in a position to benefit from receiving the time charter 
service, to allow deductions for time loss extending subsequently to the 
vessel’s wait for a berth is likely too overly broad and not in balance with the 
concerns over the benefit and burden between both contractual parties. 
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In short, the time charterer’s right to deduct from the payment of the time 
charter service would be conferred in certain circumstances but this is still 
restricted in some aspects under English law. 
 
 
5.3.1   Reforming the deduction of the payment for the time charter 
service 
 
For the same reasons explained in Section 5.2.1 in this chapter, it is 
recommended to amend the wording “deduction of hire” to the precise 
wording, “deduction of the payment for the time charter service”. 
 
At present, it can be found that the time charterer’s rights for the deduction 
from the payment for the time charter service are provided separately within 
the standard forms of the time charterparty and this might render the 
organisation of the content of the time charterparty sub-optimal. For 
example, the time charterer’s rights to deduct from the payment for the time 
charter service, under the NYPE 46 form, regarding advances as to ordinary 
disbursements for the vessel at any port are provided in Clause 5.166 The 
extra expenses caused by the occurrences of the off-payment for the time 
charter service are provided in Clause 15 of the NYPE 46 form.167 Within the 
NYPE 93 form, advances as to the vessel’s ordinary disbursements at any 
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port are stipulated in Clause 11 (d).168 Also, the extra proven expense is set 
out in Clause 17 of the NYPE 93 form.169 In addition, under the GENTIME 
form, the expenditure incurred on behalf of the shipowner is provided in 
Clause 8 (d),170 while the advance funds are stipulated in Clause 13 (e) of 
the GENTIME form.171  
 
Even though the lawyer will possibly be involved in the reviewing of the draft 
of the time charterparty and it is possible for the contractual parties, the 
shipper men, not actually to read the content of the contract, for example, the 
view of House of Lords showing in the Starsin,172 the shipowner and the time 
charterer still “should” carefully read the standard form of contract prior to 
making a fixture. This is because the content of the clause within the time 
charterparty is deeply connected to the legal right and obligation of the 
contractual parties and they “should” carefully read the contents of the 
clauses within the time charterparty and be thoughtfully concerned about 
what is relevant to them within the contract. 
 
However, these separated provisions within the time charterparties do not 
make it easy for the contractual parties--the lay parties—to immediately 
grasp the information and to gain a clear picture of the time charterer’s 
different rights for deducting from the payment of the time charter service 
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under the time charterparty.173 Therefore, aiming to benefit the contractual 
parties by simplifying and reducing their reading burden by organising and 
associating separate information together, and to make it easier and clearer 
for contractual parties to understand their legal rights and obligations, it is 
recommended that the relevant provisions be organised together regarding 
the deduction of the payment of the time charter service and placed in an 
extra sub-clause of the payment for the time charter service under the time 
charterparty.  
 
Moreover, as mentioned in Section 5.3, the clearly expressed time 
charterer’s right for a deduction from the payment of the time charter service 
provided within the time charterparty is one way to be legally allowed to 
deduct from the payment for the time charter service if a reasonable 
assessment in good faith is made.174 
 
Thus, in order to avoid possible arguments before the court as to whether the 
time charterer has the equitable right to set off under English law when no 
explicit provision under the time charterparty exists,175 it is better for the 
contractual parties, the shipowner and the time charterer, to negotiate in 
advance on this matter. The result of their negotiation should be clearly 
provided regarding the other specific circumstances which also allow the 
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time charterer to deduct expenses or costs from their payment for the time 
charter service within an extra sub-clause of the payment for time charter 
service under the time charterparty. It is necessary to note, in the view of the 
court, that the deduction should also be based on a reasonable evaluation 
made in good faith.176 
 
If Clause 11 of the NYPE 93 form,177 for example, adopts the above 
suggestions to add an extra sub-clause, Clause 11 (e) of the NYPE 93 form, 
in order to organise relevant provisions of deduction from the payment of the 
time charter service together and to clearly express the “other specific 
circumstances”, which also allow the time charterer to deduct expenses or 
costs from their payment for the time charter service, it would become:  
 
The time charterer is entitled to deduct the payment for the time 
charter service under this Charter Party under the following 
circumstances: cash advance within (d) of this Clause and the cost 
and all extra proven expenses caused within Clause 17 and the other 
circumstances, such as _____, ___, and ____.  
 
A similar approach could be likewise followed for the BALTIME form,178 the 
NYPE 46 form179 and the GENTIME form180 when they are chosen and 
modified by the contractual parties or updated the version in the future. 
                                                          
176 The Nanfri (n 104).   
177 Brodie (n 53) 35-36. 
178 Thomas (n 13) 286-89. 
177 
 
Furthermore, for the purposes of making the time charterer’s different rights 
for the deduction from the payment of the time charter service which occur in 
individual provisions under the time charterparty quickly and obviously 
noticeable, it is also proposed that the relevant information be combined 
together into one Box Layout to highlight those differently allowed situations 
for the time charterer to deduct from the payment of the time charter service 
under the time charterparty. For instance, if the NYPE 93 form181 adopts the 
aforementioned proposal to set up the Box Layout in Part 1, one box titled 
“deduction” is suggested and it is recommended that it be divided into 
several columns. For example, the columns of the Box layout can be divided 
into Clause 11 (d),182 Clause 17183 and “the other circumstances”. The 
separate columns of Clause 11 (d)184 and Clause 17185 are for the 
contractual parties to negotiate then denote whether or not they still agree to 
keep the time charterer’s right for deduction from the payment of the time 
charter service within the NYPE 93 form186 (i.e., if the contractual parties 
negotiate to delete either of these clauses, they do not need to select either 
of these clauses under the NYPE 93 form187). In addition, “the other 
circumstances” are for the contractual parties to fill in newly added clause 
numbers or newly added sub-clause numbers. Similarly these highlights—for 
the varying circumstances which allow for deductions from the payment of 
the time charter service under the time charterparty—within the Box Layout, 
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are also suggested for use in the other essential standard forms relating to 
time charterparties.  
 
 
5.4    Withdrawing the time charter service and suspension 
 
Under common law, a shipowner is not allowed to withdraw from the time 
charter service (withdraw the vessel)188 when the time charterer fails to pay 
for the time charter service by the due date.189 The shipowner has a right190 
to safeguard withdrawing the vessel, the Master, Officers and Crew from the 
time charter service, to end the time charterparty, only under the express 
withdrawal clause under the time charterparty if the time charterer is in 
default by failure to pay the instalment of payment of the time charter 
service191 or does not pay for the time charter service punctually by the due 
date, or when too little an amount of payment of the time charter service is 
paid by the due date.192 In addition, the shipowner can withdraw the time 
charter service for reasons other than the non-payment of the time charter 
service under the time charterparty.193 
                                                          
188 A change to these wordings is suggested. See Section 5.4.3. 
189 Christopher Hill, Maritime Law (6th edn Informa Professional 2003) 205. 
190 Simon Baughen, ‘ Case and Comment Withdrawal with Cargo Still on Board’ [2012] 
LMCLQ 343. 
191 Girvin (n 20) 658. 
192 Baatz (n 3). 
193 For example, Clause 5 of the NYPE 46 form provides “or on any breach of this Charter 
Party” and this entitles the shipowner to withdraw the vessel for non-payment for the time 
charter service. In addition, Lord Diplock in The Antaios (No 2) agreed with the award of the 
arbitrators and he construed that “or on any breach of this Charter Party” within Clause 5 of 
the NTPE 46 merely applies to repudiatory breaches rather than any breach however trivial. 
In other words, it refers to a fundamental breach of an innominate term or breach of a term 
which explicitly indicates it to be a condition, such as granting the shipowner the right to 
179 
 
However, if the shipowner waives his/her right for the remedy of the time 
charterer’s breach of payment for the time charter service on time, he/she 
will lose his/her right to withdraw the time charter service under the time 
charterparty.194 Establishing the shipowner’s conduct, which is treated as the 
waiver of his/her right to withdraw, should be equal to a clear and indubitable 
indication of his/her acceptance of a late payment for the time charter service 
as equivalent to being paid punctually, or as the time charterer being 
reasonably convinced of his/her delay of the payment for the time charter 
service as being accepted by the shipowner’s delay in declining to take the 
payment for the time charter service.195 
 
Nonetheless, when the shipowner exercises the right to withdraw the time 
charter service, the legal effect is that the time charterparty is terminated196 
and both contractual parties will not need to continue to perform their legal 
obligations under the time charterparty.197 Therefore, if the shipowner 
exercises further services demanded by the time charterer, after a valid 
withdrawal of the time charter service by the shipowner, the shipowner has 
                                                                                                                                                                    
choose to regard the charterparty as wrongfully repudiated by the time charterer. Antaios 
Compania Naviera S.A. v Salen Rederierna A.B (The Antaios (No 2)) [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 
235 [238] (Lord Diplock); Martin Davies and Anthony Dickey, Shipping Law (3rd edn, 
Lawbook Co 2004) 396. 
194 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 16.98. 
195 Wilson (n 17) 103. 
196 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 16.86; It is arguable whether the obligation of the time 
charterer’s payment for the time charter service punctually is under condition or intermediate 
terms. It is asserted by Lord Diplock in The Afovos that The shipowners are entitled to 
regard the time charterers’ breaching their primary obligation to make punctual payment for 
time charter service of an instalment under Clause 5 of the NYPE 46 form as a breach of 
condition. However, it is believed that the better opinion regarding the nature of the time 
charterer’s obligation to pay for time charter service under the time charterparty is an 
intermediate term. Nonetheless, this uncertain issue will wait on the House of Lords to give 
the issue a clear indication. Afovos Shipping Co. S.A v R. Pagnan & F.Lli (The Afovos) 
[1983] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 335 [341]; Coghlin and others (n 1) para 16.130, 16.132. 
197 D. Rhidian Thomas, ‘The charterparty hire: Issues Relating to Contractual Remedies for 
Default and Off-hire Clauses’ in Thomas (n 13); Baatz (n 3). 
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the legal right to be remunerated198 for those services within a new 
contract.199 It may have occurred at the time of termination of the time 
charterparty by the shipowner, during the vessel’s voyage of her carrying 
cargo for third parties.200 Under this circumstance, if the bills of lading are 
issued by the shipowner, he/she still has legal obligation to carry the cargo to 
the destination.201 Then the shipowner is entitled to recover the freight fee 
from the shipper unless the freight has already been paid to the time 
charterer or the agent of the time charterer, or the pre-paid freight is marked 
by the bills.202 On the other hand, if the bills of lading are issued by the time 
charterer, the duty of the shipowner is as a bailee to take reasonable care of 
the cargo and to carry it to the destination under the bills.203 In addition, a 
quantum meruit, on the basis of those further services after a withdrawal of 
                                                          
198 Robert Goff J in The Tropwind (No 2) [1981] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 45 [53] indicated that the 
shipowners were entitled to remuneration for the charter service at the current market rate. 
Coghlin and others (n 1) para 16.111. 
199 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 16.111. 
200 The USA courts have a different approach. If it is during the vessel’s voyage of carrying 
the cargo, the shipowner’s notice of withdrawal of the vessel with the cargo on board cannot 
be effective until the voyage is fulfilled and the cargo is discharged. For example, 
Luckenbach v Pierson, 229 F 130 (2nd Cir.1915); Schirmer Stevedoring Co. Ltd. v Seaboard 
Stevedoring Corp. 306, F 2d 188 (9th Cir. 1962); Ocean Cargo Lines Ltd. v North Atlantic 
Marine Co. 227 F Supp 872 [881] (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Diana Co. Maritime S.A of Panama v 
Subfreights of S.S. Admiralty Flyer, 280 F Supp 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).See Davies and Dickey 
(n 193) 397, footnote 403. In addition, if there is no third party involved, such as The Kos, 
due to non-payment for the time charter service, the shipowner has lawfully withdrawn the 
time charter service under the SHELLTIME 3 form. It was in the fact the shipowner 
discharged the cargo in its own time and expense. This detained the vessel in Brazil for 2.64 
days. It was held by the Supreme Court that this was not the risk that the shipowner had 
assumed under the time charterparty and the shipowner therefore was on the basis of the 
indemnity clause entitled to market rate of payment for the time charter service and the 
value of the bunkers consumed during the 2.64 days. However, the shipowner was also 
entitled under common law as a non-contractual bailee of cargo (the law of bailment) after 
the withdrawal of the time charter service. Nonetheless, it seems likely that the shipowner 
can be compensated for actual loss which covers any opportunity cost. ENE 1 Kos Ltd. v 
Petroleo Brasileiro S.A Petrobras (The Kos) [2012] 2 WLR 976 [17]; Alvin W.L and Ken T.C. 
Lee, ‘Recovering Post-Withdrawal Costs: Indemnity Clause, Bailment and Unjust 
Enrichment’ [2012] 6 JBL 549. 
201 ibid. 
202 Ngo Chew Hong Edible Oils Pte Ltd.  v Scandia Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. (The 
Jalamohan) [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 443. See Christopher Smith, ‘Time Charters’ in Eder and 
others (n 39) 356. 
203 Smith (n 39). 
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the time charter service, may be claimed by the shipowner if the freight under 
the bills has not been prepaid.204 Alternatively, in this circumstance, if the 
shipowner and the time charterer already have an agreement in advance 
regarding the shipowner being indemnified from the time charterer, or to 
make the shipowner entitled to remuneration in restitution or a contract for 
supplying this consequently post-withdrawal time charter service for the 
shipper, the shipowner could rely on those rights to recover his/her 
consequent expenses.205 
 
Even though the obligation of payment for the time charter service on time 
under the time charterparty is absolute, it is not necessary to establish 
negligence or deliberate non-performance in executing the time charterparty 
to establish default if this payment obligation is delayed.206 This seems to be 
too harsh towards the time charterer since the time charterer may be abused 
by the shipowner207 as the time charterer may suffer significant losses 
through a small fault of their own or their bankers.208 In addition, when the 
charter market rate rises, the shipowner may take advantage of the time 
charterer’s delay by even one minute to terminate the time charterparty in 
order to charter his/her vessel to another at a higher rate209 or simply to put 
pressure on the time charterer in order to make him/her agree to pay a 
higher market rate in the future or face the risk of the vessel being 
                                                          
204 ibid. 
205 Thomas (n 197). 
206 Tankexpress A/S v Compagnie Financière Belge des Pétroles S.A [1948] 82 LlL Rep 43 
[51]; Coghlin and others (n 1) para 16.73. 
207 (n 89).  
208 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 16.87. 
209 Thomas (n 197).  
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withdrawn.210 These aforementioned situations may result in unfairness to 
the time charterer.211 
 
Thus, for the purposes of diminishing the harsh impact of withdrawal of the 
time charter service by the shipowner, Lord Simon in The Laconia was 
concerned about the use of equitable relief against forfeiture, which is a 
power evolved to reduce the harsh impact of the forfeiture clauses within the 
leases of the land.212 But the House of Lords in The Scaptrade affirmed the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal and decided that equitable relief is not 
granted in any jurisdiction if the time chartered service is withdrawn by the 
shipowner.213 To aim to solve this issue in light of the strictness and 
disadvantages to the time charterer’s position, the following anti-technicality 
clause is designed to adjust the legal relationship between the shipowner 
and the time charterer in order to avoid all the circumstances which are too 
harsh towards the time charterer.214  
 
 
5.4.1    An anti-technicality clause 
 
An anti-technicality clause is intended to alter the strictness of the withdrawal 
clause under the time charterparty.215 The grounds for drafting the anti-
                                                          
210 Tropwood AG of Zug v Jade Enterprises Ltd. (The Tropwind No 2) [1982] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 
232 (CA) [234] (Lord Denning MR); Girvin (n 20) 656. 
211 Thomas (n 197). 
212 The Laconia (n 17); Coghlin and others (n 1) para 16.87. 
213 The Scaptrade [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 253; Coghlin and others (n 1) para 16.87. 
214 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 16.90. 
215 ibid. 
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technicality clause is as Lord Denning in The Rio Sun indicated, to give the 
time charterers a chance to remedy their breach before they are put at risk of 
losing their charter.216 Another reason for making this clause is because it is 
possible for times to vary between various countries and for the working 
customs of the accountants and bankers also to vary, affecting when the time 
charterer transfers the funds (payment of the time charter service) to the 
shipowner.217 In addition, it is believed that this clause is a fair method for the 
time charterer to avoid withdrawal of the time charter service by the 
shipowner for trifling delays in the circumstance where there is no sign of an 
enduring “final” failure to pay for the time charter service by the time 
charterer.218  
 
As shown in The Afovos, an anti-technicality clause is legally allowed to be 
covered in the time charterparty in order to effectively and clearly prevent the 
withdrawal of the time charter service by the shipowner and protect the time 
charterer.219 A grace period is supplied under this clause to allow the time 
charterer to perform his/her obligation for the payment for the time charter 
service before the shipowner exercises his/her right for the withdrawal of the 
time charter service.220 If the time charterer pays during the specific grace 
period provided under the anti-technicality clause, this late payment for the 
time charter service is still equivalent to “regular and punctual” payment for 
                                                          
216 Italmare Shipping Co. v Ocean Tanker Co. Inc. (The Rio Sun) [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 489 
(CA) [496]; Girvin (n 20) 656.  
217 Girvin (n 20) 656. 
218 Explanatory notes to NYPE 93. See (n 89). 
219 The Afovos (n 196); Baatz (n 3). 
220 Shipping Law (n 10) 144. 
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the time charter service under the time charterparty.221 
 
Unless an explicit period of notice has been stipulated under the anti-
technicality clause222 within the time charterparty,223 a notice of the 
withdrawal of the time charter service has to be given by the shipowner and 
be received by the time charterer224 within reasonable time of the default of 
the time charterer.225 However, the notice of withdrawal of the time charter 
service must not be sent to the time charterer until after midnight on the 
expiry date of the payment of the time charter service otherwise the notice is 
improper.226 In addition, normally the shortest necessary time is regarded as 
reasonable but what is reasonable time relies on the facts of the situation in 
the individual case.227 However, “what is a reasonable time” could be 
criticised as being different and arguable within the minds of the shipowner 
and time charterer as well as increasing commercial uncertainty in the 
course of business dealings.228 Thus it might be ideal to negotiate the exact 
specific time period in the contract in advance and subsequently provide the 
result for the time of notice within an anti-technicality clause. 
 
Moreover, It is also indicated, as in The Li Hai, that the wording of the notice 
under the anti-technicality clause has to be in the form of a clear ultimatum to 
                                                          
221 Girvin (n 20) 656. 
222 See the explanation of this clause below.  
223 Davies and Dickey (n 193) 394. 
224 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 16.84. 
225 Mardorf Peach & Co. Ltd. v Attica Sea Carriers Corporation of Liberia [1977] AC 850 
[872] (Lord Wilberforce); Davies and Dickey (n 193) 394. 
226 The Afovos (n 196); Coghlin and others (n 1) para 16.92; Shipping Law (n 10) 144. 
227 As held in Gatoil Anstalt v Omennial Ltd. (The Balder London) [1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 489, 
it is not unreasonable in these situations for there to be a delay of three days and 18 hours 
between the time charterer’s default and the notice of withdrawal of the time charter service. 
228 Certainty of terms is one of the important doctrines in current contract law. 
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show that if the payment for the time charter service is overdue and the 
payment for the time charter service is not paid during the particular grace 
period, the time charter service will be withdrawn by the shipowner.229  A 48-
hour or 72-hour notice period is frequently required for the shipowner to give 
to the dry cargo time charterer between the time charterer’s default of 
payment for the time charter service and the withdrawal of the time charter 
service by the shipowner.230 In addition, the obvious notice of withdrawal of 
the time charter service has to be provided to the charterer or his/her 
agent.231 Giving this notice of the withdrawal of the time charter service to the 
Master is regarded as insufficient.232 Even though the NYPE 46 form233 and 
the BALTIME form234 do not provide printed anti-technicality clauses, the 
typescript of anti-technicality clauses is often added by the parties.235  
 
Furthermore, it is necessary to note that the shipowner is also still entitled to 
safeguards by withdrawing the time charter service if any abuse or 
continuing misuse of the grace period anti-technicality clauses has been 
made by the time charterer.236 
 
 
                                                          
229 The Li Hai (n 122); Schelde Delta Shipping BV v Astarte Shipping Ltd. (The Pamela) 
[1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 249; Baatz (n 3). 
230 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 16.90. 
231 The Laconia (n 17); Wilson (n 17) 103. 
232 The Georgios C [1971] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 7 [14]; Wilson (n 17) 103. 
233 Williams (n 15) 228-231. 
234 Thomas (n 13) 286-89. 
235 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 16.90. 
236 (n 89). 
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5.4.2    The shipowner’s right to suspend the performance of their 
obligation 
 
It is worth mentioning that the shipowner also has the right to 
suspend/withhold the performance of any and all of his/her obligations under 
the time charterparty if the payment for the time charter service remains 
unpaid after the grace period.237 This can be found within Clause 11 of the 
NYPE 93 form238 and Clause 8 (c) of the GENTIME form.239 
 
In addition, the legal effect of the shipowner’s right to suspend the time 
charter service temporarily cancels the performance of all contractually 
provided obligations of the shipowner without any possibility of subsequent 
legal liabilities arising within the time charterparty.240 The shipowner is not 
therefore in breach of a time charterparty and the time charter has no 
remedy from this.241 Because the contract still exists and is valid, the time 
charterer has to pay for the time charter service covered in his/her legal 
obligations within the time charterparty.242 The time charterer also needs to 
take responsibility for the contractual indemnity resulting from the shipowner 
suspending the time charter service243 and take into account any additional 
expenses caused by such a suspension if these agreements have already 
been provided under the time charterparty.244 For example, if the bills of 
                                                          
237 Thomas (n 197) 128. 
238 Line 154 to 155 of Clause 11 (a) of the NYPE 93 form. 
239 Line 201 to 202 of Clause 8 (c) of the GENTIME form. 
240 Thomas (n 197); (n 57). 
241 ibid. 
242 ibid. 
243 Thomas (n 197).  
244 See Line 157 to 158 of Clause 11 (a) of the NYPE 93 form and Line 205 to 206 of Clause 
8 (c) of the GENTIME form. 
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lading are issued by the shipowner, the shipowner has a legal obligation to 
perform his/her legal obligation for carrying the shipper’s goods to the 
destination under the bills of lading contract.245 However, if the shipowner 
suspends the time charter service then possibly he/she might be subject to a 
claim for remedy by the shipper because the shipowner has breached the 
bills of lading contract and the shipowner therefore could be indemnified by 
this consequence from the time charterer based on this provision under the 
time charterparty.246  
 
Even if the shipowner has been safeguarded by the aforementioned right to 
suspend the time charter service under the time charter service, his/her right 
to withdraw the time charter service under the time charterparty is not 
hindered.247  
 
 
5.4.3    Reforming the withdrawal of the time charter service and 
suspension 
 
As Lord Porter indicated in Tankexpress A/S 248 the phraseology in the time 
                                                          
245 This carrier’s obligation could normally be seen in the bills of lading. For example, it is 
stipulated in Clause 6 of CONLINEBILL that ‘…the carrier shall be at liability to carry the 
goods to their port of destination by the said vessel or vessels either belonging to the Carrier 
or others, or by other means of transport, pro-vessel’s arrival there.’ Nicholas Gaskell, 
Regina Asariotis and Yvonne Baatz, Bills of Lading: Law and Contracts (LLP Professional 
Publishing 2000) para 7.4; 778. 
246 If the time charterer is not credit worthy, there might be a risk for the shipowner. Thus, it 
is suggested that the shipowners should never exercise the suspension of the time charter 
service before consulting their insurance supplier. Explanatory notes to GENTIME form. See 
(n 55); Thomas (n 197). 
247 Thomas (n 197). 
248 Tankexpress A/S v Compagnie Financière Belge des Pétroles S.A [1949] AC 76 [90]. 
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charterparty is illusory,249 he also asserted that the ship is not leased or 
withdrawn.250 In addition, “withdrawal of the vessel” means that the time 
charter service is not offered.251 Thus it is doubtful whether the wordings “the 
right to withdrawing the vessel from the service of the Charterers”252 and “the 
right to withdraw the vessel”253 provided in the essential standard forms of 
the time charterparty254 are precise enough. The legal meaning of the 
contents is not complete because not only has the vessel been withdrawn 
from the time charter, the Master, Officers and Crew have also been 
withdrawn,255  meaning that the entire time charter service is withdrawn by 
the shipowner.256 Moreover, the wording, “withdraw the Vessel from the 
service of the Charterers” is also no different from the wording within Lines 
780-781 of Clause 28 of the BIMCO BARECON 2001 form, a standard form 
of the demise charter.257 It is therefore believed that this might be a result of 
the legal concepts of the demise charter and the time charter being mixed 
together. In addition, this brings uncertainty into the terms of the contract 
because different merchants might construe various meanings regarding 
those wordings which do not actually show the unique features of the time 
charter and the real ambit of withdrawal of the time charter service.  
 
Even in the standard form of the time charterparty, such as the GENTIME 
                                                          
249 ibid. 
250 ibid. 
251 ibid. 
252 Such as Clause 6 of the BALTIME form, Clause 5 of the NYPE 46 form and Clause 11 of 
the NYPE 93 form. 
253 For example, Line 187 to 188 of Clause 8 (c) of the GENTIME form. 
254 Such as NYPE 93 form and GENTIME form. 
255 Thomas (n 197).  
256 Tankexpress A/S v Compagnie Financière Belge des Pétroles (n 248) [90]. 
257 ‘The Owners shall be entitled to withdraw the Vessel from the service of the Charterers 
and terminate the Charter with immediate effect by written notice to Charterers…’ See Mark 
Davis, Bareboat Charters (2nd edn, Informa Professional 2005) 259. 
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form,258 a recent form, the wording within the withdrawal clause is still 
inaccurate and confusing. The wording within the withdrawal clause under 
the GENTIME form does not show the real ambit of withdrawal of the time 
charter service, i.e. withdraw the vessel, the Master, Officers and Crew. It 
can only be seen as ‘…the Owner shall have the right to withdraw the 
Vessel…’  in Lines 187 to188;259 and ‘.., shall entitle the Owner to withdraw 
the Vessel…’ in Lines 197 to 198  within Clause 8 (c) of the GENTIME 
form.260 
 
Therefore, it is proposed to modify the inaccurate wording in those relevant 
clauses under the time charterparty and to use the precise wording “withdraw 
the time charter service” and “the right to withdraw the time charter service” 
in the essential standard forms of time charterparty261 to make the terms of 
the contract more precise, and the meaning of the terms of the contract more 
clear, certain, and complete.  
 
A further criticism is that it is not easy to read and follow clause 8 (c) of the 
GENTIME form262 and it is not an adequate draft of this clause because all 
the different sub-paragraphs are not clearly presented. Lacking a separate 
sub-heading might make it difficult for the merchants to clearly grasp and 
distinguish the key information within the different sub-paragraphs under 
                                                          
258 (n 57). 
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261 Such as Line 188 and Lines 197-98 of the GENTIME form. 
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Clause 8 (c) of the GENTIME form.263  
 
Therefore, it is suggested to clearly divide  8(c) of the GENTIME clause264 
into three sub-paragraphs by way of adding the underlined sub-heading of  
“(1) Withdrawal of the Time Charter Service” to the first paragraph of 8 (c) of 
the GENTIME form;265 and “(2) Grace Period” to the second paragraph of 8 
(c) of the GENTIME form,266 meaning the anti-technicality clause. In addition, 
the sub-heading of “(3) Suspend the Performance of the Owners’ Obligation” 
is to be added to the third paragraph of 8 (c) of the GENTIME form.267  
 
Moreover, as mentioned in Section 5.4, the shipowner can also withdraw the 
time charter service based on grounds other than the non-payment of the 
time charter service within the time charterparty.268 However, it should be 
subject to the construction by the House of Lords in The Antaios (No 2)269 
which interpreted the meaning of “or on any breach of this Charter Party” as 
only indicating the time charterer’s repudiatory breaches rather than any 
breach however trivial under Line 61 of Clause 5 of the NYPE 46 form.270 
Furthermore, Line 150 of Clause 11 (a) of the NYPE 93 form271 has adopted 
this construction by the House of Lords272 in The Antaios (No 2) so that the 
                                                          
263 ibid. 
264 ibid. 
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268 For instance, Clause 5 of the NYPE 46 form and Clause 11 (a) of the NYPE 93 form. 
269 The Antaios (No 2) (n 193); Coghlin and others (n 1) para 16.126. 
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content in this Clause is modified to “or any fundamental breach whatsoever 
of this Charter Party”.273 
 
The advantage of this modification within Line 150 of Clause 11 (a) of NYPE 
93 form274 is to make the content under this clause clearer and better thought 
out since it enables the content to fully present the view of the court275 and 
allows the contractual parties to clearly recognise that the requirement of the 
other reason for withdrawal of the time charter service by the shipowner is 
necessarily restricted only to the time charterer’s fundamental breach of the 
time charterparty.276 Therefore, it is suggested that if the contractual parties 
still insist on selecting the NYPE 46 form277 as their form of time charterparty, 
it should follow exactly the content mentioned in Line 150 of Clause 11 (a) of 
NYPE 93 form,278 “or any fundamental breach whatsoever of this Charter 
Party”. Adding this into Line 61 of Clause 5 of the NYPE 46 form279 may be 
ideal for its practical applicability280 and this may also be the best way of 
making the contents of this clause unambiguous.  
 
The same suggestion will apply to Clause 6 of the BALTIME form281 and 
Clause 8 (c) of the GENTIME form282 if the contractual parties choose these 
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277 Williams (n 15) 228-31. 
278 Brodie (n 53) 36. 
279 Williams (n 15) 229. 
280 The Antaios (No 2) (n 193). 
281 Thomas (n 13) 286. 
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forms and negotiate as well as agreeing to allow the shipowner to have the 
right to withdraw the time charter service when the time charterer 
fundamentally breaches the contract.283 The clear language “or any 
fundamental breach whatsoever of this Charter Party”,284 is also 
recommended for use in these clauses. 
 
In addition, adding the legal effect into the withdrawal provision in the time 
charterparty is suggested to enable merchants to fully appreciate the real 
legal consequences of withdraw the time charter service since the merchant 
might not recognise or predict the legal consequences of those wordings 
when they look at the legal terminology. This approach also can be seen in 
the draft of Line 781 of Clause 28 of the BIMCO BARECON 2001 form.285 
Thus, in order to make the legal result predictable by the contractual parties, 
it might be advisable to modify the relevant clauses and to provide that the 
“Owner shall be entitled to withdraw the time charter service and terminate 
the time charter” under these essential standard forms of the time 
charterparty. 
 
It might also be ideal for the contractual parties to manage any possible risk 
regarding the consequent post-withdrawal time charter service for the third 
party, the shipper, in advance. It might be, therefore, an applicable method to 
suggest that the withdrawal clause under these essential standard forms of 
time charterparty clearly express that the shipowner could be indemnified 
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from the time charterer for providing this consequent post-withdrawal time 
charter service for the shipper, in order to recover his/her consequent 
expenses.286 
 
Furthermore, Lord Denning asserted in The Rio Sun that unambiguous and 
clear content giving the time charterer an ultimatum under an anti-technicality 
clause is required.287 The time charterer should be given notice that he/she 
has not yet paid the correct payment of the time charter service.288 In 
addition, the time charterer also needs to clearly be informed beyond any 
doubt that unless he/she makes the payment of the time charter service 
within specific hours, the grace period, the shipowner will withdraw the time 
charter service.289 It can be found that Clause 11 (b) of the NYPE 93 form,290 
the second paragraph of Clause 8 (c) of the GENTIME form291 and Clause 9 
(a) of SHELLTIME 4292 exemplify the anti-technicality clause under the time 
charterparty. These clauses have already included the significant content of a 
typical anti-technicality clause as Lord Denning asserted in The Rio Sun.293 
However, it can be seen that there is no anti-technicality clause within the 
BALTIME form294 or the NYPE 46 form.295 For the purposes of preventing too 
harsh an outcome for the time charterer,296 it is recommended to add an anti-
technicality clause, such as that included in the second paragraph of Clause 
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294 Thomas (n 13) 286-89. 
295 Williams (n 15). 
296 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 16.90. 
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8 (c) of the GENTIME form,297 and the cover heading “Grace Period”, in the 
BALTIME form298 and the NYPE 46 form,299 to give the time charterer a 
grace period to pay for the time charter service. In addition, it is also 
suggested that the contractual parties negotiate in advance and clearly 
provide in these essential standard forms of the time charterparties300 that 
the shipowner shall give the time charterer written notice of the number of 
clear banking days for rectifying the failure of payment for the time charter 
service within specific hours of the time charter’s default.301 It is also effective 
to add an extra Box in Part 1 Box Layout of these standard forms of the time 
charterparty302 for filling in this specific notice period in order to draw the 
contractual parties’ attention to it. These changes might be ideal in making 
the time charterparty more thoughtful and complete if the contractual parties 
still choose the essential forms as their standard form of time charterparty.  
 
In addition, it is also suggested that “Grace Period” as has been addressed 
in the Part 1 Box Layout of the GNETIME form303 and the BALTIME form304 
should also be added to the Part 1 Box Layout which has been 
recommended for adoption by the essential standard forms of the time 
charterparties, such as the NYPE 46 form305 and NYPE 93 form.306 This 
would exercise the function of the Box Layout for clearly and quickly 
                                                          
297 (n 57). 
298 Thomas (n 13) 286-89. 
299 Williams (n 15) 228-31. 
300 Such as Clause 6 of the BALTIME form, Clause 5 of the NYPE 46 form, Clause 11 of the 
NYPE 93 form, and Clause 8 (c) of the GENTIME form. 
301 The Afovos (n 196); Shipping Law (n 10) 144. 
302 To add the Box Layout in the essential used standard forms of the time charterparties 
has been recommended in Section 2.6.4 of Chapter 2. 
303 (n 57). 
304 Thomas (n 13) 286-89. 
305 Williams (n 15) 228-31. 
306 Brodie (n 53) 32-46. 
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reminding the contractual parties how long the agreed grace period is. 
 
It is also worth noting that it is more reasonable to require that the time 
charterer correct his/her default of payment for the time charter service 
during the normal banking days, ie, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and 
Holidays.307 Thus adding “Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays excluded”308 is 
also proposed to make the content within the grace period under the anti-
technicality clause of  the BALTIME form,309 the NYPE 46 form310 and the 
GENTIME form311 more thoughtful. 
 
Finally, it is also recommended that the other essential standard forms of 
time charterparty312 could also adopt the provision regarding the shipowner’s 
suspension of his/her performance of any and all of his/her obligations in 
Lines 200 to 206 of the third paragraph of Clause 8 (c) of the GENTIME 
form313 to ensure that the shipowner has a temporary and effective weapon 
to protect himself/herself against the time charterer’s default in payment of 
the time charter service before the shipowner finally decides to 
permanently314 withdraw the time charter service.315  
 
                                                          
307 It can be seen in the example to exclude Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays for the time 
charterer to rectify his default of payment for the time charter service under the anti-
technicality clauses in The Afovos (n 196); The Pamela (n 229). 
308 The normal banking days might differ depending on countries. The contractual parties 
could negotiate these exclusions and change this. 
309 Thomas (n 13) 286-89. 
310 Williams (n 15) 228-31. 
311 (n 57).  
312 Such as BALTIME form and NYPE 46 form. 
313 ibid. 
314 Wilson (n 17) 107. 
315 Thomas (n 197). 
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In addition, if an event which prevents the full working of the vessel has 
arisen as a result of the time charterer’s responsibility or his/her breach, 
he/she could likely not rely on the off-payment for the time charter service 
clause to stop his/her obligation of payment for the time charter service.316 
Hence, due to the time charterer’s default on payment for the time charter 
service, even if there is a suspension in the performance of any and all 
obligations by the shipowner, and this results in the Master, Officers and/or 
Crew refusing to perform services when required, there is no issue of the 
vessel putting in an off-payment for the time charter service under 9(a) (ii)317 
of the GENTIME form.318 Therefore, “Notwithstanding the provisions of 9(a) 
(ii)”,319 to be set out before the rest of the contents regarding the time 
charterer still needing to continue to pay for the time charter service and to 
take responsibility for any additional expenses caused by such a suspension 
in the third paragraph of Clause 8 (c) of the GENTIME form,320 allows the 
whole meaning in Lines 200 to 206 within the third paragraph of Clause 8 (c) 
of the GENTIME form321 to become more thoughtful and consistent with the 
theory of an off-payment for the time charter service.322 This is an 
improvement on Lines 154 to 158 of Clause 11 of the NYPE 93 form which 
also provide for the shipowner’s right to suspend performance of any and all 
                                                          
316 See the discussion in Section 5.5.3. 
317 Clause 9 (a) (ii) of the GENTIME form provides ‘any deficiency of the Master, Officers 
and/or Crew, including the failure or refusal or inability of the Master, Officers and/or Crew to 
perform services when required.’ 
318 Thomas (n 197). 
319 (n 57). 
320 The third paragraph of Clause 8 (c) of the GENTIME form provides that ‘Further, at any 
time after the period stated in Box 26, as long as hire remains unpaid, the Owners shall, 
without prejudice to their right to withdraw, be entitled to suspend the performance of any all 
of their obligations hereunder and shall have no responsibility whatsoever for any 
consequences thereof in respect of which the Charterers hereby agree to indemnify the 
Owners. Notwithstanding the provisions of Clause 9 (a) (ii), hire shall continue to accrue and 
any extra expensed resulting from such suspension shall be for the Charterer’s account.’ 
321 (n 57). 
322 See Section 5.4.3. 
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obligations323 but lack this sentence.324 Thus it is also suggested that Line 
156 of Clause 11 of the NYPE 93 form325 follows the spirit of Lines 204 to 
205 of the third paragraph of Clause 8 (c) of the GENTIME form326 by adding 
the sentence, ‘Notwithstanding the event of loss of time from default of 
Officers or Crew, provided in Line 220 of Clause 17’327 in the content of the 
provisions of Line 156 of Clause 11 of the NYPE 93 form.328  
 
 
5.5   Off-payment for the time charter service clause  
 
One of the primary obligations of the time charterer329 is that he/she must 
pay for the time charter service when he/she uses the vessel under the 
service of the time charter once the shipowner supplies the vessel, the 
Master, Officers and Crew that can work efficiently.330 However, the off-
payment time charter service (off-hire clause)331 is also normally set out in 
the time charterparty332 to give the time charterer the allowances for not 
                                                          
323 Brodie (n 53) 36. 
324 “Notwithstanding the provisions of 9 (a) (ii)”. 
325 Brodie (n 53) 36.  
326 (n 57). 
327 This would be in the same spirit of the content of Lines 227 to 228 of Clause 9 (a) (ii) of 
the GENTIME form. 
328 The same suggestion also applies to other standard forms, such as the BALTIME form 
and the NYPE 46 form, when these forms also take the recommendation to adopt the 
provision regarding the shipowner’s suspension of his/her performance of any and all of 
his/her obligations in Lines 200 to 206 of the third paragraph of Clause 8 (c) of the 
GENTIME form. 
329 Girvin (n 20) 644.  
330 Mareva Navigation Co. Ltd. v Canaria Armadora SA (The Mareva AS) [1977] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep 368 [381] (Kerr J.); Coghlin and others (n 1) para 25.2. 
331 (n 7).  
332 For example, Clause 11 of the BALTIME form, Line 97 to 99 of Clause 15 of the NYPE 
46 form, Line 220 to 233 of Clause 17 of the NYPE 93 form, Clause 9 of the GENTIME form. 
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needing to pay for the time charter service during any period if the vessel has 
caused interruptions, which had been provided for in the time charterparty,333 
to the time charter service334 and therefore making the use of the vessel 
unavailable to the time charterer.335 In addition, the occurrences identified 
under the off-payment time charter service only make this clause applicable 
when these occurrences are disregarded as any fault on the part of the 
shipowner.336 It is believed that it is a provision clause for allocating the risk 
of loss of time within off-payment for the time charter service under the time 
charterparty.337 Moreover, as Bucknill L.J. indicated in The Ilissos, if the 
meanings of wording under the off-payment for time charter service clause 
are not clear enough, the wording should be construed in favour of the 
shipowner since the shipowner’s right for payment for the time charter 
service is intended to be cut down by the charterer.338 Furthermore, the 
burden of proof for the off-payment for the time charter service clause being 
operated in factual situations is borne by the time charterer in order for the 
time charterer to benefit from this clause under the time charterparty.339   
 
                                                          
333 The traditional or central off-payment for the time charter service causes may be 
categorised as follows: ‘(a) breakdown, damage, deficiency, defect (including first damage) 
to hull, machinery and equipment; (b) drydocking and other measures necessary to maintain 
the vessel; (c) collision and grounding; (d) detention, seizure and arrest of the vessel; (e) 
deficiency/default/ strike of men; (f) deficiency of stores/ documentation; (g) unjustified 
deviation and putting back.’ See Thomas (n 197). 
334 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 25.2. 
335 Wilson (n 17) 96. 
336 Wilson (n 17) 96-97. 
337 Johan Schelin, ‘On the Interpretation of Off-Hire Clause’—“The Arica” Reconsidered’ in 
Johan Schelin (ed), Modern Law of Charterparties (Jure AB 2003).  
338 The Ilissos (n 162) [199]; Wilson (n 17) 97; Girvin (n 20) 644. 
339 Shipping Law (n 10) 147. 
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Generally, the time charterer needs to establish three basic key elements of 
the off-payment for the time charter service under the time charterparty.340 To 
prevent the vessel from fully working is the first element;341 the second 
element is that the event causes the interruption of the full working of the 
vessel necessary to be listed in the clauses under the time charterparty;342 
the final one is that the loss of time to the time charterer has to be the direct 
consequence of the inefficiency of the vessel.343 
 
However, the provisions and conditions may be various in the different off-
payment for time charter service clauses under the time charterparties.344 As 
Staughton L.J. stated in The Berge Sund, it is necessary to separate 
concerns about the wordings in an individual off-payment for the time charter 
service clause under the time charterparty.345 Whether or not it is an off-
payment for a time charter service event and whether or not it is the way to 
calculate the loss of time suffered by the time charterer depends on the 
agreement of off-payment for the time charter service clause by the 
                                                          
340 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 25.6.  
341 This can be found in Line 99 of Clause 15 of the NYPE 46 form, and Line 225 of Clause 
17 of the NYPE 93 form. However, Lines 147 to 148 in Clause 11 of the BALTIME form 
provide that “hindering or preventing the working of the Vessel and continuing for more than 
twenty-four consecutive hours.” 
342 This can be seen in Lines 143 to 146, 153 to 161 of Clause 11 of the BALTIME form, 
Lines 222 to 232, 234 to 236 of Clause 9 of the GENTIME form, Lines 97 to 98 of Clause 15 
of the NYPE 46 form, Lines 220 to 225, 226 to 228 of Clause 17 of the NYPE 93 form, and 
Clause 9 of the GENTIME form. 
343 It is showed in Line 149 of Clause 11 of the BALTIME form, Line 99 of Clause 15 of the 
NYPE 46 form, Line 226 of Clause 17 of the NYPE 93 form, and Line 233 of Clause 9 of the 
GENTIME form. 
344 Thomas (n 197). 
345 Sig Bergesen DY & Co. v Mobil Shipping & Transportation Co. (The Berge Sund) [1993] 
2 Lloyd’s Rep 453 (CA); Shipping Law (n 10) 48. 
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contractual parties under the different standard forms of the time 
charterparties.346 
 
The types of off-payment for the time charter service clauses under the time 
charterparty could be normally distinguished as a “period” clause or “net loss 
of time” clause.347 To decide which type of off-payment for the time charter 
clause should be drafted within the time charterparty essentially relies on the 
result of the negotiation by the contractual parties in the commercial world. 
 
Under the “period” clause, if the time charterer loses a period of the time 
charter service,348 the off-payment for the time charter service period begins 
and he/she can stop paying for the time charter service from the occurrence 
of the provided event within the time charterparty until the vessel is again in a 
fully efficient position to recommence her service.349 Therefore, it could be 
said that it does not satisfy the requirement if the vessel recovers part of her 
efficiency.350  
 
On the other hand, under the “net loss of time” clause, “time lost” or “loss of 
time” refers to the “delay to the progress of the adventure”.351 In addition, the 
“net loss of time” clause demands that the period of the off-payment for the 
                                                          
346 Thomas (n 197). 
347 Christopher Smith, ‘Time Charters’ in Eder and others (n 39).  
348 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 25.53, 25.60. 
349 Hogarth v Miller [1891] AC 48 (HL) (Lord Halsbury); Smailes v Evans [1917] 2 KB 54; 
Tynedale v Anglo-Soviet Shipping Co. [1936] 41 Com cas 206; Coghlin and others (n 1) 
para 25.60; Wilson (n 17) 98. 
350 Hogarth v Miller [1891] AC 48 (HL); Wilson (n 17) 98. 
351 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 25.53.  
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time charter service be measured on the basis of the net time lost to the time 
charterer.352 Moreover, the “net loss of time” clause is especially significant in 
dealing with the circumstance of the partial efficiency of the vessel.353 For 
instance, in The Apollonius, the time loss resulted from a speed deficiency of 
the vessel.354 Another example is the net loss of time caused by the 
breakdown of one of three loading cranes in The HR Macmillan.355 In 
addition, Lord Denning, M.R, in The HR Macmillan asserted ‘How much 
earlier would the vessel have been away from the port of lading or 
discharging if three cranes, instead of two, had been available 
throughout?’356 This can be regarded as the test for assessing the net loss of 
time.357 
 
 
5.5.1 The ambit of off-payment for the time charter service clause 
 
Under some time charterparties, it can be seen that the final sweeping-up 
clause,358 using the final wordings “or any other cause preventing the full 
working of the vessel”, normally follows a list of particular occurrences which 
will provoke the off-payment for the time charter service clause, such as in 
                                                          
352 For example, Clause 11 (A) of the BALTIME form is a “net loss of time” Clause since the 
words within this clause indicates ‘no hire shall be paid in respect of any time lost thereby’. 
Coghlin and others (n 1) para 25.58; Smith (n 347).  
353 Wilson (n 17) 98. 
354 The Apollonius [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 53; Wilson (n 17) 98. 
355 The HR Macmillan [1974] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 311 [314] (Lord Denning).  
356 ibid. 
357 Shipping Law (n 10) 147. 
358 Thomas (n 197). 
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Clause 15 of the NYPE 46 form.359 It is asserted that, based on ejusdem 
generis,360 “or any other cause” can be construed as the same type with the 
listed events under the off-payment for the time charter service clause.361 
However, the availability of operations of the principle of ejusdem generis is 
doubtful since it would be difficult to distinguish the events listed under the 
off-payment for the time charter service clause to be a particular enough 
“genus”.362 Nevertheless, the judicial approach towards the off-payment for 
the time charter service clause is likely to construe the clause strictly in the 
way that construes the exception of the clause within the time charterparty.363 
It is claimed that “other cause” should be strictly construed as those directly 
impacting the efficient operation of the ship and to those precluding the 
external occurrences which do not connect with the physical state of the ship 
and her Crew when the ship is delayed in executing the time charterparty.364 
Thus it is closely connected with the ship’s performance so as to make it 
satisfy the off-payment for the time charter service clause if the vessel’s 
delay in getting the free pratique has resulted from suspecting that the Crew 
was suffering from typhus.365 However, the occurrences under the off-
payment for the time charter service clause do not cover situations such as 
                                                          
359 Baatz (n 3).   
360 This means that when things described by specific words have the same common 
features which form a genus, the general words which follow them should be restricted to 
things of that genus. Baris Soyer, ‘Construing Terms in Time Charterparties—Beginning of a 
New Era or Business as Usual?’ in Thomas (n 13). 
361 The Roachbank [1987] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 498, 507 (Webster J); Thomas (n 197). 
362 The Rijn [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 267 [271] (Mustill J); Thomas (n 197). 
363 Thomas (n 197). 
364 Wilson (n 17) 97. 
365 The Apollo [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 200; Wilson (n 17) 97. 
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the vessel being too heavily loaded for entering the Panama Canal,366 or the 
vessel’s delay arising from an obstacle on the Yangtse River.367 
 
Nonetheless, if the term “whatsoever” is attached after “or any other cause” 
within the off-payment for the time charter service clause under the time 
charterparty, even if the occurrences still necessary to satisfy “preventing the 
full working of the vessel” are provided in the clause and are limited to 
accidents as well as not covering natural causes by the ship’s use,368 the 
principle of ejusdem generis is not applied here and any occurrence is 
possible to satisfy taking the vessel off-payment for the time charter 
service.369 
 
 
5.5.2   The consequences of exercising the off-payment for the time     
charter service clause 
 
When applying the off-payment for the time charter service clause under the 
time charterparty, the time charterer is not exempted from his/her other 
obligations during this period, such as paying for port service or bunkers370 
                                                          
366 Actis Co. Ltd. v The Sanko Steamship Co. Ltd. (The Aquacharm) [1982] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 7; 
Andre & Cie S.A v Orient Shipping (Rotterdam) BV (The Laconian Confidence) [1997] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep 139 (the port authorities refuse the vessel a permit to work); Wilson (n 17) 97. 
367 Court Line v Dant [1939] 44 Com Cas 345; The Mareva AS (n 327); Wilson (n 17) 97. 
368 The Rijn [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 267; Wilson (n 17) 97. 
369 The Mastro Giorgis [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 66; Coghlin and others (n 1) paras 25.40-25.41. 
370 Arild v Hovrani [1923] 2 KB 141; Wilson (n 17) 99. 
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provided within the time charterparty, if there is no contrast provision371 
under the time charterparty.372 Moreover, it might be seen in practice, by the 
agreement of the contractual parties in advance, to count the off-payment for 
the time charter service period as part of the fundamental period of the time 
charter under the time charterparty.373 This is because giving the time 
charterer the benefit of the option to extend the charter term for an equal off-
payment for the time charter service period within the contract would 
probably disadvantage the shipowner if he/she has already settled on the 
next fixture of the time charter or if the time charter market rate rises.374 
However, much depends on how the contractual parties negotiate this issue 
and what standard form of the time charterparty they choose. For example, if 
the contractual parties adopt the GENTIME form, the time charterer has the 
option to add any time during the off-payment for the time charter service to 
the charter period under Clause 9 (d) of the GENTIME form.375  
 
Furthermore, the time charterer may be entitled to terminate the time 
charterparty or claim damages as remedies instead of, or in addition to, 
operating an off-payment for the time charter service clause if it is the 
shipowner who is actually at fault and in possible breach of the time 
charterparty.376 On the other hand, it is asserted that when an occurrence of 
the off-payment for the time charter service results from the time charterer’s 
breach of the time charterparty, the off-payment for the time charter service 
                                                          
371 For instance, Clause 20 of the NYPE 46 form provides that ‘fuel used by the vessel while 
off hire,…to be allowed by Owners’; Williams (n 15) 231.  
372 Wilson (n 17) 99. 
373 ibid. 
374 ibid. 
375 (n 57). 
376 Baatz (n 3). 
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clause might be operated, however, the shipowner might also have the right 
to recover his/her payment for the time charter service which they had lost 
within the off-payment for the time charter service clause as damages for the 
time charterer’s breach in obligation under the time charterparty.377 There is 
no judgment to actually handle this issue regarding whether or not the time 
charter has legal right to treat the vessel as an off-payment for the time 
charter service when there is no provision within the time charterparty to 
tackle the event to prevent the full working of the vessel arising from the time 
charterer’s responsibility or his/her breach of contract or fault.378 
Nevertheless, it was argued by the obiter of Rix J. in The Laconian 
Confidence that if the event which prevented the full working of the vessel 
was proven to result from a matter for which the charterer should take 
responsibility, this could be construed as implicitly excluded by “any other 
cause whatsoever preventing the full working of the vessel” under the off-
payment for time charter service clause within the charterparty.379 In addition, 
                                                          
377 Leolga Compania de Navigacion v John Glynn & Sons Ltd. (The Dodecanese) [1953] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep 47; Baatz (n 3).   
378 The view of the meaning of “fault” by Steyn J. in the first instance in The Berg Sund is 
referred to as conscious wrongdoing or negligence. However, the court of appeal was 
concerned whether the charterers’ fault resulted in a loss of time, this is exempted in the 
payment for the charter service under the off-payment for the time charter service within the 
charterparty. In addition, Staughton, L.J indicated in obiter that the shipowners had argued 
that the fault in this case merely pointed to a causal connection between the time lost and 
omission of the charterers or something done by the charterers.; Sig Bergesen DY & Co. v 
Mobil Shipping & Transportation Co. (The Berg Sund) [1992] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 460; [1993] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep 453; Coghlin and others (n 1) para 25.49. 
379 The Laconian Confidence (n 366) [151]; Coghlin and others (n 1) para 25.46.; In addition, 
it was stated by Greer.J. in The Megna that when loss of time resulted from ‘anything for 
which the charterer is responsible’, the payment for the time charter service should not be 
ended. In The Megna, the delay resulted from a faulty bunker of coal. However, the event 
listed in the off-payment for the time charter service was only restricted to a breakdown of 
machinery or damage to the hull. Thus it is likely that the time charterer cannot rely on the 
off-payment for the time charter service clause if the working of the vessel has been stopped 
by something which was the time charterers’ duty to provide, such as their bunkers in this 
case. Junder ames Nourse Ltd. v Elder Dempster & Co. Ltd. (The Megna) [1922] 13 LILR 
197; Coghlin and others (n 1) para 25.47; John Weale, ‘The NYPE Off-Hire Clause and 
Third Party Intervention: Can an Efficient Vessel be Placed Off-Hire?’ (2002) 33 (2) JMLC. 
<http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/jmlc33&div=13&collection=journals&
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the Court of Appeal held in The Terneuzen that the off-payment for the time 
charter service clause could not be operated.380 The time charterers need to 
keep on paying for the time charter service under the time charterparty 
during the restoration of the hull of the vessel resulting from the time 
charterers’ breach of their obligation to instruct the vessel into a safe 
berth.381 In this case, the shipowner could be indemnified from the time 
charterer on the basis of the indemnity clause under the time charterparty.382 
Therefore, in these circumstances, it may be advisable to follow the 
suggestion of several convinced authorities and to deny the time charterer 
entitlement to place the vessel off-payment for the time charter service when 
the time charterer is responsible for any cause within the off-payment for 
time charter service clause or when he/she is in breach of the time 
charterparty.383 
 
 
5.5.3     Reforming the off-payment for the time charter service clause 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
set_as_cursor=0&men_tab=srchresults&terms=33|J|Mar.L|cOM.2002|The|NYPE|OFF|HIRE|
CLAUSE|THIRD|PARTY|INTERVENTION|CAN|AN|EFFICIENT|VESSEL|BE|PLACED|OFF|
HIRE&type=matchall> accessed 22 March 2013. See also Sig Bergesen DY & Co. v Mobil 
Shipping & Transportation Co. (The Berg Sund) [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 453. It is indicated by 
the Court of Appeal in The Berg Sund that, in fact, to carry out further tank cleaning was the 
very service which the charterers demanded. The efficient working of the ship was not 
stopped by a necessity to engage in further tank cleaning. Coghlin and others (n 1) para 
38.112. 
380 Lensen Shipping Ltd. v Anglo-Soviet Shipping Co. Ltd. (The Terneuzen) [1935] 52 LILR 
141 (CA) 
381 ibid. 
382 ibid; Coghlin and others (n 1) para 25.48; Weale (n 379); Smith (n 347). 
383 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 25.44; 25.69. 
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Under the time charter, the time charterer’s payment for “hire” actually refers 
to payment for the time charter service.384 To make the wording of the terms 
of the time charterparty more precise and accurate is the consistent 
approach of this thesis.385 Therefore, it is proposed to modify the wording 
“off-hire” in the relevant clauses under the essential standard forms of the 
time charterparty, such as the BALTIME form,386 the NYPE 46387 and NYPE 
93 forms388 and the GENTIME form,389 to “off-payment for the time charter 
service”. 
 
In addition, for the purposes of avoiding unnecessary argument, it has been 
shown that the view of the authorities390 is to provide “any other similar 
cause” within Line 225 of Clause 17 of the NYPE 93 form391 and Line 345 of 
Clause 21 of the SHELTIME 4 form.392 However, if the shipping industry is 
still willing to choose the NYPE 46 form393 to be their time charterparty, it is 
suggested that the good draft model of this comparatively precise phrase is 
for them to amend Line 98 of Clause 15 of the NYPE 46 form,394 which 
currently has the drawback of lacking “similar” within the phrase and is 
unclear regarding the real meaning of the phrase.395 For the same reasons, it 
is also proposed to modify Line 146 of Clause 11 (A) of the BALTIME 
                                                          
384 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 1.15. 
385 This is as the aforementioned allegation in Section 2.2 of Chapter 2, Section 4.6 of 
Chapter 4, Section 5.2.1, Section 5.3.1, and Section 5.4.3 of Chapter 5. 
386 Thomas (n 13) 286-89. 
387 Williams (n 15) 228-31. 
388 Brodie (n 53) 32-46. 
389 (n 57). 
390 The Apollo (n 365); Wilson (n 17) 97; Thomas (n 197). 
391 Brodie (n 53) 38. 
392 Thomas (n 13) 340. 
393 Williams (n 15) 228-31. 
394 Williams (n 15) 230. 
395 Thomas (n 197). 
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form,396 which originally only indicates “or other accident”, to become “ or any 
other similar accident” to make sure this clear wording within Clause 11 (A) 
BALTIME form397 presents the precise ambit of accidents of the off-payment 
for the time charter service clause. 
 
Moreover, there is the practical argument as to whether or not the time 
charterer is entitled to put the vessel in off-payment for the time charter 
service when there is no provision within the time charterparty to tackle the 
event which prevents the full working of the vessel arising from the time 
charterer’s responsibility or his/her breach of contract.398 In this 
circumstance, it is also believed that if the event covered the scope of the off-
payment for the time charter service clause which prevents the full working of 
the vessel occurring from the time charterer’s responsibility or his/her fault or 
breach, it might be right to exclude these situations from the operation of the 
off-payment for the time charter service clause.399 The time charterer could 
not therefore rely on the off-payment for the time charter service clause to 
relieve his/her obligation for the payment for the time charter service when 
the event preventing the full working of the vessel arises from his/her own 
responsibility or breach.400 
 
Even though some of the standard forms of the time charterparties seem to 
try to deal with this issue and to express specific exclusions for applying an 
                                                          
396 Thomas (n 13) 287. 
397 ibid. 
398 See (n 377)-(n 383). 
399 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 25.44, 25.47, 25.69. 
400  See (n 377)-(n 383). 
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off-payment of the time charter service clause in order to prevent probable 
issues,401 clear and complete exclusion as to applying the off-payment for 
the time charter service clause still cannot be found in the essential standard 
forms of the time charterparty,402 such as Clause 11 of the BALTIME form,403 
Clause 15 of the NYPE 46 form,404 Clause 17 of the NYPE 93 form,405  and 
Clause 9 of the GENTIME form.406 
 
Hence, in order to make the context of the clause under these time 
charterparties more thoughtful and complete as well as to avoid triggering 
disputes between the contractual parties in the future, it is worth 
recommending a reform of the off-payment for the time charter service 
clauses by way of clearly displaying the significant exclusions as to the event 
preventing the full working of the vessel caused by the time charterer’s 
responsibility407 or his/her fault or breach of contract408 operating the off-
payment for the time charter service clause. This might also facilitate the 
                                                          
401 For example, it is provided that ‘Unless such arrest is caused by events for which the 
Charterers, their servants, agents or subcontractors are responsible’ in Lines 222 to 223 of 
Clause 17 of the NYPE 93 form. In addition, under Clause 9 (a) (iii) of the GENTIME form, it 
is only excluded by any act or omission of the Charterers, their servants, agents or sub-
contractors when the event is resulted from “arrest”. Moreover, it is indicated “Unless 
brought about by the act or neglect of Charterers” in Line 174 of Clause 21 (ii) of 
SHELLTIME 3; Line 362 of Clause 21 (a) (v) of the SHELLTIME 4. 
402 Under the Clause 17 of the NYPE 93 form, it is only excluded by the responsibilities of 
Charterers, their servants, agents or subcontractors when the event of loss of time results 
from “arrest”. It might be criticised that the contents of the off-payment for the time charter 
service clause does not consider all the circumstances and is not complete enough because 
it does not cover the other situations of exclusions.  
403 Thomas (n 13) 287. 
404 Williams (n 15) 230. 
405 Brodie (n 53) 38.  
406 (n 57); It might also be criticised that the contents of this off- payment for the time charter 
service clause does not consider all the circumstances and is not complete enough because 
it is merely excluded by any act or omission of the Charterers, their servants, Agents or sub-
contractors when the event is caused by “arrest”.   
407 (n 383); It is likely constructed here that the time charterers should take responsibility for 
their servants, agents or subcontractors of the time charterers.  
408 (n 377)-(n 383). 
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busy contractual parties’ clear understanding, and focus further attention on 
the exclusions to the benefit409 from the time charterer. 
 
 
5.6    Highlighting the key reforms in this chapter 
 
To sum up, the key reforms within this chapter can be highlighted as follows: 
Consistent with the approach throughout this thesis,410 modifications are 
proposed to the current easily confused, mixed-concept, and misleading 
wordings within the essential standard forms of the time charterparty,411  
such as “payment of hire”, “withdraw the vessel”, “deduction of hire” and “off-
hire”. More precise and clear wordings are recommended, such as “payment 
for the time charter service”, “withdraw the time charter service”, “deduction 
of the payment for the time charter service” and “off-payment for the time 
charter service”, which more accurately show the unique characteristics of 
the time charter.412  
 
In terms of reforming the payment for the time charter service, in aiming to 
follow modern commercial practice and make the contents of the relevant 
clause clearer, payment for the time charter service has to be paid in cash or 
‘other payment method equivalent to payment in cash under the commercial 
                                                          
409 Thomas (n 13). 
410 (n 385). 
411 Such as the BALTIME form, the NYPE 46 and NYPE 93 forms, and the GENTIME form. 
412 (n 44).  
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practice, which can provide the shipowner the unconditional right to the 
immediate use of the funds.’413 The text of the previous sentence is 
suggested as a reform to Clause 6 of the BALTIME form,414 Clause 5 of the 
NYPE 46 form415 and Clause 11 (a) of the NYPE 93 form.416 In addition, 
according to Clause 9 (d) of the GENTIME form, the time charterer is allowed 
to add the period of off-payment for the time charter service by declaring 
his/her option in writing within a limited period of time.417 For the purposes of 
following common practice and making the content clearly indicate the actual 
meaning in the provision, and preventing future disputes as well as saving 
busy merchants’ time, the following is recommended: directly adopting the 
explanation of the explanatory notes to Clause 8 (a) of the GENTIME form418 
and adding “original” to Line 181 of Clause 8 (a) of the GENTIME form.419 
Therefore, that the contents will be shown as ‘In the event that additional 
time charter service is payable in accordance with Clause 9 (d) of the 
GENTIME form420 such time charter service shall be based on the rate 
applicable at the original time of ending of the time charter service’. In 
addition, if the contractual parties choose the BALTIME form,421 the NYPE 46 
form422 or the NYPE 93 form423 and offer the time charterer the option of 
adding the period of off-payment for the time charter service by negotiation, 
the rate applicable at the original time of ending of the time charter service of 
                                                          
413 (n 21). 
414 Thomas (n 13) 286. 
415 Williams (n 15) 229. 
416 Brodie (n 53) 35-36. 
417 (n 57).  
418 (n 55). 
419 (n 57). 
420 ibid. 
421 Thomas (n 13) 286-89. 
422 Williams (n 15) 228-31. 
423 Brodie (n 53) 32-46. 
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payment for such additional time should also be clearly indicated in Clause 6 
of BALTIME form,424 Clause 4 of the NYPE 46 form425 and Clause 10 of the 
NYPE 93 form.426  Moreover, in order to correctly compute the whole 
payment time for the time charter service under the time charterparty 427 and 
to avoid practical disputes regarding whether or not the local time or the 
elapsed time will be applied when computing the whole time on the payment 
for time charter service,428 when the shipowner and the time charterer 
choose the BALTIME form429 or the NYPE 46 form430 as their time 
charterparty, it is proposed to follow either Lines 137 to 138 of Clause 10 of 
NYPE 93 form431 or Lines 181 to 182 of Clause 8(a) of the GENTIME form432 
and to clearly provide the elapsed time as the governing time so as to be in 
accordance with the court decision in The Arctic Skou.433 
 
In terms of the reform of the deduction of the payment for the time charter 
service, in aiming to assist merchants—or lay parties—to rapidly absorb 
information and to have a clear and complete picture of the different time 
charterer’s rights for deducting from the payment of the time charter service 
within the time charterparty, as well as to provide an easier and clearer way 
for the contractual parties to comprehend their legal rights and obligations, it 
is recommended to clearly organise separate pieces of information and to 
                                                          
424 Thomas (n 13) 286. 
425 Williams (n 15) 229. 
426 Brodie (n 53) 35. 
427 (n 55). 
428 (n 89). 
429 Thomas (n 13) 286-89. 
430 Williams (n 15) 228-31. 
431 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 14.5; Brodie (n 53) 35.  
432 (n 57). 
433 The Arctic Skou (n 75). 
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combine them together. For the purposes of preventing any possible 
disputes in advance, it is also suggested that there be a clear and explicit 
delineation of the consequence of their negotiation regarding “the other 
specific circumstances”, which also permit the time charterer to deduct 
expenses or costs incurred under these circumstances from their payment 
for the time charter service within an extra sub-clause of the payment for the 
time charter service under the time charterparty. Thus, the recommendation 
is to organise the relevant provisions as well as “the other specific 
circumstances” together regarding the allowed deduction of payment of the 
time charter service and present them in this extra sub-clause of the 
payment for the time charter service434 under the essential standard forms of 
time charterparty435 when they are modified in the future. Moreover, in order 
to draw attention to the time charterer’s different rights for a deduction from 
the payment of the time charter service which occur within individual 
provisions under the time charterparty, and to efficiently save their time, it is 
also suggested that the relevant information is associated together in all the 
essential forms to highlight those differently allowed circumstances for the 
time charterer to deduct from the payment of the time charter service into 
one Box Layout, titled “deduction” and divided into several sub-columns. The 
various titles of the number of provisions are to be separately shown in the 
sub-columns under the Box for the contractual parties negotiating to select 
finally what they want to keep in the time charterparty. The column of “the 
other circumstances” under the Box is designed for filling in a newly added 
clause number or newly added sub-clause number in the time charterparty. 
                                                          
434 The designed sample for this can be seen in Section 5.3.1. 
435 (n 411). 
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In terms of the reform of the withdrawal of the time charter service and its 
suspension, it has been critiqued that Clause 8 (c) of the GENTIME form436 
is not a sufficient draft because the paragraph is presented unclearly and are 
not easily read or followed. Thus it is proposed to divide Clause 8(c) of the 
GENTIME form437 into three clear sub-paragraphs by way of adding three 
sub-headings438 for the different sub-paragraphs. Moreover, for the purposes 
of making the content under Line 61 of Clause 5 of the NYPE 46 form439 
clearer and better thought out as well as practically operable,440 it is 
proposed to follow exactly the content aforementioned in Line 150 of Clause 
11 (a) of NYPE 93 form441 and use the clear language “or any fundamental 
breach whatsoever of this Charter Party”442 within Line 61 of Clause 5 of the 
NYPE 46 form.443 The same recommendation also applies to Clause 6 of the 
BALTIME form444 and Clause 8 (c) of the GENTIME form445 if the contractual 
parties choose these forms and negotiate as well as agree to allow the 
shipowner to have the right to withdraw the time charter service if the time 
charterer fundamentally breaches the contract.446 This reform has the merit 
of allowing the provision’s content to fully present the view of the court447 and 
make the contractual parties clearly identify that the other reason for 
withdrawal of the time charter service by the shipowner is necessarily 
                                                          
436 (n 57). 
437 ibid. 
438 (1) Withdrawal of the Time Charter Service; (2) Grace Period; (3) Suspend the 
Performance of The Owners’ Obligation. 
439 Williams (n 15) 229. 
440 The Antaios (No 2) (n 193). 
441 Brodie (n 53) 36. 
442 The Antaios (No 2) (n 193); Coghlin and others (n 1) para 16.126; Davies and Dickey (n 
193) 396. 
443 Williams (n 15) 229. 
444 Thomas (n 13) 286. 
445 (n 57). 
446 See (n 193). 
447 The Antaios (No 2) (n 193). 
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restricted to the time charterer’s fundamental breach of the time 
charterparty.448 In addition, in order to enable merchants to know and predict 
the real legal consequences of withdraw the time charter service, adding the 
legal effect into withdrawal provision and providing that the ‘Owner shall be 
entitled to withdraw the time charter service and terminate the time charter’ is 
a recommended addition into these essential standard forms of the time 
charterparty. It is also suggested that the contractual parties seek to manage 
in advance any possible risk regarding the consequent post-withdrawal time 
charter service for the third party, the shipper. Therefore, it is worth adopting 
an applicable method in order for the shipowner to recover consequent 
expenses by clearly expressing in the withdrawal clause under these 
essential standard forms of time charterparty that the shipowner could be 
indemnified from the time charterer for supplying this consequently post-
withdrawal time charter service for the shipper.449 Furthermore, the 
contractual parties could still possibly choose the BALTIME form450 or the 
NYPE 46 form451 as their time charterparty. Due to the lack of an anti-
technicality clause in both the BALTIME form452 and the NYPE 46 form,453 
the addition of one is proposed, such as that covered in the second sub-
paragraph of Clause 8 (c) of GENTIME form,454 to be included under the 
heading “Grace Period” in the BALTIME form455 and the NYPE 46 form456 to 
give the time charterer a grace period to pay for the time charter service. 
                                                          
448 ibid; Coghlin and others (n 1) para 16.126; Davies and Dickey (n 193) 396. 
449 Thomas (n 197). 
450 Thomas (n 13) 286-89. 
451 Williams (n 15) 228-31. 
452 Thomas (n 13) 286-89. 
453 Williams (n 15) 228-31. 
454 (n 57). 
455 Thomas (n 13) 286-89. 
456 Williams (n 15) 228-31. 
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This reform would have the advantage of preventing too harsh an outcome 
for the time charterer.457 In addition, it is also recommended that the 
contractual parties negotiate in advance and clearly express in these 
essential standard forms of the time charterparties458 that the shipwner shall 
give the time charterer written notice of the number of clear banking days for 
rectifying a failure of payment for the time charter service within a specific 
period of the time charter’s default.459 Also for the purposes of making the 
time charterparty more thoughtful and complete, and making the contractual 
parties pay attention, it might be an ideal and effective method to add an 
extra Box in Part 1 Box Layout of these standard forms of the time 
charterparty460 for filling in this specific time notice period. In addition, for 
clearly and quickly reminding the contractual parties how long the agreed 
grace period is through exercising the function of the Box Layout, it is also 
recommended that the “Grace Period” as emphasised in the Part 1 Box 
Layout of the GENTIME form461 should also be added to the Part 1 Box 
Layout as recommended for adoption by the essential standard forms of the 
time charterparties, such as the BALTIME form,462 the NYPE 46463 and 
NYPE 93 forms.464 Moreover, adding “Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays 
excluded” is suggested465 to allow the time charterer to correct a default of 
payment for the time charter service during the normal banking hours. This 
would make the content within the grace period under the anti-technicality 
                                                          
457 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 16.90. 
458 Such as Clause 6 of the BALTIME form, Clause 5 of the NYPE 46 form, Clause 11 of the 
NYPE 93 form, and Clause 8 (c) of the GENTIME form. 
459 The Afovos (n 196); Shipping Law (n 10) 144. 
460 See (n 302). 
461 (n 57). 
462 Thomas (n 13) 286-89. 
463 Williams (n 15) 228-31. 
464 Brodie (n 53) 32-46. 
465 See (n 308). 
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clause of the BALTIME form,466 the NYPE 46 form467 and the GENTIME 
form468 more reasonable. Finally, aiming to ensure the shipowner has a 
temporary and effective weapon to protect himself/herself against the time 
charterer’s default in payment of the time charter service before the 
shipowner finally decides to permanently469 withdraw the time charter 
service,470 it is also suggested that the other essential standard forms of the 
time charterparty could also adopt the provision regarding the shipowner’s 
suspension of his/her performance of any and all of his/her obligations in 
Lines 200 to 206 of the third paragraph of Clause 8 (c) of the GENTIME 
form.471 It is also recommended that Line 156 of Clause 11 of the NYPE 93 
form472 follows the spirit of Lines 204 to 205 of the third paragraph of Clause 
8 (c) of the GENTIME form473 to add the sentence, ‘Notwithstanding the 
event of loss of time from default of Officers or Crew, provided in Line 220 of 
Clause 17’474 in the context of the provisions of Line 156 of Clause 11 of the 
NYPE 93 form.475 This will enable the contents of Clause 11 of the NYPE 93 
form476 to be more thoughtful and consistent with the theory of an off-
payment for the time charter service.477 The same recommendation also 
applies to other standard forms, such as the BALTIME form478 and the NYPE 
                                                          
466 Thomas (n 13) 286-89. 
467 Williams (n 15) 228-31. 
468 (n 57).  
469 Wilson (n 17) 107. 
470 Thomas (n 197). 
471 (n 57).  
472 Brodie (n 53) 36.  
473 (n 57). 
474 See (n 327). 
475 Brodie (n 53) 36. 
476 ibid. 
477 See Section 5.4.3. 
478 Thomas (n 13) 286-89. 
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46 form,479 when these forms also take the suggestion to adopt the provision 
regarding the shipowner’s suspension of his/her performance of any and all 
of his/her obligations in Lines 200 to 206 of the third paragraph of Clause 8 
(c) of the GENTIME form.480 
 
In terms of reforming the off-payment for the time charter service clause, if 
the shipping industry is still willing to choose the NYPE 46 form481 as their 
time charterparty, the following is proposed, “any other similar cause” such 
as that found within Line 225 of Clause 17 of the NYPE 93 form482 and Line 
345 of Clause 21 of the SHELTIME 4 form,483 which shows the view of the 
authorities.484 This is because Line 98 of Clause 15 of the NYPE 46 form485 
has a weakness of short of “similar” within the phrase and it is unclear 
regarding the real meaning of the phrase.486 This amendment might make 
the phrase comparatively more precise and prevent any unnecessary 
disputes. This suggestion also applies to the modification of Line 146 of 
Clause 11 (A) of the BALTIME form,487 which originally states “or other 
accident”, into “or any other similar accident” to ensure that the precise ambit 
of accidental off-payments for the time charter service clause is clearly 
shown by clear wording within this clause. Moreover, for the purposes of 
making the contents of Clause 11 of the BALTIME form,488 Clause 15 of the 
                                                          
479 Williams (n 15) 228-31. 
480 See (n 328). 
481 Williams (n 15) 228-31. 
482 Brodie (n 53) 38. 
483 Thomas (n 13) 340. 
484 The Apollo (n 365); Wilson (n 17) 97. 
485 Williams (n 15) 230. 
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NYPE 46 form,489 Clause 17 of the NYPE 93 form,490 and Clause 9 of the 
GENTIME form491 more thoughtful, clear and complete and to avoid 
unnecessary disputes between the contractual parties in the future, as well 
as assist the busy contractual parties to clearly notice the exclusions to the 
benefit492 from the time charterer, further reform is recommended. The 
reform is submitted so that the off-payment for the time charter service 
clause can clearly provide the significant exclusions regarding the event 
preventing the full working of the vessel caused by the time charterer’s 
responsibility493 or his/her breach of contract494 from applying the off-
payment for the time charter service clause.   
 
 
5.7    Conclusion 
 
Payment for the time charter service is a fundamental obligation of the time 
charterer.495 The operation of deduction from the payment of the time charter 
service and to request the cessation of payments within the period of off-
payments for the time charter service by the time charterer, and the 
safeguarding of the payment for the time charter service through the 
suspension of performance of any and all of the shipowner’s obligations and 
                                                          
489 Williams (n 15) 230. 
490  Brodie (n 53) 38. 
491 (n 57). 
492 Thomas (n 197). 
493 See (n 383); (n 407). 
494 (n 377)-(n 383). 
495 Girvin (n 20) 644. 
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withdrawal of the time charter service by the shipowner, play a crucial role in 
the time charter to evenly protect the legal rights for the contractual parties.  
 
The aforementioned recommendations may contribute to giving the current 
essential standard forms of the time charterparty quite unique and obvious 
characteristics of the time charter and make these relevant provisions under 
the time charterparty clearer, more organised, thoughtful and complete. 
Reform of the relevant clauses outlined in this chapter may consistently 
assist in achieving an improvement in the imperfections of the essential 
standard forms of the time charterparties and prevent the possibility of any 
practical disputes in advance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
221 
 
CHAPTER  6: 
EMPLOYMENT OF THE SHIP AND INDEMNITY  
----------------------------------------------- 
 
6.1    Introduction  
 
The legal relationships between a Master, time charterer and shipowner under a 
time charterparty are more likely to be unique than those under a voyage 
charter and bareboat charter.1 While the vessel is employed through the time 
charterer instructing the Master, to clarify the legal relationship between the 
Master, the time charterer and the shipowner under the time charterparty helps 
them to understand their legal position under the time charterparty and to avoid 
unnecessary controversy. It can be seen that the employment and indemnity 
clauses of the essential standard forms of the time charterparty2 are in need of 
improvement as in their current form result in confusion and disputes for 
businesses. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to solve these problems 
through reforming the context within the relevant clauses of these forms. 
Consequently, it might also be possible to bring benefits to commercial shipping 
industries. This chapter will first indicate key general concepts surrounding the 
legal relationship between the Master, the time charterer and the shipowner 
when the vessel is employed under the time charterer’s instruction to the 
                                                          
1The Scaptrade [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 253 [256]-[257] (Lord Diplock); Terence Coghlin and 
others, Time Charters (6th edn, Informa 2008) para 1.4. 
2 Such as the BALTIME form 1939 (as revised 2001), the NYPE 46 and NYPE 93 forms, and 
GENTIME form; Unless otherwise specified, all references to the BALTIME form refer to the 
BALTIME form 1939 (as revised 2001). 
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Master. Important legal issues surrounding employment clauses in time 
charterparties and possible recommendations for their reform will then be 
discussed. The shipowner’s right to indemnity from the time charterer, and some 
important claims for indemnity in practice, will then be analysed. The crucial 
practical issue of identifying the contractual carrier with the bill of lading holder 
will then be clearly discussed and the limitations of the shipowners’ right to be 
indemnified will be indicated. Finally, suggestions for the improvement of the 
indemnity clause will be given. 
 
 
6.2     General key concepts surrounding the legal relationship between    
the Master, the time charterer and the shipowner when the vessel is 
employed under the time charterer’s instruction to the Master 
 
As noted in Section 1.1.3 of Chapter 1, a time charter is crucially different from a 
voyage charter or bareboat charter.3 In that under a time charter, even though 
the Master and Crew are employed by the shipowner,4 the time charterer pays 
for the charter service for a period of time5 and the Master and Crew have to 
comply with the instructions given by the time charterer under the time 
charterparty in order to complete the time charterer’s commercial task.6 It is 
necessary that these unique characteristics of the time charter be fundamentally 
                                                          
3 See (n 1). 
4 ibid. 
5 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 1.15. 
6 John F Wilson, Carriage of Goods by Sea (7th edn, Pearson Education Limited 2010) 108. 
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completed through operation by an employment clause7 and an indemnity 
clause in the time charterparty’s standard form.8 These clauses deal with the 
legal relationship between the Master, the time charterer and the shipowner 
when the time charterer orders the Master to employ the vessel.9  
 
The second sentence in Clause 9 of the BALTIME form exemplifies a typical 
employment clause and provides that the Master shall be under the orders of 
the charterer as regards employment, agency, or other arrangements.10 Similar 
provisions also can be found within Clause 8 of the NYPE 46 form,11 Clause 8 
(a) of the NYPE 93 form12 and Clause 12 of the GENTIME form.13  
 
In addition, the charterers shall indemnify the shipowners against all 
consequences or liabilities caused by the Master, Officers or Agents obeying the 
time charterers’ orders and direction.14 For example, a typical express indemnity 
clause can be seen in the third sentence of Clause 9 of the BALTIME form.15  
 
Moreover, if the time charterer has grounds for being dissatisfied with the 
performance of the Master or any Officer, it is also possible to provide a solution 
                                                          
7 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 10.92, 19.47; Howard Bennett, ‘Safe Port Clauses’ in D. Rhidian 
Thomas (ed), Legal Issues Relating to Time Charterparties (Informa 2008). 
8 ibid. 
9 Stephen Girvin, Carriage of Goods by Sea (2nd edn, OUP 2011) 664; Coghlin and others (n 1) 
para 19.17, 19.20. 
10 Thomas (n 7) 286. 
11 Harvey Williams, Chartering Documents (4th edn, LLP Reference Publishing 1999) 229. 
12 Peter Brodie, Commercial Shipping Handbook (2nd edn, Informa 2006) 34. 
13<https://www.bimco.org/~/media/Documents/Document_Samples/Time_Charter_Parties/Sampl
e_Copy_GENTIME.ashx> accessed 20 July 2012. 
14 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 19.17. 
15 Thomas (n 7) 286.  
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within the time charterparty.16 For instance, the fifth sentence of Clause 9 of the 
BALTIME form clearly stipulates that ‘if the Charterers have reason to be 
dissatisfied with the conduct of the Master or any Officer, the Owners, on 
receiving particulars of the complaint, promptly to investigate the matter, and, if 
necessary and practicable, to make a change in the appointments.’17 Analogous 
provisions are also set out in Clause 9 of the NYPE 46 form18 and Clause 8 (b) 
of the NYPE 93 form.19  
 
 
6.3    Important legal issues surrounding the employment clause under the 
time charterparty   
 
This issue often causes confusion.20 It is necessary to clarify how to construe 
the meaning of “employment”21 in the words ‘The Master should be under the 
orders of the Charterers as regards employment, agency, or other 
arrangements.’ under Clause 9 of the BALTIME form.22 
 
It is believed that in this clause, “employment” does not refer to employment of 
the Master and Crew.23 Rather, it refers to “the economic utilisation of the 
                                                          
16 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 22.1. 
17 Thomas (n 7) 286-87. 
18 Williams (n 11) 229. 
19 Brodie (n 12) 34. 
20 Girvin (n 9) 664.  
21 ibid. 
22 Thomas (n 7) 286. 
23 Girvin (n 9) 664. 
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ship”.24 Lord Wright clarified in The Ramon de Larrinaga,that “employment” 
means “employment of the ship” and refers to “the services which the ship is 
ordered to perform.”25 That is to say, the time charterer’s orders which are given 
regarding the commercial operation of the ship.26   
 
In The Ramon de Larrinaga, the ship was on requisition to the Crown under 
the T.99A time charter, which has a similar employment and indemnity clause 
to the BALTIME form, and she was instructed to move from Newport to St. 
Nazaire, and then to Cardiff for collaborative survey before being 
“redelivered”.27 However, when she discharged at St. Nazaire, she was 
instructed by the naval sea transport officer to immediately move to Quiberon 
Bay and then to assist in a convoy bound for Cardiff.28 It was argued by the 
Master that he should have waited until morning to move the vessel because 
darkness was approaching and the weather was becoming worse.29 
Nonetheless, his opinion was disregarded.30 The vessel was then stranded 
and was damaged after she set sail.31 The shipowners, therefore, claimed an 
indemnity from the Crown on the basis of the consequence of the Master 
following the time charterer’s orders.32 
 
                                                          
24 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 19.20. 
25 Larrinaga S. S. Co. Ltd. v The King (The Ramon de Larrinaga) [1945] AC 246 [255] (Lord 
Wright). 
26 Martin Davies and Anthony Dickey, Shipping Law (3rd edn, Lawbook Co 2004) 382. 
27 The Ramon de Larrinaga (n 25).  
28 ibid. 
29 ibid. 
30 ibid. 
31 ibid. 
32 Larrinaga Steamship Co. Ltd. v The King (The Ramon de Larrinaga) [1943] WN 53.  
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In the first instance, Atkinson J. held that the time charterer’s order for the 
vessel to leave St Nazaire at once was an order within “as regards 
employment… or other arrangement” under the time charterparty, thus the court 
believed that the stranding of the vessel was a result of the Master complying as 
the agent of the time charterer’s order against the Master’s better judgment.33 
However, following the charterer’s appeal, it was held by the Court of Appeal 
that the charterer was not liable for the ship’s damage since the “employment” 
within the employment clause under this time charterparty was “employment of 
persons” and not “employment of the ship”.34 Hence, the order to sail in this 
case was not an order regarding “employment” in the employment clause.35 
 
Nevertheless, the view of House of Lords was that the time charterer’s orders to 
send this vessel to St. Nazaire then to Cardiff should be treated as employment 
of the vessel.36 Lord Wright asserted that when construing the meaning of 
“employment” it was necessary to see the scheme and structure of the time 
charterparty as a whole.37 “Employment of the ship”, “agency”38 and 
“arrangements”39 were seen to be usually used to describe to the normal 
                                                          
33 ibid. 
34 Larrinaga Steamship Co. Ltd. v The King (The Ramon de Larrinaga) [1944] KB 124.  
35 ibid. 
36 The Ramon de Larrinaga (n 25). 
37 The Ramon de Larrinaga (n 25) [255] (Lord Wright). 
38 ‘“agency” deals with another aspect of the conduct of the ship’s affairs. The shipowner is 
entitled in the ordinary course to decide to what firm or person in each port the ship in the 
course of the charterparty is to be consigned as agent.’ See The Ramon de Larrinag (n 25) [254] 
(Lord Wright). 
39 ‘“Arrangements” is a wider term. There it refers to disbursements which have to be made for 
services in connection with operating the ship.’ See The Ramon de Larrinaga (n 25) [254] (Lord 
Wright). 
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conduct of the business of the vessel within the time charterparty.40 Thus 
construing “employment” as “employment of the ship” for performing the tasks 
for which the charterers planned to use the vessel gave these three terms a 
direct link and thus a related importance within a homogeneous ambit within 
Clause 9 of the charterparty in the case.41 Even so, the claim from the 
shipowners was still refused by the House of Lords since the damage to the 
vessel was held not to result  from the time charterer’s order.42  
 
This case may be regarded as a leading authority concerning the meaning of 
“employment” in a typical employment clause under a time charterparty.43 Lord 
Porter pointed out that if a time charterer’s order is to proceed from Port A to 
Port B, this order is an order regarding employment of the ship.44 However, Lord 
Porter believed that an order regarding the vessel’s sailing at a specific time in 
this case was not the same as an order with respect to employment of the 
ship.45 The reason for this was that the target of this order was how the vessel 
should have acted in the course of that employment rather than a direct order as 
to how the vessel should have been employed.46 Lord Wright also stated that 
the sailing orders of the naval sea transport officer in this case only handled 
matters of navigation about performing the orders of the time charterer to move 
                                                          
40 The Ramon de Larrinaga (n 25) [254] (Lord Wright). 
41 ibid [254]-[255]. 
42 The Ramon de Larrinaga (n 25).  
43 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 19.22; Girvin (n 9) 664; Davies and Dickey (n 26) 382.  
44 The Ramon de Larrinaga (n 25) [261] (Lord Porter).  
45 ibid (Lord Porter). 
46 ibid. 
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to Cardiff.47 The Master should have taken responsibility for exerting judgment 
in these sorts of matters of navigation.48 In other words, the shipowners should 
therefore have been liable for matters of navigation since the Master was the 
servant of the shipowners.49  
 
It is also crucial to distinguish matters of “employment” from matters of 
“navigation” in order to prevent misunderstandings of meaning in an 
employment clause.50 Lord Hobhouse, in The Hill Harmony, explained that 
“employment” within the employment clause includes the economic aspect of 
benefiting from the earning potential of the ship.51 For instance, the time 
charterer’s orders with respect to the normal route by which the vessel is to 
perform a voyage are orders as to employment of the ship.52 It was also held by 
Devlin J. in The Ann Stathatos, that an order to load specific cargo was an order 
regarding the employment of the ship.53 However, “navigation” is believed to 
cover matters of seamanship.54 This is, as noted in The Ramon de Larrinaga, 
whether the vessel’s sailing at a specific time was a matter of navigation.55 
 
Although the time charterer has the right to utilise the vessel, he/she cannot 
                                                          
47 ibid [256] (Lord Wright). 
48 ibid.  
49 ibid. 
50 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 19.20. 
51 Whistler International Ltd. v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. (The Hill Harmony) [2001] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep 147 (HL) [159] (Lord Hobhouse). 
52 ibid; Coghlin and others (n 1) para 19.24.; Howard Bennett and Stephen Girvin ‘English 
Maritime Law 2000: The Hill Harmony’ (2002) LMCLQ 104. 
53 Royal Greek Government v Minister of Transport (The Ann Stathatos) [1949] 83 LlL Rep 228. 
54 The Hill Harmony (n 51) [159] (Lord Hobhouse). 
55 The Ramon de Larrinaga (n 25). 
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infringe on matters which affect the security or safety of the vessel.56 The 
Master, who is the professional maritime expert, controls and takes 
responsibility for these matters.57 Ship management and matters of the 
navigation of the ship always remain within the liability of the shipowner and 
their servant(s).58   
 
It is important to note that even though the Master has a legal obligation to 
comply with the time charterer’s instruction under the employment clause of the 
time charterparty, it is not necessary for the Master to follow the time charterer’s 
order immediately59 if the nature of the order makes it unreasonable for him/ her 
to obey without further inquiry and consideration.60 In terms of this issue, as the 
Court of Appeal indicated in The Houda, the court will consider how a person of 
reasonable prudence would have acted, and whether or not there are 
reasonable grounds for delay in the Master’s obedience to the time charterer’s 
instruction in the circumstances of each case.61 In addition, the Master merely 
needs to exert reasonable care and skill rather than having an absolute 
obligation to follow the time charterer’s instruction.62 Moreover, Lord Hobhouse 
in The Hill Harmony also pointed out that the Master has a duty to ensure the 
                                                          
56 The Hill Harmony (n 51) [152] (Lord Bingham). 
57 ibid. 
58 Coghlin and others (n 1) paras 19.20, 19.23. 
59 ibid para 19.2; For instance, London Arbitration 15/02 (LMLN 598). It is held that the Master 
may ask the charterers whether or not the shipper’s defective cargo will be accepted by them. 
However, when the Master receives the charterers’ confirmation of acceptance, he may not 
further delay the loading operation. Girvin (n 8) 665. 
60 The Houda [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 541 (CA) [555] (Millettt, L.J.); [549] (Neill, L.J.); Davies and 
Dickey (n 26) 383. 
61 ibid. 
62 Actis Co. Ltd. v The Sanko Steamship Co. Ltd. (The Aquacharm) [1982] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 7 (CA). 
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safety of the ship, her cargo and Crew.63 Thus the Master has a legal right not to 
follow illegitimate orders from the time charterer, such as an order which might 
endanger the vessel or cargo,64 or an order to proceed to an unsafe port,65 as 
described in Section 3.4.4 of Chapter 3. The Master also has no legal obligation 
to convey cargo to a person who has no legal right to take it.66 
 
In brief, under the time charterparty, although the time charterer is entitled to 
order the Master regarding employment,67 that is employment of the ship, 
signifying “the services which the ship is ordered to perform”,68 an order 
regarding employment does not cover matters of navigation, which are still the 
responsibility of the shipowner.69  
 
 
6.4   Reforming the employment clause 
 
As established, the view of the court is that “employment” in Clause 9 of the 
BALTIME form should be construed as “employment of the ship”.70 In addition, 
the time charterer’s instruction to the Master is limited to matters of business of 
                                                          
63 The Hill Harmony (n 51) [160] (Lord Hobhouse); See also Simon Baughen, ‘Case and 
Comment: Navigation or Employment? The Hill Harmony’ (2001) LMCLQ 177. 
64 For example, London Arbitration 22/05 (LMLN 679). It was found that the Master may have 
had the legal right to refuse to comply with charterer’s order regarding the loading of cargo to an 
arrival draft of 11 meters since the official draft limitation at the discharge port was 10.5 meters; 
Girvin (n 9) 665. 
65 The Hill Harmony (n 51) [160] (Lord Hobhouse); Baughen (n 63). 
66 A/S Hansen-Tangens Rederi III v Total Transport Corp. (The Sagona) [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 
194 [205] (Staughton, J.); David Foxton, ‘Indemnities in Time Charters’ in Thomas (n 7). 
67 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 19.20. 
68 The Ramon de Larrinaga (n 25) [255] (Lord Wright). 
69  ibid [255] (Lord Wright). 
70  ibid.  
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the vessel under the time charterparty71 and not matters of navigation.72 
 
Moreover, the correct way to draft time charterparty clauses is to employ clear 
unambiguous wording so that time charterparty standard forms are 
straightforward and prevent confusion and are easier for contractual parties to 
understand. In addition, if the draft contents within the clauses under the time 
charterparty can directly reflect the view of the English court, this may also 
benefit the contractual parties. It will make it easier for them to justify their legal 
rights, since these statements in clauses will also be supported by the court. 
This ideal can be seen in Clause 13 (a) of the SHELLTIME 4 form which tried to 
clarify the wording of the clause and provides “employment of the vessel” within 
the context of the employment clause under the time charterparty.73 
 
However, it could be argued that the employment clauses within the current 
essential standards forms of time charterparty - the BALTIME form,74 the NYPE 
4675 and NYPE 93 forms76 and the GENTIME form77 - still contain ambiguous 
wording. If some wording could be added to these essential standard forms to 
make the time charterer’s and the shipowner’s legal rights and obligations with 
regard to employment of the vessel more precise, this would assist both parties 
to more effectively comprehend their legal rights and obligations. 
                                                          
71  ibid [254] (Lord Wright).  
72  ibid; The Hill Harmony (n 51) [159] (Lord Hobhouse). 
73 Thomas (n 7) 338.   
74 Thomas (n 7) 286-89.   
75 Williams (n 11) 228-31.   
76 Brodie (n 12) 32-46. 
77 (n 13). 
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Therefore, it is proposed to change the unclear and confusing word 
‘’employment’’ in Clause 9 of the BALTIME form,78 Clause 8 of the NYPE 46 
form,79 Clause 8 (a) of the NYPE 93 form,80 and Clause 12 of the GENTIME 
form81 to ‘’employment of the ship’’. This may prevent busy merchants from 
wasting their time when considering how to construe the meaning of 
“employment” in the clause of the time charterparty and may also help them to 
avoid undesirable disputes in the future. 
 
In addition, Clause 9 of the BALTIME form82 and Clause 12 of the GENTIME 
form83 use the words “or other arrangements”, though these words do not 
feature in Clause 8 of the NYPE 46 form84 or Clause 8 (a) of the NYPE 93 
form.85 Thus in order to make the contexts of Clause 8 of the NYPE 46 form86 
and Clause 8 (a) of the NYPE 93 form87 more complete it is suggested to add 
the words “and/or other arrangements”. 
 
Moreover, in order to make the scope of the time charterer’s orders clearer and 
more accurate, adding the sentence, “These orders do not cover matters of 
navigation”, is also recommended. As a result, combining this with the previous 
suggestion to modify Clause 8 of the NYPE 46 form and Clause 8 (a) of the 
                                                          
78 Thomas (n 10) 286.   
79 Williams (n 11) 229.   
80 Brodie (n 12) 34. 
81 (n 13). 
82 Thomas (n 10) 286. 
83 (n 13).  
84 Williams (n 11) 229. 
85 Brodie (n 12) 34.   
86 Williams (n 11) 229. 
87 Brodie (n 12) 34.  
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NYPE 93 form,88 as an example, the sentence will be:89 
 
…The Master…(although appointed by the Owners) shall be under the 
orders and directions of the Charterers as regards employment of the 
ship, agency and/or other arrangements. These orders and 
directions do not cover matters of navigation….  
 
It is also suggested that the modifications should operate within the employment 
clause under other standard forms of time charterparty, such as Clause 9 of the 
BALTIME form,90 Clause 8 of the NYPE 46 form91 and Clause 12 of the 
GENTIME form.92 
 
 
6.5     The shipowner’s right for indemnity from the time charterer 
 
The express indemnity clause within the time charterparty93 is established to 
reimburse the shipowner for any additional expenditure and liability incurred as 
a consequence of complying with the time charterer’s order during the time 
charter.94 It is believed that the express indemnities are regarded as one way of 
                                                          
88 ibid; Williams (n 11) 229. 
89 Bold type indicates the suggested modifications.  
90 Thomas (n 7) 286. 
91 Williams (n 11) 229.  
92 (n 13).   
93 For example, Lines 123-28 within Clause 9 of the BALTIME form. Thomas (n 7) 286. 
94 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 19.17.  
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assigning risks between the shipowner and the time charterer.95 Even if the time 
charterer is not in breach of the time charterparty and gives an order to the 
Master, the shipowner may still have a right to indemnity from the time 
charterer.96 This could happen, for example, if the time charterer’s orders or 
direction97 involve the loading of dangerous cargo,98 or physical damage to the 
vessel resulting from the time charterer’s dispatching of the vessel to an unsafe 
port.99 The time charterer may also need to indemnify the shipowner under the 
express indemnity clause when the Master signs the bills of lading at the 
demand of the time charterer and this results in additional liability for the 
shipowner.100 This will be illustrated in Section 6.6 investigating some important 
claims for an indemnity in practice.  
 
Moreover, the application of the indemnity clause is not restricted to dealing with 
an occurrence outside the ambit of other clauses in the time charterparty, even if 
this results in some overlap between the indemnity clause and other clauses.101 
However, it is argued that the indemnity clause has to be treated as a residuary 
                                                          
95 Nicholas Gaskell, ‘Charterer’s liability to Shipowner’ in Johan Schelin (ed), Modern Law of 
Charterparties (Jure AB 2003). 
96 Simon Baughen, Shipping Law (5th edn, Routledge 2012) 187.  
97 ibid.  
98 The Ann Stathatos (n 53); Deutsche Ost-Afrika Linie v Legent Maritime Co. [1998] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep 71.  
99 Lensen v Anglo Soviet Shipping Co. [1935] 40 Com Cas 320; Vardinoyannis v Egyptian 
Petroleum Co. [1971] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 200; Wilson (n 6) 109. 
100 Wilson (n 6) 109. 
101 As the held in The Ann Stathatos by Devlin J, the time charterer’s order to load specific cargo 
is regarded as employment of the vessel, hence the order was still inside the ambit of the 
indemnity clause under the time charterparty; The Ann Stathatos was time chartered on a 
wartime version of the BALTIME form which had a similar statement to Clause 9 of the BALTIME 
form: the Master was to be ‘‘under the orders of the charterer as regards employment’’. See 
Coghlin and others (n 1) para 19.26; The Ann Stathatos [1950] 83 LlLR 228 [234]-[235]; 
Christopher Smith, ‘Time Charters’ in Bernard Eder and others (eds), Scrutton on Charterparties 
and Bills of Lading (22nd edn, Sweet and Maxwell Limited 2011).  
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one to handle matters not specifically included elsewhere in the time 
charterparty.102 Nevertheless, the scope of the indemnity conferred to the 
shipowner will in all cases rely on accurate information relating to the indemnity 
clause under the time charterparty being provided.103 As with other essential 
clauses within the time charterparty, the express indemnity clause has to be 
construed within the context of the scheme of the time charter as a whole.104 
 
If the shipowner arranges the Master under the charterer’s instruction, and there 
is no express indemnity clause, such as that in the NYPE 46 form,105 the 
shipowner may be entitled to implied indemnity against suffered loss, damage or 
resulting liability caused by compliance with the time charterer’s order.106 The 
adequate costs of defending legal proceeds indicated in The Caroline P, 
exemplifies what the shipowner could claim through implied indemnity from the 
time charterer.107 In addition, as declared in The Island Archon, which was time 
chartered under the NYPE 46 form,108 an implied indemnity can be claimed not 
only when the shipowner’s consequential loss is attributed to a time charterer’s 
order which he/she is entitled to give,109 but also when the resulting loss came 
                                                          
102 The argument of the Attorney-General is in The Ramon de Larrinaga (n 25) [251]. 
103  Smith (n 101). 
104 ibid. 
105 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 19.10. 
106 Sig Bergesen DY & Co. v Mobil Shipping & Transportation Co. (The Berge Sund) [1993] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep 453 (CA); Triad Shipping Co. v Stellar Chartering & Brokerage Inc. (The Island 
Archon) [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 227 (CA); Wilson (n 6) 110; Girvin (n 9) 667-68. 
107 The Caroline P [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 466 [476] (Neill, J.). 
108 The Island Archon (n 106). 
109 ibid; Francis Reynolds, 'Time Charterparties and Bills of Ladings’ in Thomas (n 7); See also 
Girvin (n 9) 668.    
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from a time charterer’s order which he/she is not entitled to give.110 Moreover, it 
was asserted by the court that the shipowner’s right to implied indemnity from 
the time charterer against resultant loss, damage or liabilities arising from 
obeying the time charterer’s order is not on the basis of the time charterer’s 
fault.111 Furthermore, it is not necessary for an overlap between implied 
indemnity and other clauses, such as the off-payment for time charter service 
clause,112 to be associated with inconsistency within the time charterparty.113 
Consequently, for instance, the shipowner may be capable of recovering the 
loss of payment for the time charter service through the implied indemnity.114  
  
The justification for this implication of shipowner’s indemnity stems from 
business efficacy.115 The shipowner should be anticipated to allow the freedom 
of disposal of the vessel by the time charterer merely if the shipowner has the 
right under the time charterer’s liability to recover the resulting loss.116 It is also 
reasonable for the time charterer to bear the effects caused by his/her disposal 
of the vessel and instruction of the Master in order to achieve business 
effectiveness under the contract.117 Another likely ground for the shipowner’s 
right to indemnity might be based on the concept of good faith. However, this 
                                                          
110 ibid. 
111 The Athanasia Comninos [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 277; Coghlin and others (n 1) paras 19.19. 
112  It is suggested a modification of these wordings in Section 5.5.3 in Chapter 5; Girvin (n 9) 
667. 
113 Deutsche Ost-Afrika-Linie v Legent Maritime (The Marie H) [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 71; Coghlin 
and others (n 1) para 19.15; Foxton (n 66). 
114 ibid. 
115 The Island Archon (n 105) [237] (Evans, L.J.); Girvin (n 9) 668; See also Wilson (n 6) 110. 
116 The Island Archon (n 105) [237] (Evans, L.J.); Newcastle P & I V Gard [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 
387; Wilson (n 6) 110. 
117 The Island Archon [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 388 [404], [407] (Evans, L.J.); Coghlin and others (n 
1) para 19.10. 
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might be criticised as too vague.118 Nonetheless, as Mustill L.J. stated in The 
Nogar Marin, the time charterer’s obligation to implied indemnity is not 
automatic.119 It always relies on the terms of any fundamental contractual 
relationship and on the facts in each case.120 Any shipowner’s implied indemnity 
will be confined to the express terms of the indemnity clause121 and cannot be in 
conflict with the provisions within the time charterparty.122 When the time 
charterparty is created, if the shipowner expresses, or under a true construction 
implies, agreement to tolerate the liability, loss or suffered damage arising from 
the Master’s following of the time charterer’s orders and direction, there will be 
no right for the shipowner to be granted implied indemnity.123   
 
 
6.6 Some important claims for an indemnity in practice 
 
The shipowner may claim for an indemnity when the bills of lading cause the 
shipowner to incur a liability which is inconsistent with the terms of the time 
charterparty.124 This is provided in Clause 30 (b) of the NYPE 93 form.125 For 
                                                          
118 Stephen Bogle, ‘Case Comment, Disclosing Good Faith IN English Contract Law’ (2014) 18 
(1) EDIN.LR. 141, footnote 24. 
119 The Nogar Marin [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 412 [422] (Mustill, L.J.); Coghlin and others (n 1) para 
19.15. 
120 ibid. 
121 The Island Archon (n 106) [238]; Wilson (n 6) 110. 
122 The Berge Sund (n 106) [462] (Staughton, L.J.); Wilson (n 6) 110. 
123 Action Avigation Inc. v Bottiglieri Di Navigazione Spa (The Kitsa) [2005] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 432. 
See Wilson (n 6) 110; Coghlin and others (n 1) para 19.34; In addition, it is noteworthy that the 
accurate ambit and restrictions on the implied right to indemnity are not yet completely evolved. 
Coghlin and others (n 1) para 1.44. 
124 Foxton (n 66); Brian Harris, Ridley’s Law of the Carriage of Goods by Land Sea and Air (8th 
edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2010) 253-54. 
125 Brodie (n 12) 40. 
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example, in practice, if bills of lading impose a wider legal obligation on the 
shipowner than those presumed within the time charterparty when bills of lading 
are signed by the Master under the time charterer’s instruction, the shipowner 
may have the legal right for an indemnity from the time charterer regarding the 
shipowner’s additional liability.126  
 
In addition, under the time charter, there is the crucial and complex practical 
issue of identifying the contractual carrier with the holder of the bills of lading.127 
This will be specifically discussed in detail in Section 6.7. It is possible that a 
problem occurred, under the time charter, for the holder of the transferred bill of 
lading to identify who is the contractual carrier based on the ambiguous, 
confusing indication on the face of the bill of lading or contrasting indication on 
the face and back of the bill.128 Therefore, when the Master signs the bills of 
lading for cargo as presented, the shipowner might possibly be recognised as a 
carrier and be sued by the bill of lading holder for loss or damage to the 
cargo.129 The shipowner may then claim for an indemnity against all 
consequences or liabilities from the time charterer on the basis of the indemnity 
clause130 under the time charterparty.131  
 
Another potential claim for indemnity canbe caused when the shipowner claims 
                                                          
126 Foxton (n 66); Coghlin and others (n 1) para 19.18; Baughen (n 96) 189. 
127 Nicholas Gaskell, Regina Asariotis and Yvonne Baatz, Bills of Lading: Law and Contracts 
(LLP Professional Publishing 2000) para 3.28; Wilson (n 6) 7. 
128 Gaskell, Asariotis and Baatz (n 127) para 3.28. 
129 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 1.41, 21.21. 
130 For example, the express indemnity clause is indicated in The Vikfrost [1980] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 
560 (CA); Coghlin and others (n 1) para 21.24, 21.35. 
131 Wilson (n 6) 7.  
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for indemnity against the result of the time charterer delivering cargo without 
producing the bills of lading.132 Under the special characteristics of the bill of 
lading, the carrier has to deliver the goods against the production of the bill of 
lading.133 A custom of trade and the terms of the contract of carriage might 
request the delivery of cargo without presentation of the bill of lading.134 
However, in general, even if the vessel is under a time charter, the time 
charterer has no legal right to instruct the shipowner or the Master to deliver the 
cargo without showing them the bills of lading within a typical employment 
clause.135 If the time charterer has indeed instructed the shipowner or the 
Master to deliver the cargo and has not produced the bills of lading and this 
results in the shipowner’s loss, damage or liabilities,136 the shipowner may have 
the right to claim for indemnity under the indemnity clause.137 The time 
charterparty may have clearly granted the shipowner an indemnity from the time 
charterer against suffered loss, damage or liabilities caused by the shipowner or 
the Master delivering the cargo without the presentation of an original bill of 
lading.138 In addition, even if an indemnity clause within the time charterparty is 
not clearly expressed, the shipowner may have the right to claim for indemnity 
by implied indemnity.139 This happened in The Strathlorne. Cargo was released 
                                                          
132  Foxton (n 66); Gaskell (n 95).  
133  Wilson (n 6) 154. 
134 Chilewich Partners v MV Alligator Fortune [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 314; Farenco Shipping v 
Daebo Shipping [2008] EWHC 2755 (Comm); [2009] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 81; Smith (n 101)  
135  Foxton (n 66); Gaskell (n 95). 
136 In practice, the bills of lading are possibly signed by the Master or on behalf of the Master or 
other agent of the shipowner. This is why the shipowner is possibly sued by the cargo interest. 
See Wilson (n 6) 244. The issue of identity of the carrier will be discussed in Section 6.7. 
137  Foxton (n 66).  
138  ibid. 
139 ibid. 
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at the time charterer’s request without presentation of the bills of lading. This led 
to the shipowner’s liability to the third parties who held the bills of lading. Roche 
J applied the principle of Dugdale v Lovering140 and held that the shipowner was 
entitled to implied indemnity against the liability arisen from the Master’s 
obedience to the time charterer’s order under the time charter.141 
 
Cargo is another potential source of claim for an indemnity by the shipowner.142 
As The Athanasia Comninos showed, although there was nothing unusual about 
the characteristics of the coal which was carried by The Georges Chr. Lemos, 
the damages to the ship were attributed to an explosion of the coal gas on 
board.143 Mustill J allowed the shipowner’s claim for an indemnity from the time 
charterer, since the shipowner’s loss resulted from the orders of the time 
charterer regarding the loading of coal.144 In The Ovington Court, which involved 
a time charter under the NYPE 46 form, the House of Lords held that the 
damage to a cargo of wheat was caused by the improper stowage, stowage 
being the time charterer’s responsibility, and thus the shipowner had a legal 
right for indemnity from the time charterer.145 However, an exception to this 
situation is that if the time charterer can prove that the Master should have 
                                                          
140 Dugdale v Lovering [1875] LR 10 CP 196 indicates: ‘…when an act has been done by the 
plaintiff under the express directions of the defendant which occasions an injury to the rights of 
third persons, yet if such an act is not apparently illegal in itself, but is done honestly and bona 
fide in compliance with the defendant’s directions, he shall be bound to indemnify the plaintiff 
against the consequences thereof.’ In addition, under this principle, the act for which the party 
claiming for an indemnity is required to ‘perform must not be “manifestly tortious.” ‘See Coghlin 
and others (n 1) para 19.10; Foxton (n 66). 
141 Strathlorne Steamship Co. Ltd. v Andrew Weir & Co. (The Strathlorne) [1935] 50 LILR 185 
(CA); Wilson (n 6) 109; Coghlin and others (n 1) para 19.10. 
142 Foxton (n 66). 
143 The Athanasia Comninos (n 111) [297]. 
144 ibid; The Ann Stathatos (n 53); Smith (n 101). 
145 Court Line v Canadian Transport [1940] 67 LlL Rep 161 (HL). 
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intervened in the operation of cargo stowage as part of his/her ‘’supervision’’146 
and the loss or damage resulted from this inadequate supervision, the 
shipowner cannot be indemnified by the time charterer.147 The shipowner may 
also be able to claim for an indemnity based on Clause 13 (b) of the NYPE 93 
form for ‘any loss and/or damages and/or liability of whatsoever nature caused 
to the Vessel as a result of the carriage of deck cargo and which would not have 
arisen had deck cargo not been loaded.’148 However, as Mance J indicated in 
The Darya Tara,149 if the shipowners agree to the carriage of deck cargo without 
requesting any contractual right to indemnity, no implied indemnity against a 
shipowner’s suffered loss will be granted.150 
 
 
6.7 The crucial practical issue of identifying the contractual carrier with 
the bill of lading holder 
 
The significant practical difficulty of identifying who the contractual carrier with 
the bill of lading holder is, is discussed in detail in this section. How the problem 
has arisen will be shown through an exploration of the signing of bills of lading 
by the Master and the time charterer under the time charter and through 
discussion of the issue regarding the demise clause. In addition, the relationship 
                                                          
146 It can been seen in Clause 8 of the NYPE 46 form. Court Line v Canadian Transport (n 145) 
[166] (Lord Atkin) [168] (Lord Wright) [172] (Lord Porter); Gaskell (n 95).  
147 Under these circumstances, even if the facts indicate that the primary responsibility lay with 
the time charterers, the shipowners still bear the resulting loss or damage. See Court Line v 
Canadian Transport (n 145); See also Coghlin and others (n 1) para 20.21. 
148 Brodie (n 12) 37. 
149The Darya Tara [1997] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 42 [46] (Mance, J.). 
150 ibid; Foxton (n 66). 
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between the indemnity clause under the time charterparty and the bills of lading 
which are issued151 under the time charter are also highlighted. Moreover, 
efforts are made to resolve this practical problem through suggested reform of 
the relevant clause under the time charterparty. This will subsequently be 
analysed in Section 6.9. 
 
 
6.7.1 Signing of bills of lading under the time chartered vessel and related 
issues  
 
The bill of lading is significant for the international sale of goods, for the 
financing of such sales through letters of credit and for the contract of the 
carriage of goods by sea.152 A bill of lading functions as a receipt for goods 
shipped,153 as prima facie evidence of the terms of the contract of carriage154 
and as a document of title.155 Under the time charter, if the time charterer carries 
his/ her own goods, a bill of lading issued by the Master to the time charterer is 
                                                          
151 It is indicated that the process of “issue” includes ‘issue by signature and delivery by the 
carrier to the person entitled to the bill, generally the shipper.’ See Richard Aikens, Richard Lord 
and Michael Bools, Bills of Lading (Informa 2006) para 3.3. 
152 Benjamin Parker, ‘Liability for Incorrectly Clausing Bills of Lading’ (2003) LMCLQ 201. 
153 Traditionally, the practical process is that the carrier’s agent examines whether the tallies of 
cargo at the time of loading on board are correct. Following this, in returning for the mate’s 
receipt or equivalent, and for payment of any advance freight due given by the shipper, the 
Master or their agent computes the freight, records it on the bills of lading, signs the bill of lading 
as presented in conformity with the mate’s receipts and then issues the bill of lading to the 
shipper. Wilson (n 6) 118. 
154 Wilson (n 6) 129, 247. 
155 Wilson (n 6) 132. 
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only a receipt of the goods under common law.156 In addition, the rights and 
obligations between the shipowner and the time charterer are still exclusively 
dealt with by the terms of the time charterparty.157 The bill of lading will be 
regarded as a potential document of title if the time charterer sells the goods to 
a third party while the goods are still in transport.158  
 
A time charterer might run regular liner services to operate his/her own business 
and belongs to a price–fixing cartel-liner conference when chartering a vessel 
form a shipowner.159 Even though a time chartered vessel may not be 
possessed by a time charterer,160 she might be commercially painted in the time 
charterer’s colours and identified by name as a part of the time charterer’s 
fleet.161 Meanwhile, in practice the bills of lading might normally be issued by 
other conference members to the shippers when the goods are carried by the 
liner and loaded on board.162 In this circumstance, the bill of lading will serve as 
a receipt for goods shipped,163 as a document of title164 and as evidence of the 
contract of carriage between the carrier and the holder of the bill of lading when 
the bill is transferred from the shipper to the transferee, the holder of bill of 
                                                          
156 Rodocanachi, Sons & Co. v Milburn Bros [1886] 18 QBD 67; Reynolds (n 108); Charles 
Debattista, Bills of Lading in Export Trade (3rd edn, Tottel Publishing 2009) para 8.25; Shipping 
Law (2011/2012 edn, Witherby Publishing Group Ltd 2011) 161; Wilson (n 6) 6, 132. 
157 Wilson (n 6) 132; Guenter Treitel and F.M.B. Reynolds (eds), Cover on Bills of Lading (3rd 
edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2011) para 3-032. 
158 Wilson (n 6) 6-7. 
159 Wilson (n 6) 5. 
160 See the characteristics of the time charter in Section 2.2, Chapter 2. 
161 Davies and Dickey (n 26) 265. 
162 ibid. 
163 Wilson (n 6) 5. 
164 Wilson (n 6) 6-7. 
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lading.165 If the goods which are carried by the time chartered vessel have a 
problem, such as loss or damage,166 the holder of the bill of lading might sue the 
carrier of carriage.167 However, to decide who is the contractual carrier, i.e. the 
bill of lading carrier,168 who is to take responsibility for the holder of the bill of 
lading regarding any problematic goods?169 Is it the shipowner or the time 
charterer?170 This is a significant practical difficulty.171 
 
The problem in practice is possibly caused when sub-chartered vessels down 
several layers of charterparties are operated.172 In this situation, there is 
probably no indication of who the carrier in the bill of lading is since the bill of 
lading could be issued by the shipowner, the time charterer, the sub-charterer or 
the agent of any one of these.173 Under the time charter, if the bill of lading is 
signed by the Master174 or on behalf of the Master, this complex situation would 
cause confusion for the transferred bill of lading holder and cause difficultly in 
identifying who the contractual carrier was with the bill of lading holder.175  
                                                          
165 Wilson (n 6) 5. 
166 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 1.41; Girvin (n 9) 177. 
167 Simone Schnitzer, Understanding international Trade Law (Law matters Publishing 2006) 
140-41. 
168 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 1.41. 
169 Wilson (n 6) 7. 
170 Charles Debattista, ‘Cargo Claims and Bills of Lading’ in Yvonne Baatz (ed), Maritime Law 
(2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2011); Christopher Hill, Maritime Law (6th edn, Informa Professional 
2003); NJJ Gaskell, C Debattista and R J Swatton, Chorley and Giles’ Shipping Law (8th edn, 
Pearson Education Limited 2003) 261-262, 268; William Tetley, ‘Identity of the Carrier—The 
Hague Rules, Visby Rules, UNCITRAL’ (1977) 4 LMCLQ 519. 
171 Wilson (n 6) 7. 
172 Debattista (n 170). 
173 Wilson (n 6) 244. 
174 The Master is usually regarded as the agent of the shipowner. Wilson (n 6) 244. 
175 Under English law, it is assumed that there is only one contracting carrier, either the charterer 
or shipowner. Gaskell, Asariotis and Baatz (n 127) para 3.28, 3.38, 3.47; Girvin (n 9) 177; 
Wilson (n 6) 244. 
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Moreover, this issue could occur when the bill of lading in the charterer’s form is 
used under the time charter.176 The bill of lading in the charterer’s form refers to  
the name and/or the logo of the specific shipping liner as shown in the space on 
the top right within the face of the bill of lading.177 The holder of bill of lading 
might believe the time charterer is the contractual carrier because the holder of 
bill of lading may not know there is a time charterparty between the shipowner 
and carrier of carriage who charters the vessel from the shipowner to run the 
business during a set period of time.178 In this circumstance, deciding who is the 
bill of lading carrier,179 with the cargo owner, is the paramount point to best 
determine the signature for whom and how the bill of lading has been signed at 
the foot of the bill than the operation of the bill of lading in the charterer’s 
form.180 Furthermore, the problem of identification of the carrier of carriage 
under the time charter might come from a shortfall in indicating who the 
contractual carrier is, or the indication contradicting the signature on the face of 
the bills of lading,181 or the indication of the carrier and the indication of the 
signature, either or both of those provided on the face of the bills contrast with 
the provisions in the back of the bills.182 This is likely to become difficult for the 
holder of the bill of lading, because he/she might be unsure as to whether it is 
better to take notice of what is on the face of the bill of lading, to look at the 
                                                          
176 Gaskell, Asariotis and Baatz (n 127) para 3.47. 
177 ibid. 
178 Wilson (n 6) 7. 
179 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 1.41. 
180 Gaskell, Asariotis and Baatz (n 127) paras 3.47. 
181 For example, this dispute arose in The Venezuela [1980] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 393; Coghlin and 
others (n 1) para 21.4; Aikens, Lord and Bools (n 151) para 7.64. 
182 For instance, this argument occurred in Sunrise Maritime Inc. v Uvisco Ltd. (The Hector) 
[1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 287; Aikens, Lord and Bools (n 151) para 7.65; Homburg Houtimport BV v 
Agrosin Private Ltd. (The Starsin) [2003] 2 WLR 711. See the discussion in Section 6.7.1.2.  
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demise clause183 or the identity of carrier clause which might be inserted on the 
back of the bills of lading.184  
 
 
6.7.1.1 Signing bills of lading for or on behalf of the shipowner 
 
In common law, the signing bills of lading on behalf of the shipowner is by 
general authority given to the Master and these signed bills of lading can bind 
the shipowner.185 In addition, the Master is generally obliged to sign the bills of 
lading which are presented by the time charterer under the time charterparty.186 
For example, it is provided in Clause 8 of the NYPE 46 form that ‘…the Captain, 
who is to sign Bills of Lading for cargo as presented, in conformity with Mate’s or 
Tally Clerk’s receipts.’187 However it is asserted that in some circumstances the 
Master is entitled to not sign the bills of lading, for example, when the bills 
indicate a port of discharge outside the trading limits of the time charter,188 or 
when he/she knows that the bills incorrectly state that the cargo has been 
loaded under the deck.189  
 
Moreover, when the time charterer, his/her Agent or sub-Agent signs the bills of 
                                                          
183 See the discussion in Section 6.7.1.2. 
184 (n 182). 
185 Tillmanns v Knutsford [1908] 2 KB 385 (CA); [1908] AC 406 (HL); Wilston v Andrew Weir 
[1925] 22 LIL Rep 521; The Rewia [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 325 (CA); Coghlin and others (n 1) para 
21.11; Shipping Law (n 156) 162. 
186 Wilson (n 6) 7. 
187 These are usually regarded as shipowner’s bills. Gaskell, Asariotis and Baatz (n 127) para 
3.47; Coghlin and others (n 1) para 21.30; Williams (n 11) 229. 
188 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 21.41. 
189 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 21.53. 
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lading and adds the words “for the Master”190 or “on behalf of the Master”,191 it is 
disputable as to whether or not these kinds of bills of lading can bind the 
shipowner.192 There are various views regarding this issue both in the UK and 
the US.193 
 
In terms of views emerging from UK cases, the charterer or the agent signing 
the bills of lading for the Master can bind the shipowner194 either by getting 
actual authority from the Master or the shipowner through the clause within the 
time charterparty or the agreement after signing the time charterparty,195 or 
through the authority implied by the normal terms in the time charterparty.196 
The time charterer or his/her Agents are generally given an implied authority to 
sign bills of lading as Agents for the Master, which likely comes from the Master 
following the time charterer’s orders and instructions for the employment of the 
vessel under the time charterparty, as Clause 8 of the NYPE 46 form provides, 
for example.197 It was also indicated in Tillmanns & Co. v S. S.  Knutsford that 
the time charterers could sign the bills of lading on behalf of the Master and 
shipowner instead of presenting them to the Master to demand that he /she sign 
for or on behalf of the shipowner.198 In these circumstances, the shipowner is as 
                                                          
190 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 21.13; Reynolds (n 109) para 9.23. 
191 Hill (n 170) 249-50; Shipping Law (n 156) 162. 
192 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 21.1, 21.13, 21.94. 
193 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 21.13, 21.94. 
194 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 1.42. 
195 The Berkshire [1974] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 185 (Brandon, J.); Coghlin and others (n 1) para 21.19. 
196 Tillmanns & Co. v S. S. Knutsford (n 185) [1908] AC.406; Coghlin and others (n 1) paras 
21.18-19. 
197 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 21.18; Williams (n 11) 229. 
198 (n 196). 
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a party to the contract of carriage with the bill of lading holder.199 These bills 
which bind the shipowner are ship’s bills.200 In short, in the UK, under the above 
situations, it is usual that the time charterer or his/her Agent can sign for the 
Master or on behalf of the Master in the bills of lading201 and this could bind the 
shipowner as a carrier with the shipper.202   
 
In terms of US cases, if the name of the shipowner does not show in the bills of 
lading and the bills were not issued by the Master, the shipowner is not 
personally liable for them if they are issued and signed by the time charterer “for 
the Master”.203 This is because the courts believe that this does not have 
enough legal grounds for the shipowner to take responsibility as a carrier with 
the shipper.204 To bind the shipowner as the contractual party under the bill of 
lading, it would probably be essential for the time charterer to get authority from 
the Master or the shipowner when the time charterer signs the bill of lading.205   
It can be seen that the view of the courts regarding the charterer signing for the 
                                                          
199 ibid; See also Wilston v Andrew Weir [1925] 22 LIL Rep 521. LEP International v Atlanttrafic 
Express Service [1987] 10 NSWLR 614; Coghlin and others (n 1) para 21.13; The Berkshire 
[1974] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 185. Coghlin and others (n 1) para 21.18. 
200 Reynolds (n 109); Hill (n 170) 249-50; Gaskell, Asariotis and Baatz (n 127) para 1.43. 
201 (n 195)-(198); Coghlin and others (n 1) para  21.13.  
202 (n 200). 
203 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 21.94. 
204 ibid. 
205 Yeramex Int’I v The Tendo, 595 F.2d 943, 944,1979 AMC 1282,1283 (4th Cir.1979); Demsey 
& Associates v The Sea Star, 461 F.2d 1009 (2d Cir.1972); Commercial Metals v The 
Luckyman, 1994 AMC 673 (E. D. Pa 1993); Coghlin and others (n 1) para 21.94. It is also 
presumed that it would probably be necessary for the shipowner to expressly give the authority 
to the charterer to sign the bill of lading for the shipowner through an additional clause provided 
in the charterparty. Nitram, Inc. v M/V Cretan Life, 599 F. 2d 1359 (5th Cir. 1979); Russell W. 
Pritchett, ‘Charterer’s Authority to Sign Bills of Lading under Standard Time Charter Terms’ 
(1980) 1 LMCLQ 21, footnote 21.  
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Master in the US is quite different from the view of the courts in the UK.206 This 
has possibly caused conflict in international maritime law.207 In order to prevent 
this potential conflict, it has been suggested that the time charterparty should be 
supplemented to clarify the contractual parties’ intentions regarding whether the 
time charterer should be given the authority by the shipowner to sign for the 
Master.208 The same belief is also clearly presented by Article 20 (a) (i) of the 
UCP 600.209 The reforms suggested in Section 6.9 concern these suggestions 
and adopt the spirit of Article 20 (a) (i) of the UCP 600210 for the relevant clause 
of the time charterparty.  
 
Furthermore, apart from in some exceptional circumstances to limit the 
shipowner’s right to be indemnified211 when the cargo interest claims the loss or 
damage from the shipowner, the shipowner can subsequently claim indemnity 
from the time charterer against all consequences or liability directly caused by 
the Master, Officers or agents signing bills of lading under the time 
charterparty.212 From this it may be concluded that relationships between 
indemnity and the bill of lading which is issued under the time charterparty are 
                                                          
206 Coghlin and others (n 1) paras 21.13, 21.18-21.19, 21.21, 21.94. 
207 Pritchett (n 205).  
208 It was also pointed out that Clause 9 of the BALTIME form and Clause 8 of New York 
Produce Exchange do not confer the time charterer the authority to sign the bill of lading for the 
shipowner. These clauses are different from the clause in The Cretan Life, which explicitly 
stipulated for an authority given in the charterer. The Cretan Life (n 205); Pritchett (n 205). 
209 <http://finotax.com/faq/ucpdc.htm> accessed 5 July 2013. 
210 ibid. 
211 See the discussion in Section 6.8. 
212 The explicit provision can be seen, for instance, in Clause 9 of the BALTIME form which 
provides that the time charterer shall indemnify the shipowner against all consequences or 
liabilities caused by the Master, Officers or Agents signing bills of lading. Thomas (n 7) 286; 
Aikens, Lord and Bools (n 151) para 3.15; Wilson (n 6) 7; If there is no explicit provision 
regarding an indemnity in the time charterparty, the indemnity will be likely implied. Girvin (n 9) 
178. 
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not only likely to establish the balance of rights and obligations213 between the 
shipowner and the time charterer under the time chartered vessel but also 
display the possible functional allocation of risk between the contractual parties 
by way of explicitly providing the agreement within the time charterparty.214   
 
 
6.7.1.2 Signing bills of lading in the time charterer’s own name or on behalf of 
the time charterer 
 
If the time charterer or his/her agent signs the time charterers’ own names in the 
bills of lading215 or on their own behalf, instead of claiming to sign the bills of 
lading “for the Master”, or “for the shipowners”, the time charterer could be 
regarded as the only contracting party, the carrier, with the shipper under the 
contract of carriage.216 In addition, it is possible to construe the Master signing 
on behalf of the time charterer on the basis of a clear expression in the bills of 
lading showing that the Master is the Agent for the time charterer.217 It is 
therefore held by the court that the contractual carrier under the contract of 
carriage is the time charterer.218 That is to say, in these circumstances, the time 
                                                          
213 The time charterer is conferred to issue the bills of lading to the shipper and present the bills 
of lading to the Master to sign, in return for indemnity from the time charterer against all 
consequences and liabilities induced by the shipowner. Wilson (n 6) 7. 
214 Gaskell (95); Foxton (n 66). 
215 Martin Dockray, Cases and Materials on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (3rd edn, Routledge. 
Cavendish 2004) 78.  
216 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 21.14; Shipping Law (n 156) 162. 
217 Harrison v Huddersfield Steamship Co. [1903] 19 TLR 386; Gaskell, Asariotis and Baatz (n 
127) para 3.51. 
218 ibid. 
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charterer is bound by the bills of lading219 and the shipowner is not.220 The bills 
of lading are therefore recognised as charterer’s bills,221 which are under these 
self-evident contracts of carriage between the time charterer as the carrier and 
bills of lading holder.222 This also results in it being possible for the time 
charterer to be regarded as carrier and claimed by the cargo interests who are 
holders of bills of lading if there are any issues of cargo223 on the basis of the 
bills of lading contracts.224 
 
 
6.7.2 Issues regarding the demise clause 
 
Historically, only the shipowner can have a limitation of liability under the s. 503 
Merchant Shipping Act 1894.225 Under this circumstance, for the charterer’s 
interest and for the purpose of getting the benefit from the limitation of liabilities 
to the bill of lading holder, even with the fact that the time charterer is a 
contractual party with the shipper, the time charterer may have an agreement 
with the shipowner to insert a demise clause under the bill of lading to direct 
cargo claims to the shipowner,226 which can transfer his/her legal liability to the 
                                                          
219 For example, see The Starsin (n 182); Davies and Dickey (n 26) 267. 
220 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 21.14. 
221 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 21.71; Reynolds (n 109). 
222 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 21.71. 
223 ibid. 
224 Wilson (n 6) 5. 
225 Gaskell, Asariotis and Baatz (n 127) para 3.67; John Hare, Shipping Law & Admiralty 
Jurisdiction in South Africa (2nd edn, JUTA & Co. Ltd. 2009) 709. 
226 It is probable that the shipowner is willing to agree to this clause with the time charterer since 
the effect of doing so might decrease the net overall amount paid by interest by the shipowner to 
the cargo interest. In addition, it is theoretically probable that this might be a factor affecting the 
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shipowner.227  
 
However, a demise clause, when inserted in the bill of lading, makes the issue 
regarding the identity of the carrier more complex228 since it is debatable 
whether or not the demise clause in the bill of lading, which transfers the time 
charterer’s liability to the shipowner, is valid.229 Giving effect to the demise 
clause is refused in a lot of jurisdictions and the strict construction for the 
demise clause has possibly been adopted in other countries.230  
 
In addition, there is a question about whether the demise clause is still 
meaningful. The reason for this is that, following Article 6 (2) of the 1957 
Limitation of Liability in the 1957 Brussels Convention, which provided that not 
only the shipowner but also the demise charterer, voyage charterer and time 
charterer can assert the limitation of liability,231 the time charterer is therefore 
                                                                                                                                                                          
rate of payment for the time charter service. Gaskell, Asariotis and Baatz (n 127) para 3.67; A 
typical example of the demise clause is as follows: ‘If the ship is not owned or chartered by 
demise to the company or line by whom this bill of lading issued (as may be the case 
notwithstanding anything which appears to the contrary) the Bills of lading shall take effect as a 
contract with the Owner or demise charterer, as the case may be, as principal made through the 
agency of the said company or line who act as agents only and shall be under no personal 
liability whatsoever in respect thereof.’ See Wilson (n 6) 246. 
227 Wilson (n 6) 246. 
228 Davies and Dickey (n 26) 269. 
229 Shipping Law (n 156) 162. 
230 It was indicated, in Andersons (Pacific) Trading Co. v Karlander [1980] 2 NSWLR 870, that 
the demise clause is operated only when the charterer acts as an agent for the shipowner 
showed in the face of the bill of lading. See Davies and Dickey (n 26) 269; Wilson (n 6) 246. 
231 The convention is the “International Convention relating to the Limitation of the Liability of 
Owners of Sea-Going Ships, and Protocol of Signature” (Brussels, 10 October 1957). 
<http://www.admiraltylawguide.com/conven/limitation1957.html> accessed 24 June 2013. It has 
been superseded by Article 1.2 of the Convention of Limitation of Liability for Maritime claims 
1976, which applies in the UK pursuant to s. 186 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995. See David 
Foxton, ‘Bills of Lading for Goods on a Chartered Ship’ in Eder and others (n 101), footnote 105; 
Gaskell, Asariotis and Baatz (n 127) para 3.68; Hill (n 170) 249, 251; William Tetley, ‘The 
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not necessary to transfer liability to the shipowner in order for the interests of the 
time charterer by way of the demise clause within the bill of lading.232 In addition, 
it is asserted that the cargo shipper might merely contact the time charterer or 
its agents.233 The shipper might be shocked that it is not known which 
shipowner is liable for his/her cargo if any cargo dispute arises.234 Therefore, it 
is a cause for criticism that the demise clause might harm the achievement of 
justice because there may be a shortage in transparency, which is the aim of 
business.235 
 
Nonetheless, Brandon J. commented in The Berkshire that the demise clause is 
regarded as valid in the UK.236 In addition, it is asserted that the demise clause 
is acceptable because its purpose is only for identifying the party’s legal liability 
within the Hague/Visby Rules237 and it therefore does not contrast with Article III 
Rule 8 of the Hague/Visby Rules which prohibits the carrier or the ship from 
precluding or lessening their liability within a contract of carriage otherwise than 
as permitted by the convention itself.238 Moreover, inserting an “Identity of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Demise of the Demise Clause?’ (1999) 44 McGill LJ 807 <www.mcgill.ca/maritimelaw/maritime-
admiralty/demiseclause> accessed 28 December 2012. 
232 (n 226)-(n 227). 
233 Hare (n 225) 714.  
234 ibid. 
235 ibid. 
236 The Berkshire [1974] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 185 [188]. See Wilson (n 6) 246; Davies and Dickey (n 
26) 269; Hill (n 170) 249; Gaskell, Debattista and Swatton (n 170) 269. 
237 Wilson (n 6) 246-47; The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971 was enacted to give the force 
of the law to the Hague-Visby Rules. See Gaskell, Asariotis and Baatz (n 127) para 1.9; Wilson 
(n 6) 6, 174. 
238 Wilson (n 6) 246-47; Girvin (n 9) 182; <http://www.admiraltylaw.com/statutes/hague.html> 
accessed 3 July 2013. 
254 
 
Carrier” clause239 in the bill of lading by the time charterer is asserted as another 
alternative way in practice in the UK to avoid the time charterer’s legal liability.240   
 
On the other hand, in the US, there is a different view regarding the legal effect 
of the demise clause.241 It was held in Epstein v United States242 and Blanchard 
Lumber Co. v The Anthony II243 that the demise clause should be invalid since 
the time charterer attempted to transfer his/her potential liability for the loss or 
damage of goods to the shipowner by the demise clause under the bill of lading 
which is in breach of public policy.244 In addition, it is indicated in Thyssen Steel 
Co. M/V Kavo Yerakas245 that such a demise clause is null and void under 
Section 1303(8) of Title 46 of the United States Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 
1936.246 Even though the charterer likely cannot transfer liability through a 
demise clause, the court in Recovery Services International v The Tatiana L 
decided that the cargo interest still had legal right to impose liability on the 
                                                          
239 A model of an Identity of Carrier clause in the bill of lading is as follows: ‘The contract 
evidenced by this bill of lading is between the Merchant and the Owner of the vessel named 
herein and it is, therefore, agreed that the said shipowner alone shall be liable for any damage 
or loss due to any breach or non-performance of any obligation arising out of the contract of 
Carriage.’ See Wilson (n 6) 247. 
240 It is indicated that the intended effect of identity of carrier clause and demise clause is 
broadly the same. Gaskell, Asariotis and Baatz (n 127) para 3.82; Wilson (n 6) 247. 
241 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 21.7. 
242 Epstein v United States, 86 F.Supp. 740 (S.D.N.Y.1949); Coghlin and others (n 1) para 
21.137. 
243 Blanchard Lumber Co. v The Anthony II, 259 F. Supp. 857, 865-866, 1967 AMC 103, 120-
121 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). Coghlin and others (n 1) para 21.137. 
244 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 21.137. 
245 Thyssen Steel Co. v M/V Kavo Yerakas, 50 F3d 1349, 1353, 1995 AMC 2317 (5th Cir 1995); 
Davies and Dickey (n 26) 269. 
246 The United States Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1936 incorporates the terms of Hague 
Rules 1924 with some amendments. The contents of Section 1303 (8) of Title 46 U. S. C. A are 
the same as those of Article III Rule 8 of the Hague Rules. 
<<http://www.worldshipping.org/industry-issues/cargo-liability/background > accessed 19 July 
2013; <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode46a/usc_sec_46a_00001303----000-
.html> accessed 19 July 2013. 
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shipowner on the basis of the clause which identified the carrier of carriage 
within the bill of lading.247 Notwithstanding, it is held that the demise clause or 
identity of the carrier clause will still be valid under at least three 
circumstances.248   
 
Firstly, as Yeramex International v. S. S. Tendo249 revealed, the demise clause, 
which identified the time charterer as the sole carrier, was upheld and the 
shipowner did not need to take responsibility as the carrier.250 This was because 
the charterer signed “For Master” but the charterer had not been conferred 
authority to sign by the shipowner.251 Secondly, a clause which identifies the 
time charterer as the carrier is effective if the charterer has been authorised to 
sign his/her own name instead of “For Master” within the bills of lading.252 
Differently, in the third circumstance, the demise clause which identifies the 
shipowner as the carrier is also valid when the shipper finds it hard to believe  
that the carrying of its goods has been agreed by the original charterer.253 This 
occurs when the shipowner agrees to give the original charterer authority to sign 
“For Master” instead of signing the name of the original charterer, or the sub-
charterer is a carrier who solicits the goods for the vessel which is sub-chartered 
from the original charterer.254 Under these circumstances, the original time 
                                                          
247 Recovery Services International v The Tatiana L, 1988 AMC 788 (S.D.N.Y.1986). See 
Coghlin and others (n 1) para 21.138. 
248 Russell W. Pritchett, ‘The Demise Clause in American Courts’ (1980) 4 LMCLQ 387. 
249 Yeramex International v S. S. Tendo, 595 F. 2d 943 (4th Cir.1979); Pritchett (n 248). 
250 Pritchett (n 248). 
251 ibid. 
252 ibid. 
253 ibid.  
254 ibid. 
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charterer should be excluded from the carrier liability when he/she issues the 
bills of lading on behalf of the sub-charterer and the original time charterer signs 
the bills of lading “For Master”,255 or when the bills of lading were issued “For 
Master” by the sub-charterer.256 
 
The inconsistent decisions from courts in the UK and the US show that the 
controversial issue about whether the demise clause or the identity of the carrier 
clause should be regarded as valid might need further investigation.257 Even 
though it could be found that the US cases are likely to be in favour of the 
invalidity of a demise clause or identity of the carrier clause,258 it might be 
arguable that these clauses are still valuable since they provide further evidence 
of the intentions of relations between the shipowner and the charterer.259  
 
It is also worth noting the important case of The Starsin when determining 
whether the words on the face of the bill of lading or the context of the demise 
clause and the identity of the carrier clause on the reverse side of the bill of 
lading, takes a dominating effect.260 The Starsin was a carrier under a time 
charter by Continental Pacific Shipping Ltd., who issued the bills of lading.261 
The port agent signed for the time charterer as the carrier on the face of the bill 
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of lading262 and this signature was identified at the foot of the face of the bill of 
lading.263 However, there was a demise clause which stipulated that the 
shipowners were under effect of a contract of carriage by the bill of lading.264 In 
addition, it was provided in the identity of the carrier clause that the shipowners 
and the cargo owners were the parties entered into the contract of carriage as 
evidenced by the bill of lading.265 The two clauses were both in the small print 
on the back of the bill of lading.266 Due to bad storage before the voyage 
started, part of the cargo was damaged.267 The bill of lading holder sued the 
shipowner as a carrier on the basis of the two clauses.268 The House of Lords 
held that the shipowners did not need to take responsibility for the cargo owners 
because the bills of lading were charterers’ bills.269 The court construed the bill 
of lading from the commercial angle to confirm the intentions of the contractual 
parties and provide a business sense to the bill of lading.270 The court believed 
that, in this case, reasonable merchants in their course of normal dealings 
would no doubt believe that the time charterer would accept the liability of the 
carrier from reading the words on the face of the bill of lading, especially 
covering the manner of the signature.271 Therefore, the court indicated that the 
contractual carrier could be determined from the indication on the face of the bill 
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of lading, which covered the words specially inserted in the signature box272 and 
had an overriding effect on the contexts of the demise clause and the identity of 
the carrier clause inserted on the back of the bill of lading.273 That is to say, in 
this circumstance, given that there was a “clear and unambiguous” indication 
regarding the contractual carrier of the carriage on the face of the bill of 
lading,274 the significance of the face of the bill of lading was shown.275 There 
were no grounds for the court to examine the demise clause or the identity of 
the carrier clause on the reverse side of the bill of lading.276 It was also not 
necessary to try to resolve any differences between the face and back of the bill 
of lading.277 
 
The decision by the House of Lords satisfies the expectation of a business to 
clearly, easily and quickly ascertain who the carrier is.278 This is an exclusive 
advantage for considering the transferability of the majority of bills of lading and 
therefore enables the transferee, under the determination of the court, to identify 
the contractual carrier from the indication of the bills of lading.279 In addition, the 
judgment also confirms banking practice280 and guides shippers and bankers 
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toward easily identifying who the bill of lading carrier is.281 The decision of this 
case is therefore noted as being pragmatic282 and likely to have brought a 
“strong commercial outcome”.283 
 
However, The Starsin has been criticised in that it only solved the difficulty as to 
clear indication on the face of the bill of lading overriding the clause shown on 
the reverse side of the bill.284 It would still be problematic in practice if an 
unclear bill of lading presented an apparent contradiction with respect to the 
name of the charterer at the head of the bill of lading and the signature on the 
bottom of the bill, and the provision indicated in the demise clause285 and the 
identity of the carrier clause, both on the reverse side of the bills.286 Meanwhile, 
if the bills of lading are transferred to a third party or transferred down several 
layers, this might not protect the third party, who is the holder of the bills of 
lading.287  
 
This confusing conflict regarding the bills of lading might result in further 
problems in identifying the correct carrier when the bill of lading holder, normally 
a lay person, needs to claim for damage from the carrier of carriage. The legal 
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proceeding must be taken within one year of the event under Article III Rule 6 of 
the Hague/Visby Rules.288 If the bill of lading holder might pass the time bar to 
commence legal proceedings, he/she would therefore bear the mistake in 
respect of the identification of the incorrect carrier.289 The difficulty triggers 
further concern about appropriate solutions when reforming the time 
charterparty and this is discussed in Section 6.9. 
 
 
6.8 Limitations to the shipowner’s right to be indemnified  
 
There are some limitations to the shipowner’s right to be indemnified by the time 
charterer.290 First of all, the shipowner cannot recover the resulting loss if the 
types of risks involved are within the scope of the shipowner’s responsibility.291 
The shipowner remains liable for all matters with respect to ship management 
and matters of navigation.292 For example, Evans L.J., in the Court of Appeal in 
The Island Archon, indicated that time charterers may be held responsible for 
their instructions to the Master within the express indemnity clause but that this 
liability does not cover the loss caused by the navigation risks which the 
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shipowner has consented to bear.293 In addition, the shipowners are not entitled 
to be indemnified by the time charterer against the losses of ordinary expenses 
of navigation which occur following the time charterer’s orders.294 Lloyd J. in The 
Aquacharm also indicated that when expenses are incurred in the course of 
normal navigation, even when these are a result of the shipowner’s compliance 
with the time charterer’s instruction, for example, for ballasting, the shipowner 
cannot be entitled to an indemnity from the time charterer.295  
 
Secondly, as Devlin J. in Grace v General Steam Nav Co. stated, the Master is 
not obliged to act on the time charterer’s orders or instructions which are 
obviously beyond the time charterer’s authority.296 Hence the shipowner will not 
be reimbursed from the resulting loss on the basis of the indemnity clause if, for 
instance, the Master does not act in good faith and/or acts unreasonably297 in 
following the time charterer’s orders to move to an apparently unsafe port.298 In 
addition, as held by Mustill L.J. in The Nogar Marin, the clean bills of lading are 
signed but the Master did not verify the condition of the goods and did not fully 
recognise the fact that some of the coils were rusty when shipped.299 Thus the 
shipowner was not entitled to be indemnified by the charterer since the Master’s 
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act of obeying the charterer’s directions or instructions was manifestly tortious or 
improper.300 The rule of public policy is also applied here.301 Under contract, if 
someone can claim an indemnity against the results of what is known by both 
parties to be an illegal act, this is an illegal contract and it cannot be 
enforceable.302  
 
Thirdly, the shipowner cannot be indemnified by the time charterer against 
suffered loss, damages or liabilities if he/she cannot prove his/her loss, 
damages or liabilities were the result of obeying the time charterer’s order,303 or 
if the link is too remote.304 As an illustration, in The Aquacharm, the overloading 
of the vessel is likely to have occurred on account of the Master’s negligence.305 
In order to be permitted to transit the Panama Canal, the overloaded vessel 
needed to trans-ship some of the cargo.306 Griffiths L.J. indicated that the 
shipowner failed to prove that the transhipment costs were suffered as a direct 
result of obeying the charterers’ order.307 Therefore, it was held that the 
shipowners had no legal right to an indemnity from the charterer against the 
transhipment cost which arose from following the time charterer’s orders to 
move through the Panama Canal.308 In addition, as held by Lloyd J. in The 
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Aquacharm, the shipowner had no right to recover extreme weather damage 
solely based on the assertion that if the charterer had instructed the vessel on a 
different voyage, the extreme weather damage would not have happened.309 
This was because the link between the extreme weather damage and the 
shipowner’s compliance with the time charterer’s order was too remote.310 
Moreover, as Roche J. stated in The Hillcroft, if the shipowner’s loss does not 
“directly” arise from the time charterer’s order, which could be the case, if, for 
example, the chain of causation is broken by some act of the Master or Crew’s 
negligence or intervention by some marine casualty, the shipowner’s indemnity 
will not operate.311 Above all, the vital examination in practice is as follows: to 
award the shipowner a right to claim for an indemnity from the time charterer, 
the shipowner’s resulting loss, damages or liabilities should be the direct 
consequence of conforming to the charterer’s instruction.312 Meanwhile, an 
unbroken causal chain between the shipowner’s resulting loss or liabilities and 
the time charterer’s order is also essential for this type of claim.313   
 
In short, the shipowner may have the right to indemnity from the time charterer 
against suffered loss, damage or liabilities because of the Master’s compliance 
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with the time charterer’s order.314 However, there are still some limitations, as 
noted above.315  
 
 
6.9    Reforming the indemnity clause 
 
As mentioned previously Roche J. in The Hillcroft, indicated that under the time 
charter, the shipowner’s right to indemnity should be based on consequences 
which arise ‘’directly’’ from the time charterer’s order.316 The word “directly” 
indicates that the chain of causation is not interrupted by any of the 
aforementioned factors.317  
 
Therefore, it is recommended that the view of court, to add “directly” after the 
words showing causation in the indemnity clause under the time charterparty, be 
adopted. This may make contractual parties more aware that in order for the 
shipowner to successfully claim his/her right to indemnity from the time 
charterer, there should be no intervening event which breaks the chain of 
causation between the shipowner’s resulting loss, damage or liability and the 
shipowner’s compliance with the time charterer’s order.318 For example, adding 
“directly” to the third sentence of Clause 9 of the BALTIME form319 would 
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change it to state: ‘The Charterers shall indemnify the Owners against all 
consequences or liabilities arising directly from the Master, officers or Agents 
signing Bills of Lading or other documents or otherwise complying with such 
orders…’320 
 
The same suggestion is made for improving other separate clauses regarding 
narrower321 shipowners’ rights to indemnity,322 for example, in terms of the 
carriage of deck cargo, the shipowner’s rights of indemnity provided in Clause 
13 (b) of the NYPE 93 form,323 and in terms of the bills of lading, the 
shipowner’s right of indemnity stipulated within Clause 30 (b) of the NYPE 93 
form324 and Clause 17 (e) of the GENTIME form.325  
 
Specifically, Clause 18 (f) of the GENTIME form provides that the shipowner 
and the time charterer ‘agree to indemnify each other against all loss, damage 
or expenses arising or resulting from any obligation to pay claims, fines or 
penalties for which the other party is liable in according with this Charter 
Party…’326 From the standpoint of allocating risk,327 it is believed that it is also 
fair and reasonable for the person who has any obligation under the time 
charterparty to indemnify another contracted party on the grounds of directly 
causing another’s loss, damage or expenses. Therefore, it is also proposed to 
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add “directly” to Clause 18 (f) of the GENTIME form so the phrase becomes 
“…arising or resulting directly from…”328 
 
Moreover, as previously mentioned, in practice, the shipowner’s claim for 
indemnity can often be seen where the bills of lading expose the shipowner to a 
liability which is inconsistent with the terms of the time charterparty.329 In order 
to solve the dispute in practice, one possible solution is to ensure that the terms 
under the bills of lading do not change the terms applied within the time 
charterparty and to make the bills of lading subject to the time charterparty.330 
Thus a term is often included under the time charterparty indicating that the 
Master sign the bills of lading “without prejudice to this Charterparty’’ or “without 
prejudice to the terms and conditions of the Charter party’’ or with some other 
similar wording,331 as with Clause 30 (b) of the NYPE 93 form,332 Clause 17 (a) 
(i) of the GENTIME form333 and Clause 13 (a) of the SHELLTIME 4 form.334  
 
However, it is unclear why Clause 9 of the BALTIME form335 and Clause 8 of the 
NYPE 46 form336 lack this important provision. It seems likely to have been an 
                                                          
328 (n 13). 
329 Foxton (n 66).  
330 Gaskell (n 95). 
331 These words only confirm that the time charterparty be kept unaffected by the signature of 
bills of lading in likely various terms. Coghlin and others (n 1) para 21.35; Gaskell (n 95); Hare (n 
225) 760; Gaskell, Asariotis and Baatz (n 127) para 21.5. 
332 It provides “without prejudice to this Charter party”. Brodie (n 12) 40. 
333 It provides “without prejudice to the terms and conditions of the Charter party”. (n 13). 
334 It provides “without prejudice to this charter”. Thomas (n 7) 339. 
335 Thomas (n 7) 286. 
336 Williams (n 11) 229. 
267 
 
omission when these two clauses were drafted under the BALTIME form337 and 
NYPE 46 form.338 Therefore, for the purpose of avoiding the terms under the 
bills of lading making alterations to the terms under the time charterparty, it is 
suggested that Clause 9 of the BALTIME from339 and Clause 8 of the NYPE 46 
form340 could follow the sample of Clause 30 (b) of the NYPE 93 form,341 and 
Clause 17 (a) (i) of the GENTIME form,342 to add ‘All bills of lading or other 
documents shall be without prejudice to the terms and conditions of this Charter’ 
under these clauses. This may make the shipowner’s and the time charterer’s 
legal liability within the bills of lading the same as those under the time 
charterparty. It is expected that this could simplify the legal relationship between 
the shipowner, the time charterer and the bills of lading holders. 
 
In addition, it is important to avoid the aforementioned issues in Section 6.6 from 
occurring in practice, especially regarding inaccurate records of the statements 
in the bills of lading or other documents, for example, inaccuracies regarding the 
number of packages or pieces, the quantity, the weight or the apparent order or 
condition of the cargo.343 Moreover, it is asserted that, even though there is no 
provision regarding the Master signing bills of lading for cargo as presented in 
Clause 9 of the BALTIME form,344 it could be likely to conclude this from the 
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contents provided in this clause.345 Therefore, this position within Clause 9 of 
the BALTIME form346 is no different from what is provided in Clause 8 of the 
NYPE 46 form,347 Clause 30 (a) of the NYPE 93 form348 and Clause 17 (a) (i) of 
the GENTIME form.349 Nonetheless, it is unclear why the shortage is not filled or 
clearly displayed in Clause 9 of the BALTIME form.350 
 
It is important to make the contractual parties aware of their legal obligations 
and to make the context of the time charterparty more complete. It is therefore 
also recommended that further details should be added to Clause 9 of the 
BALTIME form351 to indicate that the Master shall sign bills of lading or other 
documents for cargo as presented in conformity with mate’s receipts. This would 
mean that the clause would be more consistent with other similar clauses in 
standard forms, such as Clause 8 of the NYPE 46 form,352 Clause 30 (a) of the 
NYPE 93 form,353 and Clause 17 (a) (i) of the GENTIME form.354 This would 
also make the context of Clause 9 of the BALTIME form355 clearer and more 
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complete under the time charterparty. 
 
Furthermore, as described in Section 6.7, the issue regarding identifying the 
contractual carrier with the bill of lading holder under the time charter may cause 
significant dispute in practice.356 This could incur unnecessary trouble to the 
shipowner in practice.357 Even though the shipowners could eventually be 
indemnified by the time charterers against all consequences and liabilities,358 
their business would be disturbed by the bill of lading holder, and the possible 
course of action brought to them by the bill of lading holder359 might also result 
in them suffering a time consuming and possibly costly360 and harmful blow to 
their commercial reputation and it may be necessary to take a further effort to 
recover their business reputation.   
 
It could be found that the root of this issue arose from varying ways of running 
the business under the time charter but there is possibly a lack of obvious 
indication as to who is the contractual carrier or there may be an unclear, 
conflicting signature on the fact of the bills of lading361 or the inconsistent 
context with those as to who is the carrier provided for on the reserved side of 
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the bill of lading.362  
 
It has been asserted that, in theory, it is necessary to identify who takes 
responsibility as the carrier for the cargo owner shown on the charterparty.363 
However, the lack of a clear provision indicating the name of the carrier in the 
bill of lading can be found in relevant clauses in major standard forms of the 
time charterparties, such as Clause 9 of the BALTIME form,364 Clause 8 of the 
NYPE 46 form,365 Clause 30 of the NYPE 93 form,366 and Clause 17 (a) (i) of 
the GENTIME form.367 For the purpose of preventing a future potential practical 
issue, to echo and reflect the decision by the House of Lords in The Starsin, 368 
and to confirm the customs and practice applied in banking,369 it is also 
recommended that the spirit of Article 20 (a) (i) of the UCP 600370 be adopted in 
the relevant clauses in the essential standard forms of the time charterparty.371 
This reform could have merit because it benefits consistently with 
contextualizing the time charterparty with the current practical view dealing with 
the aforementioned disputable issue. This will ensure that the way to solve the 
practical issue becomes applicable since the reform within the time charterparty 
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would comply with the court’s view372 and banking practice.373 
 
As discussed in Sections 6.7.1.1 and 6.7.1.2, in commercially practical 
situations, the bills of lading could be distinguished by two different legal 
effects:374 the ship’s bills375 and the charter’s bills.376 However, it cannot be 
found that the provision regarding charterer’s bills is shown in the relevant 
clauses in the essential standard forms of the time charterparty.377 In order to 
make the legal concepts and contents of the relevant clauses more clear, 
complete, considerate and elaborate, it is suggested that the relevant clauses in 
all the essential standard forms of the time charterparty provide two options:378 
one in which the shipowner is the contractual carrier of carriage with the bills of 
lading holder,379 and another in which the time charterer as the contractual 
carrier of carriage with the bills of lading holder.380  
 
It is recommended that the shipowner and the time charterer should agree to 
which option to take381 in order to allocate risk382 in relation to who the 
contractual carrier is for carrying goods. If the shipowner and the time charterer 
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had agreed which option to take within the post-reform context to the relevant 
clause in the essential standard forms of the time charterparty,383 it is also 
suggested as necessary for them to delete the opposite parts of the context. For 
example, if the shipowner and the time charterer agree that the shipowner is the 
carrier, the paragraph regarding the indicated name of the time charterer as a 
carrier of carriage should be deleted. 
 
It is also important for the shipowner and the time charterer to agree to which 
option to take regarding who can sign for or on behalf of who regarding the bills 
of lading and that they then ensure that the conclusion of their optional 
agreement is clearly presented in the relevant clause in the essential standard 
forms of the time charterparty when they conclude the time charterparty.384 This 
is, as noted in Section 6.7.1.1, aimed to clearly show the contractual parties’ 
intentions regarding who has been explicitly given authority to sign for who385 by 
indicating the capacity of the signatory386 in the relevant clause in the essential 
standard forms of the time charterparty.387 It is also suggested to clearly identify 
the signature as that of the carrier, the Master or the agent on the face of the 
bills of lading or other documents within the relevant clause in the essential 
standard forms of the time charterparty.388 
                                                          
383 (n 364)-(n 367). 
384 It has been recommended by Russell W. Pritchett that a clause supplementing the standard 
form of the time charterparty is needed in order to make clear the contractual parties’ intention 
regarding the breadth of the time charterers’ authority. See Russell W. Pritchett (n 205); See 
also the discussion in Section 6.7.1. 
385 (n 208)-(n 209). 
386 Debattista (n 170). 
387 (n 364)-(n 367). 
388 (n 208)-(n 209); (n 364)-(n 367). 
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Moreover, to avoid any situations in which the bills of lading holder is confused, 
it is recommended that any potentially inconsistent context referring to who the 
carrier is on the reverse side of bills of lading389 should be avoided, first through 
examination, and then by either not misleadingly inserting any details or by 
ensuring that any misleading information be deleted if it is pre-printed in the bills 
when the bills are issued. It is also proposed that this be provided as a 
contractual obligation of the shipowner and the time charterer in the relevant 
clauses of the essential standard forms of the time charterparty.390 
 
By exercising this more considerate approach and providing clear contractual 
obligations in the the relevant clauses of the essential standard forms of the 
time charterparty,391 the shipowner and the time charterer would be more aware 
that the contractual obligations are essential and they would be functionally 
reminded392 to accurately perform these obligations under the time charterparty; 
otherwise they would probably be in breach of contract.393 
 
In addition, it is believed that due to the clear agreement between the shipowner 
and the time charterer under the relevant clause in the essential standard forms 
of the time charterparty,394 adopting the aforementioned suggestions into the 
bills of lading and other documents may contribute to achieving consistency 
                                                          
389 For example, the contexts provided in demise clause and identity of carrier clause conflict 
with the indication in the face of the bills of lading. See the discussion in Section 6.7.2. 
390 (n 364)-(n 367). 
391 ibid. 
392 Gaskell, Asariotis and Baatz (n 127) para 3.34. 
393 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 21.61. 
394 (n 364)-(n 367). 
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between the indications of the contractual carrier in the bills of lading and other 
documents, and the indications in the time charterparty, and therefore solidify 
the indication in the bills of lading and other documents without prejudice to this 
time charterparty.395 These essential recommendations might also help to guide 
the shipowner and time charterer in how to edit a proper bill of lading or any 
other documents and help avoid disputes if they want to produce their own bill of 
lading for business. 
 
By way of imposing this clear contractual obligation within the relevant clauses 
in the essential standard forms of the time charterparty,396 the bona fide bills of 
lading holder, who is endorsed and has transferred the bills, may be sufficiently 
better protected.397 This is because if there is a problem with any goods being 
carried under the time chartered vessel, the bills of lading holder could easily, 
quickly398 and effectively identify the correct contractual carrier with him/her from 
the bills of lading or other documents and could then sue the carrier within the 
limited time bar, one year, under Article III, Rule 6 of the Hague/Visby Rules.399 
It is therefore possible to solve the practical difficulties and possibly contribute to 
avoiding unnecessary controversy as noted in Section 6.7. The prosperity of 
commercial shipping activities and international trade might then also be 
indirectly enhanced. 
                                                          
395 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 21.35; Gaskell, Asariotis and Baatz (n 127) para 21.5. 
396 (n 364)-(n 367). 
397 (n 287)-(n 289). 
398 (n 278). 
399 <http://www.admiraltylawguide.com/conven/haguerules1924.html> accessed 8 April 2011; 
<http://www.admiraltylaw.com/statutes/hague.html> accessed 5 February 2011. 
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The suggested reform aiming to establish clear contractual obligations within the 
time charterparty would also provide contractual parties under the time 
charterparty with less room to make excuses and opposing assertions. This 
might also possibly assist the bills of lading holder,400 the shipowner and the 
time charterer, in reducing the stress of the burden of proof and decreasing the 
stress of raising evidence to defend themselves when investigating who the bills 
of lading carrier is if the dispute of who the contractual carrier is with the bills of 
the lading holder arises. The reform already suggests a straightforward 
negotiation between the shipowner and the time charterer into the clear 
provisions of the time charterparty. Consequently, if an argument regarding the 
identity of the contractual carrier with the bills of lading holder occurs, these 
clear provisions within the time charterparty will make the bills of lading 
holder,401 the shipowner and the time charterer better able to raise the time 
charterparty as evidence to support their claim or defence. This clear evidence 
might also further facilitate saving public resources through saving the court 
time in investigating the evidence and also save costs of further hearings of the 
case. 
 
Solidly contractual obligations could also logically and finely connect to the 
provision of indemnity under the time charterparty. If any unclear or conflicting 
                                                          
400 Tetley (n 170). 
401 ibid; Even if the bills of lading holder is not a contractual party of the time charterparty, if they 
want to sue either the shipowner or the time charterer, they need to seek possible evidence to 
back up their claim. If they can obtain the time charterparty, this might be useful for them 
because they have the burden of proof when they try to sue either the shipowner or the time 
charterer. 
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indication on the bill of lading causes the shipowner to possibly directly incur a 
liability to the the bill of ladings holder, the shipowner could be no doubt 
indemnified by the time charterer by way of claiming his/her right for indemnity 
under the time charterparty.402    
 
 
6.10 Highlighting the key reforms in this chapter 
 
It is worth addressing here, for better facilitating information sharing amongst 
merchants, that if relevant contents as discussed in the provision under the time 
charterparty are too long, such as Clause 9 of the BALTIME form,403 it is urged 
that the longer context might be possibly born in mind if it may be better to 
divide them into several suitable sub-clauses with underlined sub-headings. 
Therefore, combining and clarifying all ideas and suggested recommendations 
in this section we can make concrete modifications and amendments to the 
employment and indemnity clauses under the time charterparties. As an 
example, the relevant parts of Clause 9 of the BALTIME form404 could 
become:405 
 
(A) Charterers’ Order 
                                                          
402 For instance, it is stipulated in Clause 9 of the BALTIME form that ‘…The Charterers shall 
indemnify the Owners against all consequences or liability arising from the Master, officers or 
Agents signing Bills of Lading or other documents…’ 
403 Thomas (n 7) 286.  
404 ibid. 
405 Bold type indicates the suggested modifications. 
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…The Master shall be under the orders and directions406 of the 
Charterers as regards employment of the ship, agency, and/or other 
arrangements. These orders and directions do not cover matters of 
navigation. 
 
(B) Signing of Bills by the Master  
The Master shall sign Bills of Lading or other documents for cargo 
as presented in conformity with the mate’s receipts.407 All Bills of 
Lading or other documents shall be without prejudice to the terms 
and conditions of this Charterparty.  
 
(C) Identifying the Shipowner as a Carrier 
The name of the Owner as a carrier should be clearly identified on 
the face of the Bills of Lading or other documents. The Bills of 
Lading or other documents should be signed by the Master or a 
named Agent for or on behalf of the Master.  
 
(D) Identifying the Carrier and the Signing of the Bills by the Charterer  
If the Charterer is as a carrier, the name of the Charterer as a carrier 
should be clearly identified on the face of the Bills of Lading or 
                                                          
406 This can be found in Clause 8 (a) of the NYPE 93 form and Clause 12 of the GENTIME form. 
Brodie (n 11) 34; (n 13). 
407 ‘A mate’s receipt is a document issued, on the receipt of shipment of goods, by or on behalf 
of the shipowner. It acknowledges his receipt of the goods and states their quantity and 
condition, and it may also state the name of the shipper or owner of the goods.’ Treitel and 
Reynolds (n 157) para 8-018. 
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other documents. The Bills of Lading or other documents should be 
signed in conformity with the mate’s receipts by the Charterer or a 
named Agent for or on behalf of the Charterer. 
 
(E) Signature Identification 
Any signature by the carrier, Master or Agent should be identified 
as that of the carrier, Master or Agent. 
 
(F) Agent Signature  
Any signature by an Agent should indicate whether the Agent has 
signed for or on behalf of the carrier or for or on behalf of the 
Master. 
 
(G) Precluded Inconsistency 
Any inconsistency between the named carrier on the reverse side of 
Bills of Lading or other documents, and the named carrier on the 
face of the Bills of Lading or other documents, the named carrier on 
the reverse side of Bills of Lading should be precluded. 
 
(H) Indemnity 
The Charterers shall indemnify the Owners against all consequences or 
liabilities arising directly408 from the Master, offices or Agents signing 
Bills of Lading or other documents or otherwise the Master complying 
                                                          
408 The Hillcroft (n 311) [462] (Roche, J.). 
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with such orders and directions409 as provided in (A), as well as from 
any irregularity in the Vessel’s papers or for overcarrying goods. …’ 
 
 
6.11  Conclusion 
  
The employment and indemnity clause will have an impact on the legal 
responsibilities of the shipowner and the time charterer.410 It is vital when 
operating these clauses under the time charterparty that particular special 
features of the time charter work in practice.411 This chapter has proposed some 
key amendments. The suggested reforms reflect the view of court 412 and 
practical banking practice413 in order to make the provisions in the time 
charterparty practically applicable. The suggested reforms to the time 
charterparty, may contribute to making the contexts in the relevant clauses of 
the essential standard forms of the time charterparty414 more accurate, clear 
and complete and help to avoid misunderstanding. They may also help the 
provision work better in functionally allocating risk.415 Finally, they may even 
more effectively solve practical issues, protect merchants more, and, 
consequently, indirectly increase the prosperity of commercial shipping 
activities. 
                                                          
409 See clause 8 of NYPE 93 form. Brodie (n 12) 34. 
410 Foxton (n 66). 
411 See (n 1).  
412 The Ramon de Larrinaga (n 25) [255] (Lord Wright); The Starsin (n 182). 
413 (n 373). 
414 (n 364)-(n 367). 
415 (n 214). 
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CHAPTER 7:  
EXEMPTIONS  
------------------------  
 
7.1   Introduction 
 
The provision of the exemptions clause1 plays a vital role within the time 
charterparty. It not only clarifies the scope of the legal responsibilities of the 
shipowner and the time charterer but also establishes a foundation for 
resolving connected legal issues beyond the time charterparty, such as those 
relating to commercial activities.2 The objective of this chapter is to solve the 
key problem of the exemptions clause3 under the essential standard forms of 
the time charterparty. In order to accomplish this, the general key concepts of 
the exemptions clause will firstly be outlined in this chapter. Then, the crucial 
legal issues with respect to the exemptions clause will be analysed and 
discussed. Finally, possible recommendations regarding the exemptions 
clause will be proposed and conclusions drawn. 
 
 
7.2   General key concepts of the exemptions clause under the time   
charterparty 
   
                                                          
1 For example, Clause 12 of the BALTIMEform 1939 (as revised 2001). See Terence Coghlin 
and others,Time Charters (6th edn, Informa 2008) para 37.53. 
2 The legal right of the third party might be involved. 
3 Clause 27 of the draft of the NYPE 2014 form is an example of “allocation of liability”, 
which could be equivalent to the exemption of liability. However, as indicated in Section 
1.1.4 in Chapter 1, the uncertain, immature and changeable draft of the NYPE 2014 form is 
not intended to be within the scope of this thesis.   
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It is normal for the time charterparty to cover provisions to cope with the 
shipowner’s and the time charterer’s exemptions from their legal liabilities.4 
The general key concepts of the exemptions clause under the BALTIME 
form,5 the NYPE 466 and NYPE 93 forms7 and the GENTIME form8 will now 
be introduced. 
 
 
7.2.1   The exemptions clause under the BALTIME form  
 
Clause 12 of the BALTIME form provides that the shipowner is only liable for 
a delay in the delivery of the vessel or for delay during the currency of the 
charter; and for loss or damage to goods onboard, if this delay or loss results 
from a want of due diligence on the part of the shipowner or their manager in 
making the vessel seaworthy and fitted for the voyage,9 or from any other 
personal act or omission or default by the shipowner or their managers.10 In 
addition, the shipowner should neither take responsibility for any other 
                                                          
4 Such as Clause 12 of the BALTIME form 1939 (as revised 2001), Clause 16 of the NYPE 
46 form, Clause 21 of the NYPE 93 form, and Clause 19 of the GENTIME form. 
5 The BALTIME form 1939 (as revised 2001). Unless otherwise specified, all reference to the 
BALTIEM form refer to the BALTIME form 1939 (as revised 2001). D. Rhidian Thomas (ed), 
Legal Issues Relating to Time Charterparties (Informa 2008) 286-89. 
6 Harvey Williams, Chartering Documents (4th edn, LLP Reference Publishing 1999) 228-31. 
7 Peter Brodie, Commercial Shipping Handbook (2nd edn, Informa 2006) 32-46. 
8<https://www.bimco.org/~/media/Documents/Document_Samples/Time_Charter_Parties/Sa
mple_Copy_GENTIME.ashx> accessed 10 August 2012. 
9 The responsibility of the shipowner is discussed as aforementioned in Section 2.5.3 of 
Chapter 2.  
10 Thomas (n 5) 287. 
282 
 
circumstances nor for delay or damage howsoever and whatsoever caused, 
even if this results from the fault of or neglect by their staff.11  
 
In this situation, in order to exclude legal liability, the shipowner should prove 
how the delay, loss and damage occurred and that this is included within 
Clause 12 of the BALTIME form.12 That is to say, to establish an exemption 
from liability as provided in the exemptions clause, the shipowner needs to 
prove that the delay, loss or damage did not result from want of due diligence 
on his/her or his/her manager’s part.13  
 
It is also stipulated in this clause that the shipowner should not take 
responsibility for loss or damage resulting from strikes,14 lock-outs or 
stoppage15 or restraint of labour related to the Master, Officers or Crew, 
whether partial or general.16 
 
                                                          
11 ibid. 
12 Coghlin and others  (n 1) para 37.66. 
13 The Roberta [1938] 60 LIL Rep 84 (Greer, L.J.) 
14 Lord Denning in The New Horizon [1975] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 314 gave a definition  of “strike” as 
‘a concerted stoppage of work by men done with a view to improving their wages or 
conditions, or giving vent to a grievance or making a protest about something or other, or 
supporting or sympathizing with other workmen in such endeavour. It is distinct from a 
stoppage which is brought about by an external event such as a bomb scare or by 
apprehension of danger’. Coghlin and others (n 1) para 37.80. 
15 “Stoppage” is not limited to interruptions resulting from labour disputes, for example, if the 
interruption occurs due to a fear of disease or workmen refuse to work. This refusal would 
seem to be a “stoppage”. The New Horizon [1975] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 314. In addition, “stoppage” 
within Clause 12 appears alongside the words “whether partial or general”. Thus it may 
cover incomplete interruptions. However, it is believed that “stoppage” does not include a “go 
slow” or “work to rule”; Coghlin and others (n 1) para 37.84-85. 
16  Clause 12 of the BALTIME form. Thomas (n 4) 287. 
283 
 
Moreover, the charterers’ responsibility is also set out in the final sentence of 
Clause 12 of the BALTIME form.17 The charterers shall be responsible18 for 
loss or damage19 to the vessel or to the shipowner by goods being loaded in 
opposition to the terms under the time charterparty; or by improper or 
careless bunking or loading, stowing or discharging of goods whether or not 
they are carried out by independent contractors appointed by the time 
charterer or Agents or time charterer’s servants;20 or ‘some other improper or 
negligent act of whatsoever nature on the part of the time charterers or their 
servants.’21  In addition, under these circumstances, as was held in The 
White Rose, in order to win the case, the shipowner needs to prove that the 
“loss or damage” results from one of the aforementioned events as provided 
in the final sentence of this clause.22 
 
 
7.2.2     The mutual exemptions clause under the NYPE 46 and 93 forms 
 
It can also be seen that mutual exemptions for the time charterer and the 
shipowner are provided in some time charterparties in order to protect either 
the time charterer or the shipowner from legal liability or from damage 
caused by any particular situations set out under these clauses.23 For 
                                                          
17 ibid. 
18 The word “responsible” here means no more than “legally liable”. See Tor Line A.B. v 
Alltrans Group of Canada Ltd. (The TEL Prosperity) [1984] 1 WLR 48 (HL) [53] (Lord Roskill)  
19 The scope of “loss or damage” will be analysed in Section 7.3,  
20 A/B Helsingfors Seamship Co. Ltd. v Rederiaktiebolaget Rex (The White Rose) [1969] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep 52 [60] (Donaldson, J.); Coghlin and others (n 1) para 37.89. 
21 ibid. 
22 ibid; Coghlin and others (n 1) para 37.88. 
23 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 27.1, 27.45.  
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example, acts of God,24 enemies,25 fire, restraint of princes, rulers and 
people,26 and all dangers and accidents of the seas, rivers,27 machinery, 
boilers and navigation,28 and errors of navigation throughout the Charter are 
always mutually excepted under Clause 16 of the NYPE 46 form29 and 
Clause 21 of the NYPE 93 form.30 
 
As indicated by Cockburn L.J. in Nugent v Smith, if a prudent and 
experienced carrier takes all reasonable precautions and cannot control an 
outcome due to a storm or other natural agency, he is under the exemption 
of “act of God”.31 Moreover, if the shipowners or the time charterers are 
individuals, “enemies” within the exemptions includes the action of enemies 
of those states of the contractual parties.32 On the other hand, if the 
shipowners and time charterers are a company, the “enemies” within 
exemptions includes the actions of enemies of the state within which the 
shipowners and the time charterers are registered.33 In addition, the actions 
of enemies also include the actions of enemies of the state under whose flag 
                                                          
24 “Act of God” is also set out in Section 1304 (2)(d) of Title 46 of the United States Carriage 
of Goods by Sea Act. See Coghlin and others (n 1) 815. 
25 “Act of public enemies” is provided within Section 1304(2)(f) of Title 46 of the United States 
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. It probably covers piracy. See Coghlin and others (n 1) para 
27.8; 815. 
26 Some wider exceptions are provided in Section 1304(2)(g) of Title 46 of the United States 
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. These are listed as “Arrest or restraint of princes, rulers, or 
people, or seizure under legal process”. Coghlin and others (n 1) para 27.20; 815  
27 The exemptions are set out in Section 1304(2)(c) of Title 46 of the United States Carriage 
of Goods by Sea Act as “Perils, dangers, and accidents of the sea or other navigable 
waters”; Coghlin and others (n 1) 815. 
28 If the occurrence has arisen as a result of negligence, the exemption will not provide 
protection. Coghlin and others (n 1) para 27.25. 
29  Williams (n 6) 230.  
30  Brodie (n 7) 38. 
31 Nugent v Smith [1876] 1 CPD 423 [437]; In addition, in Siordet v Hall [1828] 4 Bing.607, it 
is stated that ‘apart from extraordinary conditions of wind or sea, lightning or frost may 
amount to “act of God”. Coghlin and others  (n 1) para 27.6. 
32 Russell v Niemann [1864] 34 LJCP 10; Coghlin and others (n 1) para 27.7. 
33 ibid. 
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the vessel flies.34 Nonetheless, this exemption will not provide protection if 
the occurrence is the result of negligence by the contractual parties.35 
 
“Restraint of Princes, Rulers and People” within the exemptions includes 
forceful interference36 or actions taken by the state or government which 
hinder the performance of the time charterer.37 However, if actions are 
committed by anyone who does not hold ruling power or act on behalf of the 
ruling power of the country, the exemptions will afford no protection.38 In 
addition, the exemptions will not be effective if the vessel is arrested or 
detained under the normal judicial process.39 The exemptions will also not 
apply if a restraint comes from a state of affairs which exists when the 
charterparty is established and the contractual parties recognise this legal 
restriction or control.40 Moreover, if a restraint arises from the negligence of 
the contractual parties, the exemption will not apply.41 In terms of “dangers 
and accidents of the Seas, Rivers”, these contain risks and hazards specific 
to seas or rivers or to the navigation of the vessel at sea or in rivers which 
                                                          
34 ibid. 
35 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 27.9. 
36 A risk of forcible interference will also be included in these words when the restraint is 
actually in being and will impact on the action of the charter if an alternative method is not 
selected. In addition, the test is ‘whether a reasonable man would consider performance 
likely to be affected by the restraint.’ See Watts v Mitsui [1917] AC 227(HL); Phosphate 
Mining v Rankin [1915] 21 Com Cas 248; Nobel’s Explosives v Jenkins [1896] 2 QB 326; 
Coghlin and others (n 1) para 27.16. 
37 For example, ‘the imposition of restrictions on trade, action taken pursuant to customs or 
quarantine regulations, action to protect the government’s own proprietary interests in the 
cargo or action taken for political reasons.’ 
38 Nesbitt v Lushington [1792] 4 TR 783; Coghlin and others (n 1) para 27.19. 
39 Finlay v Liverpool [1870] 23 LT 251; Yet the express extension of this exemption covers a 
“seizure under legal process” within Section 1304 (2) (g) of Title 46 of the United States 
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. Coghlin and others (n 1) para 27.19; 815. 
40 Ciampa v British India [1915] 2 KB 774; Coghlin and others (n 1) para 27.19. 
41 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 27.19.  
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cannot be prevented by the exertion of reasonable care.42 Therefore, if the 
damage comes from an extraordinarily severe43 gale the exemption applies 
where no negligence of the contractual parties is involved.44 In addition, this 
exemption applies to accidents and dangers of the sea rather than on the 
sea.45 For instance, rain is a risk on the sea, but not a risk of the sea.46 
Moreover, the damage caused from necessary action taken to reasonably 
combat dangers and accidents of the sea or rivers will be within the 
exemption.47 For example, damage which comes from closing ventilators to 
avoid the entry of seawater during a storm is within the exemption.48  
 
However, the normal exemptions clause cannot remove the time charterer’s 
liability for breach of an undertaking not to carry cargo excluded under the 
time charter, or for an undertaking regarding the safety of ports or berths, or 
for an undertaking of shipping lawful cargo under the time charter,49 even if 
                                                          
42 Coghlin amd others (n 1) para 27.21. 
43  Even if the weather is not severe, the entry of seawater may be included in the exemption. 
For instance, ‘this exception covers its entry following the striking, without negligence, of an 
iceberg or a sunken rock or another ship being negligently navigated or as result of rats 
gnawing through a lead pipe.’ See The Xantho [1887] 12 App Cas 503 (HL); Hamilton, 
Fraser v Pandorf [1887] 12 App Cas 518 (HL). See also Coghlin and others (n 1) para 27.22. 
44 It is common under American Law to adopt a narrow view of exemption. See the decision 
of the High Court of Australia in The Bunga Seroja [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 512; The US court 
indicates that to have “a peril on the sea” weather condition, it is necessary to consider the 
time of year and location. It must not have been foreseeable. See Thyseen Inc. v The 
Eurounity, 21 F.3d 533, 1994 AMC 1638 (2d Cir.1994); Coghlin and others (n 1) para 27.21, 
27.70. 
45  Coghlin and others (n 1) para 27.23. 
46 Canada Rice Mills v Union Marine [1941] AC 55 (PC) (Lord Wright); Coghlin and others (n 
1) para 27.23. 
47 ibid; Coghlin and others (n 1) para 27.22. 
48 ibid. 
49 In The Greek Fighter, for example, it was construed that, for the exemption clause to be 
applied, “arrest or restraint” within the mutual exemption clause under the SHELLTIME 4 
form must not be caused by carrying unlawful cargo. Ullises Shipping Corp. v Fal Shipping 
Co. Ltd. (The Greek Fighter) [2006] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 99 [292] (Colman, J.); Coghlin and others 
(n 1) para 27.28. 
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damage might immediately result from one of such excluded risks.50 In 
addition, when it does not tend to provide the time charterer with protection 
from liability in the event of negligence or that of their servants, then it will not 
mutually exempt the shipowner from liability in these events of negligence.51 
Moreover, it is necessary to comply with the principle of construct to restrict 
the meaning and effect of the ambits of exemptions of liabilities under the 
exemptions clause.52 For example, except for the demonstration of obvious 
intention by the contractual parties, negligent navigation cannot be included 
within the errors of navigation,53 which is an error in some aspects of 
seamanship,54 indicated in the context under Clause 16 of the NYPE 46 
form55 and Clause 21 of the NYPE 93 form.56  
 
When Clauses 24 of the NYPE 46 form57 and 31 of the NYPE 93 form58 are 
not modified, the United States Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 193659 is 
incorporated into the NYPE 4660 and NYPE 93 forms61 by the paramount 
clause,62 which is covered in Clause 24 of the NYPE 46 form63 and Clause 
                                                          
50 ibid. 
51 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 27.28. 
52Photo Production v Securicor [1980] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 545 [554] (Lord Diplock); Coghlin and 
others (n 1) para 27.1, 27.26. 
53 The Emmanuel C [1983] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 310; The Satya Kailash [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 588; 
Coghlin and others (n 1) para 27.4, 27.26. 
54  Coghlin and others (n 1) para 27.27. 
55  Williams (n 6) 230. 
56 Brodie (n 7) 38. 
57  Williams (n 6) 231. 
58  Brodie (n 7) 40-41. 
59 The Hague Rules 1924 are incorporated into this Act. 
<http://www.shipinspection.eu/index.php?action=page_display&PageID=242> accessed 12 
April 2011. 
60 Williams (n 6) 228-31. 
61 Brodie (n 7) 32-46. 
62 Simon Baughen, Shipping Law (5th edn, Routledge 2012) 191. 
63  Williams (n 6) 231. 
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31 of the NYPE 93 form.64 In addition, if there is a conflict between the 
provisions of the Act,65 which is incorporated by Clause 24 of the MYPE 46 
form66 or Clause 31 of the NYPE 93 form,67 and the other terms under the 
NYPE 46 form68 and NYPE 93 form,69 the incorporated Act will override70 the 
terms under the NYPE 46 form71 and NYPE 93 form.72 Yet if there is no 
conflict, the provisions of the Act, those of the terms under the NYPE 46 
form73 and NYPE 93 form,74 will be supplemented by the provisions of the 
Act.75  
 
Moreover, all contractual activities to be performed by the shipowner76 under 
the time charter will be protected within the exemptions in Section 1304(2) of 
Title 46 of this incorporated Act,77 as well as “load, handling, stowage, 
carriage, custody care and discharge of goods” provided in Section 1302 of 
this Act.78 In addition, when the United States Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 
is incorporated into the NYPE 46 form79 and NYPE 93 form,80 the 
                                                          
64  Brodie (n 7) 40-41. 
65  The United States Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1936. 
66  Williams (n 6) 231. 
67  Brodie (n 7) 40-41. 
68  Williams (n 6) 228-31. 
69  Brodie (n 7) 32-46. 
70 The Agios Lazaros [1976] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 47; Coghlin and others (n 1) para 37.74; Coghlin 
and others (n 1) para 27.4, 27.29, 34.18, 34.21, 37.73. 
71  Williams (n 6) 228-31. 
72 Brodie (n 7) 32-46. 
73  Williams (n 6) 228-31. 
74  Brodie (n 7) 32-46. 
75  Coghlin and others (n 1) para 34.18. 
76  For instance, it also covers the ballast voyage. The Satya Kailash [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 
588 (CA) [596] (Robert Goff, L.J.); Coghlin and others (n 1) para 34.23. 
77 The United States Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1936; Coghlin and others (n 1) 815. 
78 The Satya Kailash (n 76) [596] (Robert Goff, L.J.); Coghlin and others (n 1) para 27.4, 
34.23; 813. 
79  Williams (n 6) 228-31. 
80  Brodie (n 7) 32-46. 
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exemptions under Section 1304(2) of the Act81 may have a great impact on 
the shipowner.82  For instance, as already mentioned, errors of navigation83 
are provided in Clause 16 of the NYPE 46 form and Clause 21 of the NYPE 
93 form84 but these do not include an exemption for negligence.85 However, 
when Section 1304(2)(a) of Title 46 of the United States Carriage of Goods 
by Sea Act86 is incorporated into the NYPE 46 form87 and NYPE 93 form88 by 
Clause 24 of the NYPE 46 form89 and Clause 31 (a) of the NYPE 93 form,90 
Section 1304(2) will give the shipowner wider protection from his/her 
liability91 since ‘act, neglect or default of the Master, mariner, pilot, or the 
servants of the carrier in the navigation92 or in the management of the ship’93 
will exempt the shipowner from liability.94 
 
When Section 1304(2)(b) of Title 46 of the United States Carriage of Goods 
by Sea Act is incorporated95 into the NYPE 46 form96 and NYPE 93 form97 by 
                                                          
81  Coghlin and others (n 1) 815. 
82  Yvonne Baatz, ‘Clause Paramount in Time Charterers’ in Thomas (n 5). 
83  It does not include negligence errors of navigation. Baatz (n 82).  
84  Coghlin and others (n 1) para 27.4. 
85 The Emmanuel C [1983] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 310; The Satya Kailash (n 76); Coghlin and others 
(n 1) para 27.4, 27.26, 34.10. 
86  Coghlin and others (n 1) 815; 
<http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode46a/usc_sec_46a_00001304----000-.html> 
accessed 26 May 2012. 
87 Williams (n 6) 228-31. 
88 Brodie (n 7) 32-46.   
89 Williams (n 6) 231. 
90  Brodie (n 7) 40-41. 
91  Coghlin and others (n 1) para 27.29; 815.  
92  Aliakmon Maritime Corporation v Transocean Continental Shipping Ltd. and Frank Truman 
Export Ltd. (The Aliakmon Progress) [1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 499 (CA); The Satya Kailash (n 
76); Coghlin and others (n 1) para 34.10, 34. 20.   
93 Actis Co. Ltd. v The Sanko Steamship Co. Ltd. (The Aquacharm) [1982] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 7 
(CA); Coghlin and others (n 1) para 34.20.  
94  Baatz (n 82).  
95  (n 86). 
96 Williams (n 6) 228-31. 
97 Brodie (n 7) 32-46.  
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Clause 24 of the NYPE 46 form98 and Clause 31 (a) of the NYPE 93 form,99 
the exemptions as to “Fire, unless caused by the actual fault or privity100 of 
the carrier”101  on the basis of Section 1304(2)(b) of Title 46 of the Act102 will 
be provided instead of “fire”103 in Clause 16 of the NYPE 46 form104 and 
Clause 21 of the NYPE 93 form.105 Under these circumstances, although the 
fire is resultant from the negligence of the shipowner’s staff and agents, the 
shipowner can still be protected by the exemption in Section 1304(2)(b) of 
Title 46 of the Act.106 However, if the fire is caused by unseaworthiness, as a 
result of the shipowner’s failure to exert due diligence to make the vessel 
seaworthy before and at the beginning of each voyage, the shipowner cannot 
be exempted from his/her liability107 by Section 1304(2)(b) of Title 46 of the 
Act.108 In addition, it is necessary to note that when the shipowner is a 
corporation, “the actual fault or privity” will refer to who has directorial 
responsibility at the core of the corporation.109 Thus, as the obiter in The 
                                                          
98  Williams (n 6) 231. 
99  Brodie (n 7) 40-41. 
100  ‘“The word “privity” really means “ knowledge” which the carrier had or should have had 
but failed to pass on or otherwise properly make use of.’ Christopher Hill, Maritime Law (6th 
edn Informa Professional 2003) 272. 
101 The burden of proof is placed on the claimant to prove that the carrier has actual fault and 
privity. See Hill (n 100) 272. 
102  (n 86). 
103  “Fire” means a flame and it does not cover heating which has not arrived “at the stage of 
incandescence or ignition”. This is explained by Wright J in Tempus Shipping Co. v Louis 
Dreyfus Co. [1930] 1 KB 699 [708]. Under these circumstances, if the cargo damage is 
caused by heat for a period of time before the fire begins to result in further damage, the 
protection includes both causes of damage within the exemption. Greenshields,Cowie & Co. 
v Stephens & Sons, Ltd. [1908] AC 431 (HL); William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, Vol 1 (4th 
edn, Thomson Carswell 2008) 995-96.  
104  Williams (n 6) 230; Coghlin and others (n 1) para 27.4.   
105  Brodie (n 7) 38. 
106  Baughen (n 62) 114; Coghlin and others (n 1) para 27.56. 
107 Maxine Footwear Co. Ltd. v Canadian Government Merchant Marine Ltd. [1959] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep 105 (PC); Coghlin and others (n 1) para 27.11; Stephen Girvin, Carriage of Goods by 
Sea (2nd edn, OUP 2011) 474. 
108  (n 86). 
109  Lennards Carrying Co. v Asiatic Petroleum [1915] AC 705 [713]; The Lady Gwendolen 
[1965] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 335; Coghlin and others (n 1) para 37.58, 37.60. 
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Apostolis indicated, the fault of the general manager or the shipowner or 
shipowners established “fault or privity of the carrier”.110  
 
Nonetheless, if the vessel is registered in the United Kingdom, the shipowner 
and charterer111 can additionally benefit from the exemptions where any 
property on board112 the vessel is lost or damaged for reason of fire 113 under 
Section 186 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995.114 This statutory protection 
will only be overruled by Article 4 of the Convention on Limitation of Liability 
for Maritime Claims 1976, which is attached to Part I of Schedule 7 of the 
Act,115 ‘if it is proved116 that the loss resulted from his personal act or 
omission, committed with the intent to cause such loss, or recklessly and 
with knowledge that such loss would probably result’.117 Yet the shipowner 
will not lose his/her protection from the exemption when the unseaworthiness 
                                                          
110 The Apostolis [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 475 QB. 
111 This is statutory protection for the shipowner, any charterer, manager and operator. The 
statutory protection also extends its protection to the Master and Crew of the ship when they 
are acting in the course of their employment. Bernard Eder and others (eds), Scrutton on 
Charterparties and Bills of Lading (22nd edn, Sweet and Maxwell Limited 2011) 469;  
However, Section 1304(2)(b) of Title 46 of the United States Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 
1936 applies to the “carrier”, as defined within Section 1301(a) of the Act. “Carrier” covers 
the owner or the charterer who establishes the contract of carriage with a shipper. Coghlin 
and others (n 1) 812. 
112 Section 1304(2)(b) of Title 46 of the United States Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1936 is 
different from Section 186 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995. It can be used in “the period 
from the time when the goods are loaded on to the time they are discharged from the ship” 
provided in Section 1301(e) of Title 46 of the United States Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 
1936. This period is usually interpreted as including “tackle to tackle”. John F. Wilson, 
Carriage of Goods by Sea (7th edn, Pearson Education Limited 2010) 181; Girvin (n 107) 
475. 
113 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 27.12, 27.14; It is held in The Diamond that the damage by 
smoke and by water used to extinguish the fire is damage by reason of the fire under the 
meaning of earlier legislation (Section 502 (I) of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894); The 
Diamond [1906] P 282; Lachmi Singh, The Law of Carriage of Goods by Sea (Bloomsbury 
Professional Ltd 2011) 237. 
114  Brian Harris, Ridley’s Law of the Carriage of Goods by Land Sea and Air (8th edn, Sweet 
& Maxwell 2010) 185. 
115  Eder and others (n 111) 469. 
116  The burden of proof is on the cargo owner.  See Jason Chuah, Law of International 
Trade: Cross-Border Commercial Transactions (5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2013) 371. 
117  Christopher Smith, ‘Liability of Shipowner for Loss of, or Damage to, Goods Carried’ in 
Eder and others (n 111). 
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of the vessel is proved to have caused the fire, through no “personal act or 
omission” as provided in Section 186 (3) of this Act.118 In addition, under this 
circumstance, the shipowner’s right to a general average contribution will not 
be removed.119  
 
Furthermore, it is worth mentioning Clyde Commercial S.S. Co. v West India 
S.S. Co., which is the leading American case regarding the application of 
mutual exemptions.120 In this case, because of the deficiency of the Crew, 
the vessel was first delayed at Panama.121 The court decided that the time 
charterer could be exempted from his/her obligation to pay payment of the 
time charter service for the time lost since “deficiency of men” had been 
provided in the off-payment of the time charter service clause of the time 
charterparty exempting the charterer from the payment of the time charter 
service if delay resulted from such deficiency.122 However, the delay occurred 
again when the vessel moved during the voyage.123 This was caused by a 
quarantine order dealing with vessels from Panama, which were presumably 
infected.124 It was indicated by the court that the mutual exemptions clause 
only exempts either contractual party from liability to the other as a result of 
                                                          
118  Louis Dreyfus & Co. v Tempus Shipping Co. [1931] AC 726 (HL). This case involved 
interpretation of Section 502 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894. This Act has a similar effect 
to Section 186 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995. Smith (n 117); Baughen (n 62) 115, 
footnote 126; Coghlin and others (n 1) para 27.13.  
119  Louis Dreyfus & Co. v Tempus Shipping Co. (n 118); In addition, under the exemptions as 
to “fire on board” within Section 186 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995, the shipowner’s 
liability for general average contribution to the owner of goods cannot be absolved when the 
goods are damaged by water utilised in extinguishing a fire on board. Schmidt v Royal Mail 
Co. [1876] 45 LJ QB 646; Greenshields v Stephens [1908] AC 431; Smith (n 117). 
120 Clyde Commercial S.S. Co. v West India S.S. Co.169 F.275 (2d Cir.1909); Coghlin and 
others (n 1) para 27.45, 27.49. 
121  ibid.  
122  Coghlin and others (n 1) para 27.49. 
123  ibid. 
124 ibid. 
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the breach of any charterparty on his part, where it comes from any one of 
the events provided in the exemptions clause.125 However, the legal rights 
and obligations of either party within the off-payment for the time charter 
service provision would not be affected by the mutual exemptions clause 
under the time charterparty.126 Therefore, it was held by the court that the 
charterer still needed to pay the payment of the time charter service for that 
period.127 The decision of the court also indicated that the shipowner can 
escape his liability since this latter delay resulted from a restraint of princes, 
which is one of the events provided for in the mutual exemptions clause in 
the time charterparty.128 From the conclusion of this case by the American 
court, it seems likely the result would be the same if the governing law was 
English law.129 
 
 
7.2.3     The mutual exemptions clause and exemption clause in the  
GENTIME form 
 
It is necessary to note that the mutual exemptions of the time charterers’ and 
the shipowners’ liability as well as the exemptions for shipowners within 
Clause 19 under the GENTIME form130 do not apply to the cargo claims 
                                                          
125 ibid. 
126 ibid. 
127 ibid. 
128 ibid.  
129 The Oliver [1972] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 458 [460] (Mocatta, J.); Coghlin and others (n 1) para 
27.33. 
130 (n 8). 
294 
 
which have been dealt with exhaustively in Clause 18(a) of the GENTIME 
form.131 If loss, damage, delay or failure in the performance of the 
charterparty has arisen from any of the grounds listed in Lines 645 to 646 of 
this clause,132 the mutual exceptions provision exempts the contractual 
parties from responsibility in order to avoid the parties claiming for damages 
against each other.133 In addition, it is indicated that the principles of the 
Hague-Visby Rules134 are obeyed by the shipowners’ exemptions in Lines 
649 to 652 in this clause.135   
 
Moreover, Clause 19 of the GENTIME form in particular also provides that 
there is no way to affect the provision regarding the off-payment for the time 
charter service clause, which is provided in Lines 653 to 654 of this 
clause.136 However, it lacks express provision concerning exemptions that in 
no way affects the provisions as to the off-payment for the time charter 
service under Clause 12 of the BALTIME form,137 Clause 16 of the NYPE 46 
form138 and Clause 21 of the NYPE 93 form.139 Therefore, it is believed that 
the clear expression in Lines 653 to 654 in Clause 19 of the GENTIME 
                                                          
131<https://www.bimco.org/Members/Chartering/BIMCO_Documents/Time_Charter_Parties/
GENTIME/Explanatory_Notes_GENTIME.aspx> accessed 17 August 2012. 
132 “Act of God, act of war, civil commotions, strikes, lockouts, restraint of princes and rulers 
and quarantine restrictions.” 
133 ibid. 
134 <http://www.admiraltylaw.com/statutes/hague.html> accessed 25 August 2012. 
135 ‘Any act, neglect or default by the Master, pilots or other servants of the Owners in the 
navigation or management of the vessel, fire or explosion not due to the personal fault or the 
Owners or their manager, collision or stranding, unforeseeable breakdown of or any latent 
defect in the Vessel’s hull, equipment or machinery.’  
136 ibid. 
137 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 37.66. 
138 Williams (n 6) 230. 
139  Brodie (n 7) 38. 
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form140 should be given credit because it might help to solve some practical 
disputes.141  
 
Furthermore, because there is nothing dealing with the cargo claims142 under 
Clause 19 of the GENTIME form,143 it is believed that when Article 4(2) of the 
Hague-Visby Rules144 is incorporated into the GENTIME form145 by the 
paramount clause which is provided in part B of Appendix A of the GENTIME 
form,146 except responsibilities for cargo claims,147 how to construe the 
incorporation of Article 4(2) of the Hague-Visby Rules148 into the GENTIME 
form149  will be the same as for the aforementioned incorporation of Section 
1304(2) of Title 46 of the United States Carriage of Goods by Sea Act150 into 
the NYPE 46151 and NYPE 93 forms.152 
 
 
7.3     Crucial issues under the exemptions clause  
                                                          
140  (n 8). 
141  For example, the dispute in The Aquacharm (n 93); Clyde Commercial S.S. Co. v West 
India S.S. Co. (n 120). 
142 It is provided in Clause 18 (a) of the GENTIME form. 
143 (n 8). 
144 (n 134). 
145 (n 8). 
146 ibid. 
147 (n 142). 
148 (n 134). 
149 (n 8). 
150  The provisions within the Article 4(2) of the Hague-Visby Rules are the same as the 
Section 1304(2) of Title 46 of the United States Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1936. Coghlin 
and others (n 1) 815. 
151  Williams (n 6) 228-31. 
152  Brodie (n 7) 32-46. 
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There is considerable debate regarding whether or not the damage indicated 
in Clause 12 of the BALTIME form153 not only includes physical damage but 
also covers financial loss.154   
 
In The Charalambos N. Pateras,155 which was chartered under the earlier 
version of the BALTIME form, the time charterers claimed damages against 
the shipowners because they alleged loss of time and additional expenses 
caused by the Master’s wrongful refusal to call at the port of Ampala in 
Nicaragua, Central America.156 On the other hand, in order to defeat the time 
charterers’ claim, the shipowners proceeded to justify the Master’s refusal 
basing their defence on an exemptions clause under the charterparty.157  
 
The court of Appeal held that “damage” in Clause 13 (now Clause 12 of the 
BALTIME form)158 should be widely construed to include both physical 
damage and financial loss.159 Therefore, the shipowners were protected by 
the exemptions clause and they were exempt from their liability for both 
physical damage and financial loss due to the second sentence in this clause 
of the charterparty.160  
 
                                                          
153 Thomas (n 5) 287. 
154 Coghlin and others (n 1) para 37.53. 
155 Nippon Yusen Kaisha v Acme Shipping Corporation (The Charalambos N. Pateras) 
[1972] 1 WLR 74.  
156 ibid. 
157 ibid. 
158 Thomas (n 5) 287. 
159 The Charalambos N. Pateras (n 155). 
160  It is provided in Clause 13 of this version of the BALTIME charterparty that ‘The owners 
not to be responsible in any other case nor for damage or delay whatsoever and howsoever 
caused even if caused by the neglect or default of their servants’.  
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Subsequently, the decision in The TFL Prosperity161 by the Court of Appeal 
allowed the shipowners’ exemption because the rule in The Charalambos N. 
Pateras was applied.162 The court also held that “damage” in Clause 13 
within the earlier version of the BALTIME form (now Clause 12 of the 
BALTIME form)163 covered physical damage and financial loss.164 However, it 
was held for the time charterer in The TFL Prosperity by the House of 
Lords.165 The judgment of the Court of Appeal was reversed and the ruling in 
The Charalambos N. Pateras166 was overruled by the House of Lords.167 
 
The TFL Prosperity, which was chartered under the earlier version of the 
BALTIME form, offered “roll-on, roll off” liner service.168 The exemptions 
clause and additionally typed Clause 26, which particularly prescribed fixed 
structural features of the vessel, were listed within this printed time 
charterparty.169 It was indicated under Clause 26 that the free height under 
the main deck was 6.10 metres.170 However, when the vessel was delivered 
to the time charterer, the main deck of the vessel could not load a double 
stacked trailer with 40 ft. containers since, in fact, the height of the main deck 
was merely 6.05 metres, which was less than the description supplied in 
Clause 26 within the time charterparty.171 Therefore, the time charterers 
claimed for financial loss and damages resulting from the shipowners’ breach 
                                                          
161  The TEL Prosperity (n 18); Coghlin and others (n 1) para 37.53. 
162  The Charalambos N. Pateras (n 155). 
163  Thomas (n 5) 287. 
164  Tor Line A.B. v Alltrans Group. of Canada Ltd. (The TEL Prosperity) [1983] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep18 (CA). 
165  The TEL Prosperity (n 18). 
166  The Charalambos N. Pateras (n 155). 
167 The TEL Prosperity (n 18).  
168  ibid. 
169  ibid. 
170 ibid. 
171  ibid. 
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of warranty as to description.172 On the other hand, the shipowners stated 
that there had been no personal default on their part on the basis of the 
exemption clause within the time charterparty.173 
 
The House of Lords in The TFL Prosperity indicated that the shipowners only 
have legal liability (according to the shipowners’ express acceptance of 
“responsibility” in the first sentence of this clause174) for two specific types of 
delay and one specific type of physical loss or damage, i.e. loss or damage 
to goods on board, if they arose from the stated causes within the first 
sentence under Clause 13 (now Clause 12 of the BALTIME form).175 In 
addition, the view of the court in this decision was to construe that the 
second sentence in this clause should be linked with the first sentence.176 
 
Thus the exemption from the shipowners’ liability in the second sentence,177 
which provides that the shipowners shall not be responsible in any other 
case nor for damage or delay whatsoever and howsoever caused even if this 
arose from the neglect or default of their servants, should be construed to be 
merely limited to the same types of delay and physical loss or damage to 
                                                          
172 ibid. 
173 ibid. 
174 The first sentence of this clause provides that the Owner should only be responsible for a 
delay in delivery of the vessel or for delay during the currency of the Charter and for loss or 
damage to goods onboard, if such delay or loss has been caused by want of due diligence 
on the part of the Owners or their Manager in making the vessel seaworthy and fitted for the 
voyage or any other personal act or omission or default of the Owners or their manager. See 
The TEL Prosperity (n 18). 
175 The TEL Prosperity (n 18) [54] (Lord Roskill). 
176 The TEL Prosperity (n 18). 
177 The second sentence in this clause sets out that the owners are not to be held 
responsible in any other case nor for damage or delay whatsoever and howsoever caused 
even if caused by the neglect or default of their servants. See The TEL Prosperity (n 18). 
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goods on board178 as in the first sentence within the same clause.179 
Accordingly, the court did not allow the shipowners’ defence, based on the 
exemptions clause, against the charterers’ claim for suffered financial losses 
caused by the shipowners’ breach.180 In addition, the court indicated that the 
exemption of the shipowners’ liability within the exemptions clause could not 
be interpreted to exclude the shipowners’ liability for the breach of a term 
regarding descriptions under the time charterparty.181  
 
It is worth mentioning that Lord Roskill asserted that the second sentence in 
this exemptions clause is intended for circumstances not included by the first 
sentence.182 Therefore, instead of looking forward to the third sentence183 
and fourth sentence in this exemptions clause,184 a more natural approach is 
to regard the second sentence as looking back to the first sentence in this 
clause while looking at this clause as a whole.185 In addition, he believed that 
if ‘’damage’’ in the first and the second sentences contained financial loss or 
damage, ‘’damage’’ and ‘’delay’’ become difficult to differentiate because 
financial loss of some type would be caused by any delay.186 Furthermore, 
he pointed out that the third sentence obviously protects the shipowners by 
                                                          
178  It is opposed to financial loss or damage; Coghlin and others (n 1) para 37.53. 
179  The TEL Prosperity (n 18).  
180 ibid. 
181  ibid. 
182 The TEL Prosperity (n 18) [54] (Lord Roskill).  
183  The third sentence of this clause stipulated that the owners are not liable for loss or 
damage arising or resulting from strikes, lock-outs or stoppage or restraint of labour or 
vehicles (including the Master, Officers or Crew) whether partial or general. The TEL 
Prosperity (n 18). 
184  The fourth sentence of this clause provides that the charterers are responsible for loss or 
damage caused to the vessel or to the owners by goods being loaded contrary to the terms 
of the charter or by improper or careless bunking or loading, stowing or discharging of goods 
or any other improper or negligent act on their part or that of their servants. See The TEL 
Prosperity (n 18). 
185  The TEL Prosperity (n 18) [55] (Lord Roskill). 
186  The TEL Prosperity (n 18) [54] (Lord Roskill). 
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excluding loss or damages caused by risks such as strikes and so on which 
were not exempted by the first two sentences.187 Moreover he held that the 
phrase “loss or damage’’ within the third and fourth sentences covered 
physical and financial loss or damage.188  
 
Furthermore, he believed that the true common intention of the parties under 
the time charterparty should be that the time charterers pay for the time 
charter service in return for the charter service and that the vessel should be 
as promised in the shipowners’ description.189 Thus, it was, for Lord Roskill, 
unconvincing to argue that the exemptions clause could be construed to 
allow a breach of the warranties regarding description provided in Clause 26 
without the shipowner being liable for financial loss or damage to the time 
charterers.190  
 
Even though it is believed that the exemptions clause was correctly 
construed as a whole in The TFL Prosperity by the House of Lords,191 it could 
be noted that it is confusing to apply a different meaning to apparently the 
same phrase “loss or damage” between the first sentence and third and 
fourth sentences of the exemptions under the time charterparty. This may 
confuse a lay person, the merchant. Consequently, it is essential to reform 
the exemptions clause in order to resolve this issue.  
 
 
                                                          
187  ibid. 
188 The TEL Prosperity (n 18) [54]-[55] (Lord Roskill). 
189 The TEL Prosperity (n 18) [58]-[59] (Lord Roskill). 
190 The TEL Prosperity (n 18) [59] (Lord Roskill). 
191 The TEL Prosperity (n 18) [53] (Lord Roskill). 
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7.4   Reforming the exemptions clause 
 
The drawback of the current exemptions clause in the BALTIME form192 is 
that it is necessary to apply the construction of the current exemptions clause 
in the BALTIME form by the court in order to really understand it.193 As a 
result, it is necessary to improve the exemptions clause by making it clear 
and straightforward so both contractual parties understand the true meaning 
of the provisions under the time charterparty. 
 
Integrating common law in the time charterparty might not only help the 
contractual parties to accurately comprehend the provisions of the standard 
form under the construction of the court, but also guarantee that the content 
does not conflict with common law. Thus directly adopting the construction of 
the House of Lords in The TFL Prosperity194 within Clause 12 of the 
BALTIME form is suggested.195 
 
Firstly, even though the word “loss” is not used in the second sentence within 
the exemptions clause, Clause 12 of the BALTIME form,196 the view of the 
court was to construe that “loss” should also be covered within the context of 
this second sentence.197 Thus it is proposed to add the word “loss” to the 
                                                          
192 Thomas (n 5) 287.  
193 The TEL Prosperity (n 18).   
194 ibid. 
195 Thomas (n 5) 287.    
196 ibid. 
197The TEL Prosperity (n 18) [54] (Lord Roskill).  
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second sentence of Clause 12 of the BALTIME form198 to make the content 
complete and avoid unnecessary confusion. 
 
Secondly, it is recommended that the whole clause should be separated into 
Part (A) and Part (B). In addition, Part (A) should be subdivided into (i), (ii) 
and (iii). It might be better to add individual section headings in Parts (A) and 
(B) in order to deal with two topics. One is “The Exemptions of the Owners’ 
Liability” and another is “The Charterers’ Liability”. In addition, the most 
significant of these divisions is cataloguing the different scope of each type of 
“loss or damage’’. This is because the ambit of the type of “loss or damage’’ 
is, as mentioned, differently construed by the court within the first two 
sentences and the remaining sentences of the clause.199 Hence, Part (A), 
concerning ”the Exemptions of the Owners’ Liability”, should be divided into 
three sub-paragraphs, (i), (ii) and (iii), to show different extents of the type of 
“loss or damage’’. This may assist the contractual parties in distinguishing 
between the differences in scope of the types of “loss or damage’’ between 
the first two sentences and the third sentence under Clause 12 of the 
BALTIME form,200 which are all relevant to the shipowners’ exemption from 
liability.  
 
Thirdly, the type of “loss or damage’’ within the first and the second 
sentences, does not cover financial loss or damage.201 However, the type of 
“loss or damage’’ within the third and fourth sentence, includes both physical 
                                                          
198 Thomas (n 5) 287. 
199 The TEL Prosperity (n 18) [53]-[57] (Lord Roskill). 
200  Thomas (n 5) 287.  
201  The TEL Prosperity (n 18) [53]-[54] (Lord Roskill). 
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loss or damage and financial loss or damage.202 Consequently, it is 
suggested to clearly add that ‘The type of “loss or damage’’ within the first 
two sentences here only refers to physical loss or damage’ after the second 
sentence of the aforementioned Part (A) (i). Moreover, after (A) (ii), which 
provides the rest of the exemptions of the shipowners’ liability, the statement 
‘Aforementioned “loss or damage” covers physical as well as financial loss or 
damage’, should be added. In addition, at the end of Part (B), which deals 
with the time charterers’ liability, the statement ‘Aforementioned “loss or 
damage” covers physical as well as financial loss or damage’, should also be 
added. 
 
Furthermore, in practice, some disputes have arisen because the time 
charterer has tried to excuse himself/herself from the payments of the time 
charter service by way of the exemptions clause in the time charterparty.203 
Therefore, to avoid unnecessary disputes in the future and to make the 
exemptions clause clear, a further amendment is recommended for (A) (iii) 
regarding the exemptions of the shipowners’ liability. Similarly to the last 
paragraph of Clause 19 within the GENTIME form,204 the exemptions clause, 
‘The above provisions regarding the exemptions of the Owner’s liability shall 
in no way affect the provisions as to off-payment of the time charter service 
in the Charter Party’ should be added. 
 
 
7.5    Highlighting the key reforms in this chapter 
                                                          
202 The TEL Prosperity (n 18) [55] (Lord Roskill). 
203 The Aquacharm (n 93); Clyde Commercial S.S. Co. v West India S.S. Co. (n 120). 
204  (n 8). 
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Combining and demonstrating all of the aforementioned proposals for 
modifying the exemptions clause under the time charterparty, if Clause 12 of 
the BALTIME form,205 for instance, were to adopt these suggestions, it would 
become: 206 
 
Clause 12 Responsibility and Exemption 
(A) The Exemptions of the Owners’ Liability  
(i) The Owner only shall be responsible for delay in delivery of the 
vessel or for delay during the currency of the Charter and for loss 
or damage to goods onboard, if such delay or loss has been 
caused by want of due diligence on the part of the Owners or 
their Manager in making the vessel seaworthy and fitted for the 
voyage or any other personal act or omission or default of the 
Owners or their Manager. The Owners shall not be responsible in 
any other case, not for loss or damage or delay whatsoever and 
howsoever caused even if caused by the neglect or default of 
their servants. The type of “loss or damage’’ within the first 
two sentences here only refers to physical loss or damage. 
 
(ii) The Owners shall not be liable for loss or damage arising or 
resulting from strikes, lock-outs or stoppage or restraint of labour 
(including the Master, officers or crew) whether partial or general. 
Aforementioned “loss or damage” covers physical as well 
as financial loss or damage. 
                                                          
205  Thomas (n 5) 287.    
206  Bold type indicates the suggested modifications. 
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(iii) Off-payment for the Time Charter Service and the Above 
Exemptions 
The above provisions regarding the exemptions of the 
Owner’s liability shall in no way affect the provisions as to 
off-payment for the time charter service in the Charter 
Party.207 
                 
(B) The Charterers’ Liability 
          The charterers shall be responsible for loss or damage caused to the  
Vessel or to the Owners by goods being loaded contrary to the terms 
of the Charter or by improper or careless bunking or loading, stowing 
or discharging of goods or any other improper or negligent act on their 
part or that of their servants. Aforementioned “loss or damage” 
covers physical as well as financial loss or damage.  
 
 
7.6     Conclusion 
 
Contractual parties can protect themselves from liability in advance by 
negotiating an exemptions clause under a time charterparty.208 However, the 
exemptions clause still needs to follow the law and be constructed 
restrictively.209 Thus in order to reform the unclear and incomplete 
exemptions clause under the essential standard forms of the time 
                                                          
207 Clause 19 of the GENTIME form. (n 8). 
208 Photo Production v Securicor (n 52) [554] (Lord Diplock).   
209  Photo Production v Securicor (n 52).   
306 
 
charterparty,210 adopting common law regarding interpretation of the 
exemptions clause might be a good method to reduce the weaknesses within 
this clause. This may also have the advantage of making the exemptions 
clause practicably applicable if any dispute occurs in the future. 
 
 
 
                                                          
210 Such as the BALTIME form, the NYPE 46 and NYPE 93 forms, and the GENTIME form. 
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CHAPTER 8:  
CONCLUSION  
---------------------------------------- 
This thesis has dealt with the significant legal issues in crucial clauses under 
the current essential standard forms of the time charterparty.1 
 
The aim of this thesis has been to provide a perspective for reform of 
important clauses in the time charterparty. The rationale for reforming these 
important clauses is to provide accessible and explicit terms that will prevent 
unnecessary wasted time and help avoid misunderstandings and legal 
disputes between the contractual parties.  
 
The time charterer uses only the time charter service, starting from the 
beginning of the period of the time charter until the end of its contractually 
allowed period,2 and pays for the time charter services.3 The vessel is still 
controlled and possessed by the Master and Crews who have been hired by 
the shipowner.4 The shipowner takes responsibility for navigation.5 In 
addition, the initial seaworthy obligation of the shipowner under a time 
                                                          
1 Such as the BALTIME form 1939 (as revised 2001), the NYPE 46 and NYPE 93 forms, and 
the GENTIME form. Unless otherwise specified, all reference to the BALTIEM form refer to 
the BALTIME form 1939 (as revised 2001). 
2 The Berge Tasta [1975] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 442 [424] (per Donaldson, J.); Terence Coghlin and 
others, Time Charters (6th edn, Informa 2008) para 1.13; Christopher Hill, Maritime Law (6th 
edn, Informa Professional 2003) 171. The relevant discussion is presented in Chapters 2-4. 
3 The relevant discussion is presented in Chapters 5. 
4 Sea & Land Securities v Dickinson [1942] 72 LlL.Rep 159 [163] (MacKinnon, L.J.); The Hill 
Harmony [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 147 [156] (Lord Hobhouse); Coghlin and others (n 2) para 
1.10. The relevant discussion can be seen in Chapters 2 and 6.   
5 The shipowner’s liability is discussed in Chapters 2 and 6. 
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charter normally attaches the maintenance obligation to the shipowner6 
within a time charterparty.7 However, it is also usually found that the time 
charterparty includes a provision to deal with the shipowner’s and the time 
charterer’s exemptions from their legal liabilities.8 
 
The time charterer can order the Master to use the vessel to operate his/her 
business and complete his/her commercial goal9 during the period of time10 
within the contractual permission.11 There are both the time charterer’s 
trading limits12 and safe port undertaking of the time charterer to restrict the 
time charterer’s use of the time charter service under the time charterparty.13 
In addition, the time charterer’s orders given to the Master are necessarily 
relevant to the commercial operation of the ship.14 If the time charterer has 
grounds to be dissatisfied with the performance of the Master and any officer, 
it is also possible to make a change in the appointments, if necessary and 
practicable, under the time charterparty.15  
                                                          
6 Snia Societa di Navihazione v Suzuki & Co. [1924] 18 LlL Rep.333; [1924] 17 LlL Rep 78 ( 
KB) [88] (Gree, J.); Coghlin and others (n 2) para 11.7. 
7 John F Wilson, Carriage of Goods by Sea (7th edn, Pearson Education Limited 2010) 12; 
Lars Gorton and others, Shipbroking and Chartering Practice (7th edn, Informa Law 2009) 
261. 
8  For example, Clause 12 of the BALTIME form, Clause 16 of the NYPE 46 form, Clause 21 
of the NYPE 93 form and Clause 19 of the GENTIME form. This is discussed in Chapter 7. 
9 Larrinaga S.S. Co. Ltd. v The King (The Ramon de Larrinaga) [1945] AC 246 [255] (Lord 
Wright); Martin Davies and Anthony Dickey, Shipping Law (3rd edn, Lawbook Co 2004) 382. 
This is discussed in Chapter 6. 
10 This is shown in Chapter 4. 
11 This is dealt with in Chapter 3. 
12 Coghlin and others (n 2) para 5.4. This is indicated in Chapter 3. 
13 Stephen Girvin, Carriage of Goods by Sea (2nd edn, OUP 2011) 307, 309, 318, 319; 
Charles G. C. H. Baker, ‘The Safe Port/Berth Obligation and Employment and Indemnity 
Clauses’ [1988] LMCLQ 43; This is discussed in Chapter 3. 
14  See (n 9). 
15 For example, Clause 9 of the BALTIME form. D. Rhidian Thomas (ed), Legal Issues 
Relating to Time Charterparties (Informa 2008) 286-87; Clause 9 of the NYPE 46 form. 
Harvey Williams, Chartering Documents (4th edn, LLP Reference Publishing 1999) 229; 
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For the purposes of safeguarding payment for the time charter service, the 
shipowner has the right to withdraw the time charter service16 and the right of 
suspension of the time charter service on the basis of the time charterparty.17 
On the other hand, the time charterer also has his/her rights protected by an 
adjustment to deduct costs from the payment of the time charter service.18 
The time charterer may also request the cessation of payments within the 
period of an off-payment for the time charter service19 if he/she cannot obtain 
the service of the time charter from the shipowner and/or, consequently, 
suffers loss of time.20 
  
Moreover, the express indemnity clause under the time charterparty21 exists 
to reimburse the shipowner against all consequences or liabilities resulting 
from the Master, Officers or Agents signing bills of lading or other documents 
according to the time charterer’s orders during the time charter.22 Any 
shipowner’s implied indemnity will be restricted to all the requirements under 
the express terms of the indemnity clause23 and cannot contradict the 
provisions within the time charterparty.24 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Clause 8 (b) of the NYPE 93 form. Peter Brodie, Commercial Shipping Handbook (2nd edn, 
Informa 2006) 34; Coghlin and others (n 2) para 22.1. 
16 These wordings are recommended to be changed in Section 5.4.3 of Chapter 5. 
17 ibid; D. Rhidian Thomas, ‘The charterparty hire: Issues Relating to Contractual Remedies 
for Default and Off-hire Clauses’ in Thomas (n 15). 
18 Wilson (n 7) 100; A change of these wordings is suggested in Section 5.3.1 of Chapter 5. 
19 It is proposed to change the wordings in Section 5.5.3 of Chapter 5. 
20 Coghlin and others (n 2) para 25.2. 
21 For example, Lines 123-28 within Clause 9 of the BALTIME form. Thomas (n 15) 286; This 
is discussed in Chapter 6. 
22 Milburn v Jamaica Fruit [1900] 2 QB 540 (CA); Coghlin and others (n 2) para 19.17, 21.67. 
23 The Island Archon [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 227 (CA) [238]; Wilson (n 7) 110. 
24 The Berge Sund [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 453 (CA) [462] (Staughton, L.J.); Wilson (n 7) 110. 
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Furthermore, the earlier discussion in Chapters 2 to 7 highlighted 
imperfections within the current essential standard forms of the time 
charterparty25 which potentially make further practical disputes more likely. 
The original contributions in this thesis, regarding the recommendations for 
reform of these prominent clauses under the current significant standard 
forms of the time charterparty,26 have attempted to achieve the aims set out 
in the introduction of this thesis. By way of achieving this, this thesis has 
done the following: 
 
(1) Demonstrating a clear, systematic, connected, logical, and 
meaningful structure throughout the whole thesis: 
 
The discussion in chapters of this thesis has focused on exploring the 
crucial legal issues of the important clauses within the current essential 
standard forms of time charterparty.27 These represent the specific core 
characteristics of the time charter28 and therefore may shape the most 
important aspects of the legal liability of the shipowner and the time 
charterer under the time charterparty.29 In addition, this thesis has 
provided a comparative analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of 
these important clauses in these time charterparty forms and has further 
made an effort to resolve the vital problems identified with these clauses 
by proposing various reforms.  
                                                          
25 (n 1). 
26 ibid. 
27 ibid. 
28 See (n 2)-(n 7). 
29 ibid. 
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(2) Making the contexts of the clauses in the time charterparty30 more 
precise, clear and certain through these reforms: 
 
(A) This can be seen in the consistent suggestions for using precise and 
clear legal concepts under the time charter instead of a misleading and 
confusing use of legal concepts within the clauses of the time 
charterparty.31 This could prevent merchants from mixing up legal 
concepts such as the time charter with the demise charter and voyage 
charter. The following modifications have been suggested: 
 
(a) Under Chapter 2, Section 2.2, use the term “beginning of the 
time charter service” instead of “delivery of the vessel”. 
 
(b) In Chapter 4, Section 4.6, change the wording of “redelivery 
of the vessel” to “ending of the time charter service”. 
 
(c) Change the wording of “payment of hire” to “payment for the 
time charter service” as shown in Chapter 5, Section 5.2.1. 
 
(d) An amendment of the wording “deduction of hire” to “deduction 
of the payment for the time charter service” under Section 
5.3.1, Chapter 5. 
 
                                                          
30 (n 1). 
31 ibid. 
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(e) Under Section 5.4.3, Chapter 5, changing the wording 
“withdrawal of vessel” to “withdraw the time charter service”.  
 
(f) Change the wording “off-hire” to “off- payment for the time 
charter service” in Section 5.5.3, Chapter 5. 
 
(B) Within Section 2.4.1, Chapter 2, clearly indicate the real intention of 
both parties by adding “when” it is necessary for the vessel to be 
consistent with “which” details of the description of the vessel32 at the 
end of the preamble of the BALTIME form,33 the NYPE 4634 and NYPE 
93 forms,35 as well as the GENTIME form.36 This revision may also 
prevent future arguments and the waste of judicial resources as well 
as both parties’ time and expense. 
 
(C) Under Section 4.3.2, Chapter 4, in order to achieve significant 
commercial certainty within shipping industries,37 and also avoid 
practical disputes, it has been suggested that wording specifies either 
the minimum and maximum duration of the time charter or a clearly 
explicit margin in Line 14 of the NYPE 46 form38 instead of having the 
problematic word “about”. 
 
                                                          
32 The suggested sample is shown in Section 2.4.1 of Chapter 2. 
33 Thomas (n 15) 286-89. 
34 Williams (n 15) 228-31. 
35 Brodie (n 15) 32-46. 
36<https://www.bimco.org/~/media/Documents/Document_Samples/Time_Charter_Parties/S
ample_Copy_GENTIME.ashx> accessed 29 March 2011. 
37 Lord Hoffmann, ‘The Achilleas: Custom and Practice or Foreseeability?’ (2010)14 (1) 
Edin. LR 47. 
38 Williams(n 15) 228. 
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(D) Within Section 6.4, Chapter 6, a modification has been 
recommended to the ambiguous and confusing word “employment” in 
Clause 9 of the BALTIME form,39 Clause 8 of the NYPE 46 form,40 
Clause 8 (a) of the NYPE 93 form41 and Clause 12 of the GENTIME 
form42 to a clearer wording of “employment of the ship”43 in order to 
directly reflect the view of the English court.44 This reform can 
therefore make the contents of these clauses more precise, clear and 
straightforward and help the contractual parties more effectively 
comprehend their legal rights and obligations as well as help 
merchants avoid wasting time when considering how to construe the 
meaning of “employment” in this clause of the standard forms of the 
time charterparty. In addition, this would make it easier for them to 
justify their legal rights and be beneficial in preventing undesirable 
disputes in the future because the construction of the clause will also 
be supported by the court.45  
 
(E) It has been proposed in Section 6.4, Chapter 6, that in order to 
ensure that the ambit of the time charterer’s orders is more accurately 
and clearly presented, the sentence, ‘These orders do not cover 
matters of navigation,’ should be added within the employment clause 
under the time charterparty, such as Clause 9 of the BALTIME form,46 
                                                          
39 Thomas (n 15) 286.   
40 Williams (n 15) 229.   
41 Brodie (n 15) 34. 
42  (n 36). 
43 This ideal can also be found in 13 (a) of the SHELLTIME 4, which already provids the 
clear wording, “employment of the vessel”.  
44 The Ramon de Larrinaga (n 9) [255] (Lord Wright). 
45 ibid. 
46 Thomas (n 15) 286. 
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Clause 8 of the NYPE 46 form,47 Clause 8 (a) of the NYPE 93 form48  
and Clause 12 of the GENTIME form.49  
 
(F) Under Section 7.4, Chapter 7, a further modification is recommended 
to Clause 12 of the BALTIME form,50 which is relevant to a 
shipowner’s liability and exemptions. In addition, similarly to the last 
paragraph of Clause 19 within the GENTIME form,51 the exemptions 
clause, it was suggested that (A) (iii) within Clause 12 of the BALTIME 
form,52 ‘The above provisions regarding the exemptions of the 
Owner’s liability shall in no way affect the provisions as to off-payment 
for the time charter service in the Charter Party’ be added. If the 
contractual parties still choose the BALTIME form53 as their time 
charterparty, this reform will not only make the exemptions clause 
clear but could also prevent unnecessary practical disputes which 
arise from the time charterer trying to excuse himself/herself from 
paying for the time charter service through the exemptions clause.  
 
 
(3) Making the context in the time charterparty54 more complete and 
thoughtful through these reforms:  
 
                                                          
47 Williams (n 15) 229.  
48 Brodie (n 15) 34. 
49 (n 36).   
50 Thomas (n 15) 287.   
51  (n 36). 
52 Thomas (n 15) 287.   
53 Thomas (n 15) 286-89. 
54 (n 1). 
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(A) Under Section 3.4.5 in Chapter 3, providing a complete listing of 
excluded ports and countries at the time of beginning of the time 
charter service, ending of the time charter service, and during the 
time charter in the time charterparty, has been recommended.55 
 
(B) Making the contexts within provision consistent with the Box Layout 
by way of reform can be found in Section 3.4.5 of Chapter 3. 
Excluded ports and countries which are listed as a recommendation 
in part 1 Box Layout of the standard forms of the time charterparty 
were proposed as also being consistently and clearly “mirrored” 
within the clause in these forms.56 This may also make the whole of 
the essential forms more complete, clear, well organised, less 
confusing and much easier to follow. 
 
(C) This aim in (3) could be achieved by recommendations in Section 
3.4.5 of Chapter 3. A revision has been proposed to add the point of 
view of Morris LJ in The Stork57 and the view of convinced authority58  
within the context of the legal effect of the time charterer’s breach of 
safe port undertaking in the time charterparty59 in order to make sure 
the Master’s novus actus interveniens60 is included. Therefore, it has 
                                                          
55 Such as Clause 2 of the BALTIME form, Lines 15, 27 to 34 of the NYPE 46 form, Clause 5 
of the NYPE 93 form, and Clause 2 (a) of the GENTIME form. 
56 ibid; It is suggested that add Part 1 Box layout be added to the NYPE 46 and NYPE 93 
forms. See (6) (A). 
57 Compania Naviera Maropan S/A v Bowaters Lloyd Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd. (The Stork) 
[1955] 2 QB 68 [104] (Morris, L.J). 
58 Yvonne Baatz, ‘Charterparties’ in Yvonne Baatz (ed), Maritime law (2nd edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2011). 
59 See (n 55). 
60 Girvin (n 13) 334. 
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been suggested to stipulate that if the Master deliberately61 or 
recklessly ignores62 the vessel outside the trading limits and/or the 
obvious dangers of a nominated port, does not reject the time 
charterer’s order and obeys the time charterers’ order outside trading 
limits and/or to proceed to or enter into the unsafe port, then the time 
charterer is not liable for the shipowners’ suffered damage.63 The 
advantage of the reform also allows the provision to more closely 
reflect the various circumstances in the reality and is more complete 
and thoughtful. 
 
(D) Under Section 5.2.1, Chapter 5, for the purpose of making the  
contexts of the clause regarding payment for the time charter service 
more complete and to also follow modern commercial practice, as 
Brandon, J. asserted in The Brimnes,64 it has been recommended that 
payment for the time charter service has to be paid in cash or by 
‘other payment method equivalent to payment in cash under the 
commercial practice, which can provide the shipowner the 
unconditional right to the immediate use of the funds’65 This reform 
would apply to Clause 6 of the BALTIME form,66 Clause 5 of the NYPE 
4667 and Clause 11 (a) of the NYPE 93 form.68 
 
                                                          
61 The Stork (n 57) [104] (Morris, L.J.). 
62 Baatz (n 58). 
63 ibid; The Stork (n 57) [104] (Morris, L.J.). 
64 Tenax Steamship Co. Ltd. v The Brimnes (Owners) (The Brimnes) [1972] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 
465 [476]; Coghlin and others(n 2) para 16.30. 
65 ibid. 
66 Thomas (n 15) 286. 
67 Williams (n 15) 229. 
68 Brodie (n 15) 35-36. 
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(E) Under Section 5.4.3 of Chapter 5, for the purpose of avoiding too 
harsh an outcome for the time charterer,69 if the contractual parties still 
choose the BALTIME form70 or NYPE 46 form,71 as their time 
charterparty, it has been suggested that an anti-technicality clause be 
added, such as that within the second paragraph of Clause 8 (c) of 
GENTIME form,72 and that this be included under the heading “Grace 
Period”, in the BALTIME form73 and the NYPE 46 form74 to give the 
time charterer a grace period to pay for the time charter service. 
 
(F) Within Section 5.4.3 of Chapter 5, it was also asserted that the 
contractual parties should negotiate in advance and clearly set out 
provisions regarding the withdrawal of the time charter service under 
the time charterparty75 so that the shipowner shall give the time 
charterer a written notice of the number of clear banking days for 
correcting the failure of payment for the time charter service within 
specific hours of the time charterer’s default.76 This would not only 
make “specific hours” reflect the contractual parties intention through 
the contractual parties’ negotiation but also make the time charterparty 
more complete and thoughtful. 
 
(G) Under Section 5.4.3 of Chapter 5, aiming to make the context within 
                                                          
69 Coghlin and others (n 2) para 16.90. 
70 Thomas (n 15) 286-89. 
71 Williams (n 15) 228-31. 
72 (n 36).  
73 Thomas (n 15) 286-89. 
74 Williams (n 15) 228-31. 
75 Such as Clause 6 of the BALTIME form, Clause 5 of the NYPE 46 form, Clause 11 of the 
NYPE 93 form, and Clause 8 (c) of the GENTIME form. 
76 Afovos Shipping Co. S.A v R Pagnan & F Lli (The Afovos) [1983] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 335; 
Shipping Law (2011/2012 edn, Witherby Publishing Group. Ltd 2011) 144. 
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the grace period under the anti-technicality clause of the BALTIME 
form,77 the NYPE 46 form78 and the GENTIME form79 more complete 
and to reflect the reality in banking practice, adding “Saturdays, 
Sundays and Holidays excluded,” has been recommended.80 The time 
charterer will therefore rectify his/her default of payment for the time 
charter service during normal banking days. 
 
(H)  It was suggested in Section 5.4.3, Chapter 5, that Line 156 of Clause 
11 of the NYPE 93 form81 adopt the spirit of Lines 204 to 205 of the 
third paragraph of Clause 8 (c) of the GENTIME form82 by adding the 
sentence, ‘Notwithstanding the event of loss of time from default of 
Officers or Crew, provided in Line 220 of Clause 17’83 in the context of 
the provisions of Line 156 of Clause 11 of the NYPE 93 form.84 This 
will bring benefit to the contexts under Clause 11 of the NYPE 93 
form85 by demonstrating more thoughtful consistency with the theory of 
an off-payment for the time charter service.86 The same suggestion 
also applies to other standard forms, such as the BALTIME form87 and 
the NYPE 46 form,88 when these forms also take the recommendation 
to adopt the provision regarding the shipowner’s suspension of his/ 
                                                          
77 Thomas (n 15) 286-89. 
78 Williams (n 15) 228-31. 
79  (n 36).  
80 The normal banking days might differ depending on countries. The contractual parties 
could negotiate these exclusions and change this. 
81 ibid 36.  
82 (n 36). 
83 This would be in the same spirit as the contents of Line 227 to Line 228 of Clause 9 (a) (ii) 
of the GENTIME form. 
84 Brodie (n 15) 36. 
85 ibid 36. 
86 See Section 5.4.3 of Chapter 5. 
87 Thomas (n 15) 286-89. 
88 Williams (n 15) 228-31. 
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her performance of any and all of his/her obligations in Lines 200 to 
206 of the third paragraph of Clause 8 (c) of the GENTIME form.89 
 
(I) Under Section 5.5.3 of Chapter 5, it has been recommended that the 
off-payment for the time charter service clause, such as Clause 11 of 
the BALTIME form,90 Clause 15 of the NYPE 46 form,91 Clause 17 of 
the NYPE 93 form,92 and Clause 9 of the GENTIME form93  should 
clearly provide significant exclusions. These regard the events 
preventing the fully working vessel from applying the off-payment for 
the time charter service clause when this is caused by the time 
charterer’s responsibility or his/her breach of contract.94 Thoughtful 
reform of these clauses might also make the context of the off-
payment for the time charter service clause more complete and might 
help the busy contractual parties clearly notice the exclusions to 
benefit the time charterer,95 and might also possibly avoid 
unnecessary disputes between the contractual parties in the future. 
 
                                                          
89 (n 36). 
90 Thomas (n 15) 287. 
91 Williams (n 15) 230. 
92 Under Clause 17 of the NYPE 93 form, it is only excluded by the responsibilities of 
Charterers, their servants, agents or subcontractors when the event of loss of time results 
from “arrest”. The content of the off-payment for the time charter service clause might be 
criticised as having not considered all the circumstances of exclusions and not being 
complete enough.  
93 (n 36); Under Clause 9 (a) (iii) of the GENTIME form, it is only excluded by any act or 
omission of the Charterers, their servants, agents or sub-contractors when the event results 
from “arrest”. It might also be criticised that the content of the off- payment for the time 
charter service clause does not consider all circumstances of exclusions and is not complete 
enough. 
94 Coghlin and others (n 2) para 25.44, 25.69. It is likely constructed here that the time 
charterers should take responsibility for their servants, agents or subcontractors of the time 
charterers. 
95 Thomas (n 17). 
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(J) Within Section 6.4 of Chapter 6, in making the context of Clause 8 of 
the NYPE 46 form96 and Clause 8 (a) of the NYPE 93 form97 more 
complete, it has been suggested that the merits98 of Clause 9 of the 
BALTIME form99 and Clause 12 of the GENTIME form100 be brought 
into these clauses, adding “and/or other arrangements”; this may make 
these clauses more ideal.  
 
(K) Under Section 6.9 of Chapter 6, for the purposes of making the legal 
concepts and contents clearer, more complete, thoughtful, and 
elaborate within the time charterparty, such as Clause 9 of the 
BALTIME form,101 Clause 8 of the NYPE 46 form,102 Clause 30 of the 
NYPE 93 form,103 and Clause 17 (a) (i) of the GENTIME form,104 it has 
been proposed to clearly divide two options within these relevant 
clauses.105 One is where the shipowner is the contractual carrier of 
carriage with the bills of lading holder,106 and the other is where the 
time charterer is the contractual carrier of carriage with the bills of 
lading holder.107 However, it was also recommended, for example, if 
                                                          
96 Williams (n 15) 229. 
97 Brodie (n 15) 34.  
98 Line 122 to 123 of Clause 9 of the BALTIME Form and Line 307 to 308 of Clause 12 of the 
GENTIME form already provides “or other arrangements” This is more complete content 
than Clause 8 of the NYPE 46 form and Clause 8 (a) of the NYPE 93 form.  
99 Thomas (n 15) 286. 
100 (n 36). 
101 Thomas (n 15) 286. 
102 Williams (n 15) 229.  
103  Brodie (n 15) 40. 
104  (n 36). 
105 (n 101)-(n 104). 
106 In other words, these are ship’s bills. The shipowner is bound as a contractual carrier 
with the bills of lading holder. This is discussed in Section 6.7.1.1 of Chapter 6. 
107 In other words, these are charterer’s bills. The time charterer is bound as a contractual 
carrier with the bills of lading holder. This is discussed in Section 6.7.1.2 of Chapter 6. 
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the shipowner and the time charterer agree to which option to take108 
in order to allocate risk109 regarding who is the contractual carrier of 
carrying of goods and therefore decide that the shipowner is the 
carrier, that the suggested paragraph relevant to the indication of the 
name of the time charterer as a carrier of carriage should be deleted. 
 
(L) It has been suggested in Section 6.9 of Chapter 6 to adopt the view 
in The Hillcroft110 and to add “directly” after the words showing 
causation in the indemnity clause in the time charterparty.111 This may 
also make contractual parties fully aware that in order for the 
shipowner to successfully claim his/her right to indemnity from the 
time charterer, there should be no intervening event to break the chain 
of causation between the shipowner’s resultant loss, damage or 
liabilities and the shipowner’s obedience to the time charterer’s 
order.112 The same recommendation may also improve other separate 
clauses regarding narrower113 shipowners’ rights to indemnity,114 for 
instance, in terms of the carriage of deck cargo, where the 
shipowner’s rights of indemnity are provided in Clause 13 (b) of the 
                                                          
108 Wilson (n 7) 6. 
109 Nicholas Gaskell, ‘Charterer’s liability to Shipowner’ in Johan Schelin (ed), Modern Law 
of Charterparties (Jure AB 2003); David Foxton, ‘Indemnities in Time Charters’ in Thomas (n 
15). 
110 Portsmouth Steamship Co. Ltd. v Liverpool & Glasgow Salvage Association (The 
Hillcroft) [1929] 34 LILR 459 [462] (Roche, J.); Girvin (n 13) 668. 
111 (n 1); For instance, adding “directly” in the third sentence of Clause 9 of the BALTIME 
form to make the content of this clause clearly show that ‘The Charterers shall indemnify the 
Owners against all consequences or liabilities arising directly from the Master, offices or 
Agents signing Bills of Lading or other documents or otherwise complying with such 
orders…’ 
112 The Hillcroft (n 110) (Roche, J.). 
113 Foxton (n 109).  
114 ibid. 
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NYPE 93 form,115 and in terms of the bills of lading, where the 
shipowner’s right of indemnity is stipulated within Clause 30 (b) of the 
NYPE 93 form116 and Clause 17 (e) of the GENTIME form.117 
Particularly, the original contents in Clause 18 (f) of the GENTIME 
form provides that the shipowner and the time charterer ‘agree to 
indemnify each other against all loss, damage or expenses arising or 
resulting from any obligation to pay claims, fines or penalties for which 
the other party is liable in accordance with this Charter Party…’118 The 
reform also suggests adding “directly” within Clause 18 (f) of the 
GENTIME form to change the sentence to “…arising or resulting 
directly from…”119 The person who has any obligation under the time 
charterparty to indemnify another contractual party is provided with 
limits on the grounds of “directly” causing another’s loss, damage or 
expenses. The clear, complete and thoughtful limitation through this 
reform might also support contractual parties in allocating risk in the 
aforementioned provisions.120  
 
 
 (4) Reducing the risk of default of the time charterparty through reform 
according to the following recommendations:  
                                                          
115 Brodie (n 15) 37. 
116 Brodie (n 15) 40. 
117 (n 36). 
118 ibid. 
119 ibid. 
120 Foxton (n 109). 
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(A) The goal, as stated above in (4), can be seen in Section 3.4.5 of 
Chapter 3. It has been proposed that the time charterparty121 
provide for the situation in which the time charterer insists on 
ordering the vessel outside the trading limits122 or on proceeding 
to an unsafe port. In this case the Master or the shipowners have 
complied with an invalid order and the shipowners are entitled to 
payment for the time charter service at the current market123 rate 
if it is higher than the charter rate during the period of the invalid 
order during time charter. This reform may not only be consistent 
with the view of the court124 but also reduce the risk of the time 
charterer invalidly ordering the vessel outside the trading limits or 
proceeding to an unsafe port. The reason for this is that paying a 
higher payment for the time charter service might not meet the 
time charterers’ intentions if the current market rate ends up 
being higher than the contractual rate. 
 
(B) This achievement stated in (4) can be also found under Section 
4.6 of Chapter 4. It has been submitted that, within the time 
charterparty,125 a difference be made in the legal consequences 
of a late ending of the time charter service depending on whether 
                                                          
121 See (n 55). 
122 This is an adoption of the court view in Rederi Sverre Hansen v Van Ommeren [1921] 6 
LlL Rep 193.  
123 The market refers to the market for the equivalent vessel for period time charters on 
terms similar to the contractual charter. The Johnny [1977] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 1 (CA); Coghlin 
and others (n 2) para 4.56. 
124 ibid. 
125 Such as Clause 7 of the BALTIME form, Clause 4 of the NYPE 46 form, Clause 1 of the 
NYPE 93 form, and Clause 4 (d) of the GENTIME form. 
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it is a legitimate or illegitimate final voyage.126 This proposal may 
reduce illegitimate final voyages being ordered by the time 
charterer because the aforementioned reform ensures the 
negative legal impact of a late ending of the time charter service 
under an illegitimate final voyage. 
 
(C) Within Section 5.4.3 of Chapter 5, it has been proposed that the   
BALTIME form127 and the NYPE 46 form128 could also adopt the 
provision regarding the shipowner’s suspension of his/ her 
performance of any and all of his/her obligations in Lines 200 to 
206 of the third paragraph of Clause 8 (c) of the GENTIME 
form.129 This would provide the shipowner with a temporary and 
effective weapon to protect himself/herself against the time 
charterer’s default in payment of the time charter service before 
the shipowner finally chooses to permanently130 withdraw the 
time charter service.131 
 
 
(5) Creatively finding a way to logically solve the practical problem of 
the legal issues under the time charterparty; and to avoid future 
possible disputes as well as controlling uncertainty and properly 
                                                          
126 The suggested example can be seen in Section 4.7 of Chapter 4. 
127 Thomas (n 15) 286-89. 
128 Williams (n 15) 228-31. 
129 ibid. 
130 Wilson (n 7) 107. 
131 Thomas (n 17). 
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and effectively pre-managing potential legal risks in advance 
through the following reforms: 
 
(A) In Section 2.5.2 of Chapter 2, it was suggested to adopt clear 
wording, as in the content under Article 3 (1) (a), (b), (c) of the 
Hague Rules132 or the Hague-Visby Rules133  instead of the 
original description concerning the shipowner’s seaworthy 
obligation, within an added sub-clause under Clause 1 of the 
BALTIME form,134 Clause 1 of the NYPE 46 form,135 Clause 2 of 
the NYPE 93 form136 and Clause 11 of the GENTIME form.137 It is 
worth mentioning that the recommendation harmonizes the legal 
concept of seaworthiness within the standard forms of the time 
charterparty and makes these clauses more complete and clear, 
and could also probably avoid future disputes. In addition, in order 
to make the shipowner’s obligation for seaworthiness and 
maintenance under the time charterparty more consistent, it has 
been suggested in Section 2.6.1 of Chapter 2 that, in order to 
avoid a repetition of the definition of seaworthiness, it can simply 
be set out that the shipowner should be obliged to maintain the 
vessel’s class if contractually required and to keep the vessel 
seaworthy during the period of the time charter in the provision 
                                                          
132 <http://www.admiraltylawguide.com/conven/haguerules1924.html> accessed 8 April 
2011. 
133 <http://www.admiraltylaw.com/statutes/hague.html> accessed 5 February 2011. 
134 Thomas (n 15) 286. 
135 Williams (n 15) 228. 
136 Brodie (n 15) 33. 
137 (n 36).  
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regarding maintenance, such as Clause 3 of the BALTIME form,138 
Clause 1 of the NYPE 46 form,139 Clause 6 of the NYPE 93 
form140 and Clause 11 of the GENTIME form.141 These consistent 
and connected provisions can also contribute technically to 
making the contents of the shipowner’s seaworthy and 
maintenance obligation within the time charterparty more logical, 
clear and simple. 
 
(B)    Adding the legal effect of the contractual parties’ breach in the 
clauses under the time charterparty through reform in order to 
make it clearer and easier to predict the legal result:   
(a)   It has been recommended in Section 2.6.4 of Chapter 2 that 
the contractual parties should negotiate to provide a clear 
expression of the maximum period for repairing the vessel 
and the consequences of this breach within the time 
charterparty when the contract is established. If any 
argument occurs, this reform would facilitate a judgment as 
to whether any relevant breach is “going to the root of the 
contract”142 and “deprive[s] substantially the whole benefit of 
the contract”143 as well as clarifying the legal result for both 
parties. This might also help the time charterer take steps to 
                                                          
138 Thomas (n 15) 286. 
139 Williams (n 15) 229. 
140 Brodie (n 15) 34. 
141 (n 36). 
142 Hongkong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd. v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. (The Hongkong Fir) [1962] 
2 QB 26. 
143 ibid. 
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manage his/her risk144 and any possible uncertain outcomes 
in advance. The recommendation145 could be added as a 
sub-clause of the maintenance clause146 of the BALTIME 
form,147 the NYPE 46 form,148 the NYPE 93 form,149 and the 
GENTIME form.150  
 
 (b)   Within Section 3.4.5 of Chapter 3, it has been suggested 
that, in the provision under the time charterparty regarding 
trading limits and safe port,151 to set out that the Master has 
a legal right to reject an invalid order by the time charterer, 
which instructs the vessel to perform a service outside 
trading limits152 or nominates the vessel to proceed to an 
unsafe port,153 and to request another valid order.154 If the 
time charterer insists that the initial order should be followed 
under protest, the shipowners are entitled to choose to 
terminate the time charterparty155 and claim for damages.156 
This reform provides a clear indication of the legal 
                                                          
144 See (n 288) in Section 2.5.6 of Chapter 2. 
145 The designed example can be seen in Section 2.6.4 of Chapter 2. 
146 Such as Clause 3 of the BALTIME form, Clause 1 of the NYPE 46 form, Clause 6 of the 
NYPE 93 form, and Clause 11 of the GENTIME form. 
147 Thomas (n 15) 286-89. 
148 Williams (n 15) 228-31. 
149 Brodie (n 15) 32-46. 
150 (n 36). 
151 See (n 55). 
152 Coghlin and others (n 2) para 5.12. 
153 The Hill Harmony (n 4) [160] (Lord Hobhouse). 
154 Baatz (n 100). 
155 ibid; Coghlin and others (n 2) para 5.18. 
156 Rederi Sverre Hansen v Van Ommeren [1921] 6 LlL Rep 193; Janet O’Sullivan and 
Jonathan Hilliard, The Law of Contract (4th edn, OUP 2010) para 18.38. 
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consequences on the basis of the court’s view.157 A 
persuasive submission158 in the provision might also have 
the advantage of making it more complete and make the 
approach more practical, applicable and convincing. 
 
   (c) Under Section 3.4.5 in Chapter 3, it was proposed to clearly 
provide that if the time charterer still insists on the initial 
invalid order, the shipowner could also choose to waive his 
/her right to refuse this order by the time charterer and 
comply with the initial order outside the trading limits or to 
proceed to an unsafe port.159 In addition, the shipowner 
could still be entitled to claim for suffered damages based on 
the charterer’s breach of the trade limits160 and safe port 
undertaking.161 This reform sets out the legal effect in the 
provision within the time charterparty as to trading limits and 
the time charterer’s safe port undertaking162 which might 
assist in reducing the dispute because it not only might help 
the contractual parties more clearly and easily predict the 
legal result but also might get credits in covering possible 
                                                          
157 The Hill Harmony (n 4) [160] (Lord Hobhouse); Rederi Sverre Hansen v Van Ommeren (n 
156). 
158 Coghlin and others (n 2) para 5.12, 5.18; Baatz (n 58). 
     159 This adopts the view in Motor Oil Hellas (Corinth) Refineries S.A v Shipping Corporation 
of India (The Kanchenjunga) [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 391 (HL); Coghlin and others (n 2) para 
10.64. 
160 Coghlin and others (n 2) para 5.14. 
161 The Kanchenjunga (159); Girvin (n 13) 333. 
162 See (n 55). 
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situations in the provision and make the provision more 
complete and thoughtful.   
 
   (d) Within Section 4.6 of Chapter 4, it was recommended that 
the contents regarding the ending of the time charter service 
within the time charterparty, Clause 7 of the BALTIME 
form,163 Clause 4 of the NYPE 46 form164 and Clause 1 of 
the NYPE 93 form165 and Clause 4 (d) of the GENTIME 
form,166 should all include the following: (i) the legal effect of 
the early ending of the time charter service; (ii) the legal 
effect of the late ending of the time charter service under 
legitimate final voyage ordered by the time charterer; and (iii) 
the legal effect of an illegitimate final voyage ordered by the 
time charterer. This suggestion is also to keep the 
advantages regarding the definition and the legal effect of 
illegitimate ordering of the final voyage by the time charterer, 
which is provided in Clause 4 (d) of the GENTIME form,167 
while integrating the court’s view168 by modifying the 
contents within those clauses. This reform169 would also 
make the contents regarding ending the time charter service 
                                                          
163 Thomas (n 15) 286. 
164 Williams(n 15) 229. 
165 Brodie (n 15) 32. 
166 (n 36).  
167 ibid. 
168Torvald Klaverness v Arni Maritime (The Gregos) [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1 (HL); Hyundai 
Merchant Marine v Gesuri Chartering (The Peonia) [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 100 (Commercial 
Court and CA). Timber Shipping Co. S.A v London and Overseas Freighters (The London 
Explorer) [1971] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 523 (HL). 
169 The suggested example is shown in Section 4.7 of Chapter 4. 
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within these clauses more complete and thoughtful as well 
as prevent future disputes. 
 
In addition, the recommendation of distinguishing whether or 
not there exists an available charter market170 contributes to 
clearly setting up a measured way of determining damages 
from the early or late ending of the time charter service under 
a legitimate and illegitimate final voyage within the time 
charterparty. More certainty and predictability171 regarding 
the contractual parties’ legal positions under the time 
charterparty might be brought about by this reform. Clear 
agreement could also assist the claimant in reducing the 
burden of proof and might make his/her loss easier to 
recover172 if any argument occurs in the future. 
 
   (e) It has been suggested in Section 5.4.3, Chapter 5, to 
include the legal effect of “withdraw the time charter service” 
into the withdrawal provision to make the legal consequence 
predictable for the merchants. Therefore the wording ‘The 
owner shall be entitled to withdraw the time charter service 
                                                          
170 Jason Chuah, Law of International Trade: Cross-Border Commercial Transactions (5th 
edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2013) 328-29. 
171 Ewan McKendrick, Contract Law (10th edn, Palgrave Macmillan 2013) 362. 
172 See (n 165) in Section 4.6 of Chapter 4. 
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and to terminate the time charter’ in the time charterparty173 
was proposed. 
 
(C)   Within Section 6.9, Chapter 6, it was found to be unclear why 
Clause 9 of the BALTIME form174 and Clause 8 of the NYPE 46 
form175 fail to include “without prejudice to this Charterparty”176 or 
“without prejudice to the terms and conditions of the Charter 
party”177 or similar words.178 It was noted that an omission of this 
important provision seems likely when these two clauses were 
drafted. For the purposes of eliminating a practical dispute which 
may arise from the shipowner’s claim of indemnity where the bills 
of lading possibly expose the shipowner to a liability which is 
inconsistent within the terms of the time charterparty,179 it was 
proposed that Clause 9 of the BALTIME form180 and Clause 8 of 
the NYPE 46 form181 could follow the model of Clause 30 (b) of 
the NYPE 93 form,182 and Clause 17 (a) (i) of the GENTIME 
                                                          
173 Such as Clause 6 of BALTIME form, Clause 5 of NYPE 46 form, Clause 11 (b) of NYPE 
93 form, and Clause 8 (c) of the GENTIME. 
174 Thomas (n 15) 286. 
175 Williams (n 15) 229. 
176  For example, Clause 13 (a) of the SHELLTIME 4 Form provides “without prejudice to this 
charter”. Thomas (n 15) 339. 
177 For instance, Clause 17 (a) (i) of the GENTIME form provides “without prejudice to the 
terms and conditions of the Charter party”. (n 36). 
178  These words only confirm that the time charterparty should be kept unaffected by the 
signature of bills of lading in likely various terms. Coghlin and others (n 2) para 21.35; John 
Hare, Shipping Law & Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa (2nd edn, JUTA & Co. Ltd 2009) 
760; Nicholas Gaskell, Regina  Asariotis and Yvonne Baatz, Bills of Lading: Law and 
Contracts ( LLP Professional Publishing 2000) para 21.5. 
179 Foxton (n 109).  
180 Thomas (n 15) 286. 
181 Williams (n 15) 229. 
182  It provides “without prejudice to this Charter party”. Brodie (n 15) 40. 
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form,183  by adding ‘All bills of lading or other documents shall be 
without prejudice to the terms and conditions of this Charter under 
these clauses.’ These reforms might assist in preventing the terms 
within the bills of lading under the time charter being altered under 
the time charterparty and ensure that the bills of lading are subject 
to the time charterparty184 as well as keep the shipowner’s and the 
time charterer’s legal liabilities within the bills of lading the same 
as those under the time charterparty. It is therefore anticipated 
that this could also simplify the legal relationship between the 
shipowner, the time charterer and the bills of lading holders. 
 
(D)   It has been suggested in Section 6.9, Chapter 6, that in order to 
prevent issues arising from inaccurate records of the statements 
in the bills of lading or other documents, such as the number of 
packages or pieces, quantity, weight and apparent order and 
condition of the cargo,185 that further details should be added 
within Clause 9 of the BALTIME form186 to indicate that the Master 
shall sign bills of lading or other documents for cargo as presented 
in conformity with the mate’s receipts. Adding these further details 
would also have the advantage of making the contents of Clause 
9 of the BALTIME form187 clearer and more complete. In addition, 
                                                          
183  It provides “without prejudice to the terms and conditions of the Charter party”. (n 36). 
184  Gaskell (n 109). 
185 The Nogar Marin [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 412 (CA) [417], [421]-[422] (Mustill, L.J.); Girvin (n 
13) 669-70; Coghlin and others (n 2) para 21.45; Foxton (n 109) para 19.14; See also 
Charles G. C. H. Baker, ‘The Safe Port/Berth Obligation and Employment and Indemnity 
Clauses’ 1 (1988) LMCLQ 43. 
186  Thomas (n 15) 286. 
187  ibid. 
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this recommendation would make the contractual parties’ 
important legal obligations more obvious and noticeable and make 
this clause more likely to be consistent with the clauses in other 
standard forms, such as Clause 8 of the NYPE 46 form,188 Clause 
30 (a) of the NYPE 93 form,189 and Clause 17 (a) (i) of the 
GENTIME form.190 
 
(E)    Under Section 6.9 of Chapter 6, in order to prevent confusion for 
the bills of lading holder which may result in a possible argument, 
it has been proposed to ensure the contractual obligation of the 
shipowner and of the time charterer in the time charterparty and to 
provide that ‘Any inconsistent context, which refers to who is 
carrier in the reverse side of the bills of lading or other documents, 
with the face of the bills of lading or other documents, should be 
precluded’ within the time charterparty, such as in Clause 9 of the 
BALTIME form,191 Clause 8 of the NYPE 46 form,192 Clause 30 of 
the NYPE 93 form193 and Clause 17 (a) (i) of the GENTIME 
form.194 
 
(F)    Integrating the court’s view (common law) into the time 
charterparty195 to ensure that the reforms are practically 
                                                          
188 Williams (n 15) 229.  
189 Brodie (n 15) 40. 
190 (n 36). 
191 Thomas (n 15) 286. 
192 Williams (n 15) 229.  
193  Brodie (n 15) 40. 
194  (n 36).  
195 (n 1).  
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applicable, as follows:  
 
                The reforms may benefit contractual parties allowing them 
to more easily justify their legal rights if the content of the 
time charterparty is also supported by the court. This may 
also help to avoid confusion and unnecessary disputes 
between the contractual parties and save court resources 
when the case appears before the court.   
 
(a) Under Section 3.4.5 in Chapter 3, it was noted that in 
order to clarify what the real meaning of the time 
charterers’ express undertaking to nominate a safe port 
is, it is recommended that a clause regarding the time 
charterers’ safe port undertaking in the time 
charterparty196 should adopt the court’s view in The 
Evia (No.2)197 as follows: 
‘The Charterers’ safe port undertaking makes it 
necessary for this port to be prospectively safe at the 
time of nomination.’ 
 
(b)  Within Section 5.2.1 in Chapter 5, it was suggested  
that Clause 6 of BALTIME form198 and Clause 4 of the 
                                                          
196 See (n 55). 
197 Empress Cubana de Fletes v Kodors Shipping Corporation (The Evia (No.2)) [1982] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep 307. 
198 Thomas (n 15) 286. 
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NYPE 46 form199 should follow either Lines 137 to 138 
of Clause 10 of the NYPE 93 form200 or Lines 181 to 
182 of Clause 8(a) of the GENTIME form201 and clearly 
provide the elapsed time as the governing time, to 
comply with the court’s decision in The Arctic Skou.202 
This will help correctly compute the whole payment 
time for the time charter service under the time 
charterparty 203 and preclude a practical dispute 
regarding whether or not the local time or the elapsed 
time will be applied when computing the whole time 
regarding the payment for the time charter service.204 
 
(c) It has been recommended in Section 5.4.3, Chapter 5, 
to apply the court’s view in The Antaios (No 2) and to 
provide clear language “or any fundamental breach 
whatsoever of this Charter Party”205 within Line 61 of 
Clause 5 of the NYPE 46 form.206 This suggestion 
could also help the contractual parties clearly identify 
that the other reason for the withdrawal of the time 
                                                          
199 Williams (n 15) 229. 
200 Coghlin and others (n 2) para 14.5; Brodie (n 15) 35.  
201 (n 36). 
202 The Arctic Skou [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 478. 
203<https://www.bimco.org/Members/Chartering/BIMCO_Documents/Time_Charter_Parties/
GENTIME/Explanatory_Notes_GENTIME.aspx> accessed 28 December 2012. 
204<https://www.bimco.org/en/Chartering/Documents/Time_Charter_Parties/NYPE93/Explan
atory_Notes_NYPE93.aspx> accessed 28 October 2012. 
205 Antaios Compania Naviera S.A. v Salen Rederierna A.B (The Antaios (No 2) [1984] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep 235 [238] (Lord Diplock); Davies and Dickey (n 9) 396. 
206 Williams (n 15) 229. 
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charter service by the shipowner needs to be restricted 
only for the time charterer’s fundamental breach of the 
time charterparty207 and could make Clause 5 of the 
NYPE 46 form208 clearer and better thought out. The 
same proposal to use clear language applies in the 
amendment of Clause 6 of the BALTIME form209 and 
Clause 8 (c) of the GENTIME form.210  
 
(d) Under Section 5.5.3 of Chapter 5, it has been 
proposed to comply with the view in The Apollo211 and 
to modify Lines 98 to 99 in Clause 15 of the NYPE 46 
form,212 adding “similar” into the original statements 
and making it ‘or other “similar” cause preventing the 
full working of the vessel’ in order to prevent disputes. 
This is because the absence of “similar” in the original 
statement makes the real meaning of the statement 
unclear213 and this might cause an unnecessary 
problem of interpretation if a merchant is still willing to 
choose the NYPE 46 form214 to be their time 
charterparty. This modification will ensure that the 
                                                          
207 Line 150 of Cause 11 (a) of NYPE 93 form had reflected the view of House of Lords in 
The Antaios (No 2); The Antaios (No 2) (n 205); Coghlin and others (n 2) para 16.126. 
208 Williams (n 15) 229. 
209 Thomas (n 15) 286. 
210 (n 36).  
211 The Apollo [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 200; Wilson (n 7) 97. 
212 Williams (n 15) 230. 
213 Thomas (n 15); The Line 225 of Clause 17 of the NTPE 93 form and Line 345 of Clause 
21 of the SHELTIME 4 form had already  showed “any other similar cause”. Brodie (n 15) 
38; Thomas (n 15) 340. 
214 Williams (n 15) 228-31. 
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precise ambit of accidents of off-payment for the time 
charter service clause is clearly presented by clear 
wordings within this clause and it is ideal for making 
the phrase comparatively precise. This 
recommendation also applies in the modification of 
Line 146 of Clause 11 (A) of the BALTIME form215 
where the original phrase would change from “or other 
accident”, to “or any other similar accident.”  
 
(e)  It has been recommended in Section 7.4, Chapter 7, 
that to directly adopt the construction of the House of 
Lords in The TFL Prosperity216 within Clause 12 of the 
BALTIME form217 to improve on its imperfect wording. 
The word “loss” is to be added in the second sentence 
of Clause 12 of the BALTIME form218 in order to make 
the content complete and prevent unnecessary 
confusion. Separating the contents in this clause into 
Part (A), The Exemptions of the Owners’ Liability, and 
Part (B), The Charterers’ Liability, is also suggested. 
For the purposes of cataloguing different extents of 
the type of “loss or damage’’ construed by the court, 
dividing (A) into three sub-paragraphs, (i), (ii), and (iii), 
is suggested. Therefore, the suggestion is to clearly 
                                                          
215 Thomas (n 15) 287. 
216 Tor Line A.B. v Alltrans Group of Canada Ltd. (The TEL Prosperity) [1984] 1 WLR 48 
(HL). 
217 Thomas (n 15) 287.    
218 The designed provision is showed in Section 7.5 of Chapter 7. 
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add that ‘The type of “loss or damage’’ within the first 
two sentences here only refers to physical loss or 
damage’ after the second sentence of the 
aforementioned Part (A) (i). The statement 
‘Aforementioned “loss or damage” covers physical as 
well as financial loss or damage’ should also be added 
to the end of Part (A) (ii). The indication 
‘Aforementioned “loss or damage” covers physical as 
well as financial loss or damage’ is also proposed as 
an addition at the end of Part (B).219 This reform might 
contribute to ensuring that the content in Clause 12 of 
the BALTIME form220 does not contradict common law 
and it also might make the content of this clause 
clearer, more straightforward and consequently assist 
both contractual parties in accurately comprehending 
the differences in scope of the types of “loss or 
damage’’ in this clause. 
 
            (G)     Directly adopting the explanatory notes from the GENTIME 
form into content under the clauses of the standard forms of 
the time charterparty through the following reforms:  
                       Within Section 5.2.1, Chapter 5, aiming to comply with 
                                                          
219 ibid. 
220 Thomas (n 15) 287.    
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common practice221 of making the real context clearly 
stipulated in the time charterparty provision to avoid future 
disputes and to save busy merchants’ time in making further 
checks, it has been proposed to directly adopt the explanation 
of the explanatory notes to Clause 8 (a) of the GENTIME 
form222 and add the “original” in Line 181 of Clause 8 (a) of the 
GENTIME form.223 The content should provide that, ‘In the 
event that additional time charter service is payable in 
accordance with Clause 9 (d) of the GENTIME form224 such 
time charter service shall be based on the rate applicable at 
the “original” time of ending the time charter service.’ The 
same suggestion also applies to Clause 6 of the BALTIME 
form,225 Clause 4 of the NYPE 46 form226 and Clause 10 of 
the NYPE 93 form.227  
 
(H)    This reform also integrates practical trading usage into the 
clauses of the essential forms228 in order to effectively connect 
international trade and further resolve the practical problem of 
the legal issues under the time charter: 
                                                          
221 See (n 203). 
222 ibid. 
223 (n 36).  
224 ibid. 
225 Thomas (n 15) 286. 
226 Williams (n 15) 229. 
227 Brodie (n 15) 35. 
228 (n 1). 
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It has been proposed in Section 6.9 of Chapter 6, that reform 
is needed to avoid a future potential practical issue regarding 
identifying who the contractual carrier is with the bill of lading 
holder under the time charter,229 to prevent the shipowner 
from incurring unnecessary trouble in practice,230 and to echo 
and reflect the decision by the House of Lords on The  
Starsin 231 as well as to confirm the customs and practice 
applied in banks for international trade.232 Therefore, it has 
been suggested to adopt the spirit of Article 20 (a) (i) of the 
UCP 600,233 to clearly provide the name of the contractual 
carrier on the face of the bills of lading or other documents, 
clearly indicating the capacity of the signatory234 and make the 
signature by the carrier, Master or Agent necessary to identify 
the carrier, Master or Agent235 in the relevant clause in the 
time charterparty, such as Clause 9 of the BALTIME form,236 
Clause 8 of the NYPE 46 form,237 Clause 30 of the NYPE 93 
form,238 and Clause 17 (a) (i) of the GENTIME form.239 This 
reform could ensure that the way to solve the practical issue 
becomes readily applicable by being not only consistent with 
                                                          
229 See the details of discussions in Section 6.7 in Chapter 6. 
230 Gaskell, Asariotis and Baatz (n 178) para 3.31. 
231 Homburg Houtimport BV v Agrosin Private Ltd. (The Starsin) [2003] 2 WLR 711; See the 
details of discussion in Section 6.7.2 in Chapter 6. 
232  This refers to The Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits.  
233 <http://finotax.com/faq/ucpdc.htm>accessed 5 July 2013.  
234 Charles Debattista, ‘Cargo Claims and Bills of Lading’ in Baatz (n 58). 
235 The designed sample can be seen in Section 6.10 of Chapter 6.  
236 Thomas (n 15) 286. 
237 Williams (n 15) 229.  
238  Brodie (n 15) 40. 
239  See (n 36).  
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the court’s view240 but also complying with banking practice.241 
In addition, it might benefit the business of the shipowners by 
reducing any possible disruption through the course of action 
brought to them by the bill of lading holder242 and might also 
release the shipowner from consequently suffering the time 
consuming, possible costly243 and harmful impact on their 
business reputation. In addition, it is believed that this reform 
might supply a more considerate approach because a reform 
imposing these clear contractual obligations in the provision 
would make the shipowner and the time charterer notice its 
essential obligations and therefore be formally reminded244 to 
then accurately perform these obligations; otherwise they 
would probably bear the risk of a breach of contract.245 The 
clear agreement provided in the time charterparty might 
achieve consistency as to the indications of the contractual 
carrier in the bills of lading, or other documents under the time 
charter, with those in the time charterparty and therefore 
solidify the indication in the bills of lading or other documents 
without prejudice to the time charterparty.246 This might also 
help to guide the shipowner or the time charterer in how to 
edit a proper bill of lading or other documents to help avoid 
disputes if they want to produce their own bill of lading for 
                                                          
240 The Starsin (n 231). 
241 Article 20 (a) (i) of the UCP 600.  
242 Gaskell, Asariotis and Baatz (n 178) para 3.31. 
243 Hill (n 2) 253. 
244 Gaskell, Asariotis and Baatz (n 178) para 3.34. 
245 Coghlin and others (n 2) para 21.61. 
246 Coghlin and others (n 2) para 21.35; Gaskell, Asariotis and Baatz (n 178) para 21.5. 
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business. Also the bona fide bills of lading holder who is 
endorsed and has transferred the bills might likely be 
sufficiently better protected.247 This is because if there is any 
problem regarding goods which are carried under the time 
chartered vessel, he/she could easily, quickly248 and 
effectively identify the correct contractual carrier from the bills 
of lading or other documents and could then correctly sue the 
that carrier within the limited time bar of one year, under 
Article III, Rule 6 of the Hague/Visby Rules.249 Then this might 
also indirectly enhance the prosperity of commercial shipping 
activities and international trade. Moreover, these clear 
provisions within the time charterparty will ensure the 
contractual parties have no space to make excuses or argue 
different statements to each other. This will also enable the bill 
of lading holder,250 the shipowner and the time charterer to 
more easily raise the time charterparty as evidence to support 
their claim or defence and therefore reduce the stress of 
establishing who is the bill of lading carrier under the time 
charter, when a dispute has arisen. This clear evidence might 
also further facilitate saving public resources through reducing 
court time for investigating the evidence and also saving the 
                                                          
247 Wilson (n 7) 246; Gaskell, Asariotis and Baatz (n 178) para 3.31; Davies and Dickey (n 9) 
266; David Foxton, ‘Bills of Lading for Goods on a Chartered Ship’ in Bernard Eder and 
others (eds), Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of Lading (22nd edn, Sweet and Maxwell 
Limited 2011) para 6-036; Simone Schnitzer, Understanding international Trade Law (Law 
Matters Publishing 2006) 14. 
248 The Starsin (n 231); Richard Aikens, Richard Lord and Michael Bools, Bills of Lading 
(Informa 2006) para 7.69. 
249 (n 132)-(n 133). 
250 William Tetley, ‘Identity of the Carrier—The Hague Rules, Visby Rules, UNCITRAL’ (1977) 
4 LMCLQ 519.  
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costs of further hearing the case. Furthermore, the reform 
might be ideal since it imposes the contractual obligations into 
the aforementioned provisions to logically and consistently 
connect to the provision of indemnity under the time 
charterparty.  
 
 
(6) By way of reform, to manage and organise the presentation style   
of the standard forms251 and to make these forms more 
functional for reminding contractual parties clearly, easily, and 
quickly of their own legal obligations and rights. 
   
(A) It has been suggested in Section 2.4.1, Chapter 2, that the 
essential standard forms should be presented in a more organised 
manner, by adding Part 1 Box Layout252 to the NYPE 46253 and 
the NYPE 93 forms.254 It was also recommended in Section 2.6.4 
of Chapter 2 that to attach an index to the BALTIME form,255 the 
NYPE 46256 and NYPE 93 forms,257 as found in the GENTIME 
form.258 This is because Part 1 Box Layout and an index can allow 
the contractual parties to clearly and quickly identify their legal 
rights and obligations.  
 
                                                          
251 (n 1). 
252 NYPE 46 form and NYPE 93 form are lack of Part 1 Box Layout. 
253 Williams(n 15) 228-31. 
254 Brodie (n 15) 32-46. 
255 Thomas (n 15) 286-89. 
256 Williams(n 15) 228-31. 
257 Brodie (n 14) 32-46. 
258 (n 36). 
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(B) Under Section 2.6.4, Chapter 2, for the purposes of more easily 
and efficiently presenting information in the clauses of the time 
charterparty, adding an underlined heading at the front of each 
section has been suggested, as shown on the GENTIME form259 
when the BALTIME form,260 the NYPE 46261 and the NYPE 93 
forms262 are chosen and modified by the contractual parties. 
 
(C) Within Section 2.6.4 in Chapter 2, the recommendation was to 
add a Box to highlight the maximum period for repair of the vessel 
in the time charterparty in Part 1 Box Layout of the essential 
forms263 in order to ensure that both parties are effectively 
reminded of the period by way of the emphasised key words in the 
Box Layout. 
 
(D) It has been suggested in Section 3.4.5 of Chapter 3 that a Box 
Layout be added to emphasise “trading limits”, “excluded ports” 
and “excluded countries” in the essential forms.264 A clearer divide 
has also been proposed “at the time of beginning of the time 
charter service”, “at the time of ending of the time charter service” 
and “during the time charter” within “excluded ports” and “excluded 
countries” for guiding the contractual parties with discretion and 
                                                          
259 ibid. 
260 Thomas (n 15) 286-89. 
261 Williams(n 15) 228-31. 
262 Brodie (n 15) 32-46. 
263 (n 1). 
264 ibid. 
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flexible choice for negotiating these and to fill these in in order to 
deal with different situations.   
 
(E) Within Section 4.3.2 in Chapter 4, it has been suggested that this 
is divided into “margin on the early ending of the time charter 
service” and “margin on the late ending of the time charter service” 
in Box 6 (a) in Part 1 Box Layout of the GENTIME form265 to make 
it clearer. Adding another box of minimum and maximum was also 
proposed for the duration of the time charter in Box Layout of the 
GENTIME form266 in order for the contractual parties to be free to 
have an alternate choice. It is worth mentioning that these 
recommendations not only help contractual parties to effectively 
pay attention to the negotiated margin and remind the time 
charterer to comply with it but provide further benefits by allocating 
commercial certainty for the duration of the time charter. These 
suggestions could also guide a direction for adding the Box Layout 
regarding the duration of the time charter on the BALTIME form,267 
and the NYPE 46268 and NYPE 93 forms269 in order to improve 
their defects when any of these forms are chosen and modified by 
the merchants. 
 
(F) Under Section 5.3.1 of Chapter 5, it was recommended that the 
                                                          
265 (n 36).  
266 ibid. 
267 Thomas (n 15) 286. 
268 Williams(n 15) 229. 
269 Brodie (n 15) 32. 
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relevant information be connected together to allow for different 
circumstances under which the time charterer can deduct from the 
payment for the time charter service under the essential forms270 
to appear in one Box in the Box Layout which is titled “deduction” 
and is then divided into several sub-columns. The various clause 
numbers of provisions regarding deducting from the payment for 
the time charter service would then be separately presented in the 
sub-columns under the Box for the contractual parties negotiating 
to select finally what they want to keep in the time charterparty. In 
addition, the column of “the other circumstances” under the Box is 
available for newly added clause numbers or newly added sub 
clause numbers in the time charterparty. This reform could not 
only quickly help the contractual parties to clearly notice the time 
charterer’s different rights for deduction from the payment of the 
time charter service which occur in individual provisions under the 
time charterparty but also efficiently save the merchants’ time. 
 
(G) It has been proposed in Section 5.4.3, Chapter 5, that an extra 
Box in the Part 1 Box Layout of these standard forms271 be added 
for contractual parties to fill in the specific hours of notice of the 
time charter’s default272 in order to highlight the period within 
which it is necessary for the shipowner to give the time charterer a 
written notice of the number of clear banking days for rectifying the 
                                                          
270 (n 1). 
271 ibid. 
272 ‘A telexed notice of withdrawal sent before the time the payment has truly expired is 
improper’. The Afovos (n 76); Shipping Law (n 76) 144. 
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failure of payment for the time charter service. This might be ideal 
for effectively reminding both contractual parties of this necessity.  
 
(H) Under Section 5.4.3 of Chapter 5, it has been suggested that 
“Grace Period” as addressed in the Part 1 Box Layout of the 
GNETIME form273 should be also added to the Part 1 Box Layout 
proposed for the other essential forms, such as the BALTIME 
form,274 the NYPE 46275 and NYPE 93 forms.276 This might help 
the contractual parties more easily identify how long the agreed 
grace period is through operating the function of the Box Layout. 
 
 
(7) Integrating and applying dynamic knowledge, risk management,277 
psychology, and the economical point of view to apply a fresh way 
of thinking into the legal field in order to evaluate possible issues 
from different angles to then further reform the clauses in the time 
charterparty278 to solve problems: 
 
(A) It is worth noting here that this thesis has not only followed the 
knowledge of managing legal risk,279 it has applied the knowledge 
                                                          
273 (n 36). 
274 Thomas (n 15) 286-89. 
275 Williams (n 15) 228-31. 
276 Brodie (n 15) 32-46. 
277 Thoughtful draft of contents of contract can manage the legal risk. See Mandaraka-
Sheppard, Modern Maritime Law and Risk Management (2nd edn, Informa Law 2009) 1018, 
1026, 1028; Michel Crouhy, Dan Galai and Robert Mark, The Essentials of Risk 
Management (McGraw-Hill 2006) 1-2, 9, 31. 
278 (n 1). 
279 See (143). 
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of managing legal risk to transforming the important clauses of the 
standard forms280 by way of raising constructive suggestions to 
reform the draft of provision under the essential forms.281 This is 
exemplified in (5) (B) (a).  
 
 (B)  Concerning the issue of applying psychological knowledge to 
better organise and manage the legal contexts through reform: 
(a) Section 5.3.1 of Chapter 5 applied the knowledge of 
psychology into the reform. For the purposes of helping 
contractual parties—normally lay parties—to simplify the 
burden of reading a complex time charterparty and quickly 
capture information as well as clearly providing a whole 
picture of the time charterer’s different rights for deducting 
from the payment of the time charter service under the time 
charterparty, it has been recommended to clearly manage 
separate contexts under the same concept of the time 
charterer’s rights for deducting from the payment of the time 
charter service under the time charterparty in the relevant 
provisions. Combining them together is demonstrated in the 
same clause within the time charterparty.282 This will aid the 
contractual parties to more easily comprehend their legal 
                                                          
280 (n 1). 
281 ibid. 
282 Such as Clause 5 and Clause 15 of the NYPE 46 form, Clause 11(d) and Clause 17 of 
the NYPE 93 form, and Clause 8 (d) and 13 (e) of the GENTIME form.  
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rights and obligations.283 To avoid any possible dispute in 
advance, it was also recommended that the charterparty 
clearly and explicitly provide the consequences of their 
negotiation regarding “the other specific circumstances”, 
which also allow the time charterer to deduct the expenses or 
costs incurred under these circumstances from their payment 
for the time charter service within an extra sub-clause of the 
payment for the time charter service. Therefore, the proposal 
raised aims to organise and manage the relevant provisions 
and “the other specific circumstances” together regarding the 
permitted deduction of payment of the time charter service. 
These are to be presented in this extra sub-clause of the 
payment for the time charter service284 under the time 
charterparty when they are amended in the future.  
 
(b) Under Section 5.4.3 of Chapter 5, in order to improve the  
imperfection of Clause 8 (c) of the GENTIME form,285 the 
recommendation was to add three underlined sub-headings286 
for clearly separating the different sub-paragraphs. Organising 
contractual paragraphs to be clearly presented might not only 
contribute to making the forms easier to read, follow and 
understand in terms of the content of the clause regarding a 
                                                          
283 See footnote 173 in Section 5.3.1 of Chapter 5. 
284 The designed sample of this provision is demonstrated in Section 5.3.1 of Chapter 5. 
285 (n 36). 
286 (1) Withdrawal of the Time Charter Service; (2) Grace Period; (3) Suspend the 
Performance of The Owners’ Obligation. 
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withdrawal of the time charter service and suspension of the 
time charter service under the standard forms of the time 
charterparty287 but also allow better management of their legal 
risk.288     
 
(c) Section 6.10 of Chapter 6 urged that in order to enable the 
merchants to more easily receive and digest the information 
provided, in those cases where the contents of the provision 
under the time charterparty are too long, such as Clause 9 of 
the BALTIME form,289 the longer contents might better be 
divided into several suitable sub-clauses with underlined sub-
headings.290 
 
(C)   A consideration of the economical point of view is presented in 
(2)(B), (5)(F), (5)(H). Reforming the important clauses of the 
standard forms of time charterparty291 achieves effectiveness and 
efficiency in relation to economic value through time savings, a 
management of expenses in commercial dealings and an 
avoidance of having to make unnecessary efforts to recover 
business reputation, as well as saving public resources.  
 
 
                                                          
287 (n 1). 
288 See (n 144). 
289 Thomas (n 15) 286.  
290 The example can be seen in Section 6.10 of Chapter 6. 
291 (n 1). 
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(8) The impact of the above reforms is that it improves on the 
important clauses of the time charterparty.292 In addition, the 
reforms could bring the benefit of realistically reducing any 
impracticalitiesand in solving any practical problems.293 They would 
therefore provide additional protection to contractual parties294and 
also possibly indirectly boost commercial activity in the time 
charter as well as prompting the development of international trade. 
 
To sum up, reforming the important clauses of the essential standard forms 
of the time charterparty295 can creatively transform these clauses to become 
clearer, simpler, more accurate, organised, and creative, and can indeed 
effectively and efficiently solve important legal issues under the time 
charterparty and eliminate any possible practical dispute. The 
recommendations could also contribute toward guiding the modification of 
the crucial clauses of the essential forms296 when these forms are updated in 
the future. Moreover, before these forms are actually amended, contractual 
parties could also be guided by the reforms to negotiate and adopt the 
suggestions in the thesis to modify these important clauses of the essential 
forms297 themselves when they establish the contract, if these forms are 
chosen as their time charterparty. Thus, the reforms might possibly better 
enable the essential forms298 to effectively exercise their guiding function and 
allow the contractual parties to better conclude their rights and obligations in 
                                                          
292 (n 1). 
293 It can be found, for instance, in (5) (H). 
294 For example, see (5) (H). 
295 (n 1). 
296 ibid. 
297 ibid. 
298 ibid. 
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the time charterparty. The reforms might likewise contribute to supplying 
some constructive ways, basis and directions for flexibly solving the 
problems in the rest of the clauses and reforming the clauses within these 
essential forms299 or direct reform in other standard forms of charterparty. 
 
Due to the limitations of research time and the word count of this thesis, it 
has only been possible to focus on the important legal issues within the 
significant clauses in the essential forms300 which shape the core 
characteristics of the time charter301 and then consider associated reforms. 
Future researchers who are interested in the field could base work around 
the principles and spirit of reforming the clauses under the essential forms302 
which have been provided in this thesis to examine the rest of the clauses in 
these essential forms303 and other standard forms of charterparty. Moreover, 
it is worth mentioning that when the NYPE 2014 form304 further evolves into 
its final and certain stages and there are enough authorities, future 
researchers interested in the new development of issues in the NYPE 2014 
form305 can also continue to explore this area in more depth. 
 
 
 
                                                          
299 ibid. 
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